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1
Having Your Beefcake, and Leaving Him Too (Oct. 2001)
Aphra Behn’s desire for intimacy and sex with an admiring 
(and admirable) young man is the foremost inspiration for her 
creating “The Disappointment” and Oroonoko. Claims that 
either work is primarily concerned with other things testifies 
largely to Behn’s success in misdirecting readers: a goal as 
vital to her own self-protection as is her success in 
misdirecting herself into thinking she is in fact writing about 
and attempting to satisfy something other than her own 
“suspect” desires. That her desire for sexual intimacy is so 
real and so pressing to be the reason why these works were 
written, as well as the key factor in determining how, exactly, 
Behn wrote them, will hopefully be demonstrated in this 
essay. That admitting this desire to herself is so dangerous a 
thing to do because sexual satisfaction is so suspect a desire 
for an older woman to admit, develop, and enjoy in 
eighteenth-century society—even if only through her own 
writings—so as to make this paper seem a work of scientific 
detection intent on uncovering her base nature, will be 
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demonstrated beginning with the uncovering of a lie, or a lie-
seeming misdirection, Behn tells us in “The 
Disappointment.” 
In “The Disappointment” Behn writes, “The nymph’s 
resentments none but I / Can well imagine or condole. But 
none can guess Lysander’s soul, / But those who swayed his 
destiny” (131-34). This, I believe, is authorial misdirection—
for it is precisely Behn who “sways” poor Lysander’s destiny: 
she is the writer, poor Lysander but her hapless prop. Behn is 
the “env[ying] god [who] conspires / To snatch his power, 
yet leave[s] him the desire!” (79-80). She knows what it is to 
lack “Nature’s support [. . .] / Itself now wants the art to live” 
(81-83). Like Lysander, she lacks “nature’s support”: though 
she desires consummated love, her age makes this ridiculous. 
It is therefore her own “bewitching influence” (139) that 
dooms Lysander “to the hell of impotence” (140). Why? 
Because she has discovered a stratagem for bringing sexual 
intimacy into her life without thereby inviting upon herself a 
“vast pleasure [. . .] which too much love destroys” (73-74): a 
“vast pleasure turned to pain” (73).
Lysander’s “destiny” is no accident: he must suffer so the 
nymph doesn’t have to. The nymph, described as 
“Abandoned by her pride and shame, / She does her softest 
joys dispense, / Offering her virgin innocence / A victim to 
love’s sacred flame” (65-68), is the same nymph who leaves 
Lysander “fainting on the gloomy bed” (120) with “No print 
upon the grassy road [. . .] / to instruct pursuing eyes” (124). 
The virgin whose innocence would have been lost, changing 
DRAINING THE AMAZON’S SWAMP
3
her nature forever, leaves the poetic world an eternal mythic 
Daphne, leaving the reader alone with Lysander, with his grief 
swelling into storms, with him cursing his birth, fate, and 
stars. He alone is left to experience shame. Yet despite the 
fact that his shame owes to his inability to consummate his 
lust, and despite the likelihood we leave the poem thinking its 
title well caught its gist, this testifies more to Behn’s art at 
misdirection than to an absence of ambiguity in the poem: for 
the verses we read of Cloris before and after his inability to 
perform are just as appropriate for usage if he actually had 
done the deed. Imagine if after finally “Offering her virgin 
innocence” (67), Lysander performed, wouldn’t having her 
return from a trance, explore and find a disarmed snake, be 
just as appropriate a development if he had discharged as it 
would be if he hadn’t? In both cases her lover would have 
been left with no spark for new desire: he would be more 
shepherd than general. Is it possible that Behn has imagined a 
way for a woman whose nature would be adversely changed 
by a sexual act (a virgin’s pure status, in this case) to in fact 
experience a sexual encounter, with both the reader and the 
writer prepared to convince themselves otherwise, and 
thereby avoid harsh self-recriminations and a public’s scorn? 
If the descriptions offered afford a close-enough facsimile to 
sex, and if this sexual encounter, if it had occurred, of the sort 
to have the reader and writer feel someone should probably 
be punished for it, then this punishment falls on only one of 
the two involved: Lysander. That is, neither the Nymph nor 
our narrator, Behn, is left anywhere in sight, with the nymph 
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“o’er the fatal plain,” and our narrator along with her, 
imagining her resentments, ostensibly quite incapable of 
“guess[ing] Lysander’s” (133) own. We know, however, that 
as much as Behn professes no other option than to focus on 
the nymph, her attendance mostly owes to a need to detach 
herself from—so as to not too closely identity herself with—
Lysander, for in Oroonoko we find Behn very well informed as 
to what happens to souls that rage desire with little hope for 
satisfaction.
My reader might be thinking that I want to link 
Lysander’s situation to that of the King of Coramantien in 
Oroonoko. I do—but as a way of working my way to a 
discussion of Onahal. The King, indeed, like Lysander, has a 
passion for a young beauty—in his case, Imoinda—that 
because of “nature,” the decrees of time, he is unable to 
consummate: like Lysander, he has been left embarrassingly 
impotent. When Oroonoko considers “laying violent hands 
on himself,” reason finally prevails when “[t]hey [i.e., his 
followers] urged all to him that might oppose his rage,” with 
“nothing weigh[ing] so greatly with him as the king’s old age, 
incapable of inuring him with Imoinda” (20). A reasonable 
Oroonoko begins to realize there may be a way to claim 
Imoinda after all; and the “plot to rescue a princess” 
introduces us to another antiquated would-be lover: Onahal, 
a “past mistress of the old king” (24).
With Onahal we have Behn offering for both her and 
our contemplation, a woman, who, like Behn at the time of 
writing Oroonoko, is subject to the “despites and decays of 
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time” (24). Being robbed by nature draws Onahal to react as 
Lysander did upon learning of how nature pilfered him: she 
does not spare her fury—she “treated the triumphing happy 
ones with all the severity, as to liberty and freedom, that was 
possible, in revenge of those honors they rob [her] off” (24). 
Like Lysander, Onahal has been left with desire; she hopes 
she might yet again be seen as desirable by youth of the very 
best quality. In reference to Aboan—just such a youth—we 
are told:
This young man was not only one of the best quality, 
but a man extremely well made and beautiful; and 
coming often to attend the king to the otan, he had 
subdued the heart of the antiquated Onahal, which 
had not forgot how pleasant it was to be in love. And 
though she had some decays in her face, she had none 
in her sense and wit; she was there agreeable still, 
even to Aboan’s youth, so that he took pleasure in 
entertaining her with discourses of love. (25)
Oroonoko and Aboan take advantage of Onahal’s self-
delusion to secure a re-union between Oroonoko and 
Imoinda. But at a cost: Aboan must “suffer [. . .] himself to 
be caressed in bed by Onahal” (28). Onahal might be 
unaware of her failure to charm Aboan, but those who would 
identify themselves with her, would live vicariously through 
her, understand that to a young lover her caresses are but to 
be suffered. The only way a young man and an older woman 
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can relate with one another where both can be imagined 
enjoying the experience, is through conversation. However, 
to a clever and imaginative writer, who might, like Onahal, 
still hope “she [could] make some impressions [on a young 
man’s] heart” (25), this is a discovery to be used in her own 
battle between her still enabled wit and whittling age.
Behn has learned—or perhaps rather, confirmed beyond 
any hopeful countenancing—two important things from her 
writings of Onahal and Aboan: first, as mentioned, that there 
is a way in which a young man could be imagined as being 
charmed by an older woman which allows for intimacy and 
reciprocal exchanges; second, that there is a fictional role—
namely, as a gatekeeper—based on real advantages of the 
aged, that can introduce and perhaps even necessitate the 
introduction of an older woman into a story purportedly all 
about young lovers. Onahal, as a past mistress, is a “guardian 
or governant [. . .] to the new and young ones [i.e., Imoinda]” 
(24). Aboan must “compl[y] [. . .] with her desires” (25). “For 
then, [. . .] her life lying at [his] [. . .] mercy, she must grant 
[him] [. . .] the request [he] make[s] in [. . .] [Oroonoko’s] 
behalf” (25). Oroonoko uses what he has at his disposal—a 
beautiful proxy in Aboan—to realize his desire to be with 
Imoinda, just as Behn uses the advantages she has as a 
writer—the ability to create the proxy Onahal—to explore 
the consequences of a sexual encounter between an older 
woman and a younger man, allowed the extenuation and 
stretch that imagination enables. What Behn learns from this 
exploration, combined with what she learned from “The 
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Disappointment,” will be put to use in the second part of 
Oroonoko, beginning with Oroonoko’s arrival in Surinam, 
where Behn, the writer, brings herself as close as possible to 
imagining herself “having subdued the finest of all the King’s 
subjects to her desires” (26-27).
In the second part of Oroonoko Behn does what Onahal 
wanted to do but could not manage for herself—namely, to 
subdue “the finest of all the King’s subjects to her desires,” 
without in “victory” actually becoming more the fool. She 
captures the attention and compliance of Oroonoko in the 
same way Onahal did with Aboan: by making clear that the 
means to what he wants (freedom in this case) lies with her. 
Much as Onahal and Aboan accomplished for one another, 
she engages Oroonoko in a reciprocal manner, where each 
soothes one another’s concerns. She sets the scene for a 
sexual encounter in much the same way she did with Onahal 
and Aboan as well, but handles the consummation in a 
fashion inspired, instead, by Cloris and Lysander—where, 
that is, overtly, no sex occurs, but where passions are aroused 
as if it had. Behn is, in her being unaffected by the encounter, 
therefore much like Cloris; and Oroonoko, with his 
immediately experiencing a change for the worse, more like 
Onahal and Lysander. I will expand on each of these 
machinations in turn.
Oroonoko calls Behn a “Great Mistress” (49), a title in 
nature akin to the labels—a past mistress, a guardian, a 
governant—attached to Onahal, a woman Oroonoko knew 
that “to [. . .] court [. . .] was the way to be great [. . .] [,] [for 
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her] being [of those] persons that do all affairs and business at 
court” (25). Behn understands she possesses a similar power 
over Oroonoko, saying, should he make her doubt him “[i]t 
would but give us a fear of him, and possibly compel us to 
treat him so as I should be very loath to behold: that is, it 
might occasion his confinement” (49). However, although 
Behn as a character does not do so, Behn as a writer makes the 
same claim upon Oroonoko that Onahal made upon Aboan: 
To acquire Imoinda, he must first service her own sexual 
needs. Between Behn’s first meeting of Oroonoko and her 
(i.e., Behn’s) completion of her sporting with him, Imoinda is 
but twice referred to in the text. The first reference to her 
within these time-posts is when Behn refers to her in third 
person, saying she entertained her “with teaching her all the 
pretty works that I was mistress of, and telling her stories of 
nuns, and endeavoring to bring her to the knowledge of the 
true God” (49). Behn, like Onahal, treats the young beauty 
with “all the severity, as to liberty and freedom, that was 
possible in revenge of those honors they rob them of” (24). 
In telling her stories of nuns, she temporarily renders 
Imoinda a celibate, denying her the sexuality owed a young 
nymph. The second reference occurs when Oroonoko 
explains to Behn he fears she might prevent them from 
returning to his kingdom. He is wise to suspect her, for Behn 
indeed “holds Imoinda hostage,” just as the envious 
governess Onahal did, releasing her only after she finishes her 
sports. (We are then told, in a clear after-thought, that despite 
her complete invisibility in the text Imoinda “was [also] a 
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sharer in all our adventures” [60].)
As a prelude to romance, Behn interacts with Oroonoko 
in the same socially acceptable way Onahal had before with 
Aboan—they converse. This allows for the same kind of 
back-and-forth involvement with one another, with each 
taking turns reassuring, tending to the other, we saw between 
Onahal and Aboan. Keep in mind when reading a description 
of this foreplay in Oroonoko, so to not misconstrue the true 
nature of the conversational exchanges between the “lovers” 
therein, the back-and-forth sequence of tension and easing of 
tension in the passage of overt foreplay between Cloris and 
Lysander in “The Disappointment”:
Her bright eyes sweet, and yet severe,
Where love and shame confusedly strive,
Fresh vigor to Lysander give;
And breathing faintly in his ear,
She cried, “Cease, cease your vain desire,
Or I’ll call out—what would you do?
My dearer honor even to you
I cannot, must not give—retire,
Or take this life, whose chiefest part
I gave you with the conquest of my heart. (21-30)
When Aboan (after “The whole affair being agreed upon 
between the prince” [26] and himself) engages with Onahal, 
she sighs, cries, and asks when he “will [. . .] be sensible of my 
passion” (26). She is fearful her eyes had already given her 
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away, and wonders if she possesses beauty-enough to sway 
him. Aboan calms her, assuring her that her beauty “can still 
conquer,” and of how “he longs for more certain proofs of 
love than speaking and sighing” (26). We are told she speaks 
again, but with a different tone (one as if “she hope it true, 
and could not forbear believing it” [26]), and offers him a gift 
of pearls—symbols of beauty that never wane—which 
prompt Aboan to reassure her he is interested in no other but 
her (charmed in part, he hopes to have convinced her, by her 
still extant physical beauty). She forces the pearls into his 
hands anyway, linking the gift to a setting for her later 
reception of him. All this naughtiness justifies why they take 
care “that no notice might be taken of their speaking 
together” (27), because “speaking together” is clearly just 
verbal cover for their overt flirting. This “speaking,” 
presumably, is pleasurable for both parties, for Behn makes 
clear that as Onahal has lost “none in her sense and wit,” 
Aboan would take “pleasure in entertaining her with 
discourses of love” (25).
Behn and Oroonoko share a similar interaction which 
also clears way for an intimate relationship to develop. But 
Behn, the writer, precedes it by first linking the two together, 
telling us that Oroonoko “was impatient to come down to 
Parham House [. . .] to give me an account of what had 
happened. I [i.e., Behn] was as impatient to make these lovers 
a visit” (47). That is, Behn cheats—they seem paired before 
they’ve even met. Again we are told “this new accident made 
him more impatient of liberty” (48), an upset they follow by 
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soothing each other. Behn entertains him and “charm[s] him 
to my company” (49). He admits “these conversations failed 
not altogether so well to divert him,” and that “he liked the 
company of us women much above men” (49). This is where 
we hear him call Behn a “Great Mistress,” of how her word 
goes “a great way with him” (49). Later he confesses he fears 
his behavior would provoke her into breaking her word to 
him. She tries to ease his anxiety, but errs in mentioning 
“confinement,” an error she “strove to soften again in vain” 
(49). But he assures her he would “act nothing upon the 
white people,” and that as for herself, “he would sooner 
forfeit his eternal liberty, and life itself, than lift his hand 
against his greatest enemy on that place” (49). After their 
mutual reassurances, Behn tells us he is again impatient, “full 
of a spirit all rough and fierce [. . .] that could not be tamed to 
lazy rest,” and that he is eager to exercise himself in [. . .] 
actions and sports” (50). They then part, meeting again to 
sport—but not before Behn has had a chance to tell us about 
her aromatic garden at St. John’s Hill.
Before comparing the similarity of this garden to the 
meeting place for Onahal’s and Aboan’s embrace, we should 
note that Behn and Oroonoko have a nervousness-allaying, 
sex-ensuring conversation similar to their own. Oroonoko, like 
Onahal, admits he suspects his over-eager behavior has 
ruined any chance of realizing his desires. Behn, like Aboan 
previously, is then offered a chance to reassure her partner. 
But Behn, in expressing her own fears, opens herself up to 
ruin, a concern Oroonoko can abate by assuring her he would 
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do her no harm. We are further told, as we had been before 
with Aboan, that they are impatient for activity beyond 
conversation. With Aboan: “those few minutes we have are 
forced to be snatched for more certain proof of love than 
speaking and sighing; and such I languish for” (26; emphasis 
added); and with Oroonoko: suddenly he is all-“impatient” 
for sports and vigorous activity. While “languish” is the 
adjective most overtly linked to sex in Oroonoko, we remember 
reading in “The Disappointment” of “One day the amorous 
Lysander, / By an impatient passion swayed” (1-2; emphasis 
added). We should note, too, the marked similarity between 
how Lysander concludes his wooing of Cloris and 
Oroonoko’s final reassurance to Behn. Lysander claims sex 
with, “Or take this life, whose chiefest part I gave you with 
the conquest of my heart” (29-30)—that is, with his offering 
up his life and his reference to his lover as a vigorous 
conqueror. Oroonoko finishes by offering to “forfeit” “life 
itself,” on behalf of an empowered defender. Full submission 
is offered, and a lover’s physical needs are supplanted in place 
of courtliness, concern, and shy retreat.
We know the activity Aboan will be up to is sex, and we 
know this about the setting for the initial setting for his re-
union with Onahal: it will occur at a “grove of the otan, 
which was all of oranges and citrons.” Oroonoko and Aboan 
are instructed to wait there, to be taken away to (the 
bedchambers of) Imoinda and Onahal respectively. Before 
Oroonoko and Behn engage in their sports, Behn tells us 
about her house on St. John’s Hill, which has a “grove of 
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orange and lemon trees” (52). Through successive paragraphs 
we are immersed within fragrant imagery; Behn is preparing 
for herself as she once prepared for Clovis, “ a lone thicket 
made for love” (21). We are told of an “eternal Spring” of 
“trees, bearing at once all degrees of leaves and fruit from 
blooming buds to ripe autumn, groves of oranges, lemons, 
citrons, figs nutmegs, and noble aromatics, continually 
bearing their fragrancies” (51). Of this grove we are told she 
is sure “the whole globe of the world cannot show so 
delightful a place as this grove was” (52). And once 
delineated, she is now herself anxious for action, telling us, 
“But to our sports” (52). Appropriate to a scene I believe 
sexual in nature, the sports have about them the feel of a racy 
bedroom encounter. Behn has moved from mention of an 
“eternal Spring” to speaking of “the hot countries” (57), from 
sexual priming to lustful satiation. With the climactic 
encounter between Onahal and Aboan, Behn spares us the 
details, so to speak, but it is better in any case for us to have 
“The Disappointment” in mind when experiencing Behn’s 
accounting of all her hot sporting action.
In “The Disappointment” Behn uses a telling metaphor 
when describing Lysander’s penis—it is a “snake” (110). But 
this is when she is writing in mock-pastoral mode, when he is 
a shepherd. It is perhaps, though, not too bold a conjecture 
that had the penis been featured when writing mock-epic it 
would have been referred to as a sword. Oroonoko, like 
Lysander, is a mighty warrior—he is Caesar!, and thus no 
shepherd. “[H]e took Mr. Martin’s sword [desiring] [. . .] him 
PATRICK MCEVOY-HALSTON
14
to stand aside, or follow the ladies,” and “he met this 
monstrous beast [i.e., a tiger they are hunting] of might, size 
and vast limbs, who came with open jaws upon him, and 
fixing his awful stern eyes full upon those of the beast, and 
putting himself into a very steady and good aiming posture of 
defense, ran his sword quite through his breast down to his 
very heart, home to the hilt of the sword” (53). Once he has 
slain the tiger, Behn rejoins him (she had previously run 
away), sees him “lug out the sword from the bosom of the 
tiger, who was laid in her blood on the ground” (53), and is 
surprised by his gifting of a tiger cub at her feet.
I believe this passage arouses us in much the same way 
as if we had just witnessed a sexual encounter between 
Oroonoko and Behn. As with Lysander, who was “Ready to 
taste a thousand joys” (71), Oroonoko “meets this monstrous 
beast” (53). As with Cloris, Behn is elsewhere. When Cloris 
returns from her trance, and when Behn returns after the kill, 
both witness an item similar in nature to a penis that has lost 
its potency, that has gone flaccid. Lysander’s penis is a 
“flower,” owing to his inability to bring “fleeting vigor back” 
(87); Oroonoko lugs his sword, suggesting—considering how 
previously his running the tiger on through to the hilt 
suggested the deep penetration of an erect penis—the labor 
in the withdrawal of a discharged one. The cute cub is akin to 
the mentioning of flowers after a sexual encounter: it suits the 
relaxed mood and play of consummated love. Further, if we 
take Oroonoko laying the cub at her feet as his presenting her 
with a gift, he mimics here Onahal’s gift of pearls to Aboan, 
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something we know was closely linked to an anticipated 
sexual encounter between them. In fact, to provide and 
receive gifts is the primary impetus behind further sports. He 
asks, “What trophies and garlands, ladies, will you make, if I 
bring you the heart of this ravenous beast?” (53-54). Behn 
tells us, “We all promised he should be rewarded at all our 
hands” (54). The hunting of tigers is explicitly linked here to 
rewards by women; and Behn, as the writer of “The 
Disappointment,” as having written, “All her unguarded 
beauties lie / The spoils and trophies of the enemy” (39-40), 
clearly shows an inclination to link trophies to sexual 
consummation.
If we are not convinced Behn thinks a sword a penis in 
this context, what of a snake, or a near-snake, that appears 
while they sport? There is a “numb eel” (55), an eel Behn had 
eaten. And if not the eel, what of fishing rods or flutes, which 
are also present? Or what about each and/or all in 
conjunction with the jungle natives, when they: 
By degrees [. . .] grew more bold, and from gazing 
upon us round, they touched us, laying their hands 
upon all the features of our faces, feeling our breasts 
and arms, taking up one petticoat, then wondering to 
see another, admiring our shoes and stockings, but 
more our garters, which we gave them, and they tied 
about their legs [.] [. . .] In fine, we suffered them to 
survey us as they pleased, and we thought they would 
never have done admiring us. (57)
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Or in conjunction with how similar these natives’ 
“surveying” seems to how Behn described Lysander’s lustful 
advancement upon Cloris? Lysander didn’t “[b]y degrees [. . .] 
grow more bold,” but he did “without respect or fear [. . .] 
seek the object of his vows” (41-42), which is not as 
incremental but toward the same end. Lysander didn’t “touch 
[her] [. . .], laying [his] hands upon all the features of [her] 
face, feeling our breasts and arms,” but he did “Kiss her 
mouth” (34), “press / Upon her swelling snowy breast” (37), 
and “By swift degrees advance where / his daring hand that 
altar seized” (44-45), which amounts to much the same, if 
more artfully guided. Lysander didn’t take advantage of an 
“offer” “to survey as [he] pleased,” nor can we be sure he 
“never stopped admiring” her, but he did try to take full 
advantage of Cloris being “Abandoned by her pride and 
shame / [so] She does her softest joys dispense / Offering 
her virgin innocence” (67), which is no less the enthused 
partaking of pleasures before him. And it is actually possible 
that to Behn—the writer—Lysander would in some sense 
actually have been there if Oroonoko hadn’t been. But 
despite all to the contrary—he was.
Just as Behn was absent from Oronooko’s encounter 
with a predator, Oroonoko is absent from the one present 
here, and we should consider these absences equivalent and 
suggestive—as implicating. Behn uses a technique here she 
develops in “The Disappointment” where a sexual 
encounter/experience is communicated but where no such 
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thing is overtly shown to take place. Both Oroonoko and Behn 
have sexual and intense encounters where, in each case, one 
of them is absent from the scene. Yet once consummation 
occurs—with the lugging out of the sword, with the natives 
finishing their surveying—the absent partner suddenly 
reappears. There is a sense, though, that the ostensibly absent 
partner was actually present throughout. That is, assuming we 
accept Onahal as a version of Behn, a proxy in the nature and 
intensity of her desires, can we hear of a ravenous beast that 
fixes “her long nails in his flesh” and not think of predatory 
Onahal, who “took her dear Aboan [. . .] where he suffered 
himself to be caressed in bed” (28)? And can we encounter 
the natives and not also have in mind the princely but still 
native Oroonoko, a link we first make but start setting when 
subsequently told of how as “[G]eneral” Caesar he “had in 
mind to see and talk with their war captains,” of how, though 
he considered their “courage too brutal to be applauded,” he 
still “expressed his esteem of them” (59), and when we come 
to know all of them not just as warriors but as trophy 
hunters?
Just as Imoinda was available to Oroonoko once Onahal 
had “tasted a thousand joys” from Aboan, with the sporting 
now complete, the pair is reunited: evidence, I think, toward 
understanding the reading experience of the sports as 
satisfying anyone who could identify with Onahal’s need to 
believe herself still “of beauty enough engaging [. . .] to be 
desirable,” who hopes she “can have [young] lovers still” (26), 
and who would similarly be inclined to first take advantage of 
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the young before granting them access to their own joys. I 
believe this Behn’s desire as much as it is Onahal’s, but 
because Onahal’s desire, once realized, leads to a shameful 
situation where her audience understands her physical charms 
were in fact non-existing, that they had actually had no effect 
other than to amuse or—more likely—horrify, that her 
rapture in sex was for him simply a suffering, even with 
Behn’s better disguised affair (so that “no notice might be 
taken” [27]), some shame would come from having contrived 
it. Fortunately for Behn she has learned this shame can be 
dispersed through the same art that brought it into existence 
in the first place. Through her plotting, that is, she can arrange 
for all the consequences arising from shameful behavior to 
fall on but one of the two actually involved.
After Cloris flees him, Lysander’s “silent griefs swell up 
to storms, / And not one god his fury spares; / He cursed his 
birth, his fate, his stars” (147). Shortly after the sports, 
Oroonoko’s griefs also swell up to storms, as he exempts 
little of their daily life from his curses: 
Caesar [Oroonoko] [. . .] made a harangue to them of 
the miseries and ignominies of slavery; counting up all 
their toils and sufferings, under such loads, burdens, 
and drudgeries as were fitter for beasts than men, 
senseless brutes than human souls. He told them it 
was not for days, months, or years, but for eternity; 
there was no end to be of their misfortunes. They 
suffered not like men who might find a glory and 
DRAINING THE AMAZON’S SWAMP
19
fortitude in oppression, but like dogs that loved the 
whip and bell, and fawned the more they were beaten. 
That they had lost the divine quality of men, and were 
become insensible asses, fit only to bear, Nay worse, 
an ass, or dog, or horse having done his duty, could 
lie down in retreat, and rise to work again, and while 
he did his duty endured no stripes; but men, 
villainous, senseless men such as they, toiled on all the 
tedious week till black Friday, and then, whether they 
worked or not, whether they were faulty or meriting, 
they promiscuously, the innocent with the guilty, 
suffered the infamous whip, the sorded stripes, from 
their fellow slaves till their blood trickled from all 
parts of their body, blood whose every drop ought to 
be revenged with a life of some of those tyrants that 
impose it. “And why,” said he, “my dear friends and 
fellow sufferers, should we be slaves to an unknown 
people? Have they vanquished us nobly in fight? 
Have they won us in honorable battle? And are we, by 
the chance of war, become their slaves? This would 
not anger a noble heart, this would not animate a 
soldier’s soul. No, but we are bought and sold like 
apes, or monkeys, to be the sport of women, fools, 
and cowards, and the support of rogues, runagades, 
that have abandoned their own countries, for raping, 
murders, thefts, and villainies. Do you not hear every 
day how they upbraid each other with infamy of life 
below the wildest salvages, and shall we render 
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obedience to such a degenerate race, who have no 
one human virtue left to distinguish them from the 
vilest creatures? Will you, I say, suffer the lash from 
such hands? (61-62)
As with Lysander, who, after cursing his birth, his fate, 
and the stars, finishes by cursing the “soft bewitching 
influence” of a woman (149), Oroonoko concludes his own 
diatribe by saying: “But if there were a woman among them 
so degenerate from love and virtue to chose slavery before 
the pursuit of her husband, and with the hazard of her life to 
share with him in his fortunes, that such a one ought to be 
abandoned, and left as a prey to the common enemy” (63). 
Quite a change in Oroonoko here from the one who asked of 
Behn, “What trophies and garlands, ladies, will you make me, 
if I bring you home the heart of this ravenous beast” (53-54), 
and who “made it his business to search out and provide for 
our entertainment” (59). But the effect of reading this very 
lengthy, this very aggressive diatribe is to have the sports 
which immediately preceded it become of much less interest, 
as a man savagely battles against a world pit against him. And 
so, too, the understanding of Behn and Oroonoko as a 
couple.
Oroonoko is made into a “monster of the wood” (72) 
just after Behn begins to manifest herself in the text more as 
the writer of Oroonoko than as a character within it, a writer 
who increasingly associates herself with qualities notably 
different from transmogrified Oroonoko’s: “We met on the 
DRAINING THE AMAZON’S SWAMP
21
river with Colonel Martin, a man of great gallantry, wit, and 
goodness, and, whom I have celebrated in a character of my 
new comedy, by his own name, in memory of so brave a man. 
He was wise and eloquent” (68). Meanwhile, Oroonoko exists 
a world apart: “his grief swelled up to rage; he tore, he raved, 
he roared, like some monster of the wood” (72). Behn 
actually distances herself from him in several ways. First, she 
attempts to convince us that the sporting was of no particular 
import; she describes it ostensibly because it was her near 
duty to record all instances of his activity she partook in or 
had been aware of—but right due for a noble personage. 
Then from a chronicler whose relationship with her subject 
implies a respectable distance between them, she becomes a 
writer of comedies, making Oroonoko but one subject of 
interest of a varied many. Second, as Behn distances herself 
further and further from Oroonoko—forward to her writing of 
him in the present rather than the past, and away 
geographically to England—Oroonoko, despite his rage and 
capacity for effective action, is doomed to be trapped and 
killed on remote southern Surinam. Third, and as we have 
seen, Oroonoko becomes of a kind that it no longer seems 
likely that Behn actually could well “guess [the nature of] his 
soul” (134).
Why, one might well ask, is all this connivance necessary, 
since the Behn that is a character in the novel is a much, 
much younger Behn than the one writing it, was in fact of an 
age and status where it might seem not so inappropriate if, 
while still being primarily fixed upon Imoinda, always 
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devoted to her, Oroonoko acknowledged some interest in 
casual flirtations with a genteel hostess? An obvious 
explanation would lie in her having chosen to account for the 
rise and fall of a near singularly great and noble prince, and 
such rarities were understood to act only in very specific 
ways, to hold to a tight script, as it were, involving much 
more lordly forbearance than courtly sweets. Possibly—but I 
don’t buy it. Instead, the masking owes to the character Behn 
being, in a very real sense, the very same age as the writer 
Behn while writing/experiencing Oroonoko so to help 
intensify, make more real, the feeling that the sports are 
happening to the writer during the here and now of the time 
of writing rather than some time before in the less stark long 
ago. Note that Behn plays the role of a great governess, a role 
we have been instructed to associate with the aged, not the 
youthful. Note that Behn primarily emphasizes, draws 
attention to, her skill in conversation—a skill, along with wit, 
we have been told so prominent in the aged that it can 
substitute for such charms no longer available. And note 
most especially that the setting for the sporting is a near 
mirror-image the one imagined for the aged Onahal, when 
Oroonoko and Aboan paid her call in their excited sport to 
rescue a princess.
Some readers might object to the claim that Oroonoko’s 
fate was largely determined by the current 
psychological/sexual needs of the author, since his fate—or 
at least, his execution—is a match for that suffered upon 
Charles I, but I would argue for understanding this objection 
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as but a consequence of successful authorial misdirection. 
Behn needs for both herself and her readers to think the 
novel primarily a faithful, pious, recording of a great man’s 
life. Why? Because she must disarm herself (and us, her 
imagined and real readers and critics) of her considerable 
poetic awareness while reading the piece. Incurring upon 
herself and her readers the upright, serious, intolerant reading 
posture—this containment—is crucial, because if we turn to 
the work alert to poetic technique and contemplative of 
courtier’ motive, the real intentions for writing the piece 
become more open to view—and to critique.
Through Onahal, Behn has shown us there exists in her 
time a notable distinction and a loaded difference between 
speaking/writing and real action. Harold Weber writes that 
“speaking and thinking venery [sexual desires] define the 
limits of a woman’s sexual prerogatives: to indulge those 
thoughts, to turn speech into action, confronts female 
characters [. . .] with the vast gulf between the maid or wife 
and the whore” (The Restoration Rake-Hero 133). Yet women 
are in a bind because “[e]ven though libertine attitudes 
depended on assumptions that would seem to promise 
acceptance of female sexuality, women remained unable to 
enjoy the sexual liberties taken for granted by men. Women 
after the Restoration, even among the most debauched 
section of the population, occupy a world of strict sexual 
limitations” (148). There was a “severe morality directed 
against women when what all knew to go on in private 
suddenly became public [. . .] [:] all the prudery of the Court 
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was let loose [. . .] [,] vociferous in demanding justice” (148). 
Yet we cannot understand the distinction between writing 
about sexual desires and acting upon them, whatever the 
importance in the distinction, as being well articulated or 
understood at this time. Owing to her being a successful 
playwright, Behn was well aware that writing for a public 
amounted to indecent self-exposure to the world. There was 
great risk, as Weber explains: 
Yet the public ridicule she suffered reveals the very 
high price she had to pay for her success. [. . .] In 
attempting to move outside of the restricted roles 
ordinarily occupied by women, Behn became a 
convenient target for those who refused to accept the 
participation of women in the larger social world: To 
publish one’s work, then, was to make oneself 
‘public’: to expose oneself to ‘the world.’ Women who 
did so violated their feminine modesty both by 
egressing from the private sphere which was their 
proper domain and by permitting foreign eyes access 
to what ought to remain hidden and anonymous. 
(151)
Weber tells us that Behn simply refused to remain 
anonymous, and reminds us that “in doing so [. . .] she placed 
herself in a position where both her morality and her 
femininity could be questioned” (151). So we have a situation 
where women possess circumscribed possibilities for 
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acceptable sexual gratification, in a libertine world where 
sexual desires constitute the context in which everyone 
participates and can be expected to be judged within: Is it not 
then appropriate to assume that in the one area where sexual 
desire might be expressed—in writing—that these written 
words become so inflated to trespass beyond the vicarious 
and actually become lived experience? And if any slip from 
privately kept to public evidencing of the desire should be 
expected to be eagerly used to fuel the popular courtier sport 
of reducing a lady to a whore, is it not likely that Behn would 
need to disguise from her readers, from herself, the satisfaction 
of her sexual desires through her writing? The best way to 
dissuade both herself and her readers from considering other 
possible but less legitimate purposes for the novel is to bring 
into the story an execution that couldn’t help but remind 
contemporaries of Charles I’s own. She presents us, she 
presents herself, with quite the challenge: You couldn’t 
possibly be thinking sex, anything at all lurid, while I 
document my umbrage at the execution of our past king, 
could you? However we would answer, we might at least to 
some extent back off and disarm ourselves of the conceptual 
tools necessary for an alert poetic reading of her work, so that 
we are not in some way culpable of disregard for hierarchy 
and right-place, prove ourselves in sympathy with evident 
barbarians. She wants pious readers, not wits, poetically 
informed and ready-primed to note the methods of their 
kind.
But if we are ready to spot contrivance, we must 
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acknowledge that the structuring of Oroonoko is similar to that 
of “The Disappointment.” Specifically, that the number of 
words compared as a proportion to the whole of the work 
chronicling Oroonoko’s fate after the sports, is not dissimilar 
to the number of lines detailing Lysander’s fate after Cloris 
departs him in “The Disappointment.” I believe this to be 
space to ensure a comfortable, an assured, distancing of the 
narrator from her male protagonist. This distancing, required 
so we do not associate the passions aroused in Oroonoko with 
the writer of the work in “The Disappointment,” is not as 
crucial for Behn in that work because the passions at work 
there are explored using familiar mock-epic and mock-
pastoral imagery, which naturally work to help keep the writer 
in mind as a wit, as a removed observer of the scene; but it is 
crucial in Oroonoko, where to close the distance between herself 
and her fictional lover she tells us over and over again that 
what she writes is a true account of all that happened. By 
telling us immediately after the sports that she is offering a 
chronicle of real happenings, she helps substantiate them as 
such: she is reminding herself that she is describing the 
sports, not simply narrating them. The distinction she would 
have understood between description and narration is crucial 
to understand here, because therein lies an explanation as to 
why Behn chose to write a chronicle of Oroonoko rather than a 
more overtly fictional Oroonoko.
According to Howard Marchitello, “[d]escription [. . .] 
resists the appropriative nature of possession that comes to 
characterize narrationality in which the other always exists 
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secondarily—after the fact, as it were, of the narrator’s own 
primary and privileged existence” (94; emphasis added). By 
telling herself she is offering a faithful record and description 
of events, in the sense Marchitello describes, Behn manages 
them so they seem exterior to herself, so they accumulate and 
become more something of the real world than simply of her 
own making. Her veiled sexual exchange with Oroonoko 
becomes, not passions created through her imagination, a 
product of her own mind, her own writing, but passions 
generated in her as the consequence of actions of someone else 
towards her. Behn, in writing in a way which comes close to 
crossing the private/public divide, with all of its associated 
perilous consequences, is precariously involved in the 
passions of this text in a way she is not in “The 
Disappointment.” It is because the passions are made to feel so 
real that Oroonoko must, like Lysander, experience all sorts 
of compromising emotional states, making him a monster: 
Because Oroonoko is elevated to a status where he is more 
than a narrative construct, is more than words, is more nearly 
real, Behn is able to, and does, dump the equally real agitating 
emotions she experiences in creating and immersing herself in 
a near sexual encounter into him. Thereby, the terrible change 
of status normally due a woman who compromises her 
virtues is—as was true with Cloris—entirely left for her male 
partner to experience: a brutal but effective solution.
More attending to poetics, we would note in Oroonoko 
the doubleness of the sequence involving the rescue of a 
princess in Coramantien and the sporting sequence in 
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Surinam. We would then understand the sequence in 
Coramantien, precisely because it leads to the re-union of 
Oroonoko and Imoinda, as no mere diversion but rather as 
the climax of the first part of Oroonoko: the part arousing the 
highest degree of interest owing to it satisfying a desire we 
had been bated into anticipating since the beginning of the 
work. Together, both of these scenes form the center of the 
work, with everything else either leading up to and away from 
them, a chiasmus (AB / BA) where “A” is Oroonoko distant 
from Behn; the movement from “A” to “B” a closing of this 
distance in the first half (“’tis fit I tell you the manner of 
bringing them to these new colonies” [9]); with “B” 
Oroonoko united to a representative of the writer—Onahal 
in part one, and Behn in part two; and “B” to “A” the plot of 
the second half of the work, the movement from Oroonoko 
and Behn as a couple to him once again removed and remote 
from her.
This is why criticism of Oroonoko that focuses on 
anything other than Behn’s use of the text to satisfy her own 
sexual desires, testifies so well to Behn’s skill as a writer. Her 
expertise in poetics is such she can subdue what ought really 
to command our attendance: the structuring of the scenes 
and the words we would attend to less narrowly if we thought 
of the work as a contrivance, as not so much a work of sober 
accounting as an act of play and mischief. In “The 
Disappointment” Behn shows that words like “snake” are to 
be primarily understood as metaphors for penis, and words 
like “trophy,” metaphors or similes for sexual satisfaction, yet 
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as I have shown the sporting sequence is full of penis-
seeming objects, contains several references to trophies, and 
she still claims (surprisingly convincingly, considering how 
many critics consider the sequence odd for a reason Behn 
would hardly object to—namely, for it amounting to a 
unnecessary intrusion in a work mostly concerned with 
greater things) the sequence testifies to Oroonoko’s 
character!” (69).
Some critics have pointed out how Behn creates 
protagonists that are flawed so that they are primed for 
other’s exploitment. Robert Chibka, for one, writes that 
Oroonoko is made to be “the perfect fool for the knaves who 
surround him” (“Oh! Do Not Fear a Woman’s Invention” 
515), which he believes Oroonoko’s tragic flaw. But Chibka 
does not implicate Behn, the writer, as akin in mischief intent 
these untrustworthy knaves, even though she, being the one 
inclined to make him into a “perfect fool” in the first place, 
was certainly empowered to make use of him herself. But 
according to Chibka, if she is using him in any way at his 
expense, it is only to better please and serve her audience, 
which still leaves her actually mostly self-denying: 
“disdain[ing] the arrangement of a narrative ‘at the Poet’s 
pleasure,’ [. . .] [Behn] admits to editing and arranging her 
story so that what was ‘pleasant to us’ need not ‘prove tedious 
and heavy to [her] [. . .] Reader’”; “Pleasure (the reader’s not 
the poet’s) will indeed dictate the management of her story” 
(514). Chibka is no fool; he for example recognizes that “[a]t 
times Oroonoko seems to resemble the Surinamese numb eel, 
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making critics on contact lose their feel for narrative texture” 
(511). But he is yet still naïve enough to not ask if Oroonoko 
is made to seem so susceptible to other’s use, not just to suit 
knaves’ alteriors or audience’ expectations but to better serve 
and satisfy the depriver herself—Behn.
In her Aphra Behn’s Afterlife, Jane Spencer implicates the 
writer Behn in a way Chibka fails to. She believes Behn uses 
Imoinda as a proxy, but shares Chibka’s understanding of 
Behn as virtuous. She writes: “Imoinda here is a fantasy 
substitute for the heroic action the narrator cannot take. The 
split between the two women expresses anxieties about 
narrative position: to take on a narrator’s authority, it seems, 
is also to accept a position on the fringes of the action, unable 
to intervene” (232). In suggesting that the writing of the text 
was so vivid and powerful for Behn that she would want to 
be in on the sports, Spenser’s argument is similar to mine, but 
in suggesting that Behn’s position on “the fringes of action” 
was somehow forced on her, and by arguing that Behn has 
well-meaning intentions for Oroonoko at this point of the 
text, also so very different. I will quote from Spencer once 
again as I believe the following passage offers the most 
familiar and most preferred conception of Oroonoko and 
Behn for contemporary critics:
Behn’s Oroonoko, then, is a troubled and opaque text, 
full of anxious claims and obscure quarrels. It is not a 
clear attack on the institution and practices of slavery, 
but the sympathetic treatment of Oroonoko and 
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Imoinda, the descriptions of white cruelty, and even 
the narrator’s very inconsistencies and divided 
position, have the effect of presenting a disturbing 
picture of colonial life, and provide the germ for the 
later, abolitionist development of Oroonoko’s story. 
(232)
Spencer does note that, beginning especially with “the 
1696 ‘Memoirs’ of Behn, whether composed, compiled, or 
merely commissioned by [her friend Charles] Gildon” (34), 
eighteenth-century readers were drawn “to the titillating idea 
of a sexual relationship between Oroonoko and [Behn]” (35). 
Spencer says that it was through a repetition of rumors and 
denials “that eighteenth-century readers approached 
Oroonoko alerted to the idea of intimacy between the writer 
and a hero who was understood to be authentic” (35). I am 
arguing that we should be alert for the same—and as well to 
the poetic toolkit for writing of sexual passion she had 
created for herself by the time of her writing of Oroonoko. I 
have argued that Behn herself would have been pleased by 
the reaction of contemporary critics to her writings because 
they have largely exonerated her of any wrongdoing, choosing 
instead to focus their hostility on other targets. Like Behn, 
who dumped disturbing passions into Lysander and 
Oroonoko so to find herself prettily emptied of them herself, 
critics have targeted men /patriarchy and left us with a near 
pristine Behn. Thereby, Behn has achieved the wished-for 
effect upon us she could not hope to have procured in her 
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contemporaries. Still, even amongst her own contemporaries, 
Behn could be heralded as one who “did at once a Masculine 
wit express / And all the softness of a Femal tenderness” 
(266). She could be compared to Eve, who, although 
associated with the fall, was also “[their] first mother” (266). 
Spencer tells us that the “idea of [Behn] as a female champion 
for other women to emulate proved a potent one in the 
following decade [after her death],” even though present too 
were early anticipations of the “worries of many later women 
writers [her failure in virtue]” (31).
Spenser, like so many critics, believes that emerging 
understandings of Behn as primarily a writer of sexual 
fantasies is necessarily linked to a disparaging culture-wide re-
evaluation of women. Spencer writes how a “link made 
between [. . .] Behn and Milton’s Eve illuminates the 
formation and masculinization of the English literary canon 
during the eighteenth century. It is only one example of the 
recurrent definition of her in terms of the sinful and sexual 
body as opposed to the heaven-seeking and spiritual mind of 
the male genius” (267). Milton is conceived in a way Behn 
wished she could be: “His choice of heavenly subject made 
the poet himself appear a spiritual figure, rising heavenwards” 
(267). Behn, by contrast, with “her familiar, wordly-wise 
poetic persona and fictional narrator, her discussion of sex, 
political intrigue, and other mundane matters, and her choice 
of comedy and irony” (267), could hardly be more opposite. 
Behn, and female poets in general, began to be conceived in 
such a way that “made so much more of her [and their] 
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femininity and sexuality than of her creativity” (268). There 
arose the growth of a “myth about Behn, which both drew 
on received notions of the relationship between a female 
writer and her work, and set the tone for the reception of 
later women writers. The myth is that Behn’s writing reflects 
a life pre-eminently concerned with sexual love” (20).
And Spencer tells us that “[t]o discuss an author’s life in 
this way—as the story of her writing career—always risks 
leaving the impression that this is the way she herself thought 
about it” (21), something, as I have shown, she attempts to 
exonerate Behn from. I am well aware that an estimation of 
Behn as a female poet of over-flowing passions can be used 
to sustain social-sphere divisions by sex, of calcified 
suppression and cruelty, and I think it very likely that a good 
portion of the eighteenth-century interpretation of Behn’s 
works as just imaginative dalliances between a writer and her 
fantasy lovers, was moved, not in any way to fairly assess her 
but simply to mudden her. But, still—this is what she was up 
to. It would have been much more accurate and fair an 
assessment had it showed more appreciation for the 
intelligence, creativity, and bravado required to create a space 
wherein an author could plausibly be imagined enjoying 
sexual pleasures with her literary creations, but to my mind it 
is still a vastly more accurate reading of her work than ones 
which have Behn spinning lively tales—but principally for 
sober intent. The real problem for us moderns is our 
difficulty in understanding that this need not be a put-down. 
It can and should be understood as a tribute, a call for her 
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revival as a writer to be celebrated, especially for her not being 
in the mold of the eighteenth-century man of reason. How 
immensely dull this conception was! To my mind, to have 
denigrated passions, have them principally embodied in 
women, denied men greater acquaintance with the kinds of 
feelings and passions that make life most worth living. Behn 
lived at a time where the sexual appetite wasn’t “for mature 
audiences only,” always something of a no-no, that is, but 
where women still faced being seen as whores if caught 
indiscreetly acting upon their sexual desires. Further, a 
younger woman was the only appropriate target for sexual 
amours: the desires in older women were to be suffered, were 
fit only for ridicule. For Behn to create a simulacrum, an 
artificial world in a historical account/novel that allowed for 
satisfaction of this desire, is a remarkable accomplishment to 
be celebrated. And as for the idea that what women require 
most is full recognition of their unlimited intellectual capacities, 
I have two responses: first, the millennium (plus) long 
“elevation of the cognitive over the emotional aspect of our 
mind” (Greenspan 2) which has so profoundly influenced 
Western thought, needs to be exorcised so to stop its 
haunting of our present; second, if we create or need such a 
world, you can be sure that I for one will start turning to 
romance to find myself living in a more humanly satisfying 
world. And to those who would frown upon me, not share 
with me my departure, risk inuring themselves to my fate: I’m 
with Amazon princesses in a grove of ripening citrus—and 
you? Yes, the bitter, in the form of anacondas, has arrived, 
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but I’ve learned clever means are at hand to make them 
actually add to all our fun. 
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The Search for a Way of Being (Nov. 2001)
Ridley Scott has recently told us that Decker, from Blade 
Runner, is in fact a replicant. There are several reasons why I 
think this a disservice to fans of the film. My primary concern 
is that it substantiates takings of it that focus primarily on the 
characters at the expense of, as a cover for, explorations of 
our own responses to Scott’s ominous city-world and its 
subjected denizens. The choice to create a city-world so 
reminiscent of our own today was certainly not an arbitrary 
one. We have been offered a cold simulacrum—a replication—
of our own cities, designed, surely, to bring to conscious 
awareness likely feelings of ambivalence many of us have 
towards them. I believe the reason we are interested in 
Decker (a response so natural to us that the camera’s interest 
in him mimics our own: it becomes our own viewing eye) is 
that his movement, his explorations, seem like they might 
tend to our ambivalence. This is why we follow him, and why 
we pay close attention to what he (also Gaff—but Decker in 
particular) attends to. This search for our own identity, for a 
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right way of being in this simulacrum of our own city-world, 
is well captured in this sequence through camera placement, 
camera movement (or lack there-of), and the mise-en-scene.
Certainly not all sequences in the film are well suited for 
self-reflection—there are ample sequences that are either 
tense (and thus encourage us to self-protect rather than 
explore) or exciting (where we mimic the mindset of the 
chaser or the chased)—but this one actually is. The opening 
shot helps us feel composed and relaxed—tranquil. Camera 
placement, lack of camera movement, and the particular 
nature of the mise-en-scene in this shot produce this effect. 
We are offered a level, extreme long-view shot of the 
environs, where we float above most of the city. The scene is 
near picturesque, with its mostly still field of black space, 
wherein we encounter a protagonist to key in on at a quieting 
remove from all other objects. The movement in the mise-en-
scene is the predictable, slow, curving of the flying car as it 
moves away from us. Knowing the camera eye not fixed to 
the potentially unnerving proximity of the close-up, and 
knowing the action to be something we pursue (i.e., we are 
closing in on the car), the next shot—a following shot with 
low-angle framing, situated at a building across the street, 
several levels above street level but much closer to it than we 
were to the car—seems guided by our own interest. The 
probing, inquisitive camera “eye” has become, for all intents 
and purposes, our own, and will remain so through the rest of 
the sequence.
After the second shot, where we look down on Decker 
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and Gaff via high-angle framing, we cut to a shot where our 
interest is drawn upwards, via a low-angle framing shot, to a 
sign flashing YUKON on top of the building nearest them. It 
is almost as if we are presenting ourselves with a choice, the 
same choice we had in the first shot of the sequence: Should 
we direct our interest to the flashing neon-sign and the 
message it cannot help but present us with, or do we continue 
to attend to Decker and Gaff? The camera looks back to 
Decker and Gaff (switches to the previous high-angle frame), 
and follows its present course—anticipating their destination, 
it reappears in the replicant’s apartment—and here it surely 
reflects our own decision when confronted with a choice 
away from a giant flashing Coca-Cola sign that announces 
DRINK(!) while referring but to a simple beverage, and a 
YUKON sign so bespeaking of the artificial we have to fight 
to keep our known sense of the Yukon unadulterated upon 
sight of it. Surely what will interest us most will be something 
we must search for and find, not something openly presented 
to us within the city’s invasive skin.
With the next shot we are inside the replicant’s 
apartment, looking at Decker and Gaff from the apartment’s 
perimeter. We know the bright neon lights we briefly 
attended to failed to present us with “answers”—mightn’t 
Decker or Gaff come upon something more satisfying? We 
focus on the two, via a long shot that lasts until both Decker 
and Gaff have entered the apartment, as if considering for a 
brief moment our preferred candidate. We choose Decker, 
who in his movement across the room mimics the familiar, 
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accustomed movement of the car in the opening shot. 
Obvious choice, really, for Gaff presents us, with his city-
immigrant racial flavor and his Old South, bow-tied, country-
gentleman attire, the same feeling of uncertainty, of 
incongruence—like we are all subjects to be played with—we 
felt upon sight of the YUKON sign. Moreover, Gaff in his 
stillness, with his dandyish attire and muted expressions, 
seems imperturbable, quite ready to mock anyone’s 
inconveniently experienced emotions—including, we intuit, 
our own, if they should ever somehow come into play. 
Though we will cut back to him while Decker is in the 
bathroom, Gaff, no doubt, is our second choice.
We do not exactly follow Decker—that is, we do not trail 
behind him, looking over his shoulder. Instead, seeing in the 
previous shot that he was heading into a chamber (a 
bathroom), anticipating his destination, we cut to a shot 
where we are inside the chamber, looking at him from the 
same vantage point we assumed in the previous shot. 
However, we will follow him, the camera will come to situate 
itself just over his shoulder, as he spots and finds something 
that captures his interest. The movement reflects our 
eagerness: What has he found? Is it fit for our consideration, 
too? We, the camera, now cut to an extreme close-up of his 
hand cusping a scale he has placed in a small plastic bag. The 
scale, in conjunction with the hand that holds it, are key 
components of the mise-en-scene: one of three groupings we 
will be presented with in this sequence through the 
explorations (with Decker) or manipulations (by Gaff) of two 
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people who, through their actions and their interests, are 
showing us how they themselves exist within this world. This 
is our own keenest interest—how to involve ourselves in this 
world?, what to make of this world?; and we show this in our 
switch to extreme close-ups when we spot objects like the 
scale that may afford more self-understanding than could 
possibly come from commandant neon signs.
The scale, though, in the same way as the Blade Runner 
city-world is and is not a city of our own experience, is and is 
not “us,” is a jostling reaquaintance with part of our own 
selves. Though neither we nor Decker have scales, 
bathrooms, via the tub, sink, or toilet, have traces of our body 
surface that are as disturbing to our sense of what it means to 
be human as are the skins of our cities, and involve us in 
uncomfortable self-questioning. Is the body just enfleshment? 
Mightn’t it be (or somehow come to be) beyond simply 
necessary, itself possess, rather than just carry, essence, 
anima—soul? This a consideration we are more likely to 
make in regards to humans than with replicants, not because 
they are obviously all function down to their densely wired 
core, but because our souls have winnowed to the point 
where the most banal, brutal, dispensable—dead—aspects of 
our bodies seem to occasion the truest account of who we 
now are.
Troubling… so we switch to Gaff, who, for a moment at 
least, actually seems the more appealing of the pair. We cut to 
an extreme close-up of his hand putting down something he 
was making—an origami stickman—on a table. Momentarily, 
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this feels reassuring. He is not finding anything; rather, he is 
exerting himself, making a comment on, we think, the current 
behavior of Decker. Gaff, through this simple, confident 
action, provides visual evidence that one can avoid being self-
implicated, adversely affected by one’s actions, if one places 
oneself along the perimeter, making comments about 
someone more directly involved and exposed. Gaff might be 
making an honest appraisal of Decker, but not one likely 
shorn of irony or irreverence (we notice the stickman’s 
erection). This brings to mind a dissonance-incurring 
question: If like Gaff we are mostly uninvolved, for the most 
part extragenous to a world we count ourselves still part of, 
to what extent can we fairly be said to be living our lives—to 
what extent, even, are we alive? Unlike us, Gaff has a hand, 
and what a hand represents—an embodied existence in the 
film world. But through the action of his hand we understand 
he really exists more like a removed, disembodied eye—that 
is, like us—than one enfleshed. Thus reminded of a way of 
being similar to our own which was unsubstantial, 
unsatisfying enough to motivate our search for a more 
satisfying way of being in the first place, we choose to once 
again follow Decker, hoping he might find us something just 
as interesting but more satisfying to contemplate.
We are not disappointed. Decker’s subsequent 
exploration leads to an object which, though it will likely 
bring to Decker’s mind questions pertaining to his own 
identity (notably, is he a replicant?), suggests for us and 
potentially for him a way of being through a choice of what 
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and what not to value which makes these questions, if not 
moot, potentially nowhere near as vital for our self-
understanding. Decker does not fear being a replicant 
because this would make him one of the hunted; he fears it 
because it makes his experiences, his own treasured 
memories, an implantation from some disinterested other 
person—because it would make him more someone else’s 
personal agenda than himself a person ensouled. But what 
cannot be an implantation is his experience of the here and 
now, and his choice whether to make for himself the kind of 
experiences worthy of photos is under his control, subject, 
only, to his decision on how to relate to the people he meets, 
objects he finds, the environments he finds himself within.
The third prop we will focus on, then, are the replicant’s 
photos, hidden under several layers of shirts and sweaters. 
Unlike with the tub, wherein Decker found evidence in 
minuscule form but bared to view, the photos are not found 
in the empty first drawer we focus on: they are instead 
concealed in the second drawer. Scott, in choosing to place 
this prop under shirts and sweaters, offers us an encounter 
with a replicant’s home life which actually suggests a 
human(e), warm persona. The replicant is protecting, 
insulating, his photos, keeping them at a distance from casual 
observance—what you are supposed to do with intimate 
treasures. But this isn’t all he is up to. Here is someone who is 
not so sensitized to and determined by the threatening 
environment so to feel the need to take it into consideration 
in his every judgment. The placement is appropriate for 
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someone who values an object enough to hide it. But by 
hiding it in a dresser under shirts and sweaters—a place so 
suggestive of human warmth and closeness—he is in fact 
revealing much about himself. The nature of their placement 
amounts to him telling himself, telling anyone who happens 
upon them: “The experiences these photos embody matter to 
me; they are the very core of my being. Therefore to be 
placed in the most homey compartment of my living 
quarters.” (Shortly following this sequence we will hear Batty 
teasingly ask Leon, “Did you get your precious photos?”: Leon 
had obviously been harping on the importance of retrieving 
them.)
In a cold, threatening world this kind of ostensibly trivial, 
what we would normally think of as generic self-exposure, 
proves astonishing. In the close-up of Decker leafing through 
the photos (where we see, and Decker will focus on, a house 
interior we later recognize in Rachael’s treasured photos), we 
have moved from a state of safe remove (in the initial long 
shot) to situating ourselves in near proximity to precious 
vulnerability. But unlike with the scales, whose discovery is 
threatening to us because they involve us in an act of self-
definition which makes us seem more denatured and cold 
than human, the photos are threatening because they are 
disorienting, way out of place. They are evidence that we truly 
can, whether the memories they are supposed to represent are 
real or not, value the intimate human world they represent. 
To know that someone thinks like this, could value being 
open and vulnerable over sure protection, is itself a source of 
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strength. It presents an option, a way of being, so ludicrous to 
not be possible yet so wonderfully is! Within a drawer of 
folded clothes, within an apartment, within a building, within 
a city of endless numbers of buildings, we have found 
something powerful enough to suggest an eventual unfolding 
of a macrocosm of a different kind: a humane world of 
intimate proximity and touch, that could well matter to us, 
and that may just be within reach.
This is a find well worthy of our search. It is a critical 
placement in the mise-en-scene of a prop so significant we 
replicate the actions of the replicant and protect our 
experience, secure it for future consideration. Thus, as would 
be the natural reaction to a discovery of something so 
surprisingly, so suggestive of warmth in a world where we 
possibly accepted it as something on every wall advertised but 
nowhere really to be found, we cut to a shot where we are no 
longer in the apartment. We cut to a shot similar enough to 
the opening shot of the sequence to suggest—like Decker’s 
exploration of the drawers—an opening and sealing-off of a 
discovery. The camera is still; we have a view of the city-
environment; and there is a vehicle moving in the frame. 
However, this time, not tranquil, the scene is instead very 
tense: We find ourselves in the path of a police vehicle 
advancing ever larger, ever larger, ever larger towards us!
Perhaps surprisingly, this last shot also feels as if in 
response to our own will. We use our freedom of movement 
to place ourselves in view of the most threatening image we 
could imagine and know to provide a good sense of what it 
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can feel like to exist in this city. Unlike in the first shot, we 
choose to be grounded at street level, and engage in a long-
shot of the environment rather than an extreme long-shot. 
After asking ourselves, “Can we explore our human need for 
a warm community, or will this make us feel all too 
intolerably vulnerable to the dangers in this world?,” we cut 
to a danger, and see. We ask ourselves, before this menacing 
encounter, “Will we learn that faith in privacy and self, home, 
family and friends, is a source of strength to resist the most 
fear-inspiring experiences we might encounter in this world?”
These are questions that are not settled or answered for 
us (or for Decker) at film’s end. They are questions that 
should not ever be quietened by us lest we ignore their 
importance and relevance in our own post 9 /11 world. We 
have seen and explored how Decker, Gaff, and the replicants 
exist in their world, and imagined how we might too: Now 
how do we choose to exist in our own world? What 
assumptions do we make of its nature? Is our world an 
inevitably hostile one of hunters and hunted? Or is it 
something that can be re-made, and thus, potentially, peaceful 
and humane? What are the consequences of this decision for 
our own behavior? Do we arm ourselves and hunt, though 
this means encountering life with the mind-forg’d manacles 
of polarized thinking? Do we protect ourselves and avoid 
whatever could make us feel vulnerable, though it would 
surely also mean narrowing our life experience? Or do we 
involve ourselves as warm-hearted neighbors, and help rather 
than hunt, reach out rather than isolate, even if this puts us in 
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harm’s way? These are explorations we involve ourselves with 
in our encounter with Scott’s creation, and should continue 
doing long afterwards.
Ridley Scott makes a mistake in telling us that Decker is 
a replicant because he thereby privileges the certainty of 
conclusions over the uncertainty in loose inquiry. In a sense, 
he is mimicking the too knowing Gaff, not inquisitive 
Decker. Yet Blade Runner surely represents the creation of a 
questing and questioning soul, born of an impulse to reject 
the kind of closure urged on us by impossible-to-ignore neon 
signs, in favor of a more open project. Reflected in, and 
produced by, its choice of camera placement and movement, 
and in its offering, through close-ups, of three key props for 
our consideration, the film involves us in a search which 
presents us with choices, not necessarily with answers. Blade 
Runner really is an existential film; its glory is its uncertainty. 
Scott rightly eliminated the rosy ending of the initial release 
from his editor’s cut. He should have remained mute as to 
whether or not Decker is a replicant.  
Work Cited
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Pleasure into Pain, Pain into Pleasure (November 2001)
When I read the critiques of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein and 
John Keats’ odes, I feel as if I ought to ask myself if it is 
actually misleading to identify either of them as Romantic, 
that is, as possessed of immoderate energy, as moved by a 
desire to unsettle and change. Mary Shelley, wife of Percy 
Shelley, daughter—as she told Percy on their first meeting—
“of Godwin and Mary [Wollestonecraft]” (37), is surely a 
definitive Romantic writer, isn’t she? According to many 
scholars, perhaps not. Maurice Hindle, for instance, in the 
introduction to a Penguin Classics’ edition of Frankenstein, 
confidently asserts that “its [Frankenstein’s] moral lesson that 
pride must have its fall should be obvious to the most 
indifferent reader” (viii). He sees Frankenstein as a first work 
which evidences her commendable life-long preference for 
simple “domestic happiness and good friends,” of “moderate 
and peaceful ambitions” (xlvi), not really so much out of 
having herself known loss but out of respect for the 
“moderate needs of the community” (xxxviii) and disdain for 
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the “‘sexy’ lure of scientific penetration” (xlvii). The proud, 
self-absorbed, over-reaching hero appeals to the Romantic 
spirit, a tale that subjugates him to the argument that it’s best 
to remain in place—not so much. Hindle accepts as obvious 
(“[t]here seems little doubt that [—]”) a judgment by P. D. 
Fleck that Frankenstein “contains in an imaginative form her 
criticism of [Percy] Shelley” (iv; emphasis added). So that’s it: 
Mary’s last name mislead me into expecting her to focus on 
the Romantic engagement with the life of a great but doomed 
man, when she rightly belongs in my mind’s catalogue of 
authors and their works with the Classic, with, say, Samuel 
Johnson and his “Vanity of Human Wishes,” that are 
primarily interested in judging such a life as immoderate. John 
Keats—now he must be a Romantic, for if not, who 
possibly?—just Bryon and Shelley? But doesn’t Keats also 
provide a similar lesson to Johnson’s “Vanity of Human 
Wishes”? Keats’ “conclusion” to his “Ode to a Grecian Urn, 
” “‘Beauty is truth, truth beauty,’—that is all / Ye know on 
earth, and all ye need to know” (50), even if to instruct us as 
to what we should stick to rather than show what follows 
from having let ourselves go, still shares with “Vanity” the 
concern to discourage waywardness. And though some critics 
dispute the claim that the last two moralizing lines truly 
represent Keats’ judgment, and though some hold that the 
last two lines are out of sync with the rest of the poem, for 
many and perhaps most, it’s all Keats, all the way through. 
However, from my own explorations of Frankenstein and “Ode 
to a Grecian Urn,” I do not dispute that both authors 
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moralize, nor that this moralizing can seem so obvious to 
appear the point of their works, but because I consider the 
central life conflict that between our right to pursue our own 
dreams—what we owe ourselves—and “the disapproval or 
condemnation of significant others, such as parents” 
(Branden 63)—what they think we still owe them—and that 
the guilt and fear this disapproval causes, because of its 
source, is overwhelming—to the point that it can still people 
in place for generations—it is really no surprise that the 
parents’ (elders’) moralizing voice often dominates these 
works, can appear the point in these works. It should, rather, 
be expected to, even in works whose overall impetus is very 
much still contest and revolt, and does not by itself disqualify 
either of them as Romantic. So long as there is a sense that 
the moralizing voice is present so the writer can engage with 
it, find a way, perhaps, to triumph over it, the work is a 
Romantic one. And Shelley and Keats are fighting, they are 
resisting parental demands for them to let go their dreams—
with both in fact finding some solution to their parents’ 
claims upon them: Shelley, through embracing the 
monstrous; Keats, through further immersion into his pain.
From the very beginning of Frankenstein there are signs 
that Shelley is not simply about to tell us a moral tale, but 
rather is trying on a moralizing voice, as if looking to resolve 
feelings of uncertainty towards this voice, its message, while 
at the same time asking herself if it truly is her own. If we are 
not too hasty to assume that simply because Shelley is female 
(and thus cognizant, even at this early age, of the monstrous 
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sort of over-ambition ostensibly peculiar to the male sex), and 
because the lesson we think she wants to impart regards the 
dangers of Promethean-style scientific overreach—still one of 
our own favorites—we might remind ourselves that this is 
what we might expect of a nineteen year old, who, through 
her elopement, her travels and distance from her father, her 
attempt to start her own family—but most pointedly for the 
sheer fact of her growing up—is constantly experiencing 
within herself a disapproving voice as she insecurely and 
uncertainly, nevertheless perseveres on.
There is something of this ambition in our early 
description of Frankenstein. Walton tells us first of a broken 
Frankenstein: “I have found a man who, before his spirit had 
been broken by misery, I should have been happy to have 
possessed as the brother of my heart” (26). Shortly thereafter 
we learn being broken does not exempt Frankenstein from 
remaining someone of whom it can still be said: “no one can 
feel more deeply than he does the beauties of nature” (28). 
Walton asks—and I will later consider if it is in fact what 
constitutes his very “brokenness”—“what quality it is which 
he possesses, that elevates him so immeasurably above any 
other person” (28). Then we have a sign (if we haven’t already 
a couple of them, in knowing him to be so feeling and so 
elevated), not only that he still has spirit but that he has not 
learned, not internalized, the lessons he hopes to impart to 
Walton. Frankenstein tells Walton to:
 
[p]repare to hear of occurrences which are usually 
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deemed marvellous. Were were among the tamer 
scenes of nature, I might fear to encounter your 
unbelief, perhaps your ridicule; but many things will 
appear possible in these wild and mysterious regions, 
which would provoke the laughter of those 
unacquainted with the ever-various powers of nature; 
—nor can I doubt but that my tale conveys in its 
series internal evidence of the truth of the events of 
which it is composed. (28)
And here he stops us short, if more out of befuddlement 
than wonder, for in the very effort of making his tale credible 
to Walton Frankenstein shows good reason to doubt the very 
wisdom he hopes to impart. Note that Frankenstein tells us 
the experience of the “ever-varied powers of nature” is 
empowering, enfranchising: he yet still knows what is and 
what is not possible “in these wild and mysterious regions” 
(29). More importantly, note that Frankenstein, knowing the 
magnitude of the tale he has to impart, shows signs of 
struggling with self-doubt, self-castigation, his fears of being 
ridiculed. Most importantly, we note the similarity of this 
passage to the one in which he articulates the hubris of 
thought and demonstrates the sort of self-belief he tells us 
got him into such dire straights in the first place. When 
Frankenstein discovers how to create life, he says:
 
I was surprised, that among so many men of genius 
who had directed their enquiries towards the same 
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science, that I alone should be reserved to discover so 
astonishing a secret [. . .]. Remember, I am not 
recording the vision of a madman. The sun does not 
more certainly shine in the heavens, than that which I 
now affirm is true. Some miracle might have 
produced it, yet the stages of the discovery were 
distinct and probable. (51)
In both cases he is offering an account of something 
important and true but also so hard to believe it strongly 
credits the person who can actually appreciate it, placing him 
enviably beyond the rest of man, in fact, and yet still insists 
on its truth, telling us in both cases that he can prove it! 
There is another way that by the very means in which he 
introduces his tale to Walton, Frankenstein offers reasons for 
doubting, not his sincerity, but the degree to which Shelley, 
through Frankenstein, is using her work to just simply lay out 
her own already settled value system. Notice the modesty and 
respect for critical judgment Frankenstein shows Walton 
upon surmising that he seeks “for knowledge and wisdom, as 
[he] [. . .] once did” (28): “I do not know that the relation of 
my disasters will be useful to you; yet, when I reflect that you 
are pursuing the same course, exposing yourself to the same 
dangers which have rendered me what I am, I imagine that 
you may deduce an apt moral from my tale” (29). Notice, too, 
his concern that Walton deduce his own moral from the tale. 
It seems clear that Shelley is attempting to make Frankenstein 
credible through his very respect for the reasoning powers of 
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man. Yet note the change in Frankenstein when he:
 
see[s] by [Walton’s] [. . .] eagerness and the wonder 
and hope which your eyes express, my friend, that 
you expect to be informed of the secret with which I 
am acquainted; that cannot be: listen patiently until 
the end of my story, and you will easily perceive why I 
am reserved upon that subject. I will not lead you on, 
unguarded and ardent as I then was, to your 
destruction and infallible misery. Learn from me, if 
not by my precepts, at least by my example, how 
dangerous is the acquirement of knowledge and how 
much happier that man is who believes his native 
town to be the world, than he who aspires to become 
greater than his nature will allow. (52)
Frankenstein is now moralizing to Walton, telling him 
the lesson he must take from the tale. I will later discuss why I 
think for Shelley the very consideration of young Walton’s 
“eagerness of wonder and hope” (52) would summon this 
crushing declaration by Frankenstein (purportedly for 
Walton’s own good), but for now I will highlight signs of 
uncertainty in Frankenstein at the very moment he elucidates 
the moral lesson many critics take to be the obvious moral, to 
be the whole point, of the book.
This lesson, incidentally and importantly, is not what 
many critics take it to be: despite its appearance, it is as much 
a spurring for further self-examination and self-exploration as 
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it is a stop-sign in way of it. Frankenstein does not refer to 
the dangers of man’s pride; instead, he refers to the dangers 
for those who seek to rise above what their own particular 
nature allows. This begs the question: “What, then, is my 
particular nature—how do I rank?” How do we think Shelley, 
daughter “of Godwin and Mary,” thinks she compares with 
other people? Perhaps we see some indication of it in 
Walton’s description of Frankenstein, whom he places 
beyond all other men. Certainly Frankenstein, when he 
discusses “our weak and faulty natures” (28), generalizes 
about a human condition. But again, this pronouncement is 
based on what he has learned through extraordinary life 
experiences; and this pronouncement, as with all those he 
makes, owing to his insistence in his ability to prove it, 
evidences an effectual will that clashes with any claim to its 
ineffectuality. It is difficult for me to believe that Shelley 
could present us such an extraordinary figure and really think 
that Frankenstein was deficient, limited. I believe that Shelley, 
through Frankenstein, is offering us a real sense that this—a 
desire to be great, coupled with a fear of the consequences of 
deeming himself so superior—is a source of considerable 
inner conflict for her. Frankenstein will at times devalue his 
own worth, but as I have shown there are also times where in 
bringing the possibility that he is ordinary to the fore, he 
struggles in making himself seem wholly credible, in 
convincing us he truly believes what he is arguing.
In the very introduction of the tale, Shelley shows signs 
she is exploring the possibility that moralizing is a 
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consequence of self-surrender, of failure. Note that 
Frankenstein tells Walton that his own tale “may direct you if 
you succeed in your undertaking, and console you in case of 
failure” (29; emphasis added). Reading this, surely we should 
ask ourselves whether at some level Shelley is aware that the 
very act of writing a moral lesson concerning the sad 
consequence of selfish pride is exactly the kind of thing one 
might do to console yourself if you sensed you’d been 
compromised. I expect this is why Shelley introduces 
Frankenstein by attending to his greatness, even though it 
calls her text’s overt moral lesson into question. Shelley is 
fighting; she is resisting inviting upon herself the self-
assessment as a failure she knows would follow from telling a 
wholly convincing moral tale. This is why she at times resists 
generalizing about man’s nature, having Frankenstein say, 
“Yet why do I say this? I have myself been blasted in these 
hopes, yet another may succeed” (210). At nineteen, and with 
a childhood and adolescence of a kind I will explore later, she 
might be asking herself if she might be this “another,” this 
someone else, this exception. Nevertheless, she seems 
uncertain of life’s outcome, and thus consoles herself 
throughout much of the text—with note, what amounts to a 
kind of pride—with the idea that “the man who imagines his 
native town to be the world” (52) is greater than those not 
similarly enlightened.
Shelley, through Frankenstein, is exploring the self-
satisfaction, the self-pride that follows from being a member 
of a remarkable family—what she has most closely in mind, I 
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think, when she writes of belonging to a “native town.” 
Chapter one begins with a statement by Frankenstein of the 
superior nature of his own parents. He tells us that:
[m]y mother’s tender caresses and my father’s smile 
of benevolent pleasure while regarding me, are my 
first recollections. I was their plaything and their idol, 
and something better—their child, the innocent and 
helpless creature bestowed on them by Heaven, 
whom to bring up to good, and whose future lot it 
was in their hands to direct to happiness or misery, 
according as they fulfilled their duties towards me. 
With this deep consciousness of what they owed 
towards the being to which they had given life, added 
to the active spirit of tenderness that animated both, 
it may be imagined that while during every hour of 
my infant life I received a lesson of patience, of 
charity, and of self-control, I was so guided by a 
silken cord that all seemed but one train of enjoyment 
to me. (33)
Frankenstein is likewise conscious of “how peculiarly 
fortunate [his] [. . .] lot was” (37), and notes that this 
gratitude—arising from a comparison with those less 
fortunate as them—“assisted the development of filial love” 
(37; emphasis added). Frankenstein provides an example of 
this downward comparison when he describes Clerval’s 
parents for us: “His father was a narrow-minded trader, and 
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saw idleness and ruin in the aspiration and ambition of his 
son. Henry [Clerval] deeply felt the misfortune of being 
debarred from a liberal education. He said little; but when he 
spoke, I read in his kindling eye and in his animated glance a 
restrained but firm resolve, not to be chained to the miserable 
details of commerce.” (44)
We find another example at Justine’s trial, where Justine, 
Frankenstein’s father, and especially Elizabeth, distinguish 
themselves as apart from the rest of the town. Frankenstein’s 
poor regard for his fellow townsmen is clear: “My passionate 
and indignant appeals were lost upon them. And when I 
received their cold answers and heard the harsh, unfeeling 
reasoning of these men, my purposed avowal died away on 
my lips” (86). It is important that we note that what is 
especially repugnant about these men is their harshness and 
lack of feeling, because here too is evidence that Shelley, 
through Frankenstein, may be confronting feelings of anger, 
feelings of betrayal, she at some level feels towards her own 
family.
Justine is not betrayed by her family—but she does 
suffer self-betrayal for confessing to a crime she did not 
commit. She explains she was besieged by a “confessor” who 
“threatened and menaced [. . .] until I almost began to think 
that I was the monster that he said I was” (84). But after 
confessing, she experiences overwhelming feelings of shame, 
telling us “[i]n an evil hour I subscribed to a lie; and now only 
am I truly miserable” (84). Elizabeth tries to console her, to 
give her strength, saying she “will prove [her] [. . .] 
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innocence” (84), but Justine shakes “her head mournfully” 
(84) and says:
‘I do not fear to die,’ [. . .] that pang is past. God 
raises my weakness and gives me courage to endure 
the worst. I leave a sad and bitter world; and if you 
remember me and think of me as of one unjustly 
condemned, I am resigned to the fate awaiting me. 
Learn from me, dear lady, to submit in patience to the 
will of heaven!’ (84)
  
This surely reminds the reader of Frankenstein’s reply to 
Walton, when Walton felt “the greatest eagerness [. . .] to 
ameliorate his [i.e., Frankenstein’s] fate” (29):
 
‘I thank you,’ he replied, ’for your sympathy, but it is 
useless; my fate is nearly fulfilled. I wait but for one 
event, and then I shall repose in peace. I understand 
your feeling,’ continued he, perceiving that I wished 
to interrupt him: ‘but you are mistaken, my friend, if 
thus you will allow me to name you; nothing can alter 
my destiny; listen to my history, and you will perceive 
how irrevocably it is determined. (29)
Justine, like Frankenstein, is singled out and faces 
condemnation, not only from “the public” but from those 
friends she most values. She asks them: “And do you also 
believe that I am so very, very wicked? Do you also join with 
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my enemies to crush me, to condemn me?” (83). 
Frankenstein, too, fears his new friend’s judgment, 
speculating that Clerval might ridicule his own tale if they 
were in “the tamer scenes of nature” (29). But in Justine’s 
case, she is innocent—she is no monster, she is only made to 
feel as if she is. But if the unfairness of her self-conviction is 
meant to distinguish her from the truly guilty, the truly fallen 
and monstrous Frankenstein, then why present such strong 
parallels between these two scenes so that each seems a 
duplicate of the other, with one featuring a false confession 
and the other, a true one? Is it means to emphasize 
Frankenstein’s guilt? Or is it, rather, means for Shelley to 
explore her own? That is, is she offering herself a variety of 
versions of a similar experience with judgments of culpability 
to help her decide whether she deserves to feel guilty, 
whether virtue lies through accepting or rejecting the guilt, 
and through which choice—to aim to be good, or accept 
being bad—will follow the truest freedom?
My own opinion is that Shelley, through a variety of 
characters and in a variety of scenes throughout the text, is 
meditating on the difficulties involved in maintaining her own 
convictions before intimidation from elders—or rather, from 
a specific elder, her father. Acquiescence means suffering 
disappointment, owing to inconstancy to oneself. We note 
that Justine’s family is surprised and disappointed that she, 
unlike courageous Elizabeth, who braves those who’d hem 
her in, kowtows to public authority. But Shelley surely would 
not do so; one senses throughout Frankenstein such pride in 
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her family we would expect it to bully through prescriptions 
from public norms. But Frankenstein and Justine—and thus 
surely Shelley as well—are vulnerable to the opinion of her 
closest friends and family. And it is when she experiences 
conflict between her own desires, her own needs, her own 
beliefs and those of her family’s, that Shelley encounters a 
blasting force that brings to mind considerations of what it 
might be like to live by the standards of others, to accept 
their voice, their judgments, as her own. A sad what if? she 
ends up exploring through Frankenstein and Justine.
Justine experiences a moment when she “subscribed to a 
lie” that lead immediately to misery and self-condemnation. 
Justine, we note, who was twelve years old when 
Frankenstein’s family took her in, is entering adolescence, is 
growing up, when her transformation from one with promise 
to one newly doomed occurs. The precise age is noteworthy 
because it amounts to, if not further evidence, at least further 
impetus to consider as evidence that the actual moment 
which dooms and haunts Frankenstein is not when he 
awakens the monster but rather one much earlier in his life, 
occurring when he too was entering that stage where he 
began to see before him “the moment when [he] [. . .] should 
put them [i.e., benevolent intentions] in practice and make [. . 
.] [himself] useful to [. . .] [his] fellow beings” (87). He reflects 
on this moment when—and once again it is important again 
to pay attention to the wording:
 
all [became] blasted: instead of that serenity of 
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conscience which allowed me to look back upon the 
past with self-satisfaction, and from thence to gather 
promise of new hopes, I was seized by remorse and 
the sense of guilt, which hurried me away to a hell of 
intense tortures, such as no language can describe. 
(87)
Frankenstein’s monster experiences a similarly painful 
transformation after working his way to his climactic meeting 
with his “friends,” in particular, the fatherly De Lacey. 
“Finding [himself] [. . .] unsympathised with, [he] wished to 
tear up the trees, spread havoc and destruction around [him]” 
(132). And it seems clear that this is the moment which 
haunts Frankenstein, and which haunts Shelley herself, a key 
moment in her life when her hopes were dashed by the lack 
of sympathy, by the disregard, of fathers.
Frankenstein tells us that when he was thirteen years old, 
after reading through a volume of books “[a] new light 
seemed to dawn upon [his] [. . .] mind, and, bounding with 
joy, [he] [. . .] communicated [his] [. . .] discovery to [his] [. . .] 
father” (38). Frankenstein notes that “[his] father looked 
carelessly at the titlepage of [his] [i.e., Frankenstein’s] [. . .] 
book and said, ‘Ah! Cornelius Agrippa! My dear Victor, do 
not waste your time upon this; it is sad trash’” (38). 
Frankenstein tells us that this moment was crucial only 
because, owing to his father’s carelessness, he continued to 
explore studies that would count against him in life. We 
should not believe him in this, for this is in fact a 
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remembrance for Shelley’s consideration of the crucial 
moment of Frankenstein’s life, and it is a moment which is a 
certain simulacrum for an experience Shelley had with her 
own father at the same age (twelve to thirteen). There are 
several reasons why I believe this is the case. The text itself, 
independent of any biographical knowledge of Shelley’s life, 
certainly points in this direction, but in addition there are 
scholars that have explored Shelley’s life, have examined 
Shelley’s letters, as well as her father’s letters to her, and 
believe there was a dramatic change in how Shelley’s father 
treated her around this age. And when one keeps Shelley in 
mind, what was going on, that had gone on in her life while 
reading Frankenstein, we cannot miss the similarities between 
her upbringing and Frankenstein’s (and Frankenstein’s 
monster’s as well) own. And finally, though Shelley is nearly 
keen to it without of course any recourse to its like, 
psychoanalytic explorations of the schism that develops 
between parents and children when their needs and desires 
begin to match especially poorly—i.e., during adolescence—
show how children almost always end up blaming themselves 
for the rejection they suffer for pursuing their life goals. 
Hoping not to tax my reader’s patience too much, I will 
explore each piece of evidence in turn in hopes of offering as 
powerful, as convincing a case possible, that Shelley’s trial of 
Frankenstein is best understood as a trial of her own self for 
daring to resist and resent her father’s judgments of her.
Throughout the text moments of pleasure are raised and 
subsequently crushed. It is Walton’s (child-like) look of 
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“wonder” and “hope” and his eagerness “to be informed of 
the secret with which [Frankenstein] [. . .] is acquainted” (51), 
that has Frankenstein not only refuse to comply but to 
commence his lecturing of him. No surprise, this, since 
Frankenstein once had his own eager hopes similarly crushed, 
and so is familiar with the perverse allowances allotted the 
defeated. This moment for Frankenstein was the crucial 
moment life moment for him, the moment where he told 
himself, “I am a blasted tree; the bolt has entered my soul” 
(155), and proof lies in the nature of the passages where the 
key word “blasted” appears in the text and in its absence in 
the passages involving the creation of the monster—that is, at 
the moment most critics believe where all pleasure actually 
turned to pain for Frankenstein.
Frankenstein describes this moment as one where “all 
was blasted” (87). Critics who believe the moment he is 
obsessing over is his creation of life, attend to how the 
creature is brought to life by a spark of electricity: they 
believe this is the scene foreshadowed earlier with the image 
of an oak tree being “utterly destroyed” by a bolt of lightning. 
But a lightning bolt that leaves nothing behind but a “blasted 
stump” (40) matches poorly with an awakening by a mere 
spark of electricity. But it is, however, a perfect match for the 
passage where Frankenstein decides he “should put 
[benevolent intentions] [. . .] into practice,” a decision which 
follows with him subsequently concluding that “all is blasted” 
(87). The moment where the lightning bolt blasted the oak 
was not written to foreshadow Frankenstein’s fateful decision 
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to create life; it was, instead, a description of what if felt like 
at the very moment of bringing, in the form of a book, his 
own ambitions, his own path for making a distinctive 
contribution to the world, to his father for consideration, and 
having him attend to it with a cursory glance, before 
dismissing it entirely.
Though two years pass between his writing of his 
father’s dismissal and of how all is blasted, textually, the 
blasting of the oak follows immediately from Frankenstein’s 
description of his father’s reaction to his studies. Following 
learning of his father’s disapproval, we hear of Frankenstein 
encountering a “man of great research in natural philosophy” 
(40) who ostensibly inspires a complete “overthrow[ing] [. . .] 
of [the lords of his (i.e., Frankenstein’s) imagination which] [. 
. .] disinclined [him] [. . .] to pursue [his] [. . .] accustomed 
studies. It seemed to [him] as if nothing would or could ever 
be known. All that had so long engaged [his] [. . .] attention 
suddenly grew despicable” (40). He tells us he dismisses every 
one of the sciences, deciding only mathematics, “being [the 
only branch of study] built upon secure foundations” (41), 
worth studying. To inform us of an encounter which lead him 
to abandon all his studies, all the lords of the imagination of 
his childhood, only a few passages after telling us that the 
reason he relates to us the moment of his father’s dismissal is 
because it encouraged him to keep at reading, is very odd. He 
explains the change in course, from eager interest in studies 
to sudden disavowal of most of them, as result of a last-ditch 
attempt by a “spirit of preservation” to save him. But 
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considering that the voice throughout the book that keeps 
appealing to Frankenstein’s better nature, telling him “not [to] 
[. . .] brood [on] [. . .] thoughts of vengeance [. . .] but with 
feelings of peace and gentleness, that will heal [. . .] the 
wounds of our minds” (70), that attempts to dissipate the 
“gloom which appears to have taken so strong a hold of [. . .] 
[his] mind” (142), which warns him of the effects of whatever 
current behavior/inclination—it festers current wounds (70), 
it “prevents improvement or enjoyment” (88)—this 
mysterious spirit of preservation, no doubt, is but the already 
abundant and familiar voice of his father. No, Frankenstein 
does not continue his childhood studies because his father 
failed to have a notable impact upon him; rather, the impact of 
his cursory glance could not have had a more reverberating 
and long-lasting effect on him. Frankenstein persists not in 
spite of his father, but instead to spite him, for his “harsh, 
unfeeling” (86) reaction to his developing interests and hopes 
for the future.
I believe the reason a fatherly scientist appears in the text 
soon after the devastating blow to his own (i.e., 
Frankenstein’s) explorations and self-confidence, is that 
Shelley, imagining a similar confrontation with her own 
father, must soon engage with the feelings that arose from 
this near recall of her own experience. I argue mostly through 
an appeal to common sense, but Shelley is clearly aware of the 
pain involved in attempting to repress feelings: “Even in my 
own heart I could give no expression to my sensations—they 
weighed on me with a mountain’s weight, and their excess 
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destroyed my agony beneath them” (144). Frankenstein is 
enraged by his father’s inattention. It brings to mind one of 
the few instances where Frankenstein considers the possibility 
that his father is not perfect, is not right. And it is followed 
by the introduction into his tale of M. Krempe and M. 
Waldman, who offer Frankenstein all that his father failed to 
offer him.
M. Krempe and M. Waldman are not to be imagined 
devils-in-the-guise-of-angels who lead Frankenstein on into 
sin. It is important that Shelley establishes that they both 
share with Frankenstein’s father a preference for thinkers 
other than Frankenstein’s previous lords of his imagination. 
What Frankenstein had hoped from his father, supposedly, 
was merely for him to “take the pains to explain to [him] [. . .] 
that the principles of Agrippa had been entirely exploded” 
(38). M. Krempe shares Frankenstein’s father’s belief that his 
(i.e., Frankenstein’s) studies have been a waste, but 
substantiates Frankenstein’s feeling that his father was still 
somehow in error. In fact, he makes it a crime:
 
‘Every minute,’ continued M. Krempe with warmth, 
‘every instant that you have wasted on those books is 
utterly and entirely lost. You have burdened your 
memory with exploded systems and useless names. 
Good God! In what desert land have you lived, where 
no on was kind enough to inform you that these 
fancies which you have so greedily imbibed are a 
thousand years old and as musty as they are ancient? I 
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little expected, in this enlightened and scientific age, 
to find a disciple of Albertus Magnus and Paracelsus. 
My dear sir, you must begin your studies entirely 
anew.’ (45)
We hear here not only an accusation that his father must 
have been neglectful, but that the native land he came from 
must have been a desert island. Note, too, that M. Krempe 
speaks here in a warm voice, a marked contrast to 
Frankenstein’s father’s cold dismissal.
M. Waldman does M. Krempe one better in that “[h]e 
heard with attention the little narration concerning my 
studies, and smiled at the names of Cornelius Agrippa and 
Paracelsus, but without the contempt that M. Krempe had 
exhibited” (47). He substantiates the feeling Frankenstein 
once had as a child that these old philosophers had 
something significant to offer him: “He said that ‘these were 
men to whose indefatigable zeal modern philosophers were 
indebted for most of the foundations of their knowledge’” 
(47). He comes across as an ideal father-figure, one who gives 
lie to Frankenstein’s claim that all he wanted from his father 
was to show that “the powers of the [these early 
philosophers] [. . .] were chimerical” (38). Not so: the 
thirteen-year-old Frankenstein who came to his father with 
“[a] new light [. . .] dawn[ing] on his mind [. . .] [,] bounding 
with joy [ . . .] [,] [and who] communicated [his] [. . .] 
discovery to [his] [. . .] father” (38), was hoping for what 
every child wants—validation for his/her own life pursuits. 
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M. Waldman appears in the text because at some level Shelley 
is aware that she was mistreated, was aware she deserved 
better, and it is no coincidence that in M. Waldman, who is 
“[h]appy [. . .] to have gained a disciple” (48), Frankenstein 
has “found a true friend” (49)—or rather, an ideal father-
figure—and one who doesn’t just happen to show up his own.
It is no accident that Waldman is described as smiling at 
Frankenstein: Frankenstein’s own father, with a “smile of 
benevolent pleasure while regarding” him, was Frankenstein’s 
first recollection of him. But around adolescence Shelley 
stopped receiving those smiles, and desperately in further 
need of them, creates for herself M. Waldman. And from 
Frankenstein’s subsequent description of him, we know we 
have here a man compared to whom even his own father 
suffers from steep downward comparison:
 
His gentleness was never tinged by dogmatism, and 
his instructions were given with an air of frankness 
and good nature, that banished every idea of 
pedantry. In a thousand ways he smoothed for me the 
path of knowledge, and made the most abstruse 
enquiries clear and facile to my apprehension. (49)
Buoyed by the love from this good man, Frankenstein 
will begin to engage in the laboratory experiments that will 
have him discover the purportedly chimerical ability to create 
life. Some critics attend to M. Waldman’s declaration that 
science “penetrate[s] into the recesses of nature, and show 
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how she works in her hiding-places” (49), and argue it as 
proof that Shelley herself disapproves of him. But if such a 
man as M. Waldman is in for a hard time from critics, I am 
fearful to know whom they would praise, for he is a near ideal 
father, only one, though we might imagine him, pretend play 
at having him, most of us still have trouble convincing 
ourselves we actually deserve.
Shelley, in imagining this perfect father, one far superior 
to her own, surely felt considerable guilt (sacrilege!), and this 
explains why she has Frankenstein accuse himself of 
neglecting his family, saying: 
I knew my silence disquieted them; and I well 
remembered the words of my father: ‘I know that 
while you are pleased with yourself, you will think of 
us with affection, and we shall hear regularly from 
you. You must pardon me if I regard any interruption 
in your correspondence as a proof that your other 
duties are equally neglected.’ (54)
We note the discord, the inconsistency, between how his 
father is made to seem here and how Frankenstein described 
his father at the beginning of the text. His father had been 
described as someone who was “deeply conscious [. . .] of 
what [he] [. . .] owed towards [. . .] the being to which they 
had given life,” and who “fulfilled [his] [. . .] duties towards [. 
. .] him” (33). With his failure to attend to his son, we have 
already seen signs of his neglect, and in this passage we have a 
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father who seems mostly focused on what his son owes him. 
Frankenstein does not accuse his father of inconstancy, but it 
is one of things his characters notice as a significant fault in 
others. The monster says to Frankenstein, for example: “How 
inconstant are your feelings! [B]ut a moment ago you were 
moved by my representations and why do you again harden 
yourself to my complaints?” (142). Elizabeth writes of 
Justine’s mother that “[t]he poor woman was very vacillating 
in her repentance. She sometimes begged Justine to forgive 
her unkindness but much oftener accused her of having 
caused the deaths of her brothers and sister” (64). 
“[W]hen you are pleased with yourself, you will think of 
us” (33), is not one of the more appealing nuggets of life 
advice I’ve encountered in literature, and it surely smacks of 
exactly the kind of moralizing his father ostensibly 
disapproved of. I think that Shelley is aware of this, is aware 
that her own father did not practice what he preached, and 
buoyed by her creation of an ideal father who validates her 
own needs has Frankenstein doubt his father’s advice: “I then 
thought that my father would be unjust if he ascribed my 
neglect to vice, or faultiness” (54). But he follows this by 
informing us he no longer thinks this way:
but I am now convinced that he was justified in 
conceiving that I should not be altogether free from 
blame. A human being in perfection ought always to 
preserve a calm and peaceful mind, and never to allow 
passion or a transitory desire to disturb his tranquility. 
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I do not think that the pursuit of knowledge is an 
exception to this rule. If the study to which you apply 
yourself has a tendency to weaken your affections, 
and to destroy your taste for those simple pleasures in 
which no alloy can possibly mix, then that study is 
certainly unlawful, that is to say, not befitting the 
human mind. If this rule were always observed; if no 
man allowed any pursuit whatsoever to interfere with 
the tranquility of his domestic affections, Greece had 
not been enslaved; Caesar would have spared his 
country; America would have been discovered more 
gradually; and the empires of Mexico and Peru had 
not been destroyed. (54)
He interrupts himself to offer excuse for what he prefers 
to see as his moralizing, but which owing to its striking length 
is best understood as evidence of the profound ripple effect, 
the profound resulting affect—shock—writing Frankenstein’s 
fathers’ words has upon Shelley immediately after writing 
them. Shelley, through Frankenstein, is attempting to process, 
make surer sense of the moralizing, commanding tone of 
Frankenstein’s father—a simulacra of her own—whose 
immediate effect is but to disturb her so profoundly it shocks 
her into assuming an older philosophic address. Such sober 
dressings protect her some from accusation, buy her time to 
process all that just went on in her fictional re-encounter with 
her own father, something that requires a significant pause 
because at some level Shelley is aware that a father who writes 
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of a child’s duties is not likely simply being attendant to the 
child’s best interest, but rather more to his own. This is why 
we encounter here talk in praise of simple, of moderated 
(read: compromised) pleasures: the pressure to acquiesce, to 
accept being owned by others’ demands and to make it seem 
for the best, is crushing.
But how much respect is due such a father, really? 
Shelley, through Frankenstein, has already criticized Clerval’s 
father for attempting to determine his career path. Moreover, 
we read that Clerval was not a fool to the true nature of his 
father’s intent; instead, he “deeply felt his [i.e., Clerval’s] 
misfortune” (44). Fortunately, Clerval possessed a “firm 
resolve, not to be chained” (44). So Shelley, again through 
Frankenstein, is not only cognizant of fathers’ inclination to 
dominate their children, she shows she thinks the child who 
resists the one worthy of salute. Clerval’s father saw “idleness 
and ruin in the aspirations and ambition of his son,” and this 
too was worthy of a harsh judgment from Frankenstein: “his 
father was a narrow-minded trader” (44). Shelley, now 
imagining for herself a father—Frankenstein’s—who, unlike 
Clerval’s trader, comes closer to being a reproduction of her 
own, is not simply trying to rationalize Frankenstein’s father’s 
words. She is also testing them, to see if she can permit herself 
to judge her father in the same way Frankenstein judges 
Clerval for perpetration of the same crime.
If Shelley let Frankenstein be fully aware of just how 
wrong his father was to “ascrib[e] [Frankenstein’s] [. . .] 
neglect to vice, or faultiness” (54), she would likely 
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understand this as weighing toward a harsh critique of her 
own father as well. She would understand that the reason 
Clerval is behaving heroically while resisting his father, is 
because this isn’t the easiest of things to do, especially in 
previous eras where “do as you’re-told!,” not “what color is 
your parachute?,” principally moved the adolescent-parent 
dynamic. Making such a judgment alienates you from your 
family; you are not like them, making hopes of claiming your 
father’s love something to be abandoned, once and for all. 
But if, after praising Clerval for his determination, she has 
Frankenstein surrender to his father’s judgment, this would 
amount to self-surrender, to capitulation for Shelley, one near 
obvious to her, which would make every attempt to make it 
seem all for the best, equally obvious rationalizing. The 
anxieties arising from her two conflicting desires—to never 
betray herself, but also to prove her father always in the 
right—lead to the re-doubling of her effort to wipe out all 
doubts Frankenstein has towards his father. Thus we read: 
“My father made no reproach in his letters, and only took 
notice of my silence by enquiring into my occupations more 
particularly than before” (54).
When Clerval enters the tale, again we hear Frankenstein 
maintain that freedom lies in terminating his [i.e., 
Frankenstein’s] explorations: “I hope, I sincerely hope, that 
all these employments are now at an end, and that I am at 
length free” (59). But what does such “freedom” open up for 
Frankenstein? Only the god-awful, it would seem. When 
Frankenstein returns home, Shelley has Elizabeth “express a 
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sorrowful delight to see me” (75). He had returned late: “Ah! 
I wish you had come three months ago, and then you would 
have found us all joyous and delighted” (75). For the hubris 
of ignoring his family, for not thinking of his family when he 
experienced pleasure, for disobeying his father, Shelley imagines 
for him a situation (the death of his brother) that could only 
substantiate his sense of guilt, his inclination toward self-
reproof. But experiencing guilt—a confession to knowing 
yourself in the wrong—offers no respite, no rescue, for his 
father chastises his son for his brooding (though 
Frankenstein describes it as an attempt “to inspire [him] [. . .] 
with fortitude, and awaken in [him] [. . .] the courage to dispel 
the dark cloud which brooded over [. . .] [him]” [87]):
‘Do you think, Victor,’ said he, ‘that I do not suffer 
also? No one could love a child more than I loved 
your brother’—tears came into his eyes as he spoke—
‘but is it not a duty to the survivors that we should 
refrain from augmenting their unhappiness by an 
appearance of immoderate grief? It is also a duty 
owed to yourself; for excessive sorrow prevents 
improvement or enjoyment, or even the discharge of 
daily usefulness, without which no man is fit for 
society.’ (88)
Yet saintly, “heroic[,] and suffering” (88) Elizabeth was 
“sad and desponding; she no longer took delight in her 
ordinary occupations; all pleasure seemed to her sacrilege 
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toward the dead” (89). Frankenstein will have a tough time 
finding a way out, for if happy, he is being disrespectful to the 
newly dead, and if he grieves, he shows immoderacy. He is in 
fact brought tight-walk-close to the kind of double bind 
situation where no solution would end up proving available 
to him, that the psychiatrist R.D. Laing believes is related to 
the development of schizophrenic symptoms. I suspect this is 
why Shelley introduces into the tale the consideration that 
“[t]here was always scope for fear, so long as anything I loved 
remained behind” (89): Shelley, presenting herself with a 
facsimile of her own self-conflicted state, is imagining for her 
own consideration the respite to be found in the most terrible 
of available solutions—namely, leaving loved ones permanently 
behind by becoming unknown and unlovable.
I mentioned that there are several reasons why I suspect 
Shelley had once experienced a terrifying moment of parental 
abandonment that thereafter weighed heavily upon her. I 
have discussed evidence in the text that Frankenstein, though 
having difficulty admitting it to himself, was crushed by a 
sudden change in his father’s reaction to him around the age 
of thirteen—that is, at the age where he most sought 
approval for his own chosen life course—which inspired a 
subsequent effort to individuate anyway, to imagine 
something better for himself, better father, better 
surroundings, as well as the very creation of life from 
knowledge of the kind his father had previously dismissed as 
a waste of time, but followed by collapsing into self-hatred, 
by rejoining a family that put him down, and by initiating a 
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desperate, swirling search for just what it would take for him 
to be free from the dictates of others’. But before exploring 
where these desperate imaginings took him, an exploration 
which follows one of a “serene” moment protected from a 
“disastrous” future that compares rather well with Keats’ own 
explorations of the same in “Ode to a Grecian Urn,” I would 
like to offer biographical proof that Frankenstein is itself such 
a frozen moment for Shelley, one she is using to help sort out 
just what the hell happened? in adolescence after having known a 
much less debilitating, and perhaps even mostly pleasing, 
childhood.
Concerning Shelley’s difficulties with her father upon 
emerging into adulthood, Hill-Miller writes:
 
Mary Godwin passed through childhood, she satisfied 
her passionate attachment to William Godwin by 
living up to his literary expectations, by identifying 
herself with his hopes for her, and by modeling 
herself after him [. . .] [,] as [she] [. . .] entered 
adolescence, William Godwin’s aloof demeanor 
seemed to turn to outright rejection. In fact, the 
beginning of Mary’s adolescence marked a long 
period of alienation from her father, an alienation that 
only ended when she married Percy Bysshe Shelley 
at age nineteen. This parental rejection is central to 
Mary Shelley and her career: it haunted her all of her 
life and became emblematic of the many other types 
of rejection she encountered. It shaped her response 
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to her burgeoning femininity and gave birth to her 
vision of the precarious nature of daughter-hood; it 
provided part of the creative impulse for her first two 
novels—Frankenstein and Mathilda—both of which tell 
the story of the daughter’s painful induction into 
adult womanhood. (31)
She believes that “[a]s Mary Godwin grew older and 
entered adolescence, her need for emotional support from 
her father increased” (31). She refers to the work of Nancy 
Chodorow and “the psychic currents of the oedipal nuclear 
family” (31) to explain Shelley’s rejection by her father, telling 
us that “[f]rom a father’s point of view [. . .] the daughter’s 
passage through adolescence often creates an anxious—and 
even threatening—moment. As the daughter passes out of 
the sexual latency of childhood and begins to develop into a 
mature woman, the father often rejects her. As Lynda Boose 
explains, the daughter’s new physical maturity invites 
incestuous desire” (31-32).
I admit I look to other theorists for the whys behind 
paternal rejection (by which I mean, I don’t think it owes 
mostly to incestuous desires), but I find what Hill-Miller has 
to say about the rejection—that it “meant the end of a 
childhood full of wide horizons and possibility” (32)—along 
with her documentation of the sort of distancing from her 




In the spring of 1811, when she [Shelley] was thirteen 
and a half years old, she was sent away [. . .] in the 
hope that the sea air would cure her. [. . .] Though 
Godwin had good medical reason to send Mary away, 
and though the separation was intended to calm 
Mary’s feelings as well as preserve the peace of the 
whole household, Mary could not help but read the 
separation from her father as an abandonment—and 
an abandonment directly connected to the fact that 
she was becoming a woman. [. . .] Godwin wrote to 
his daughter only four times, and failed to visit her for 
her fourteenth birthday, though he was vacationing in 
the area. (34)
Shelley experiences distance from her father as his 
rejection of her. She is sent away because she is “bad, ” 
because she is growing up, and therefore apart from him. 
Little wonder, perhaps, that Frankenstein gets up to no good 
while away at university, for it proves her father was right 
about her, would work to demonstrate her the repentant who 
had come to accept the full wisdom of his ways. And little 
wonder, perhaps, that when Frankenstein leaves for 
university it is described as something beyond his control: “it 
[i.e., earlier desires to take his place amongst men] would have 
been folly to repent” (44), though he was “unwilling to quit 
the sight of those that remained” (43).
When Shelley returns home “family conflict resumed 
with a vengeance” (Hill-Miller 34), and she is sent away once 
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again, this time to Scotland. Hill-Miller’s discussion of the 
implications of this event for Shelley’s life, need also be 
considered:
Mary Godwin’s stay in Scotland became the event 
that marked and engulfed her adolescence. When she 
wore a new introduction for the 1831 edition of 
Frankenstein, Mary Shelley reflected that she had “lived 
principally in the country as a girl, and passed a 
considerable time in Scotland” (Frankenstein 223). This 
description of her early years must have come as a 
surprise to her father, because Mary principally 
lived in Godwin’s home during her childhood, and 
she spent time in the country and Scotland only when 
Godwin sent her there to restore her health and the 
family peace. The point is that Mary’s absences from 
Godwin’s house—absences she read as acts of 
banishment and paternal rejection—-became the 
events that defined her adolescence, overshadowing 
all else. (35)
Shelley never forgot her early childhood, but her 
obsession to make right, to make sense of her own 
adolescence, so occupied her subsequent attention the 
constant sorting and re-sorting of memories associated with 
her adolescence in a search for answers made them the 
memories most available for recall.
When the sixteen-year-old Mary eloped with Percy 
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Shelley to the Continent, Godwin was horrified; “[h]e felt 
robbed of his favorite daughter, cheated of his literary heir, 
and deprived of the material link to his cherished past with 
Mary Wollstonecraft” (Hill-Miller 38):
There followed a long period of even more intense 
estrangement between Godwin and his daughter, an 
estrangement that formed the specific background 
against which Mary Shelley conceived and began 
Frankenstein. As Godwin commented in 
August 1814, before Mary, Percy, and Jane returned 
from the Continent, ‘Jane has been guilty of 
indiscretion only [. . .] [,] Mary has been guilty of a 
crime.’ [. . .] Godwin cut himself off from his daughter 
completely. He refused to communicate with Mary at 
all and forbade Fanny Imlay to see or talk to her half-
sister. Godwin did not write or speak to Mary when 
she lost her first child in February 1815, or when she 
bore a son, named William in honor of Godwin 
himself, on 24 January 1816.” (Hill-Miller 39; 
emphasis added)
Godwin abandoned Shelley at the moment of the birth 
of her own son, the same astonishingly cruel act that 
Frankenstein inflicts upon his own creation. This was revenge 
for Shelley’s crime of self-individuation on the Continent and 
for creating a family that would claim attention away from 
him. Mimicking Frankenstein, I will insist that I am not telling 
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falsehoods here. In a letter written to Shelley after her writing 
Frankenstein, and after the death of another child, Godwin 
belittles Shelley’s mourning and tells her in a truly terrifying 
passage very reminiscent of the passage in Frankenstein where 
his father instructs Frankenstein to moderate his grief, to 
“[r]emember, too, that though at first your nearest 
connections may pity you in this state, yet that, when they see 
you fixed in selfishness and ill-humour, and regardless of the 
happiness of everyone else, they will finally cease to love you, 
and scarcely learn to endure you” (Hill-Miller 48).
She gives us good reason to suspect that Frankenstein 
does not really represent Percy Shelley, as critics such as 
Hindle insist is the case, but rather Mary Shelley. Hill-Miller 
reminds us that Mary was raised by her father to be his son, 
to be his literary heir:
In the years leading up to her adolescence, Mary 
Godwin emerged as her father’s potential intellectual 
heir, the child most suited to carry on his work as a 
writer and thinker [. . .]. He entertained great hopes 
for her. He proudly described her to a correspondent 
as “singularly bold, somewhat imperious, and active 
of mind.” [. . .] As Mary Shelley herself put it many 
years later, speaking of her father’s expectations for 
her, “I was nursed and fed with a love of glory. To be 
something great and good was the precept given me 
by my father.” [. . .] Young Mary Godwin took her 
father’s hopes entirely to heart; she learned to 
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measure herself against her parents and to envision 
herself inheriting their intellectual legacy. As she 
wrote a correspondent in 1827, “her greatness of soul 
[Mary Wollstonecraft’s] & my father[’s] high talents 
have perpetually reminded me that I ought to 
degenerate as little as I could from those from whom 
I derived my being [. . .]. [M]y chief merit must always 
be derived, first from the glory these wonderful 
beings have shed [around] me, & then for the 
enthusiasm I have for excellence” (25)
Shelley had an “education and a childhood that in today’s 
vocabulary might be described as non-gendered—that is, an 
education that made the least possible differentiation between 
males and females, that encouraged daughters to develop 
professional aspirations, and that allowed daughters to 
envision themselves in many roles, including those reserved 
for sons” (Hill-Miller 30). She was singled out as singularly 
great, and evidently still had in mind to evidence her 
greatness, to demonstrate it to the literary world, well past her 
writing of Frankenstein. Mary aimed to be victorious—
Frankenstein’s pride is surely also her own.
And of what results from Frankenstein’s pride, is there 
any evidence in Mary’s life to shed light on why the monster 
appears in the novel? Hill-Miller continues:
[But] [t]o say that William Godwin gave his oldest 
natural daughter the aspiration and training necessary 
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to make her a writer—that is, all the expectations of 
literary inheritance and sonship—is not to say that 
their relationship was always warm and affectionate. 
Quite the contrary: Godwin was emotionally 
withdrawn and often cold; he knew, and his children 
saw, that effusive displays of tender feeling were 
generally beyond his emotional grasp. [. . . ] Mary 
Shelley eventually attributed her father’s emotional 
distance to his shyness and to inability to grasp his 
children’s feelings quickly. (25)
We find here the best evidence for understanding Shelley 
as creating Frankenstein’s monster to explore her childhood, 
perhaps to see if her troubles in adolescence owed to 
something that went wrong earlier, perhaps something she 
did, or was, that made her worthy of being disowned. We 
recall the monster asking himself, “Was I, then, a monster, a 
blot upon the earth, from which all men fled and whom all 
men disowned?” (Shelley 117).
We mustn’t be over-hasty, though, to assume the 
monster as best understood as a single entity, because there is 
evidence for understanding the monster as embodying 
different identities, different people—sometimes Mary 
Shelley, sometimes her father—at different times in the text. 
Note the passage in which the monster chastises 
Frankenstein, telling him to “[b]e calm I intreat you to hear 




[h]ave I not suffered enough, that you seek to 
increase my misery? Life, although it may only be an 
accumulation of anguish , is dear to me, and I will 
defend it. [. . . ] I was benevolent and good; misery 
made me a find. Make me happy, and I shall again be 
virtuous” (96-97). 
There are similarities between this passage, I think, and a 
passage from a letter written from Frankenstein’s father to his 
son:
 
Come dearest Victor; you alone can console 
Elizabeth. She weeps continually and accuses herself 
unjustly as the cause of his death; her words pierce 
my heart. We are all unhappy, but will not that be an 
additional motive for you, my son, to return and be 
our comforter? (70)
Both the father and the monster are making appeals to 
Frankenstein to satisfy them with a deed only he can 
accomplish for them. Both explain they are suffering, and 
hold their suffering as dwarfing the importance of whatever 
Frankenstein is himself experiencing, the significance of his 
own concerns, and thus the fatherly appeal to family duties, 
to common decency, as well as the fatherly address of “Come 
Victor” and “be calm I entreat you to hear me,” we hear from 
both father and monster. (The same address, we note, often 
encountered in Shelley’s father’s letters to her.)
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There is psychological evidence for understanding 
children who believe they possess lords of the imagination 
somehow actually as friends, and that do in a sense in fact 
possess them (and are not yet so much malignantly possessed 
by them), which do function to help them feel protected, safe, 
and empowered, as coming to experience them as castigating 
monsters upon adolescence. The psychohistorian Lloyd 
DeMause informs us that:
[C]hildren usually feel guilty about being traumatized. 
“I must have been too noisy, because mommy left 
me” was my sincere belief when my mother left my 
father. I also believed I deserved my father’s 
strappings because I wasn’t obedient enough. This is 
why children set up a separate, internal self as a 
“protector” to try to stop themselves from ever being 
noisy, pushy, sexual, demanding, in fact, to stop them 
from growing and thus re-experiencing trauma. At 
first, these internal “protectors” are friendly; 
sometimes they are represented as imaginary 
playmates or even as protective alters [. . .]. Later, 
particularly when adolescence brings on opportunities 
for greater exploration and especially dating 
[important to note in regards to Keats’ “Ode to a 
Grecian Urn”], these protective selves become 
persecutory selves that “have had it” with the host 
self and actually try to harm it. Their persecutory self 
says, “It’s not happening to me, it’s happening to her, 
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and she deserves it! (6)
While Frankenstein’s lords of the imagination encourage 
hubris, the monster reads and contemplates powerful voices 
that try to caution him away from over-ambition. These 
include Volney’s Ruins of Empires, with its moral lessons 
skimmed from the collapse of once-great empires; Plutarch’s 
Lives, which led him “to admire peaceable lawgivers, Numa, 
Solon, and Lycurgus in preference to Romulus and Theseus” 
(125); and Milton’s Paradise Lost, which has him reflect that he 
had “allowed [his] [. . .] thoughts, unchecked by reason, to 
ramble in the fields of Paradise, and dared to fancy amiable 
and lovely creatures sympathising with my feelings and 
cheering my gloom” (127). Many readers end up 
sympathizing with the monster and almost to hate 
Frankenstein: Mightn’t this owe to that while the monster 
attends to voices which tell of his fallibility, Frankenstein 
listens to those which encourage further ambition? That is, to 
their also being under orders from old lords of the 
imagination, gone monster?
DeMause argues that the kind of wounds incurred from 
being aware at an early age that your parents may often be 
indifferent to or even actually at some level hate you, is 
ultimately far more severe than what might follow from their 
physical beatings. Most times, these emotional hurts never 
heal, and end up rattling on throughout your lifetime, for the 
most part determining its course:
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Traumas are defined as injuries to the private self, 
rather than just painful experiences, since non-painful 
injuries to the self [. . .] are more traumatic to the self 
than, say, more painful accidents. Without a well-
developed, enduring private self, people 
feel threatened by all progress, all freedom, all new 
challenges, and then experience annihilation anxiety, 
fears that the fragile self is disintegrating, since 
situations that call for self-assertion trigger memories 
of [. . .] abandonment. Masterson calls this by the 
umbrella term “abandonment depressions,” beneath 
which he says, “ride the Six Horsemen of the Psychic 
Apocalypse: Depression, Panic, Rage, Guilt, 
Helplessness (hopelessness), and Emptiness (void) 
[that] wreak havoc across the psychic landscape 
leaving pain and terror in their wake.” Whether the 
early traumas or rejections were because the [parents] 
[. . .] were openly abandoning, over-controlling and 
abusive, clinging, or just threatened by the child’s 
emerging individuation, the results are much the 
same—the child learns to fear parts of his or her 
potential self that threatens the disapproval or loss of 
the [. . .] parent. (7)
I think we see here why Frankenstein rejects (he does 
this at least a couple of times) the very same philosophers his 
father so disapproves of, and why, after being subject to 
constant chiding from his father for their distance, he 
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eventually leaves university for home.
But returning home, re-merging with the parent, itself 
has horrible consequences. DeMause tells us that according 
to Socarides:
 
fears of growth, individuation, and self assertion that 
carry threatening feelings of disintegration lead to 
desires to merge with the omnipotent mother, literally 
to crawl back into the womb, desires which 
immediately turn into fears of maternal 
engulfment, since the merging would involve total 
loss of the self. When Socarides’ patients make moves 
to individuate—like moving into their own apartment 
or getting a new job—they have dreams of being 
swallowed by whirlpools of devoured by monsters. 
The only salvation from these maternal engulfment 
wishes/fears is a “flight to external reality from 
internal reality.” (7)
The need to fly away to an external reality, to flee home, 
away from internal reality, may be what Frankenstein is doing 
when he leaves his family to wander through the valleys, and 
why this sublime landscape, though it “did not remove [his] [. 
. .] grief, [. . .] subdued and tranquillised it” (93). He tells us as 
much himself: “Sometimes I could cope with the sullen 
despair that over-whelmed me; but sometimes the whirlwind 
passions of my soul drove me to seek, by bodily exercise and 
by change of place, some relief from my intolerable 
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sensations” (91).
DeMause describes a patient of Masterson’s who should 
remind us strongly of Frankenstein, of the feelings he felt 
before and after his act of hubris:
I was walking down the street and suddenly I was 
engulfed in a feeling of absolute freedom. I could 
taste it. I knew I was capable of doing whatever I 
wanted. When I looked at other people, I really saw 
them without being concerned about how they were 
looking at me [. . .]. I was just being myself and 
thought that I had uncovered the secret of life: being in 
touch with your own feelings and expressing them 
openly with others, not worrying so much about how 
others felt about you. Then just as suddenly as it 
came, it disappeared. I panicked and started thinking 
about the million things I had to do at the studio, of 
errands I needed to run after work. I began to feel 
nauseous and started sweating. I headed for my 
apartment, running most of the way. When I got in, I 
felt that I had been pursued. By what? Freedom, I 
guess [or maybe by a monster]. (8)
This moment of total awareness and complete happiness 
matches well with Frankenstein’s own upon discovering the 
secret of life:
Whence, I often asked myself, did the principle of life 
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proceed? It was a bold question, and one which has 
ever been considered as a mystery; yet with how many 
things are we upon the brink of becoming acquainted, 
if cowardice or carelessness did not restrain our 
enquiries. I revolved these circumstances in my mind, 
and determined thenceforth to apply myself [.] I 
became acquainted with the science of anatomy [.] I 
do not ever remember to have trembled [. . .] or to 
have feared [.] I was led to examine [;] I saw [. . .] the 
fine form of man [.] I beheld the corruption of death 
[.] I saw how the worm inherited the wonders of the 
eye and brain. I paused, examining and analysing all 
the minutiae of causation, as exemplified in the 
change from life to death, and death to life, until from 
the midst of this darkness a sudden light broke in 
upon me—a light so brilliant and wondrous, yet so 
simple, that while I became dizzy with the immensity 
of the prospect which it illustrated, I was surprised, 
that among so many men of genius who had directed 
their enquiries towards the same science, that I alone 
should be reserved to discover so astonishing a secret. 
[. . .] The astonishment which I had at first 
experienced on this discovery soon gave place to 
delight and rapture. (55-6)
But after he beholds “the accomplishment of [his] [. . .] 
toils,” he experiences “an anxiety that almost amounted to 
agony” (56). And this switch from absolute bliss to absolute 
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panic and misery is similar to that experienced by Masterson’s 
patient:
The different accidents are not so changeable as the 
feelings of human nature. I had worked hard for 
nearly two years, for the sole purpose of infusing life 
into an inanimate body. For this I had deprived 
myself of rest and health. I had desired it with an 
ardour that far exceeded moderation; but now that I 
had finished, the beauty of the dream vanished, and 
breathless horror and disgust filled my heart. Unable 
to endure the aspect of the being I had created, I 
rushed out of the room, and continued a long time 
traversing my bedchamber, unable to compose my 
mind to sleep. (56)
Pleasure arising from an accomplishment that 
distinguishes him from other people, leads to a flight to 
external reality.
Shelley, through Frankenstein, is to some extent realizing 
that addressing her inclination toward self-castigation requires 
figuring out a way to ignore her father’s commands, not in 
accepting them, without this amounting to the kind of 
scornful repudiation we saw Frankenstein and Clerval suffer 
upon Clerval’s father. This solution, I think, is something she 
is investigating via her vehicle Frankenstein, but for herself, 
because though Frankenstein is eternally damned, damnation 
blesses him with a wondrous new power. Late in the text, 
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when Frankenstein is recovering from illness, his doctor, Mr. 
Kirwin, exclaims “in a rather severe tone”: “I should have 
thought, young man, that the presence of your father would 
have been welcome instead of inspiring such violent 
repugnance” (174). Frankenstein will now tell his father the 
real reason for his “madness” that previously he’d been 
unable to share with anyone. His father listens to him, and 
“with an expression of unbounded wonder,” says, “My 
dearest Victor, what infatuation is this? My dear son, I entreat 
you never to make such an assertion again” (180). But 
Frankenstein does not acquiesce. Instead, he cries out, “‘I am 
not mad, [. . .] the sun and the heavens, who have viewed my 
operations, can bear witness of my truth. I am the assassin of 
those most innocent victims; they died by my machinations” 
(180). Shelley tells us that “[t]he conclusion of this speech 
convinced [Frankenstein’s] [. . .] father that [his] [. . .] ideas 
were deranged, and he [i.e., the father] instantly changed the 
subject of our conversation” (180). I think this is a replay 
of Frankenstein’s childhood encounter with his father where 
his own explorations were belittled as mere nonsense, but this 
time his father is not right but overhasty, this time he is just 
plain wrong. And this time Frankenstein does not belittle his 
beliefs as false imaginings because he knows he is right. It is 
an encounter between two minds where the father shows 
himself possessed of the smaller.
Moreover, we have a sense that when the father turns to 
other subjects, his son is no longer listening to him; a crucial 
moment has occurred, and Frankenstein is now freed from 
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his father’s opinions and judgments of him. Shelley has 
Frankenstein understand that he knows himself better than 
his father does. Perhaps the significance of this moment is 
such that the deaths of his family members which soon 
follow, which now include both Elizabeth and his father, 
amount to external evidence that he has found a way free of 
torments—no further need to grapple with them required. 
Shelley needed to figure out a way in which Frankenstein’s 
father could still remain good—as it is too painful to imagine 
him otherwise—and where Frankenstein’s own independence 
makes him bad—thereby validating Shelley’s father’s 
judgment of her—but in a way which secretly proves mostly 
liberating. Shelley finds one in the Blakean assessment of 
goodness as innocence and badness as corruption through 
experience. Shelley no longer has Frankenstein listen to his 
reprimands to be happy, his encouragements to abandon his 
studies, or his requirement to turn away from happy thoughts 
towards servicing his family. He heeds no more of his father’s 
advice, because his father is in a sense the child: his father 
cannot appreciate the truths accessible to Frankenstein from 
Frankenstein’s more ranging experiencing of the world. 
Importantly, his father is still characterized as being well-
intentioned; he is still to be distinguished from Clerval’s 
tyrant of a father. But he cannot also be right, because his very 
goodness precludes this possibility. Frankenstein, who once 
speculated that man’s “superior [sensibilities] [. . .] to those 
apparent in the brute [. . .] only renders them more necessary 
beings” (94), and that “[i]f our impulses were confined to 
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hunger, thirst, and desire, we might be nearly free” (94), has 
found a way to claim freedom without denying his superior 
intellectual capacities. For Shelley, I think that this amounts 
to a refusal to falsely confess the wrongness of her way of 
thinking.
In Frankenstein’s last conversation with his father, he is 
attending to other voices. There is no exploration of, no 
engagement with, his father’s lessons; instead, Frankenstein, 
mimicking, claiming the authority of his father, offers but a 
short cursory comment: “Such were the lessons of my father” 
(184). Frankenstein’s mind is on his creation, on his monster. 
Because he can no longer be reached, is no longer to be 
understood by man, Frankenstein is alone. This to many 
critics is the consequence—the punishment—for 
Frankenstein’s hubris, but it is in fact a state of exclusion, of 
being, Shelley was struggling toward—not to be apart from 
man, but to be able to tolerate and appreciate the aloneness 
of independent thinking. As the psychologist Nathaniel 
Branden remarks, “We are social animals [. . .] [;] [w]hile it 
may sometimes be necessary, we do not normally enjoy long 
periods of being alienated from the thinking and beliefs of 
those around us, especially those we respect and love. [Thus] 
[o]ne of the most important forms of heroism is the heroism 
of consciousness, the heroism of thought: the willingness to 
tolerate aloneness” (50). We see, through Frankenstein, that 
Shelley herself finds independence problematic because her 
father wants her to turn her thoughts to her family—to him—
when she takes pleasure from her own activity, her own 
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creations, her own thoughts, or when she attends to those 
outside the family circle. In imagining herself, through her 
creation Frankenstein, surrounded by a cloud of melancholy 
that purportedly makes pleasure impossible to experience, she 
is exploiting the logic of her father’s commands: that is, 
whatever it may do to pleasure, mightn’t it leave her free?
But in truth, is Frankenstein really no longer happy? We 
note that even when he suggests he has become such a vortex 
of misery that even praise has become but another source of 
pain, he isn’t much averse to recounting examples of this 
ostensible, pain-inducing praise. He recounts, for instance:
 
why, M. Clerval, I assure you he [Frankenstein] has 
outstript us all. Ay, stare if you please; but it 
is nevertheless true. A youngster who but a few 
years ago, believed in Cornelius Agrippa as firmly as 
in the Gospel, has now set himself at the head of the 
university and if he is not soon pulled down, we shall 
all be out of countenance. — Ay, ay, [. . .] Mr. 
Frankenstein is modest, an excellent quality in a 
young man. Young men should be diffident of 
themselves, you know, Mr. Clerval; I was myself when 
young, but that wears out in a very short time. (66)
Frankenstein would have us believe he experiences little 
pleasure in, not only such high praise, but high praise from 
one who does not believe great accomplishments are 
necessarily also immodest ones.
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Frankenstein continues to astonish people until his 
death. We remember Walton’s “astonishment on hearing 
such a question addressed to [him] [. . .] from a man on the 
brink of destruction” (24). And though some doubt whether 
Walton is a trustworthy narrator, I think his assessment of 
Frankenstein on the mark when he concludes: “Such a man 
has a double existence: he may suffer misery and be 
overwhelmed by disappointments, yet, when he has retired 
into himself, he will be like a celestial spirit, that has a halo 
around him, within whose circle no grief or folly ventures” 
(28). Shelley, through Frankenstein, has offered herself a sort 
of self-acceptance for her own consideration, where, though 
it amounts to internalizing badness, also means to no longer 
be at war with oneself. It does not amount to stasis; in fact, 
just the opposite—it offers the potential to change, to evolve, 
precisely because it helps resolve inhibiting inner-conflicts. 
Frankenstein is not consistently at peace; he still suffers grief 
and experiences misery. But as Walton observes, he now has 
the ability to recover and continue on his way. Yes, I know—
Frankenstein perishes along the way. But does this represent 
proof, for Shelley, of the trueness of the moral of the story? 
Or, having used Frankenstein to achieve for herself a kind of 
solution, does satisfaction from discovery now replace the 
energy of the inner-toil that drove the writing of the book, 
the telling of the tale, making it simply the appropriate time to 
leave her proxy behind and put down the pen?
Silly consideration? Consider how many people find 
strange the ending of Huckleberry Finn in which, after a 
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confrontation with God we intuitively felt the book was 
leading to, Huck is more or less abandoned as the main 
protagonist as he but passively participates in what really 
amounts to the further adventures of Tom Sawyer. Both 
Twain and Shelley were using their characters for their own 
psychic explorations, and when they create a situation for 
their protagonists—for themselves—that manifests a 
“solution,” a way out/through, it’s time to distance 
themselves from the creation, either by ending the book or 
through the insertion of some other protagonist (one who 
does not so closely resemble themselves) to carry out the 
remainder of the action. The mind primarily busies itself in its 
hoarding away of the discovery for subsequent picking-ats 
and unraveling.
Wendy Steiner, in an introduction to Frankenstein, newly 
released as one of the Modern Library Paperback Classics, 
believes Frankenstein’s polar adventure does not offer 
Frankenstein transcendence. She argues, instead, that the 
ending amounts to a critique by Mary Shelley of the sublime:
The sublime takes individuals out of their time and 
place and lifts them into what Mary Shelley portrays 
as a deathly, inhuman transcendence. Of course, in 
Kant and Burke, this liberation from the here and 
now is the supreme achievement of the imagination, 
but it is clear that Mary Shelley disagreed. 
Frankenstein spends most of his time in the Alps or 
on the polar ice cap, the archetypal landscapes of the 
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sublime; by contrast the Rhine Valley, where he 
travels with Henry, is a romantic setting of gentler 
beauty. “The mountains of Switzerland,” he says, “are 
more majestic and strange, but there is a charm in the 
banks of this divine river that I never before saw 
equalled.” “Charm” is a term that Kant slightingly 
associates with “the agreeable”—meretricious beauty, 
sentiment, the allure of surfaces. If Frankenstein’s 
pure taste craves the self-annihilating sublime, Mary 
Shelley’s belief in “the amiableness of domestic 
affection, and the excellence of universal virtue” finds 
its analogue in the aesthetic of Charm. (xix)
Frankenstein tries to make a firm distinction between the 
sublime and the picturesque, and perhaps this helped fool 
Steiner, because “the amiableness of domestic affection” 
most certainly does surface when Frankenstein is in the Alps! 
Traveling through the valley of Chamounix, Frankenstein 
observes that though “this valley is more wonderful and 
sublime, [it is] [. . .] no[t] so beautiful and picturesque, as that 
of Servox” (91); but of the entire journey of the Alps, 
including traveling through the “high and snowy mountains [. 
. .] and beholding the “supreme and magnificent Mont Blanc” 
(92), Frankenstein tells us:
A tingling log-lost sense of pleasure often came across 
me during this journey. Some turn in the road, some 
new object suddenly perceived and recognised, 
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reminded me of days gone by, and were associated 
with the light-hearted gaiety of boyhood. The very 
winds whispered in soothing accents, and maternal 
nature bade me weep no more. [. . .] [W]atching the 
pallid lightnings that played above Mont Blanc, 
and listening to the rushing of the Arve [,] [. . .] the 
same lulling sounds acted as a lullaby to my too keen 
sensations. (92)
Mont Blanc is itself cuddled by the “vast river of ice 
[which] [. . .] wound among its dependent mountains” (95). I 
do not believe being reminded of the “light-hearted gaiety of 
boyhood” is what Steiner is alluding to in her argument that 
the sublime brings about thoughts of transcendence from the 
here and now, and I doubt that Shelley could imagine any 
landscape more soothing, more gentle, than Frankenstein’s 
description of the Alps allows. It certainly does not seem a 
deathly or inhuman sort of transcendence either. And 
indisputably, there is much more a sense of cocooning in this 
passage than any move toward self-annihilation. No, Shelley 
is not criticizing the sublime landscape here; and the key word 
is not “charm” but rather “joy”—joy in nature offering, after 
travels in any region, serenity and fulfillment.
Joy comes in his contemplations of nature, whether the 
Rhine, the Alps, or a sea of polar ice. About the northern 
ocean of ice, Frankenstein remarks:
The Greeks wept for joy when they beheld the 
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Mediterranean from the hills of Asia, and hailed with 
rapture the boundary of their toils. I did not weep, 
but I knelt down, and, with a full heart, thanked my 
guiding spirit for conducting me in safety to the place 
where I hoped, notwithstanding my adversary’s give, 
to meet and grapple with him. (199)
This thanking of spirits for the chance to grapple with 
his creation is not evidence of his madness—instead, it is the 
very real pleasure Frankenstein is capable of feeling now that 
he has decided he will confront rather than be intimidated by 
the demands of his confessor. He dies before he has the 
chance, but the monster gives what amounts to a fair account 
of Frankenstein’s and Shelley’s strange but real triumph: “Yet 
when she died!—nay, then I was not miserable. I had cast off 
all feeling, subdued all anguish, to riot in the excess of my 
despair. Evil thenceforth became my good” (212).
Steiner is right, though, to describe “the plot of 
Frankenstein [as] [. . .] a demonic parody of the epiphanic 
‘spots of time,’ in Wordsworth’s ‘Prelude.’ Every episode in 
the novel is the same trauma, nightmarishly repeated: the loss 
of a loved one” (xix). Where I differ with him is in believing 
that the purpose of the repetition is not to draw attention to, 
to emphasize, the consequences of hubris—to offer the same 
moral lesson over and over again—but rather to assist Shelley 
in a search for a solution to a traumatizing abandonment 
when for her all pleasure turned to pain. The solution is not 
readily grasped; it requires wide knowledge of the way people 
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work along with the capacity to accept some unsettling truths. 
But it is a Romantic one (where “Evil thenceforth became my 
good” [212]) that rivals the oddity and remarkableness 
of Keats’ own solution to a similar moment in his own life he 
too cannot but obsess over.
Before arriving at a better solution, Shelley has 
Frankenstein satisfy himself with moments where “a truce [is] 
[. . .] established between the present hour and the irresistible, 
disastrous future” (178). I believe this is the satisfaction Keats 
experiences from contemplating the urn. I mentioned earlier 
that the onset of dating often brings about parental rejection. 
The reason is because dating, like motherhood, means 
making someone other than your parents the primary focus 
of your concerns. In Frankenstein, the father tells Frankenstein 
to turn his attention to his family when he experiences self-
pleasure, and we learn from Hill-Miller that Shelley’s father 
was greatly displeased with her daughter’s decision to elope 
with Percy Shelley. In “Ode to a Grecian Urn” we have two 
lovers “frozen” just as they are about to kiss (“[t]hough 
winning near the goal”[18]). This image is followed by one of 
townsfolk coming to sacrifice. Together, they constitute a 
before and after—or more aptly, an if/then: if you choose to 
embrace, then you can expect to be promptly punished for 
doing so. By being frozen in time, the lovers are saved, not 
simply from experiencing their own sure inconstancy in love 
and the slow effects of aging on young beauty, but from the 




The poem’s structure pits the ideals and strivings of 
youth against the harsh judgments of parents. It begins with 
the narrator, excited by what he sees on the urn, eagerly 
asking questions: “What men or gods are these? What 
maidens loath? / What mad pursuit? What struggle to escape? 
What pipes and timbrels? What wild ecstasy?” (8-10). He, like 
Walton in Frankenstein, is “by [his] [. . .] eagerness and [. . .] 
wonder and hope [. . .] express[ing] [. . .] that [he] expect[s] to 
be informed of the secret with which [the urn is] [. . .] 
acquainted” (51). We remember Frankenstein refusing to 
“lead [Walton] [. . .] on to [his] [. . .] destruction and infallible 
misery” (51-52), his lecturing him on “how much happier that 
man is who believes his native town to be the world, than he 
who aspires to become greater than his nature will allow” 
(52). Similarly, the urn, in a sense, attempts to stop the 
narrator’s over-eager and perilous investigations, supposedly 
“out of friendship,” as “a friend to man” (48), moralizing 
“Beauty is truth, truth beauty,”—that is all / Ye know on 
earth, and all ye need to know” (49-50).
These last two lines are as famous as almost any out of 
Shakespeare. They last out of poetry, but just as much for 
representing the ongoing human problem of inhibiting 
parental voices, the power, similar voiced statements in 
people’s own lives had, to still their realizing their full 
potential. Some critics believe they represent Keats’ firmly 
held conclusions, having arisen from his own investigations 
of truths for man (Lyon 45). Sidney Colvin says that “amidst 
the gropings of reason and the flux of things, [truth is beauty, 
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beauty is truth] is to the poet and artist—at least to one of 
Keats’ temper—an immutable law” (45). Others have an 
adverse reaction to them, believing they are jolting, poetically 
awry, or self-evidently false, or the voice of the urn rather 
than Keats’ own. William Wilkinson believes that the “idea of 
‘truth’ [is] [. . .] foisted in with violence” (49), and that it 
upsets both the beauty and believability of the poem. He 
proceeds to create a “better” ending where “[b]eauty is joy” 
(49). H. W. Garrod believes that “every reader [. . .] in some 
degree feels them, feels a certain uneasiness [in the last two 
lines]” (60). Royall Snow damns the message: “[t]hat is 
nonsense and instinctively we feel it. The poem is so well 
loved precisely because that appeal is valid and universal. 
Though we crave a solution of the questions transiency raises 
in our minds, we scarcely crave this solution once its 
implications become clear” (62). Snow investigates whether it 
is possible that “Keats never either meant nor made such a 
statement as ‘Beauty is truth?’” (62). He concludes that he did 
not; the trouble is that the message has been taken out of 
context. Snow, though, believes there is a consistent single 
voice encountered throughout the poem. Like F.R. Leavis, he 
believes “[t]he proposition is strictly in keeping with the 
attitude concretely embodied in the poem” (78). Others find 
the riddle solved upon appreciating that they are “uttered by 
the urn without any interference on the part of the poet” 
(Lyon 111). 
The mere fact that there are a variety of opinions here is 
refreshing compared with the near absence of mental-
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wrestling over whether or not Frankenstein’s moralizing 
statement to Walton is in fact a component of Shelley’s own 
world-view. The best we get there is the suggestion that 
Shelley’s warning, “however reasoned and erudite [,] [. . .] has 
sounded timid next to the heroes challenge of 
Frankensteinian inquiry, and posterity has preferred horror 
over healing” (Steiner xx). In short, most critics do not 
explore as they do with Keats’ “Ode to a Grecian Urn,” 
whether the moralizing voice is not in fact the voice of the 
writer. However, neither work is simply the playing out of a 
conclusion regarding life either writer has already arrived at. 
Instead, both are active working-outs of a life experience that 
afflicts them enough for them to attempt to find a solution 
through their writing of the work itself.
In both works there is the staging of the warring 
elements—youthful ambition versus parental intimidation. 
Shelley uses the pursuit of youthful studies to taste success, 
Keats uses the young lovers to know love. Concerning Keats, 
Clarence Thorpe concurs:
[T]he symbols executed here, themselves a product of 
mind and soul, still contain within themselves a 
dynamic something that has power to kindle the 
imagination of a sympathetic observer, who [. . .] is 
able to re-create the particular bits of life[.] [T]he 
image [of the young lovers] comes to the mind of 
Keats in a pleasurable wave of recognition. It is 
pleasurable because he detects, starting out at him 
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from the fair chiselled form, waves of intuitive 
whisperings that seize his imagination and set it 
aflame[.] (58-59)
I differ from Thorpe in believing that what the 
“kindl[ing] the imagination” (59) of a sympathetic observer 
amounts to is a merging with the image, not simply being 
stimulated by it, so to become a near participant in the scene, 
and that the pleasurable wave of recognition is not caught 
sight of a semblance to one’s own experiences, but the result 
of a more direct re-experiencing of the past.
The critic I am in most sympathy with in regards to its 
meaning agrees that the poem represents, though disguised, a 
moment from Keats’ own past. Albert Mordell believes that 
“emotions connected with Fanny Brawne [Keats’ former 
lover] inspired his two most famous odes [,] [including] [. . .] 
‘to the Grecian Urn’” (199). “Keats saw a resemblance 
between himself and that youth. He, too, was winning and 
near the goal, and he no more had her love than did the 
youth on the urn. [. . .] He had to accept his lot and pretend 
to see some advantage in it as he did in that of the youth on 
the urn” (205). Compromise owes to his sharing a fate akin to 
Frankenstein’s, when, even when he “appeared almost within 
grasp of [his] [. . .] foe, [he had his] [. . .] hopes [. . .] suddenly 
extinguished” (201). Consummation, experience of any 
moment that would make one truly happy, is often one where 
pleasure turns into pain. Branden notes that “[he] had the 
opportunity to work with many thousands of people in a 
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variety of professional contexts and settings[,] [and] [. . .] is 
absolutely persuaded that happiness anxiety is one of our 
most widespread and least understood problems” (91). He 
continues:
Many people feel they do not deserve happiness, are 
not entitled to happiness, have no right to the 
fulfillment of their emotional needs and wants. Often 
they feel that if they are happy, either their happiness 
will be taken away from them, or something terrible 
will happen to counterbalance it, some unspeakable 
punishment or tragedy. (97)
Branden notes that to stop and reflect on one’s troubles, 
in an effort to properly identify and resolve them, is unusual, 
because most people fear that if they ever stop and look 
inside they may discover “there’s nothing there” (93). Rather 
than reflect upon and attempt to resolve it, most often when 
feeling anxious, “[i]n order to make it more bearable, it is 
commonly converted into specific, tangible fears, which 
might seem to have some semblance of plausibility of the 
circumstances of one’s life [but which amount to] [. . .] a 
smokescreen and defence against an anxiety whose roots lie 
in the core experience of self” (79). Keats is using the two 
lovers to engage his past. In this he is already somewhat less 
the coward than Mordell assesses him as.
It is true, though, that Keats, like Shelley, is imagining 
what it might feel like if he pretended it true that “Heard 
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melodies are sweet, but those unheard / Are sweeter” (11-
12). He is trying the rationalization on, just as Shelley is trying 
on the idea that it is best to live modestly, quietly, amongst 
friends and family in her native town. Both, though, have too 
high a self-esteem to long content themselves with 
compromised offerings, for: 
one of the characteristics of high self-esteem is an 
eagerness for the new and the challenging, for that 
which will allow an individual to use his or her 
capacities to the fullest extent—just as a fondness for 
the familiar, the routine, and the unexacting coupled 
with a fear of the new and the difficult is a virtually 
unmistakable indication of low self-esteem. (Branden 
90)
We have discussed Shelley’s eventual solution, and we 
will soon discuss Keats’ own, but first I will offer a brief 
explanation as to why we should imagine the image of the 
village sacrifice as conjoined to the image of the young lovers, 
not as separate and distinct from them.
The poem, of course, begins with talk of pursuits, 
struggles to escape, along with maidens and wild ecstasy. 
“Who are these coming to the sacrifice?” (31) follows but 
three lines after “All breathing human passion far above” 
(28), so they are, more or less, two images which flow into 
one another. From “Lead’st thou that heifer lowin at the 
skies” (33), we know that a heifer, a young cow, is to be 
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sacrificed. The sacrifice of animals in antiquity was actually a 
change for the better in the history of the barbaric ritual of 
sacrifice; previously, sacrifices were human, healthy young 
men and women—representing our most promising selves—
more often than not. All we require to understand that the 
heifer is in fact a metaphor for young lovers, and that the two 
images are linked for Keats’ consideration of the troubling 
moments in his past when pleasure turned to pain, is to 
understand that dating often leads to parental rejection. 
Children, who initially worship their parents as gods, and 
imagine their family as all the world, are left alone to contend 
with the wiles of the world—are sacrificed—by their parents, as 
they begin to focus more on themselves and life beyond the 
home.
Keats’ “Ode to Melancholy” represents his own 
Romantic solution to the terror and pain of parental rejection. 
Rather than acquiesce to parents’ demands, Keats offers a 
prescription for continuing on in the very teeth of pain, 
making a poem that begins with “death moths” (6) and 
“mournful Psyche” (7) rather than with a “flowery tale” (4) 
and a “wild ecstasy” (10), actually the more uplifting of the 
two. If all great pleasures turn into piercing pain, if “Joy [. . .] 
Turn[s] [. . .] to Poison while the bee-mouth sips” (24), there 
is another option available other than avoiding vivid 
experience in ostensible preference for “unheard melodies”: 
keep sipping. To prescribe feeding “deep, deep upon [the] [. . 
.] peerless eyes” (20) of melancholy amounts in my mind to 
an admission that “heard” melodies are in fact much sweeter 
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than “unheard” ones, they just come with the bitterest of 
after-tastes. Same thing, also, with unconsummated love. 
Keats concludes that it is better to suffer the pain because 
otherwise “For shade to shade will come too drowsily” (9): 
our experiences in life will be muted ones. As Morris 
Dickstein tells us, the “permanence that the [. . .] Grecian urn 
seemed to offer is forgotten [. . .]. Keats no longer seeks 
passive dissolution, freedom from the flux and tension of 
actuality; he dismisses that wish, demands passionate assault 
on the world of experience, with all its contrary sensations, 
with all its intimations of mortality” (231).
This is the declaration of a Romantic. In a sense, it is not 
dissimilar to what Frankenstein’s family had hoped Justine 
capable of. They believed it better to resist “confessors,” to 
resist being compliant, for, even if this leads to torture, to 
“let[ting] her [confessors] rave” (19), in addition to being 
both good and right it also affords a pleasing sense of self-
regard that counts against the pain. Keats is choosing not to 
follow the path of least resistance, which would have him, not 
drink down terrors, but douse his anxieties with drugs in 
some effort to turn them off. Instead, he declares he will 
continue to imbibe them so he might enjoy a rich, resonate 
life.
John Keats died at an early age, and so we are used to 
hearing that “[n]o one can read Keats’ poems and letters 
without an undersense of immense waste of so extraordinary 
an intellect and genius cut off so early” (Abrams 504). One 
rarely encounters such regret for Frankenstein, for, for his 
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hubris of self-attendance and transgressive exploits, he 
ostensibly deserved no better. But in coming to this 
conclusion, a conclusion I believe Mary Shelley herself did 
not subscribe to and was struggling the whole of her life to 
resist, are we rewarding ourselves with the sense of 
superiority that comes from being “good” at the expense of 
the genuine superiority that could follow from our being 
“bad”? Is it really true that happiness and self-respect lie in 
never forgetting all our parents are due, in moderating our 
pleasures in deference to all we have been told we still owe 
them? Or is this a deception we foist on ourselves, a “truth” 
we feel we must try to oblige, lest we slip into self-
condemnation, self-hatred? Mightn’t it be, that is, that we just 
failed where others would have succeeded? 
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Draining the Amazons’ Swamp (March 2002) 
Elizabeth Gaskell, in her “Our Society at Cranford,” creates 
for herself a means of revisiting the maternal matrix from 
which she emerged, the lengthy gestational period with her 
mother. As the desire for symbiosis with our mothers, who 
are “our original primary source[s] of pleasure, security, and 
identity” (25), is always with us, we experience throughout 
our lives “a regressive longing to ‘return’ to the maternal 
matrix” (Koeningsberg 26). At the same time, as fusion with 
our mothers means the disintegration of our own self-
constructed identities as well as feelings of “re-capture” by 
the “devouring mother [. . .] [,] who destroys at will or 
retributively” (Rheingold 18), this push to make a return 
generates subsequent desperate attempts to pull ourselves 
back out. It is a hazardous journey; however, there are ways 
to make it a less troubling one. Gaskell, for instance, goes on 
the journey second-hand, through a constructed narrator. 
Further, she brings with her totems of maleness, that is, 
representations of an other that all mothers carry with them 
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that represent something alien and distinct from themselves. 
Their male essence acts as a repellent which provides time to 
re-experience the matrix; but their potency, detached from 
their manly source (i.e., the outside world), is quickly drained. 
Gaskell therefore needs to generate successive 
representations of maleness within her narrative to 
accomplish the transformation she is attempting to effect. 
Her goal is nothing less than the replacement of her own 
internal representation of her mother with one less terrifying, 
one less threatening to drain her own individuality from her. 
She is assisted by men, but it is a heroine’s journey, towards a 
most valuable prize: after braving such a journey, daring such 
a feat, she feels entitled and becomes empowered to keep this 
transitional mother as the one she returns to on subsequent 
journeys.
Before we begin this, our own journey, which likely 
threatens to be moving inwards to its own strangely alluring 
(hopefully) but also menacing “swamp” (hopefully not), to 
help lure the reader in, I will make some attempt to anticipate 
sources of apprehension my reader may currently be having. 
1) Though I believe that the quality of parental care varies 
enormously and is more important in determining the adult 
personality than one’s sex, my argument is based on a 
biologically fixed way all mothers react to their differently 
sexed children. My study is not inspired by the work done on 
the instability of semantic boundaries; I do believe, though, 
that contemporary critical approaches to literature such as 
deconstruction and new historicism provide journeys similar 
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to the one I will be describing here. Critics set off from an 
“enlightened” (st)age: they are aware of the instability of 
meanings and of the multiplicity of selves (a sophisticated 
state of consciousness denied those they set out to visit). 
Though they are braving a journey into a matrix they 
associate with the disintegration of selfhood, they come 
equipped with theories that enable them to transform their 
environment. They too are attempting to become heroes: by 
demonstrating a text’s incoherence and heterogeneousness 
they leave the text, formally a formidable representation of 
the literary canon, “de-fanged”—it becomes a less threatening 
object to play with and return to. 2) I am also identifying the 
narrator with the author. I see the narrator in “Cranford” as 
the object generated by Gaskell to locate herself within the 
text; the narrator’s status, whether flattened out within the 
plural pronoun “we” or strongly individuated within the 
personal pronoun “I,” serves to both represent Gaskell’s own 
sense of herself at a particular point of the text and to 
generate subsequent plot developments. Since the distinction 
between author and narrator is so often made these days, I 
accept my reader’s potential disapproval, but also ask for 
open consideration of this possibility: Perhaps my brazen 
approach will for some help reinvigorate subsequent revisits 
to “Cranford.”
The first several paragraphs of the story establish for 
both the reader and for Gaskell herself that we are about to 
revisit the maternal home. As children naturally see their 
mother as vastly more powerful than themselves (she is their 
DRAINING THE AMAZON’S SWAMP
115
first god, and the inspiration behind all subsequent ones), and 
with the father (especially in the past, but so often these days 
too) often either for the most part absent from the home or 
distant while in the home, the maternal matrix (i.e., home) is a 
place where the mother is in charge. Cranford, the narrator 
tells us, “[i]n the first place, [. . .] is in the possession of the 
Amazons” (3). The Cranford women are described as if they 
are each best identified by what they share in common: they 
all “keep [ . . .] gardens full of choice flowers” (3); they all 
“frighten [. . .] away little boys” (3); they all “rush out at 
geese” (3); they all “decid[e] [. . .] questions of literature and 
politics without troubling themselves with unnecessary 
reasons or arguments” (3); they all “obtain [. . .] clear and 
correct knowledge of everybody’s affairs in the parish” (3); 
they are all “kind [. . .] to the poor” (3); they are all 
“sufficient” (3). They are all the same. At our entrance into 
Cranford, into the maternal matrix, we sense immediately that 
we are in an environment where our individuality, our 
personhood, may not be secure.
As we crave the love of our mothers, and as an attempt 
to revisit and reclaim this love motivates our journey, the 
narrator takes care not to be too critical of the way the 
mother, so to speak, tends her home. So despite having 
described the town of Cranford as a swampy place into which 
men “disappear,” and into which goes the Cranford women’s 
individuality, the narrator assures herself (and us) that “each 
[of these Amazons] has her own individuality” (3). But she 
follows his declaration by once again making them seem all 
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alike. We are told, “good-will reigns among them to a 
considerable degree” (3). In truth, there is only one distinctive 
individual who resides in Cranford: the formidable mother-
figure, Miss Jenkyns. And she is to be found further, deeper 
into the story—at its center, rather than along its periphery.
The journey into Cranford is a journey into the past. 
“Their [i.e., the Cranford women’s) dress is very independent 
of fashion” (3)—“the last tight and scanty petticoat in wear in 
England, was seen in Cranford” (4). Specifically, Gaskell is 
creating a journey to a past we have all experienced. 
“Cranford” is a journey to the time in our lives when we were 
subject “to rules and regulations” (4) of our own mothers. 
The narrator tells us that it takes but a few days’ stay in 
Cranford for young people (who are just visiting) to lose their 
autonomy, their “liberty,” and to internalize Cranford’s 
“rule[s]” (4). These are the same rules, presumably, they 
hoped to have left behind them in their becoming adults, but 
to be within Cranford is to become the child in his/her 
mother’s domain. It is to re-experience the authority of all 
that “your mamma has told you” (4), and finding yourself 
accepting her rule. Acquiescence means that visitors lose their 
adult sense of autonomy in their speech (“no absorbing 
subject was ever spoken about” [4]), in movement (“the 
inhabitants [. . .] clattered home in their patterns” [5]), in time 
(“the whole town was abed and asleep by half-past ten” [5]), 
and in dwelling-place (“baby-house of a dwelling” [5]). In 
Nostalgia and Recollection in Victorian Culture, Ann Coley argues 
that “Cranford” is a creation born out of a “yearn[ing] for a 
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time and place that seems to compensate for and soothe the 
rough incongruities of the present” (76). I concur; but 
considering that such shaping and softening means the 
obliteration of one’s own distinct personality, I think 
“Cranford” at least as much or more represents Gaskell’s 
attempt to “undercut the longing for such an idyllic past” 
(Coley 76)! In fact, if we were not driven by our need, set by 
our early experiences of our mother as the source of love and 
human warmth, to re-experience this “idyllic” environment, 
we likely would not attempt the journey.
Our narrator does not stay long in Cranford. Just as she 
is beginning, with her successive step-by-step itemizing of the 
particular regressions Cranford commands of her, to slowly 
acclimatize herself, she pulls herself out: she leaves this space 
within the text she calls and we think of as Cranford. She 
withdraws to her starting point, her present existence in the 
city of Drumble. She is able to do so because she has not well 
identified herself as being, in the present tense, within the 
town. Moreover, she has a masculine place to return to. This 
place, this city, Drumble, is associated with commercialism, 
modern technology, a quickness in pace and an authoritative 
judgment of anything not new as of bad taste. It is a 
masculine Now prepared to ruthlessly shorn itself of its 
feminine past. She uses a description of Mrs Jamieson as 
“practic[ing] ‘elegant economy’” (Gaskell 5) to remind herself 
she is no longer in Cranford. When she repeatedly writes 
“[e]legant economy!” and reminds herself that she was 
“fall[ing] back,” of how easy it is to “fall back into the 
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phraseology of Cranford!” (5), she is startling herself back 
into her adult mindset with the help of successive 
exclamations. The narrator is losing herself too readily within 
the collective pronoun “we” in the text, despite her attempts 
to sustain the singular “I.” She becomes part of the “we” that 
“kept [. . .] [them]selves to short sentences of small talk, and 
were punctual to our time” (4), despite her earlier attempt to 
establish the young visitors to Cranford as those who 
acquiesced to its rules.
At this point in the text the singular pronoun “I” is 
claimed by the narrator principally while she is outside 
Cranford, explaining its nature to someone else. For now, 
within Cranford, “I” is associated with the commanding 
mother-type who transforms the visiting youth and the 
narrator into a complicit “we,” that is, the one who offers 
scolding lectures (“I dare say your mamma has told you, my 
dear, never to [—]” [4]) to them. However, the narrator is 
merely testing the waters; she knows from the beginning what 
is required to explore Cranford without so readily 
disassembling. She needs to bring along “[a] man,” a 
representative of—and one metonymically linked to—the 
“outside world,” who will get “in the way” (3) of the 
homogenizing forces at work in Cranford.
She creates one. And, after her successive and nearly 
endless listing of the smothering forces at work in Cranford, 
she begins her re-entry into Cranford with a successive listing 
of the masculine attributes of her guardian, Captain Brown, 
which enables him to resist meekly conforming to Cranford’ 
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laws upon entrance into town. He is described as “brazen” 
(6), and he is. He speaks openly (“about his being poor” “in 
the public street!” [5]), “in a loud military voice!” (5). He is 
“invad[ing] [. . .] their territory” (5). More importantly, he 
scares them (the women of Cranford) with his “connexion 
with the obnoxious railroad” (6). He is empowered by his 
“masculine gender” so that rather than being made to feel like 
a child, he soon “ma[kes] himself respected in Cranford [. . .] 
in spite of all resolutions to the contrary” (6).
The narrator likely means for “masculine gender” to 
mean the male sex, and though he clearly is supposed to 
represent the exceptional man, it is largely because of Captain 
Brown’s sex that he is able to remain distinct while in 
Cranford. Unlike with their girls, mothers automatically react 
to their boys as if they are fundamentally different and 
distinct from themselves. Because of this, girls understand 
early on that “freedom”—i.e., an identity distinct and separate 
from their mother—has something to do with being male. As 
we will explore, freedom can be, not just disorienting but an 
absolutely terrifying thing, and fear of experiencing freedom 
is the inspiration for the Cranford women literally scaring 
away all the (unexceptional) men in town. But to be able to 
be fully free, that is, to be able to strongly resist capitulating 
to others in favor of your own growth, is unceasingly alluring. 
And thus we understand the Cranford ladies’ attraction to the 
exceptional man—to Captain Brown—who can remain 
undaunted after experiencing their best efforts to either expel 
him or make him conform to Cranford’ law.
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Captain Brown, by keeping Cranford’s smothering forces 
in check, makes it safe for the narrator to re-enter the text. 
She can now revisit her memories with her mother without 
experiencing an overwhelming sense of regression or a 
withering away of her autonomy and individuality. He is her 
agent, and her lead-in: after he triumphantly establishes 
himself in the town as conqueror of the Amazons, the 
narrator establishes herself, in the present tense, within 
Cranford.
While in Cranford Captain Brown serves two primary 
purposes for the narrator: 1) As he does not take his 
“appointed” house and instead “take[s] a small house on the 
outskirts of the town” (7), he thereby provides the narrator 
with a place to situate herself so that she can be, so to speak, 
at Cranford, but not wholly within it. Coley argues that 
Cranford’s rituals, which “soften and smooth out the effects 
of change,” permit Captain Brown (whom she describes as 
representing “a more modern age or progress” [75]) to “be 
admitted from the periphery into the center [of Cranford] [. . 
.] without rupturing its core” (75). I appreciate her focus on 
the various sorts of textual spaces in Cranford, and might 
agree that Cranford eventually integrates Captain Brown 
within its society, but strongly argue that his very purpose for 
being introduced into Cranford is so that he can rupture its 
core! 2) With his masculine otherness and essence he will help 
bring the narrator to her goal: a re-encounter with her 
“mother,” and not just with her (i.e., her mother’s) immediate 
environment. As mentioned, he will also, as a representation 
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of “Death” (Gaskell 6), and through the narrator’s sacrifice of 
him, destroy the authority and potency (a kind of death) of 
Cranford’s town matriarch, Miss Jenkyns.
Captain Brown, this early into Cranford and into the 
text, is capable of dramatic displays of his manhood, but this 
soon begins to drain away. We are offered a sense of both 
who he is (a master) and who he will become (a servant), 
when he again distinguishes himself from the Cranford crowd 
at church. “He [Captain Brown] made the responses louder 
than the clerk—an old man with a piping feeble voice” (8). 
Soon afterwards the text shows him fluctuating between loud 
brazenness and inaudible feebleness. Importantly, however, 
still energized and encouraged by his dominance of the 
church crowd, he is able to lead the narrator to his one-on-
one encounter with Miss Jenkyns.
At a party of Miss Jenkyns,’ Captain Brown still 
dominates the Cranford women (“sharp voices lowered at his 
approach” [9]), but he is beginning to seem more courteous 
than brazen. Captain Brown, we are told, “immediately and 
quietly assumed the man’s place in the room” (9). However, 
he still has enough manly impudence to challenge the hostess 
in her home. Like dueling shamans, they summon their gods 
for battle: Miss Jenkyns’ Dr Johnson versus Captain Brown’s 
Mr Boz. Miss Jenkyns attempts to tame Captain Brown’s 
literary taste, telling him, “I have formed my own style upon 
it; I recommend it to your favourite” (11). Her friends already 
consider Miss Jenkyns’ “[e]pistolary writing as her forte” (11; 
emphasis in original). However, he rebuffs her by telling her, 
PATRICK MCEVOY-HALSTON
122
“I should be very sorry for him to exchange his style for any 
such pompous writing” (11). It is a brave confrontation with 
Cranford’s chief “amazon,” but also one that required most, 
if not all, of his adult masculinity. He shows clear signs of 
regressing to a childlike state while dueling with her. While 
listening to her, he “screw[s] his lips up, and drummed on the 
table, but he did not speak” (11), as if a child afraid to 
confront his mother directly. He asks her a defiant question, 
but “in a low voice, which [the narrator thinks] Miss Jenkyns 
could not have heard” (11). And after managing to deliver 
upon Miss Jenkyns “a personal affront,” “he was penitent 
afterwards, as he showed by going to stand near [her] [. . .] 
arm-chair, and endeavouring to beguile her” (11). In short, in 
this scene, where he does act the part of the triumphant 
shaman, he also plays the part of the sometimes timid, 
sometimes remorseful, acolyte.
The personal suffering of Captain Brown’s kin and his 
repeated attempts to placate Miss Jenkyns, constitutes much 
of what immediately succeeds this scene in the text. We hear 
of Captain Brown’s daughter’s (Miss Brown’s) “lingering, 
incurable complaint” (13), and as if her condition is linked to 
Miss Jenkyns fury at Captain Brown’s impudence, we read of 
Captain Brown trying repeatedly “to make peace with” (13) 
her. The narrator, as if in response to Captain Brown’s loss of 
“potency” (i.e., his “placidity” [13]), coupled with signs of her 
own obedience to Miss Jenkyns (she is described as being 
“bade” [13] by Miss Jenkyns), leaves Cranford for Drumble 
while still empowered to do so. 
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The narrator introduces a new source of manly potency 
into the text to help rejuvenate her sagging Captain Brown—
Lord Mauleverer. Lord Mauleverer is a source of energy: he 
“br[ings] his lordship [into the] [. . .] little town” (14; emphasis 
added). He has come to visit Captain Brown, and brings upon 
him associations of manly performance “in the ‘plumed 
wars’” and the power to “avert destruction” (14)—just what 
Captain Brown needs to avoid losing the individuality which 
had empowered him thus far in Cranford! As formerly with 
Captain Brown, Lord Mauleverer is described as exciting the 
town. He, much like Captain Brown, tames the Cranford 
Amazons, and thereby makes it safe for the narrator to re-
enter Cranford. Her next visit is described in such a way to 
make Cranford seem set for another energized happening: 
“[t]here had been neither births, deaths, nor marriages since I 
was there last” (15). The stage is set, with a newly energized 
Captain Brown, for the delivery of another powerful blow to 
their head “prophetess” (14).
Lord Mauleverer does indeed “do something for the 
man who saved his life”: Captain Brown becomes “as happy 
and cheerful as a prince” (17). Newly energized, Captain 
Brown is primed to usher in the narrator’s coup-de-grace: she 
uses his newly reinvigorated association with the outside 
world (his experience in wars and his friendship with lords) to 
bring in a “nasty [and] [. . .] cruel” (17) train into Cranford to 
run over him. The train might have been introduced at any 
time, but is best introduced when it can most readily be 
associated with him. This is likely only when he seems 
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energized, as then the train’s dramatic entrance is more apt to 
remind one of his own “invasion” (5) of Cranford. The train 
could not, however, be introduced at the beginning of the 
text, because the narrator required time to strongly associate 
Captain Brown and Miss Jenkyns with one another. With him 
always placating her, and with her forever piqued at him, the 
pairing is complete. Further, just as Captain Brown’s 
association with Lord Maulever made him “a prince,” Captain 
Brown’s association with Miss Jenkyns incurs upon her his 
association with death.
We remember that when we first met Captain Brown, his 
association with the railroad also associated him with death. 
In this early part of the story, in two sentences, one following 
the other, these two key words are linked with Captain 
Brown’s own behavior. The text reads, “[along with] his 
connection with the obnoxious railroad, he was so brazen as 
to talk of being poor—why, then, indeed, he must be sent to 
Coventry. Death was as true and as common as poverty; yet 
people never spoke about that, loud in the streets” (6). 
Captain Brown brings Death into “Cranford,” and it filters 
into our experience of “Cranford” thereafter.
Death is first characterized as if it is similar to poverty, 
both being true and common, but a distinction is made 
between the two terms: Captain Brown loudly speaks of his 
poverty, but does not speak of death. Why, then, if he himself 
doesn’t, and the Cranford ladies most certainly don’t, does 
the narrator attach this word to Captain Brown, so early into 
the narrative and brazenly capitalized? It is not simply an apt 
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comparison to make to help convey how inappropriate his 
openness about poverty is in Cranford. It serves this purpose, 
but the selection of death as the particular association to be 
paired with poverty serves as a clue that to the narrator and to 
the Cranford women to openly acknowledge one’s poverty is 
to very specifically bring about thoughts of death. Therein, in 
fact, lies the true reason the Cranford women deliberately 
blind themselves to poverty. 
The narrator complains of the Cranford ladies “blinding 
[themselves] to the vulgar fact that [. . .] [they] were, all of [. . 
.] [them], people of very moderate means” (6). She offers a 
reason—a highly suggestive though badly misleading one—
for their self-blinding: it is so they are not “prevent[ed] [. . .] 
from doing anything that they wished” (6). Arguably, the 
opposite is true: if the Cranford women did not blind 
themselves and instead permitted themselves to openly 
acknowledge their poverty, they might take the first step 
towards increasing their status materially rather than just 
imaginatively. That is, they might stop compensating for their 
fallen state and arise through the efforts required to amass 
material possessions.
Change requiring the altering of habits might lead to 
personal growth, to self-discovery, to individuality, and thus to 
emergence from the maternal fold. Blindness leads to a static 
life in which “doing anything [one] [. . .] wish[es],” really 
amounts to doing much the same as everyone else. The real 
reason they blind themselves is because, because 
individuation by a child is so often imagined by the mother as 
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a rejection of her, if they allowed themselves to individuate it 
would bring about real feelings of abandonment, of having 
incurred an intolerable loss. “The perception of loss is not 
bearable, it cannot be integrated by the ego” (Koenigsberg 
10). “The child is so dependent on the mother, [his/her] [. . .] 
attachment to her so intense, that separation from the mother 
is experienced to be equivalent to the death of the self” (14; 
emphasis in original). To be blind is to lose individuality, to 
remain in symbiosis with the mother; but to allow oneself to 
see is to risk losing oneself altogether. The double-bind 
women are in explains Captain Brown’s possession of 
totemic powers: because the mother’s original conception of 
the male is as someone different from her, Captain Brown 
can exist outside the maternal fold (in the realm of death) and 
still claim the attention of the mother figure. This is, after all, 
the original way mother and son encounter one another.
Soon we encounter Miss Jenkyns identified with Captain 
Brown (as a warrior), and thus to death as well. At Captain 
Brown’s funeral, the narrator imagines Miss Jenkyns’ bonnet 
as a helmet (Gaskell 20). However, Miss Jenkyns resists the 
fate the narrator has in mind for her. She uses the power her 
own hegemony over Cranford still provides her to attempt to 
overwhelm the wily narrator who seeks her destruction. Our 
narrator momentarily is in a weak position: she has killed her 
own guardian, who not only facilitated departure from 
Cranford but also provided a safe position on the periphery 
of Cranford in which to locate herself.
And Miss Jenkyns is powerful in her death-knell. She is 
DRAINING THE AMAZON’S SWAMP
127
described as both commanding and angry (e.g., “Miss Jenkyns 
declared, in an angry voice” [21]). She reduces the narrator to 
a child-like state, “c[atching] [her] crying,” and making her 
“afraid lest she would be displeased” (21). Miss Jenkyns 
insists that Captain Brown’s remaining daughter, Miss Jessie, 
“stay with her,” leaving her (i.e., Miss Jessie’s) own house 
“desolate” (21). Contrary to Colley’s view, Captain Brown’s 
house is not located on the periphery because it will take time 
for him to integrate himself within the Cranford community; 
rather, the periphery is instead the ideal position to locate 
oneself while Cranford’s core is under Miss Jenkyns’ control. 
As many new historical and Marxist critics hold as true 
regarding the societies they study, the best space to develop 
one’s own voice in Cranford is along the periphery, where the 
hegemonic hold of the dominant power is least certain.
Now lacking a conception of Cranford as having a 
secure periphery in which to ground some opposition to its 
potent center, the narrator is helplessly being drawn into its 
core and is showing signs of losing her self-command. Her 
“adulthood” is being drained from her as she looses her 
established means of resisting Miss Jenkyns—so we hear that 
she “durst not refuse to go where Miss Jenkyns asked” (22). 
However, Miss Jenkyns has suffered a mortal wound she 
cannot recover from. The narrator, by introducing a 
representative of powerful manliness into Cranford, and by 
imagining a way to sustain him until his identity could 
become intertwined with Miss Jenkyns,’ is able to bring the 
destructive powers of a train straight to the heart of Cranford. 
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The power that sustains Miss Jenkyns, her maternal world of 
Cranford, is pit against the powers of the exterior world, and 
it is no contest: track and train master swamp. In fact, the 
power of (what is in effect) the Industrial Revolution to 
overwhelm Cranford owes to the Victorian need to conceive 
of an external reality in this way.
That is, in order to assist their escape of the maternal 
matrix, they had to imagine that a distinct, tasking “outside 
world” exists which compels them to leave our homes—to 
make it seem that in fact there is no choice in the matter! 
Because they create a world that compels them away, they can 
imagine their mothers as being less likely to interpret their 
departure as a deliberate rejection of her. The result of 
creating a world in which leaving their mothers and the family 
home behind them is the harshest demand a modernizing 
world makes of its citizens, as something that should inspire 
no guilt, as it was not up to them, is that nostalgic revisits to 
the family home still seem available. Industrial society, then, 
though deemed something they had to adjust to, as something 
which ravaged a less abrasive, more peaceful and natural way 
of life, was in fact a construct Victorians wanted, that they 
needed and themselves created, to help youth, to help 
themselves, tame an entrapping home life so to partake in 
some individuality-enabling freedom.
However, since they need to revisit this past, they can 
make their return easier if they can avoid, as much as 
possible, re-experiencing the traumas associated with 
childhood. It is often overwhelming and therefore unhelpful 
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to recall traumatizing experiences with significant 
verisimilitude. Instead, it is better to revisit these experiences 
transformed. Transform actual experiences into fiction (so 
they are not “real”), and means to reshape or replace 
memories becomes facilitated. I am arguing that this is what 
Gaskell is up to when she strips Miss Jenkyns of her potency: 
she is readying her for a replacement—Miss Jessie. By 
bringing to the fore a formidable Miss Jenkyns, she primes 
memories of her own mother when she seemed most 
powerful and controlling. Then, with these memories drawn 
out, she supplants their association with authority—which 
prevents their being tampered with—with instead, depletion 
and exhaustion. The net effect is that, unconsciously, she can 
feel empowered to effect a permanent transformation of her 
own memories, making them less scary, and therefore better 
suited for future revisits.
Miss Jenkyns is not killed at the end of “Cranford”; she 
is instead weakened and then replaced by Captain Brown’s 
daughter, Miss Jessie. But a weakened and defeated Miss 
Jenkyns can no longer set the tone for the rest of the town. 
The Cranford ladies now orbit around Miss Jessie, who has a 
strong sense of self-possession. “[H]er house, her husband, 
her dress, and her looks” (23) all draw praise from them. Miss 
Jenkyns is “old and feeble” (23-24), and her reign is 
effectively over. To help ensure this end, Gaskell introduces 
Major Gordon into the text. Major Gordon is a young 
military man associated with freedom of movement and with 
much grander distances and locals than even Captain Brown. 
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Major Gordon, who “had been travelling to the east”(23), will 
now apparently reside within Cranford. With Major Gordon in 
place in Cranford, Gaskell lodges a potent male presence that 
will reside not only in this fictional creation but likely also 
within her own memories of her childhood alongside her 
mother. She is creating an empowered father figure both to 
accompany her own memories of her mother and to oppose 
them.
With the Cranford ladies now depicted as reading 
Dickens rather than Johnson, there is a sense that the 
narrator leaves Cranford much different than it had been 
upon her entrance: no longer will its inhabitants be amazons 
who scare away men and restrict women’s individuality. Now 
that our heroine has freed them from smothering taboos, 
next time young visitors go to Cranford perhaps they’ll bring 
with them some “commerce and trade” (4), and afford the 
Cranford women some new fangled ways of living and being.
We, of course, have been attempting our own heroic 
journey. I hope that our visit to an example of nineteenth-
century Victorian literature leaves it tampered for bold new 
explorations. I imagine those interested in nostalgia in 
Victorian and Edwardian England may now have, if they wish 
to explore it, evidence that nostalgia is best understood as a 
longing for our mothers’ love, not a past society’s. They may 
also have a new hypothesis to test: Is it possible that nostalgic 
revisits are better understood as expeditions involving 
potentially brave encounters with primal fears than as the sort 
of thing indulged in only by those who cannot face the 
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everyday hazards of the real world? If so, and so long as it 
unconsciously moves their readers to face and perhaps ease 
old traumas, is novel reading potentially both nurturing and 
progressive, the vehicle, perhaps, of personal and social 
advance, over any other sort of literature? If ostensibly light, 
genial stories like “Our Society at Cranford” indeed did 
trump the work of serious essayists such as Newman and Mill 
in the service of good, it’s so far passed our notice more than 
any train into “Cranford” could possibly have—but it may 
nevertheless have been the way of it.
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Jo’s March (March 2002)
According to object-relations theorists, even after leaving the 
maternal matrix and achieving autonomy, the desire to revisit 
home and merge with the mother never leaves us. The 
mother and her home ever-promises “the immediate and 
effortless gratification of one’s desires” (Koenigsberg 35). 
However, after childhood, home has ambivalent and 
conflicting associations because it is also associated with the 
“loss of one’s power, the loss of one’s capacity to grow and 
develop. The idealized drama of oneness is, in actuality, a 
manifestation of a dependent, infantile attachment [. . .] 
which oppresses the self as it reaches toward its own powers” 
(38). The desire to revisit her own past, to recall memories of 
her own closeness to her mother and also shore up her 
independence from her, likely motivated Alcott to create 
Little Women, for the text is a revisitation to the long 
gestational period with the mother in the home and 
recapitulates a strategy that enabled a “little woman”—Jo 
Marsh—to individuate and become an adult.  As females 
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begin life with an initial estimation of the mother as someone 
similar to them, Jo individuates from her mother through 
successive internalizations of alien—of male—“objects,” 
which culminate with her imagining herself as distinct and 
separate from her. 
At the end of the chapter “Jo meets Apollyon,” we find 
Jo asking her mother to help “contain her,” to prevent her 
“from flying out” (Alcott 81). Jo pleads for her mother’s help 
so she can become as close a replica of her (i.e., her mother) 
as possible. This is at least a plausible and even a likely 
reading of Jo’s saying, “If I’m ever half as good as you, I shall 
be satisfied” (80). But aware that a child can come to see her 
mother as an obstacle to his/her individuation, we know to 
pay particular attention to what her mother says to prompt 
this reply. Mrs. March says to Jo that “the love, respect, and 
confidence of my children [is] [. . .] the sweetest reward [she] 
[. . .] could receive for [her] [. . .] efforts to be the woman [she] 
[. . .] would have them copy” (80; emphasis added). Attending to 
the word “copy,” and appreciative of the child’s fears that too 
close an attachment to the mother means a kind of “death of 
self,” we are more inclined to take what Jo says literally: that is, 
we understand Jo to mean here she would be satisfied to have 
her mother influence half, and only half, of her identity. The 
other half, her “bosom enemy” (80), the one her mother fears 
and hopes to contain, she’ll use to become enough the 
heavyweight that she could remain grounded and yet still 
prove too much to handle. 
A too strong and too complete an attachment to the 
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mother figure is represented in Little Women by Jo’s sister, 
Beth. Beth, unlike Jo, who has this “temper” (80), is a 
perfectly “good girl.” Alcott describes Beth as one of a cohort 
who are “shy and quiet,” “who sit [. . .] in corners till 
needed,” and who “live [. . .] for others so cheerfully” (39) 
they almost go unnoticed. Beth, as a homebody, as someone 
content to remain at home, “too bashful to go to school” 
(38), is the text’s best representation of death of the self. 
Beth’s easy acceptance of “blessings already possessed” (44), 
opposes Jo’s tendency to “do something very splendid” (38), 
and best exemplifies Mrs. March’s moral doctrine. It is no 
accident, then, that Alcott writes Beth’s death into the text, 
for to exist as Beth does, perpetually cloistered, fearful, and 
accepting of her lot, is to not really be living. She has a 
persona—but a static one. She is a girl, but hardly even a little 
women. Her character, as with her fate—despite the text’s 
praise for the many Beths in the world—is presented as 
something to be avoided at all costs. However, as Beth 
“unconsciously exercised more influence than anyone [else] in 
the family” (41), we know that Jo desperately has need of 
influences outside the family if she is to resist becoming, like 
Beth, too strongly identified with her mother’s home.
As at the end of Little Women Jo has her own school, 
with its boys, as well as her own brood of “a family of six or 
seven boys spring[ing] up like mushrooms” (484), she is 
clearly associated with fecundity, not with death. This is an 
appropriate representation of her because she successfully 
manages what Beth never attempts, and what the other 
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March girls manage less completely: she distinguishes and 
detaches herself from her mother. This ending, with Jo as 
“matriarch” of Plumfield, with its “wilderness of boys” (484) 
(“poor boys as well as rich” [484]), which is also “just the 
place for boys (the house is big [many-roomed]” [482]), is 
prefigured in her interaction with her mother at the beginning 
of the book. 
The book’s first chapter, “Playing Pilgrims,” shows the 
March girls encircling their mother in her chair by the fire, 
attending to her reading of their father’s letter. This is the 
scene featured on many covers of Little Women, and may be 
the image that comes to her mind when Katherine Fullerton 
Gerould complains that “[t]here is [all] too much love-
making” (500) in the book. The tendency may be, however, 
to emphasize the inner world of the March women in this 
scene and forget to attend to the outside world embodied in 
the father’s letter to them. That is, we may tend to focus on 
the feminine aspects at the expense of the masculine, which 
would be a mistake, because this scene felicitously captures 
how Jo understands her childhood, and it is from denaturing 
both the masculine and feminine spheres in this scene that 
inspiration for the rest of the plot can be found.
According to the psychoanalyst Stanley Greenspan, 
“children can classify their emotions and emotionally relevant 
relationships far earlier than they can physical objects. For 
example, they know members of their families from those 
who are not members, classifying the family as a unit” (35). 
The family, though, as the child has spent most of his/her 
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time interacting with and focused on the mother, is embodied 
in her, and thus the first conception of “other,” the first alien 
or outsider, is one normally understood as part of the 
domestic circle—the father.  This chapter presents us with 
the qualities the March girls initially, and thus also strongly, 
associate with “motherness,” or femininity, as well as the 
qualities they associate with either “fatherness,” or 
masculinity. The mother represents symbiosis—the close 
attachment to Mrs. March by the fire. The father represents 
individuation (he writes from a long distance away), risky self-
exertion (he is “at war,” and is associated with “marches” 
[Alcott 8]), and self-discipline (he mentions his love for them 
“only at the end” [8] of the letter). Further, the text not only 
tells us what her father explicitly writes to his daughters 
about, but through what it keeps mum, the girls also learn to 
associate the father with “dangers faced” and “homesickness 
conquered” (8). (We note, too, that the March girls’ father 
commands their mother’s attention [later in the text he is 
explicitly characterized as someone Mrs. March “obeys” 
(80)].) Jo understands, then, that the road to individuation, to 
her own “Celestial City,” is to become as much like her father 
as she can manage. She will attempt, therefore, to inculcate a 
copy of her father inside herself—i.e., she will internalize 
sources of his real maleness so she can gradually replace her 
temporary and inferior way of distinguishing herself from her 
mother: clothing herself in a tom-boy persona.
True, these girls are not infants; they presumably have a 
past understanding of their father as someone living within 
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the home. But as I believe the rest of the text shows that the 
initial impression we receive of the March mother and father 
is the template for Jo’s individuation, and as the text makes 
the beginning of Little Women also the beginning of each of 
the March girl’s subsequent “Pilgrim’s Progress,” my 
argument is that it is best to understand this initial impression 
of the father as the one Alcott carries with her as she 
develops the journeys of the girls’.
With a reference to a “true Celestial City” (10), the first 
chapter ends with Mrs. March offering advice Jo chooses to 
misinterpret. Mrs. March says, “[n]ow my little pilgrims, 
suppose you begin again, not in play, but in earnest, and see 
how far on you can get before father comes home” (10). Mrs. 
March often speaks of each of her children’s Pilgrim’s 
Progress as if it is a journey they must undertake alone, but 
the second chapter, “Merry Christmas,” has her 
accompanying them (in earnest) on an encounter with the 
outside world. It is in opposition to this, to her mother’s own 
path, with its clearly limited and delimited association with 
the world outside the home, that Jo undertakes to see how far 
on she can in fact get.
Mrs. March takes the children on a “maternal inquiry” 
(7) to tend to a poor starving German family. Mrs. March’s 
interaction with the outside world—the only instance of it we 
are offered a substantive look at (outside of her interaction 
with her daughters in their own homes, that is)—is 
associated, then, with back streets (taken so as to remain 
unseen), poverty (“a poor, bare, miserable room” [15] for a 
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house), a mother and her girls (i.e., no boys or men), as well 
as a giving away of their Christmas dinner (15). Mrs. March’s 
dictum that it is better “to enjoy the blessings already 
possessed, and [to] try to deserve them, lest they should be 
taken away entirely [. . .] instead of increased” (44), is 
subverted in the text because her own attempt to deserve 
blessings leads precisely to a decrease, a taking away of their 
precious Christmas dinner. Jo is given early on in the text a 
representative example of what the real ends of this “old 
woman’s advice” (44) are. This contradiction between Mrs. 
March’s moral lessons and their results—between her fiction 
and reality—is actually quite a gift: it helps Jo imagine a way 
of relating to the outside world which distinguishes her from 
her mother. And so, at the end of chapter two, we find Jo 
wanting to know more about the grandson of Mr. 
Laurence—their next-door neighbor, with the “big house” 
(21). This is Laurie, the boy who helped procure for the 
March family a very nice Christmas dinner after all.
Before exploring how Laurie is the first of a succession 
of males that Jo encounters, defeats, and grows from, with 
the aid once again of Stanley Greenspan I will briefly 
emphasize the significance for children of their initial 
associations of quantities of time (such as “soon” and “a long 
time”), distance (such as “next-door” and “faraway”), and 
size (such as “small” and “big”), with both the mother and 
the father and their respective environments. According to 
Greenspan, “[w]hether positive or negative, nearly all of 
children’s early affects involve the persons on whom they 
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depend on so completely for their very survival. [. . .] As 
[children] [. . .] grow and further explore their world, 
emotions help them comprehend even what appear to be 
physical and mathematical relationships [i.e., time and 
distance]” (19). He continues: “Mathematicians and physicists 
may manipulate abstruse symbols representing space, time, 
and quantity, but they first understood these entities as [. . .] 
children” (20). Greenspan would have us attend very closely 
to children’s early experience of variations in time, distance, 
and size, especially as they relate to children’s experience with 
their parents and their homes, as they will serve as the 
foundation for experiencing the world as they grow up. For 
our purposes, he helps us imagine how Jo conceives what is 
required to see herself as an adult.
In the letter to his family, Jo’s father acknowledges that 
for a child “a year seems very long to wait before [he] [. . .] 
see[s] them” (Alcott 8). Jo therefore has as an early feeling 
associated with things she wants (i.e., the return of her 
father): obtaining them involves an extension of time that feels 
overlong. Further, the anticipation of “a nice long letter” (8) 
from father and his strange world of “camp life, marches, and 
military news” (8), likely makes her father’s world seem as 
distant as an imaginary Celestial City (or, rather, a City of 
Destruction) would be to the March girls. Even within their 
own home, in which they replicate a journey from a City of 
Destruction to a Celestial City, they must “travel through the 
house from the cellar [. . .] up, up, to the house-top” (9). Jo’s 
early psyche, then, is set to understand the distance from 
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where she is—firmly within the maternal matrix—to where 
she wants to be—securely established outside of it—as 
requiring a succession of stages, each greater than the other 
(“up, up”), which takes time to unfold and involves 
movement to faraway places.
Laurie represents the first step of Jo’s journey of 
individuation. He is but a boy, he lives just next door, and he 
is readily understood—appreciatively, yet still diminishingly—
by her mother “as looking like a young gentleman” (22). So 
Mrs. March, thinking him harmless and “lik[ing] his manners” 
(22), encourages her girls to go visit him. However, Laurie, 
though not seen as a threat by Mrs. March, is still identified 
by “one of the girls” as being remote (he is “shut up when he 
isn’t riding or walking” [21]): he turned down an invite by the 
March girls to a party, and seemed little interested in speaking 
to them (21). At least to the March girls, Laurie, though a 
boy, still represents an other from the outside they have been 
unable to assimilate within their familiar world—he is 
somewhat frightening to them. Jo recognizes Laurie as 
possessing some of this male otherness (his remoteness, his 
restraint), and therefore aims to distinguish herself from her 
timid siblings (and the maternal home) by bridging the gap 
that currently exists between them. That is, she aims to 
transform Laurie, the-stranger-on-the-other-side-of-the-fence, 
into Laurie, the-friendly-next-door-neighbor.
Jo is already the only March sister who has managed to 
even talk to him. She says they “talked capitally,” but only 
“over the fence” (21). Not having engaged with him face to 
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face, Laurie still represents a challenge, even to brave Jo. In 
fact, when they do meet face to face, the encounter at first 
surprises her, and it takes a short while before she feels “at 
her ease” (27). Jo is described as “stor[ing] [. . .] up” (28) what 
Laurie says, and of taking in how he looks so she can best 
“describe him to the girls, for they had no brothers, very few 
male cousins, and [thus] boys were almost unknown creatures 
to them” (29). The result of Jo, in effect, ingesting him, so as 
to better describe him to her sisters, is that her sisters get 
some sense of Laurie’s strange maleness from her. Within Jo’s 
being, then, she comes to possess some of his masculinity. 
And as her intake of maleness involves risking a conversation 
with a male stranger, it also has about it a sense of realness 
vastly different from and superior to her self-constructed 
tomboy and theatrical masks. Further, Jo’s dispensing of this 
masculineness into the March home recalls the Marsh girls’ 
eager anticipation of their father’s letter, with her, in this 
instance, playing the part of the letter. That is, while only the 
carrier, the vehicle for the message—and therefore not yet 
the source of the male voice—she is no longer simply just 
one of the girls receiving it second-hand through her mother 
(’s voice).
Making claim to Laurie is more than child’s play, as there 
is more to him than his simply being a rather well-mannered 
little gentleman. Rather, as Laurie “thrashe[s]” (28) boys, and 
as he has been to faraway places, such as Switzerland and 
Paris, and aims to live just as faraway (“in Italy [. . .] to enjoy 
[himself] [. . .] in [his] [. . .] own way” [29]), Laurie has about 
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him some of the associations Jo has of her father’s civil war 
environment (its soldiers, and—even though Laurie lives just 
next door—its distance from home). He also seems to have, 
because he is a male, the latent ability to traverse long 
distances—the same ability Jo is denied, not simply because 
she is a girl, but because of what being a girl comes to be 
associated with inside the March family home. We might 
expect, then, that if Jo comes to possess some of Laurie’s 
power—his male essence, if you will—two things would 
likely follow: 1) we would expect Jo to be then capable of 
attempting even bolder encounters with older, more 
formidable men; and 2) we would expect a depiction of 
Laurie as if he were depleted of his masculine energy, and as if 
it were the result of Jo’s own doing, at some subsequent point 
in the text. And both of these developments do in fact occur, 
as they come to know each other as friends.
Though Mrs. March is quite comfortable with Laurie, 
she is not so much so with his grandfather, Mr. Laurence. 
Mrs. March preaches to her girls that they be content with 
what they have—which clearly means the plain and 
unassuming—while Mr. Laurence is the rich neighbor with 
the big house. She describes him, further, as an “odd old 
gentleman” (21). Moreover, though Mrs. March encouraged 
her girls to give away their dinner, she is well pleased with Mr. 
Laurence’s gift to the March family of a plentiful Christmas 
dinner. The text draws attention to how the girls react upon 
caught first sight of it. We are told “they stared first at the 
table and then at their mother, who looked as if she enjoyed it 
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immensely” (21). They notice that, despite their mother saying 
the dinner remained because she “could not refuse” (21) it, 
she finds herself, despite herself, grateful and pleased before 
it. The feast is described as being as unfamiliar to the March 
household as boys are, with “anything so fine as this [. . .] 
unheard of since the departed days of plenty” (20). Mr. 
Laurence, then, is someone embodying a large extension of 
time (with his old age), faraway distances in time (reminding 
them, with his provision of a Christmas dinner, of their past), 
and a position of power over Mrs. March: he represents a 
stronger sense of maleness, a closer representation to Jo of 
her own father, and is therefore the logical next figure for her 
to overcome on her own preferred pilgrim’s progress.
Laurie is himself overcome by Jo when she attempts 
something he seems scared of: a confrontation with Mr. 
Laurence, while Mr. Laurence is on rampage. Before Jo’s own 
confrontation with Mr. Laurence, when Jo, in reference to 
meeting Mr. Laurence, declares she is “not afraid of 
anything,” we are told that Laurie “privately thought she 
would have good reason to be a trifle afraid of the old 
gentleman, if she met him in some of his moods” (51). Jo 
admits to herself that she is “a little bit afraid of him” (52); 
and, as with Jo’s initial face-to-face encounter with Laurie, 
when she finally meets his grandfather, she is caught off-
guard. Looking at a portrait of Mr. Laurence, and attempting 
to convince herself, as she had before with Laurie, that there 
are grounds for expecting their encounter to be a pleasant 
one, she comments, “He isn’t as handsome as my Mr. 
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Laurence, but I like him” (52). Mr. Laurence overhears her 
and challenges her by asking, “So you’re not afraid of me, 
hey?” (53). The text shows her alarmed at first, but also as 
eventually finding herself more at ease (with him) (53). Jo has 
successfully met Mr. Laurence and begun to make of him, a 
friend: shortly after just having met him, Mr. Laurence tells 
her to “go on being neighbourly” (53).
The gap between Jo and her sisters has grown larger. Mr. 
Laurence, after all, is the master of the Laurence household, 
known previously to the March girls as the one who “keeps 
his grandson shut up when he isn’t riding or walking his 
tutor, and makes him study dreadful hard” (21). Jo not only is 
in possession of a greater story to tell her sisters (“she 
imagined herself telling the story at home” [54]), she is also 
directly responsible, by bridging the gap between the two 
families, for the March family going “visiting in a body [,] 
[with each finding] [. . .] something very attractive in the big 
house on the other side of the hedge” (55), and indirectly 
responsible for Mr. Laurence’s gift of his grand piano to 
Beth. Laurie was partially responsible for the provisioning of 
the Christmas dinner, and Jo, as if drawing upon his essence 
but making more of it, becomes associated with a greater gift 
to the March household than even that. Jo the messenger is 
becoming Jo the provider.
Jo will soon attempt the encounter that Laurie fears—to 
confront his father “in one of his moods,” and the text 
characterizes Laurie as slowly being drained of his 
masculinity. Elizabeth Lennox Keyser notes that “Laurie’s 
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inclusion in the female circle, ‘The Busy Bee Society,’ has 
apparently feminized him” (52), with “Jo even teach[ing] him 
to knit” (52). And it is of course Jo who introduces Laurie 
into the March’s feminine world. Laurie is described as 
“play[ing the part of] lord of the manor” (59), just as Jo once 
played the part of Roderigo. While Laurie “is always playing 
truant, and running over to [play with] the Marches” (59), Jo 
is increasingly associated with Mr. Laurence. She is described 
as “brows[ing] over the new library voraciously and [as] 
convuls[ing] the old gentleman with her criticisms” (59). 
Laurie, under the influence of Beth, resolves to sacrifice his 
ambitions. He says, “I’ll let my castle go, and stay with the 
dear old gentleman while he needs me” (146). Jo, on the 
other hand, as if in possession of Laurie’s now lost fighting 
spirit—and as if the direct result of her absorption of Mr. 
Laurence’s “tremendous will” (53) while under his 
influence—is ready to confront Mr. Laurence while in one 
“of his moods” (53).
This important encounter follows Laurie’s telling Jo of 
how he was “shaken” (211) by his grandfather, and of the 
reason for the abuse. The text, in showing how she 
manipulates this information from him, draws attention to 
Jo’s power over him. Jo “knew how to manage him” (211); 
and Jo, unlike Laurie, whose plan is to “slip off” (212), 
garners the courage to confront this very angry Mr. Laurence. 
It is an unnerving encounter for her. Mr. Laurence is 
described as “look[ing] so alarming, and [speaking] [. . .] so 
sharply, that Jo would have gladly run away if she could [but] 
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he stood at the foot, a lion in the path, so she had to stay and 
brave it out” (214). He yells, “You hussy, how dare you talk 
in that way?” (215). He threatens again to “thrash [Laurie] 
with [his] [. . .] own hands” (214); but though “[t]he threat 
sounded awful [,] [it] [. . .] did not alarm Jo” (214). Jo knows 
now that she not only has the ability to “shield him [Laurie]” 
(214) but to successfully “attack” Mr. Laurence. Jo, in fact, 
wins the day (216), through blunt truth: she tells him that 
Laurie will run away if he doesn’t ease up. After her 
encounter, Laurie, amazed, exclaims, “[w]hat a good fellow 
you are, Jo!,” and asks, “[d]id you get blown up?” (216).
Jo has managed what Laurie could not, and her stature as 
a “fellow,” her increasing association with and integration of 
maleness, is becoming more and more real. This encounter, 
so close to the end of the first part of Little Women, serves as 
its climax. As we shall explore, Mr. Laurence is increasingly 
depicted as both kind and harmless, as if all his will and 
ferocity were drained in his loss to Jo. Jo, on the other hand, 
has finally “got [. . .] by the lions” (57) in the path to her 
“Palace Beautiful” (57). At the end of part one, we witness 
Jo’s, from having realized a goal presaged much earlier in the 
text, having grown a great deal in the absence of her father.
Not long into part two we encounter Jo, even within her 
own home, capable of a powerful isolation, of “falling into a 
vortex” (265) while writing. She is described here in much the 
same way Laurie and Mr. Laurence were while still alien to 
the March family. Specifically, the way her family reacts to her 
mimics, with their meekness and with their interest, the way 
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Jo chose to initiate her climactic encounter with Mr. 
Laurence. Indeed, her family is described “during these 
periods [. . .] [as] ke[eping] their distance, merely popping in 
their heads, and when her cap “was drawn low upon the 
forehead,” they “dare[d not] address [her]” (265). The 
narrative tone is mock-serious, but is better understood as at 
least half-serious: Jo’s writing is no joke—it is soon to 
become a source of substantial provisioning for the March 
family.
Soon Jo “electrifies” (268) her family with the 
presentation of the check she received for being a 
prizewinner. Owing to her possession of a skill associated 
with manly genius, she is becoming a major contributor to 
the family income—i.e., she is already a kind of father for the 
March family. At this point in the novel, however, the father 
has returned, and he informs her she has further yet to travel. 
He tells her to “[a]im at the highest” (268). Jo, though, 
through her successful management and inculcation of those 
nearest her, has already grown significantly, and soon sets out 
to complete her individuation from the maternal home: she 
sets forth to obtain for herself someone who closely 
resembles her own father.
Opposite to the sort of transformation, this growth in 
prowess, we see in Jo, Mr. Laurence is increasingly depicted 
as a kind old man. Mr. Laurence, having lost his ferocity, now 
seems feeble and harmless. He is depicted at the beginning of 
part two as “shrugg[ing] and smil[ing]” (253), and as having 
to “settle [. . .] himself in his easy-chair to rest, after the 
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excitement of the morning” (253). He has become the 
antiquated old man associated with days of old (implicit in his 
early association with Samuel Johnson’s “The Rambler”), 
while Jo is now ready to embrace the new world (also implicit 
in her being associated with Dickens and his “Pickwick 
Papers”). Her next journey will be the last one she will need 
to undertake. New York is for her the apex of her journey; it 
is the Celestial city wherein she meets Mr. Bhaer.
Jo has traveled far on her journey toward independence; 
the text tells us that the result of her labors—her prize-
winning story—“had seemed to open a way which might, 
after long travelling, and much up-hill work lead to this 
delightful chateau en Espagne” (345). And, as the narrator 
wonders “whether [it was the result of] the study of 
Shakespeare, or the natural instinct of a woman for what was 
honest, brave and strong,” Jo goes beyond creating imaginary 
heroes (perhaps an accurate characterization of Jo’s 
retrospective estimation of both Laurie and Mr. Laurence) to 
“discovering a live hero” (350). The text is now referring to 
Jo as a woman, not as a little woman. And her intellect is no 
longer playfully—that is, essentially disingenuously—
identified as “genius.”
Instead, Jo’s intelligence is given right due, as it draws 
her to Bhaer’s own striking intellect. Bhaer tends to young 
children in this, for him, foreign locale: he employs himself as 
a teacher while in New York. Though he seems “homely” 
(351) in America, he was an “honored Professor in Berlin” 
(351), “esteemed for learning and integrity in his native city” 
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(351). Here is a man, then, who is away from home, who is 
deemed a heroic-figure in his homeland, but who assumes in 
America a more modest role as a teacher of young children, 
and who approximates her father’s own age at the time of his 
writing his letter to his girls: he is made to seem just like the 
March-family father as he was portrayed at the beginning of 
the text. Their father, we remember, was initially described as 
someone “too old to be draughted” (8), and as one who, 
though treated by his wife and children as almost divine while 
at home, chose to serve as a chaplain, tending to the needs of 
young men on civil war battlefields.
As was the case with Laurie and Mr. Laurence, the text 
draws attention to a gap between Jo and Bhaer she must find 
a way to bridge. With Laurie, the gap was his apparent refusal 
to either talk to or associate with the March girls; with Mr. 
Laurence, it was his formidable temper; and with Bhaer—as 
he represents her future husband—it is his age. Jo tells her 
mother that since “[Bhaer’s] most forty [. . .] [,] it’s no harm” 
(334). She makes their age difference a reason to become 
more familiar with him. Any of the other March girls would 
see Bhaer’s age and his unmarried status sufficient to declare 
him a potential source of danger, and thus someone to be 
kept at a distance. But as we saw with Laurie and Mr. 
Laurence, Jo is one to make friends out of strangers. She does 
this by taking what she knows of them and managing this 
knowledge so it serves to legitimize and spur on their 
acquaintance. The only difference here is that Bhaer becomes 
her lover, not her friend; and this outcome is foretold in Jo’s 
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initial description of him to her mother.
Jo is turning twenty-five and believes she has nothing to 
show for it. The narrator corrects her, saying, “Jo was 
mistaken in that, there was a good deal to show” (440). Jo 
believes she will be a spinster; but this too is an indication, 
not of the bleakness of her upcoming future but rather that 
she is now ready to realize her goal. She had internalized early 
on (from her study of her father) that a goal is reached just 
after feeling overlong, perhaps never to occur. At this point 
in the novel, Jo has in several aspects mimicked her father as 
he seemed to her in the letter he sent. He was far away; she 
has gone to live in New York. He was associated with 
battlefields; she braves an encounter with Mr. Dashwood at 
the “Weekly Volcano” office—and this office, which 
publishes nothing “but thrilling tales” (349), also reminds us 
of her father’s “camp life, marches, and military news” (8). Of 
course, her father “said little of the dangers faced, and the 
hardships endured” (8), but his reticence then, for fear of 
unnerving his family, surely worked to firm up any sense they 
would have of him as being involved in dangerous but still 
wondrous war environments. For her purposes, her age is not 
helpful in helping her determine her appropriateness for 
someone like Bhaer. The key determinant is how well she 
resembles, how well she approximates, the sense of her father 
she carries before her.
When Jo brings Bhaer home, she introduces him with “a 
face and tone of such irrepressible pride and pleasure [. . .] 
that she might well have blown a trumpet and opened the 
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door with a flourish” (451)—that is, very appropriately, as Jo, 
with Bhaer at her side, is close to her long-sought triumph. 
Mrs March believes Bhaer is certainly a “good” man, but her 
husband sees him as more—that he is “wise” (454). 
Superficially, this is not meant to be a struggle between them 
but more concurrance—but it is actually, for the text had 
previously articulated the clash for us, indicating that “if 
greatness is what a wise man has defined it to be [. . .] then 
[Jo’s] friend [. . .] Bhaer was not good, but great” (353). Mr. 
March ascribes him as the highest sort of man, as a man like 
himself, actually —and therefore as someone Mrs. March is 
almost instructed to interact with in a worshipful, obedient 
manner, and come to think of as no less than her husband’s 
equal. While Laurie was sporting, but a boy; while Mr. 
Laurence formidable, but an old man; Bhaer is not only 
“good, but great” (353). He is a “kindred spirit” (451) to Mr. 
March: he fully embodies the early sense Jo has of her father.
Jo’s acquisition of father-Marsh-seeming Mr. Bhaer 
enables her to seem, not so much her mother’s daughter, 
someone sprouted from her, but instead, a rival from the 
outside—and one competent enough to challenge and even 
displace her. But to effectively mount this transgression, this 
challenge (Mrs. March, we remember, is depicted as 
controlling the children’s access to their father, i.e., she reads 
her father’s letter to them), required a journey. Bhaer is the 
man she needed to possess all along to fully individuate from 
her mother, but which, to be felt as a liberating acquisition, as 
if finally having reached the Celestial City, required a long 
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drawn-out journey, broken into several stages. Soon she 
absorbs even Bhaer within herself, as he merges into the 
Plumfield estate Jo inherits. And as with all others in her 
path, while Jo shows signs of an increase in her status and 
power from her intake, Bhaer shows signs of having lost 
much of his own to her. In Bhaer’s case, he deflates: at first 
his pronounced cosmopolitan identity and great intellect were 
emphasized (he was a professor from Berlin), but later he is 
rounded out by his possessing Germanic pride and his loving 
folk songs—as becoming in his own sort of soft way, country 
and common.
To many readers and scholars, the key regression in 
status at the end the novel is that incurred upon Jo, not to 
anyone else. In marrying Bhaer, she shifts away from being a 
successful writer in New York, backs away from her life’s 
greatest accomplishment. However, Ann Murphy is one who 
believes Jo’s marriage to Bhaer represents a kind of 
triumphant subversive challenge to the world. She says, “[i]n 
marrying Professor Bhaer, and hence committing herself to 
her work rather than to romantic love, Jo creates anew 
possibilities for herself as a member of a community and as a 
profession in her own right. [. . .] Jo March achieves full 
professional existence—[though] at the apparent cost of 
literary expression [. . .]—through her marriage to her father-
professor” (569).
Murphy also believes that Jo’s marriage is a triumph over 
her (Jo’s) own mother. That she triumphs is clear when we 
compare Jo’s fate to Meg’s. Meg represents the “journey” 
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“empowered” by selflessness; Jo represents selfish full 
individuation from her mother. Meg’s passivity leads to a 
marriage which takes her out of the family home but which 
leaves her a marginal figure who “disappears completely from 
sight in the text,” living “in a home so minuscule it is hard to 
imagine adult human beings living in it” (571). Jo, on the 
other hand, through sheer boldness and her continuous 
association with and possession of properties opposite her 
mother’s, best manages to “individuat[e] fully [. . .] while 
enmeshed in Marmee’s loving, coercive socializing, maternal 
bonds” (575). Jo, unlike Meg, is most visible at the end of the 
text, both dramatically, in creating the story lines (with her 
presiding over a boy’s school) for the next series of books, 
and spatially, in inhabiting the grandest mansion. From her 
continuous association with boys and men, with the affluent 
and the large, and with her engagement with the masculine 
world outside her home, she has distinguished herself from 
her mother’s world of girls, poverty, and back-alleyway visits 
to one-roomed homes. Further, Jo has superseded her 
mother: Jo, at novel’s end, becomes the matriarch young 
children will have to contend with and attempt to individuate 
from.
Murphy summarizes Little Women’s attractiveness to 
generations of young women readers as owing to it “not 
merely [offering] a quest for ethical development [. . .] but a 
narrative of subjectivity that must accommodate both the 
active seduction of maternal oneness and the compelling 
desire for separation” (575). She sees Little Women, therefore, 
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because it is addresses a problem that is not historically 
isolated but rather fixed out of the fact of our being human, 
as of timeless relevance. She draws critical inspiration from 
such notable Freudians as Nancy Chodorow and Dorothy 
Dinnerstein, who attend to the “pre-Oedipal phase at the 
process of psychosexual differentiation” (Showalter 258) and 
know to focus on the role of the mother “as the primary [. . .] 
fulcrum of the private and public” for the March children. 
Inspired by different theorists, I hope to have offered a 
reading of Little Women inspired by a similar vein of thought, 
but one not as yet as richly mined. Specifically, I hope to have 
shown how Little Women brings to the fore a strong 
impression of two different worlds—the private home, 
associated with the mother, and the public world, associated 
with the father—and how this initial, powerful impression of 
the distinctiveness and separateness of these two worlds 
(especially in their felt spatial and temporal aspects) supplies 
means on out of the maternal fold. In my view, Jo does so 
through an enlargement of her sense of self, thereby 
establishing herself as her own “Mother Bhaer”(485). This 
may have been Alcott’s own story, or it may have remained 
her dream. Either way, the sheer fact of so many successive 
generations of appreciative readers, makes clear that it was 
not hers alone.  
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Critical Movements (March 2002)
Sir Philip Sidney refers to Utopia as a “perfect way of 
patterning a Commonwealth” (117), which might easily be 
understood as a reference to Sir Thomas More’s exploration 
of Utopia’s utopia—that is, to book two of Utopia. It is, after 
all, in book two where More, through his character Raphael 
Hythloday, unfolds for his created courtly listeners the nature 
of this ideal commonwealth, Utopia. But Sidney does not 
limit his attention in his Defence solely to fine examples of 
works of poesy. Sidney, in making a defence for embattled 
poesy, argues the importance of attending both to poesy’s 
audience and to poesy’s “maker,” the poet, in evaluations of a 
work’s poetic worth. From our own acquaintance with 
Sidney’s several examples in the Defence that depict the 
intertwined involvement of the poet with his poesy and with 
his public, we know that not one of these three elements 
should be removed in favor of attending to any of them in 
isolation. Therefore, knowing that Sidney refers to the “whole 
Commonwealth” (117) as the particular audience he has in 
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mind for More’s work, with our “erected wit” (Sidney 109), 
we do not misconstrue Utopia’s first book as of secondary 
importance for our evaluation. The gentlemen in book one 
are, after all, debating the plausibility of “correcting errors” 
(7) in their “own cities, nations, [. . .] and kingdoms” (7). Still, 
we leave ourselves with two possible avenues of investigation, 
which lead to opposite conclusions. If, falling prey to our 
“infected will” (Sidney 109), we make the mistake of 
following our initial impulse and focus on the second book, 
we judge Utopia as not fully satisfying Sidney’s requirements 
for poesy, for we cannot imagine ourselves being moved to 
imitate Utopians or their commonwealth. However, assuming 
Sidney’s Defence works to “move [. . .] us to do that which we 
know” (Sidney 123), with both books in mind, we find More 
very well practices what Sidney preaches: he creates in Utopia 
a work which could very well improve a whole 
commonwealth.
Before exploring the basis for our investigation of 
Utopia—what Sidney believes a poetic work to be—we must 
first acknowledge that the relationship between the poet and 
his/her audience is not entirely absent as an interest from 
book two of Utopia. Admittedly, a teller—Raphael, as well as 
More’s created courtly listeners, are in a sense “there” 
throughout, but only emerge as the text’s primary subjects at 
the end of the work. Compared to the bulk of what 
constitutes book two, and compared with what book one 
provides, we are offered but a snippet of them. This snippet 
of Raphael and, in particular, his listener, the character Thomas 
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More engaging with each other, is indeed worth notice, but 
considering what mostly constitutes book two, we may only 
know to take notice if we have not misconceived book one as 
merely introduction, and thus of lesser import. Something 
similar can be said of Sidney’s work: if we give scant attention 
to how Sidney begins his Defence of Poesy, perhaps imagining it 
as simply a device to persuade the reader to explore further 
on, we are likely to fail to attend well to Sidney’s John Pietro 
Pugliano. If we are guilty of this sin, we are however surely 
punished for it, for we would miss discovering how this key 
example of Sidney’s helps unlock the real worth of Utopia as a 
poetic work.
Sidney both directly and indirectly tells us what poesy 
does, and what it is, several times in the text, usually in 
combination with attempts to distinguish poesy from two 
other disciplines, philosophy and history. In the midst of his 
argument where he promotes poets over philosophers, Sidney 
tells us that “the inward light each mind hath in itself is as 
good as a philosopher’s book” (123), and that “in nature we 
know it is well to do well, and what is well and what is evil” 
(123). Because learned men already know what the 
philosopher aims to teach, since poesy works to move “learned 
men [. . .] to do that which [they] [. . .] know, or to be moved 
with desire to know” (123), Sidney deems poesy superior to 
philosophy. Poesy moves men. To Sidney, that is what poesy 
does.
In his refutation of the philosopher’s claim of superiority 
to the poet, Sidney also indirectly suggests what poesy is—
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that is, what it is about poesy that makes it move men—by 
drawing attention to the manner in which philosophers 
moralize. He presents us with a “perfect picture” (Sidney 116) 
of moral philosophers stepping forward to challenge him, 
“rudely clothed for to witness outwardly their contempt of 
outward things, with books in their hands against glory” 
(113). As Sidney claims that poesy is superior to philosophy 
because it would “win the goal” (116) through general 
precept and particular example, if we turn to the second book 
of Utopia with the details of this image of moral philosophers 
in our minds, we believe that Sidney’s striking image of the 
particular philosopher inhibits us from learning from More’s 
“general notion” (Sidney 116) (i.e., the overall conception) of 
Utopian moral philosophy.
More tells us that Utopian moral philosophy is not 
disdainful of pleasure, even of sensual pleasure (56). They 
(the Utopians) in fact “think it is crazy for a man to despise 
beauty of form”(56). However, Sidney’s example of moral 
philosophers, because it excites our senses and creates a 
lasting memory for us to draw upon, conflicts with and 
ultimately overwhelms the impression this “fact” has upon 
us. His example, in fact, draws out details which complicate 
any easy assuming that Utopians are best understood as 
enjoying, rather than as being barely tolerant of, sensual 
pleasures. For example, we notice that More introduces the 
section on moral philosophy by telling us how Utopians are 
“amazed at the foolishness of any man who considers himself 
a nobler fellow because he wears clothing of a specially fine 
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wool” (48), wherein we hear echoes of Sidney’s poorly 
clothed philosophers, criticizing glory. Further, though we are 
told that Utopians take pleasure in outward things, we are 
now primed to attend to the things they take little visual 
pleasure from, such as gold and silver, and little olfactory or 
gustatory pleasure from, such as food or drink. Since they 
take such pleasure in music, the privileged portal must be 
their ears—but still also their eyes, for though they ignore the 
glitter of precious metals, they do yet marvel at the stars (48). 
But again, another of Sidney’s perfect pictures springs to 
mind and intrudes in our reading of the text: Sidney has us 
imagining them as foolish philosophers so busy admiring the 
stars and attending to celestial music that they “might fall into 
a ditch” (113)!
True, it may be argued that it is misleading to focus on 
Sidney’s ridicule of those who do, after all, “by knowledge 
[seek] [. . .] to lift up the mind from the dungeon of the body” 
(Sidney 113), when, referring to “the most barbarous and 
simple Indians” (105), he scornfully refers to these “Indians’” 
needing “to find a pleasure in the exercise of the mind” (105) 
lest “their hard dull wits [are never] softened and sharpened 
with the sweet delights of Poetry” (105). In Utopia, so the 
argument goes, since we also have “Indians” but who “[o]f all 
the different pleasures [. . .] seek mostly those of the mind” 
(More 55), surely considering Sidney’s disparaging remarks 
concerning “Indians” in the Defence we are likely to attend 
foremost to this discrepancy between Sidney’s “fact” and 
More’s “fiction” while formulating our impression of the 
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Utopians. Exactly: we both attend to and wonder at this 
curiosity, and, as we will soon expand upon, not being 
children, we believe ourselves unmoved by it. Instead, 
Sidney’s image of the simply clothed priggish philosophers, 
because of its humorous exaggeration of a selection of 
characteristics we, being of a time when philosophers have 
“fallen” (103) “from almost the highest estimation of 
learning” (Sidney 103), might already be inclined to associate 
with philosophers, changes how we encounter the Utopians: 
we impose a clear and vivid counter-image on the one we 
composed from More’s descriptions, which makes them seem 
at least as prudish and absent-minded as aesthetically and 
practical minded. The result is that they seem less worthy of 
our emulation, and our conception of Utopia as a poetic work 
is lessened.
Sidney offers another definition of poesy when he 
attempts to demonstrate poesy’s superiority to history. Here 
he does so through the use of a precept: poesy does not do 
what history does. History’s fashioners—historians—are 
“inquisitive of novelties [,] [which makes them] [. . .] a 
wonder to young folks” (114). So alerted, when we turn to 
More’s example of a utopia we note that each section has 
therein a particular novelty intended to both attract our 
attention and inspire our wonder. Within the section “Their 
Work Habits,” we learn that they devote only six hours each 
day to work (38)! Within the section titled “Social and 
Business Relations,” we learn that men at market take what 
they want without payment (41-42)! Within the section 
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“Travel and Trade in Utopia,” we learn that “anyone who 
takes upon himself to leave his district without permission [. . 
.] is severely punished” (45)! Within the section on gold and 
silver, we learn that these metals have such little value 
(“which other nations give up with as much agony as if they 
were being disemboweled” [47]) that Utopians’ chamber pots 
are all made from these materials! And within the section on 
marriage customs, we learn that brides-to-be are shown 
unclothed to their grooms to ensure happily married couples! 
This utopia does a number of things Sidney believes good 
poesy does and that history does not do. It is set in a 
contemporaneous time (114). It is obviously not limited in 
conception to what “was” or even what is (120). It does offer 
us an example of a “house well in model” (116)—that is, a 
well thought out and thorough presentation of a harmonious 
society for our consideration and critique. But learning from 
Sidney to attend to how we react to novelties which might 
capture a child-like mind, it is difficult for us to imagine 
ourselves as inspired enough to either create a better world 
(be moved to do) or to learn more about the Utopians (be 
moved with desire to know) after our encounter with More’s 
fictional commonwealth.
However, our evaluation of how well Utopia conforms to 
what Sidney believes poesy is, and how it works, should not 
be influenced by our own reaction to More’s work. Further, we 
ought to take care not to judge ourselves unmoved simply 
because we think we think we haven’t been—i.e., there may be 
discord between what we know (gnosis) and how we actually 
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behave (praxis). We will now both explain and explore the 
importance of these two self-administered checks on our 
initial rush to judgment, towards a way of seeing Utopia as 
serving rather well as a poetic work.
Sidney does not believe that a work can be judged poetic 
before considering its effect on its intended audience, and we, 
though learned, are not the particular audience Sidney has in 
mind when he praises More’s work. Admittedly, Sidney does 
give some support for a conception of poesy which assumes 
that a certain reaction necessarily follows from experiencing a 
work of art. He uses the authority of Aristotle and his 
judgment of poesy as concerned “with the universal 
consideration” (119), to help augment the persuasiveness of 
his argument. However, he also takes care to tell us that, 
according to Aristotle, “the universal weighs what is said or 
done” (119), which, though literally meaning that everything 
said or done is evaluated against a constant truth, at least 
implies the well-reasoned state of mind of the poet who notes 
the inconstancies he sees and hears about him. Such a mind is 
Sidney’s, who we see refer to the effect poesy has on learned 
men, and hear warn of the effects of bad poesy—specifically, 
bare, unimproved history—has on uninformed, 
inexperienced listeners. Sidney understands that what moves 
a learned man would likely bore a child, and vise-versa. 
Sidney teaches us that a judgment of a work as poesy 
necessarily involves keeping the audience in mind; no art 
stands on merit alone.
Indeed, we, as readers of the Defence, knowing its 
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examples and arguments, should not be so unlearned as to 
focus our attention on Utopia’s second book. Instead, we 
attend to Sidney’s reference to Utopia in the Defence, note that 
Sidney praises More for fashioning a work which would aid 
the learned man best placed to shape a commonwealth, and 
know to judge Utopia an example of poesy on its ability to 
move such a man to get to work accomplishing it. We are 
well directed, then, to consider book one of Utopia in making 
our assessment, since influence at court constitutes its 
primary interest.
We must acknowledge that Sidney does not refer to 
Utopia as a good example of poesy with which to influence a 
prince; rather, he says it is a good example with which to 
inspire a “whole Commonwealth” (117). However, in Utopia, 
when More (through his character More) says that for 
Raphael to maximize his influence he should aim to serve a 
prince, we have a characterization of a prince which should 
influence our reading of Sidney’s intended meaning here. 
More says, “a people’s welfare and misery flows in a stream 
from their prince, as from a never-failing spring” (8). He 
defines the prince as the source of societal destruction and of 
reconstruction. Sidney, both naturally as an Elizabethan 
courtier, and by example with his attempt to promote poesy 
as the sovereign discipline—unless we assume that Sidney is 
radical enough to imagine the poet capable of bypassing the 
king and transforming a commonwealth through a direct 
appeal to the people—shows that he shares More’s 
conception of the prince as key to any reinvigoration of a 
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commonwealth. Since the prince has advisors to inform his 
judgment on, for example, matters of policy, we believe the 
advisor to a prince the particular audience Sidney has in mind 
when he praises Utopia. If the more radical alternative seems 
too tempting to leave unexplored, to help weaken its appeal, 
we refer our reader to Sidney’s praise for poesy’s ability to 
“beautify” (121) historians’ recitations of “counsel, policy, or 
war stratagem” (121), wherein we hear of both counsel and 
policy in a passage about the good service of advisers to 
princes. Of course, Raphael doubts some aspects of More’s 
characterization of the prince. For instance, he thinks a prince 
is best understood as someone who makes wars, not 
commonwealths (8), which, if we believe his accounting of 
princes over More’s own, might have us imagine a prince as 
completely uninterested in Utopia. Such a prince might find 
something in the Utopians’ war stratagems that interests and 
even inspires, but this sort of inspiration leads to the 
destruction of commonwealths, not their reconstruction. 
Raphael, though, never calls into question the actual power of 
a prince. His disagreement with More concerns the disposition 
of the prince, and therefore also the effectiveness of virtuous 
advisers at court, a subject we will soon discuss.
Sidney offers an example of an encounter between a 
would-be poet trying to affect a learned man—Sidney 
himself—in the Defence; in fact, it serves as his introduction to 
the work. In the exordium, Sidney tells us of his encounter 
with John Pietro Pugliano, of Pugliano’s attempt to “enrich” 
(102) Sidney’s mind as to the greatness of his (Pugliano’s) 
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placement as equerry at Emperor Maximilian II’s court. From 
attending to Sidney’s reaction to Pugliano, we note that the 
learned man is well aware of man’s tendency to enjoy self-
flattery, of the length of time a teller takes in telling his tale, 
and of the possible relation of teller to listener as one of 
master to servant (102). Guilty of telling a drawn-out tale 
intended to promote himself and demean others (to make 
them want to be horses rather than their riders [102]), 
Pugliano is presented as an example of the inept poet for our 
consideration.
Before we compare Sidney’s reaction to Pugliano with 
how we might imagine a particular sort of learned man—one 
who hopes to influence a prince—reacting to Utopia’s 
Raphael, it is important to note that Sidney clearly does not 
want to introduce his argument by boring his audience. That 
is, since Sidney wants to demonstrate poetry’s worth by 
engaging and familiarizing his learned audience with poesy’s 
art, he obviously assumes that the learned enjoy the playful 
ridicule of foreign (Italian) dignitaries. Presumably, the 
learned man, as with Sidney, also enjoys demonstrating that 
he has not been moved, not been “persuaded” (Sidney 102-03), 
remaining composed, contemplative, and critical of both the 
“poesy” and the “poet” after his encounter with them. Sidney 
suggests, though, that we can believe ourselves comported, 
feel ourselves unmoved, experience ourselves as wholly 
cognizant, yet still none the less find ourselves influenced and 
changed: that is, he suggests that the learned man can in fact 
be moved through bad poesy. Sidney, by example, 
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demonstrates that he is himself sufficiently moved by his 
encounter with Pugliano’s poesy to make it the introduction 
to his Defence, and he implies that his experience with 
Pulgiano serves, along with the poor regard poesy is held in, 
as a springboard from which to investigate the nature of good 
poesy.
The most prominent examples Sidney offers us of good 
poesy draw our attention as much or more to the poet, and 
the effect he has on his audience, as he does to the tale. We 
do not encounter in the Defence lengthy replicas of poesy; 
Sidney’s method is instead to wow us with the abilities of a 
singular individual, like Menenius Agrippa, who, “though he 
behaves himself like a homely and familiar poet” (125), so 
“masters” his audience that he creates “such effect in the[m] 
[. . .] that words [. . .] brought forth so sudden and so good an 
alteration” (125). Why is this? If we note that the effect 
Agrippa has on the Romans is as exaggeratingly characterized 
as Pugliano’s purported effect on Sidney (that it almost makes 
him wish himself a horse [102]) is, we see a pattern: Sidney’s 
account of Agrippa and the Romans makes him comparable 
in his storytelling “ineptness” to Pugliano. Indeed, in his 
Defence Sidney warns us early on that he, as with Pugliano, is 
presenting us with examples of “strong affection” (103) (i.e., 
his enthusiastic desire to persuade), which lead to the creation 
of “weak arguments” (103) (i.e., over-ripe accounts) out of 
good material. Unlike Pugliano, Sidney’s ineptness is 
deliberately fashioned to move his learned readers to embrace 
his argument. Sidney’s learned contemporaries might, at first, 
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think most of the argument pure folly and judge it wholy 
unpersuasive (especially the claim that the playful poet is 
monarch over the philosopher!), but ultimately find 
themselves revisiting the memorably presented (with its 
humor and its daring) defence in their memory and perhaps 
too, finding some use in practice for the ideas Sidney puts 
forward. In sum, modifying an expression of Sidney’s, we can 
say that to Sidney “a [‘bad’] [. . .] example hath as much force 
to teach as a [‘good’] [. . .] example” (120), at least where the 
learned are concerned.
It is in book one of Utopia that the learned reader who 
prides himself on his insusceptibility to foolery, perhaps due 
to being “a piece of a logician” (Sidney 102) himself, likely 
notes the discrepancy between the nature of a teller and his 
tale. The Utopians, who “actually practice” (26) “the kind of 
thing that Plato advocates in his Republic” (26), are described 
in book two as being rooted to their isle: it is their minds, “in 
their diligence and zeal to learn” (30), which “move” about. 
Yet Raphael, “eager to see the world” (5), is a sailor who, 
even after encountering the Utopians and claiming to be so 
impressed with them he “would never have left” (29), 
remains a man forever on the go, living, as he tells us, much 
as he pleases (7-8). The learned man, knowing his Greek, is 
sure to take pleasure in understanding why Raphael 
Hythloday is to be understood, in part, as a “speaker of non-
sense.” As with the Defence, this likely leaves the narrator—
who in this case is also the character Thomas More—who 
remains a sceptic, and who remains in part unmoved, 
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unconvinced at “story’s” end, as the person the learned 
reader is most likely to sympathize and identify with.
At the end of book two More tells us he would like to 
challenge Raphael on a point, but, noting that Raphael “was 
tired of talking” (84), and as More remains unsure whether 
Raphael “could take contradiction in these matters” (84), 
instead placates him with praise and leads him on to dinner. 
This odd foreign storyteller Raphael, with his over-lengthy 
tale, consisting of interesting but often absurd ideas, and with 
his imperial but clownish persona, clearly is a delight to More. 
Raphael is harmless; he is not given the authority to win his 
argument with More that, even delivered with skillful 
attendance to the particular likes and dislikes of court, it is 
impossible to give good ideas a fair hearing at court. Instead, 
much as with Sidney’s Pugliano, we learn that a good way of 
passing on new ideas to courtiers is to frame them within a 
story dealing with topics of clear interest, such as an Italian 
courtier and fine horses in the Defence, or of strange peoples 
and their strange worlds in Utopia, but to create room for the 
learned listener to distance himself from the teller and his tale 
so he doesn’t feel manipulated into experiencing our would-
be poet as “monarch” (Sidney 123) and himself as subject. 
Good advice to win the ear, mind, and heart of an advisor, as 
well as for him to gain the attention, consideration, and inspiration of a 
prince. “Entertain” (7) the prince, and offer him a “supply of 
examples” (More 7) to discard, and he might just keep some 
with him, perhaps to help re-invigorate a “fallen” 




Utopia—if we include both its first and second books—is 
well framed to both entertain an advisor and inform his 
address to a prince. It is also well stocked with suggestions 
that could be refined into promising policy changes that 
would help improve a commonwealth. Utopia is a work of 
poesy. And if we consider the sort of literature that follows 
Utopia in sixteenth-century England, such as Spenser’s Faerie 
Queen and Shakespeare’s comedies (with their “green 
worlds”), it may well be that Sidney’s precept for good poesy, 
along with More’s fine example of it, moved at least some 
learned men to attempt to influence a prince. Their “prince,” 
after all, unlike Raphael’s sketch of a prince from which so 
much followed, was both acquainted with and interested in 
much more than simply “the arts of war” (More 8): Queen 
Elizabeth, that is, was very much interested in re-
constituting—and thereafter maintaining—a stable 
commonwealth out of one divided by (religious) strife.
One last thing needs to be addressed before we part. We 
have only explained why we believe that, after a close look at 
both of Utopia’s two books, we find Utopia corresponds to 
what Sidney, by both what he directly states and what he 
indirectly shows, believes qualifies a work as poetic. We have 
told you we know to inform our judgment with a close look 
at both books of Utopia, and revealed the conclusion we 
believe follows from having done so. However, we have not 
exempted ourselves from willfully preferring to stick with our 
initial impulse and make our assessment primarily based on 
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Utopia’s second book. Why is this? Because, since we only 
claimed we learned from Sidney’s argument, and only 
acknowledged that we were moved by its parts, not by its 
whole, to make such an assessment would require an 
exploration not of how well Utopia satisfies Sidney’s 
definition of what poesy is, but rather how well Sidney’s 
Defence itself works as a poetic construction. That is, we would 
need to explore how well the Defence moves us to do what we 
now know we ought to do. We will gladly explore this with 
you, but at another time, as we have already talked so much, 
kept you overlong, and burdened you with many novelties. 
And besides, we feel sure that “another such [. . .] 
opportunity will present itself some day” (More 85). 
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Haunting Raveloe (June 2002)
In George Eliot’s Silas Marner (1861), the men at the Rainbow 
debate over whether or not there is a ghost at the Warren 
stables. Further, they weigh in on whether a ghost, even if it 
did exist, would want “ignorant folk” to believe in it. With 
Silas’s unnoticed entrance into the bar, and with his 
apparition-like countenance, Eliot suggests that ghosts aren’t 
actually all that discriminating as to who they want to believe 
in them—they just want to be remembered. Silas, of course, 
is not a ghost, but “ghosts,” or presences associated with the 
past, do haunt many characters in the text. And these ghosts, 
if ignored, give every reason for people such as those at the 
Rainbow to be wary of them. Raveloe is also inhabited by an 
apparition from the future: Eliot herself, as a narrative 
presence. But Eliot would rather embrace Raveloe than haunt 
it. In fact, her visit is evidence of the continuing influence of 
old ways of thinking—of ghosts—on her own life. Knowing 
intimately the increasing prospects for happiness moderns 
like her have in an age where seemingly anyone can rise to 
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success, and knowing how different her situation and beliefs 
that sustain it are from those of the past, she is not be able to 
shake off the feeling that she has earned punishment for 
being unfaithful to her heritage. In her unfaithfulness, she is 
like her character Godrey Cass. But perhaps—her vicious 
attack on him notwithstanding—Eliot is more like the 
diabolically cunning and daring Dunstan, in imagining though 
her creation Silas Marner a stratagem for appeasing the 
ancestral ghosts. By showing both that she has not forgotten 
them and that she believes they must be remembered—lest 
the present prove degenerate!—Eliot placates internal 
persecutors, but only so as to buy time until she is ready to 
banish them from her mind altogether! We look first to signs 
of agitation in the narrator in a text otherwise crafted by a 
sympathetic but judicious mind, for evidence that Eliot fears 
she is blameworthy for being an egoistic, willful modern.
When Mr. Macey argues “[a]s if ghos’es ’ud want to be 
believed in by anybody so ignirant” (Eliot 54), Eliot, with 
Silas’s ghost-like appearance at the Rainbow, is able to 
suggest otherwise, because his statement could be 
contradicted by experience. Experience, often in the form of 
sudden and dramatic changes to everyday life, is most often 
used by Eliot to show how unpredictable nature is. Eliot’s 
conception of nature likely strikes us as realistic for it being of 
persistent interaction and change. In Raveloe, or with simple, 
reclusive people such as Silas, Eliot shows us that because 
“life [is] [. . .] breathed on variously by multitudinous 
currents, from the winds of heaven to the thoughts of men[,] 
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[. . .] [which] are for ever moving and crossing each other, 
with incalculable results” (23), neither the town nor its 
inhabitants can long hold life or nature at bay. Realistic-
seeming, too, is Eliot’s characterization of systems or codes 
of thought as ideologies particular to a person or people at a 
particular time and place. She treats those who cling to 
regular and patterned ways of thinking with sympathy, but in 
general shows rigid ways of thinking as imposing a form onto 
reality which Reality either subverts at their user’s expense (as 
with Silas and his ritual of leaving his door unlocked), or 
which encloses their users in walled-in misery (as is the case 
with Nancy’s “unalterable little code[s]” [156]).
Yet despite this tendency, she herself expresses a 
tenuous-seeming maxim in the text, namely, that burglars are 
dull-minded, which she insists is almost always true (39). 
Furthermore, Silas Marner is itself a rhetorical argument for 
judging the degree to which people are rewarded and 
punished in life as depending entirely on how selfishly they 
behave. It advances the same sort of argument we often 
actually expect to see in a fairy tale, and it reflects a world-
view which Dunstan—the character Eliot makes a skeleton 
of—“deprecate[s]” (74).
Eliot is concerned to show how Godrey, Dunstan, and 
Silas think of themselves and how they fare in life. Godrey, at 
book’s end, has been both punished and rewarded. He is 
admonished in the text for not having the “moral courage” to 
own up to his marriage to Molly to Nancy. Yet not informing 
Nancy did not prevent the marriage, nor did it entirely ruin 
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his prospects for happiness: he fails to make claim to Eppie, 
but clearly has found happiness in marriage. With 
“tenderness,” he says to Nancy (175), “I got you in spite of all 
[,] [. . .] and yet I’ve been grumbling and uneasy because I 
hadn’t something else” (175), adding, “as if I deserved it” 
(175). Godrey’s brother Dunstan is judged by Eliot for his 
demoniac cleverness, and is punished more severely; for 
whereas Godrey at least had been modest enough to think he 
deserved punishment, Dunstan extorts his brother and preys 
upon his neighbors without any self-reproach. To be 
rewarded with an entirely happy present and with promising 
future prospects, according to the logic of Silas Marner, 
demands the “humble sort of acquiescence in what was held 
to be good” (142) that Silas has.
Eliot, who discerns when the landlord, for example, uses 
“analogical logic” (54), clearly knows and believes that 
reflection can help one avoid mistaking norms or habits of 
thought for universally valid truths. Reflecting on “[p]oor 
Marner” (14), she tells us that “[t]o people accustomed to 
reason about the forms in which their religious feeling has 
incorporated itself, it is difficult to enter into that simple, 
untaught state of mind in which the form and the feeling 
have never been severed by an act of reflection” (14). 
According to psychoanalyst Stanley Greenspan, however, 
even those used to reasoning things out and reflecting before 
acting, may find that in certain circumstances they are unable 




The emotional guides to our thinking can also lead us 
astray during extreme states of anxiety, depression, 
fear, anger, or the like. At such times our emotions 
become so overwhelming that we are unable to fine-
tune our ideas. Thoughts become polarized, rigid, 
fixed, while inflexible beliefs dominate the mind. (34)
Greenspan, who believes that each of our sensory 
perceptions is “[labelled] by [. . .] both its physical properties 
[. . .] and by the emotional qualities we connect with it” (21), 
and that abstractions are created by “fus[ing] various 
emotional experiences into a single, integrated concept” (26), 
would disagree with Eliot’s contention that reflection severs 
form from feeling; to him, reflection, instead, helps us 
“modulate our emotions” (22). And since even highly abstract 
concepts like religion are actually constituted by emotions (27), 
no less than the untaught and simple, the reasoning 
philosopher is not able to exempt herself from emotional 
influence. Those who seek pure exemption, in fact—and so 
not just those overrun by base desires—are exactly those to 
be expected to suffer from extreme lapses of self-control, for 
their flight no doubt owes to their inexperience in 
successfully managing what are, of course, inevitable emotional 
upsets.
Perhaps the reason that Eliot, then—at least with the 
dispersal of rewards and punishments is concerned—
suddenly conceives of nature as predictable and orderly, that 
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it ensures that there are, to Dunstan’s huge misfortune, 
“unpleasant consequences” to people’s actions (73), when 
otherwise nature is vicarious and unfathomable, is because 
Eliot herself, with this matter, has not yet managed to entirely 
free herself from that simple way of thinking too bonded to 
emotional arousal to enable reflective thought. That is, while 
writing, when she brings to mind clear examples of egoism, 
of people’s intention to immodestly satisfy themselves, feeling 
guilty for her own superior intelligence and success, she 
becomes so agitated she cannot manage that controlled, 
calibrated state of mind required to notice, and therefore be 
capable of altering, her inclination to associate ambition with 
hubris, and see vengeance visited upon all the guilty 
trespassers.
Eliot, we know, does not always distinguish herself from 
simpletons; she frequently tells us—often including all 
humanity in her sweeping generalizations—that we all share 
some of the mental habits of the simple and honest members 
of the Raveloe community. But suspiciously, the 
exceptions—those such as William Dane and Dunstan Cass, 
who consider themselves exceptional, and who expect status 
and riches—are also those whose gains she insists on 
characterizing as ill-gotten. William, whom his peers see as 
being “so dazzled by his own light as to hold himself wiser 
than his teachers” (10), displaces Silas as a revered brother 
with a plot that involves stealing from the deacon. Dunstan, 
who “swaggers” (34), who is always on the lookout “to take [. 
. .] someone in” (34), refers to Silas as an “old staring 
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simpleton” (39). William and Dunstan are youngsters who 
not only disrespect their elders—the teachers, with William, 
the elderly, with Dunstan—but are indifferent to their fates 
once they have left them behind in pursuit of further “petty 
egoistic” (156) acquisitions. Dunstan possesses a singular 
ability to arouse Eliot. Eliot, who seems to find every way to 
find virtue in the simplest of minds, finds none at all when 
she estimates Dunstan’s as dull. But is this really how she 
thinks of him? We note how she attaches this label just after 
his dismissing Silas as but an old simpleton. Further, while 
the sequence that has him ride his horse to death and burglar 
Silas shows him as an impulse-driven, unthinking fool, 
previously Dunstan not only showed considerable cunning in 
his mastery over his brother but also showed himself a 
competent master of his emotional state. Considering that 
Eliot characterizes Dunstan’s manipulation of Godrey so that 
it seems much more diabolically clever than miscreant but 
otherwise dull, spite and vengeance, not reasoned fair 
commentary, clearly is moving her pen here.
Previously Eliot showed Dunstan as a risk-taker, but a 
thoughtful and intelligent one, emphasizing his own self-
control and Godrey’s lack thereof. While Godrey succumbs 
to a “movement of compunction [. . .] which was a blight on 
his life,” it is Dunstan who sees “in his brother’s degrading 
marriage the means of gratifying at once his jealous hate and 
his cupidity” (31), and seizes upon his opportunity. Godrey 
prefers to intimidate rather than reason with his brother. 
Godrey, “mastered by [. . .] fear,” would flog [Dunstan] [. . .] 
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within an inch of his life” (29). Dunstan, in contrast, 
maintains, even while under physical threat from threat, “an 
air of unconcern” (29). His insouciance owes to having 
sufficient insight into his brother’s ways that he can simply 
“wait” (29) for Godrey to stop resisting, and then lead him to 
accept his terms. If Eliot was to make a fair assessment of 
Dunstan’s intelligence and impulse control at this point in the 
narrative, she really could do no better than to suggest, as 
Godrey does, that he could have “more sharpness” (27). But 
even in this she would be in error, because one of Dunstans’s 
goals—unfortunate as it surely is—is to agitate his brother as 
much as possible. He braves a trial, risks error (or 
“oversho[oting] his mark” [27]), but thereby better knows just 
how well he has caught his brother out. Ultimately, we note, 
Godrey acquiesces; Dunstan accomplishes his goal, and need 
not fear Godrey. But Dunstan is not, however, safe from Eliot; 
and it is she, incapable of the restraint that even Godrey 
manages, who ultimately “knock[s] [. . .] [Dunstan] down” 
(28).
What Dunstan in particular represents to Eliot is 
someone who “forsake[s] a decent craft that he may pursue 
the gentilities of a profession to which nature never called 
him” (74). Dunstan, the second son, lives a gentry-life of 
drink, horseriding, and leisure, and has his elder brother 
contemplate the consequences of becoming a soldier (28). In 
his presumption, Dunstan is similar to William Dane, who, 
though favored, is not looked upon with quite the reverence 
as those thought selected by God (such as Silas) for a special 
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purpose are. As with Dunstan, William, when he devises 
means to benefit at Silas’s expense, betrays the bond that 
ought to exist between brothers, and both of these 
“betrayers” are actually similar in nature to Eliot and her 
contemporaries. Mid-Victorians, as with Dunstan, and as with 
later born sons, rather than having clear roles and identities 
thrust upon them, have instead the nebulous freedom to 
shape their fates themselves. Elder sons have an obvious link 
to the past in that they would—as with Godrey—“come into 
the land someday” (24). They are more easily imagined—
again, as with Godrey (and as Eliot herself imagines him)—
“as having an essentially domestic nature” (31), and are thus 
not subject (as Eliot imagines Dunstan) to wanderlust. Eliot, 
like Dunstan and William, possesses the intelligence to, if she 
should desire, manipulate those about her for her own 
benefit. Moreover, they all have sufficient will and self-
confidence to accept the risks involved in pursuing ambitious 
goals. In a complex, modern, ever-changing society, this 
degree of intelligence and will would be necessary, not just to 
succeed but simply to meaningfully participate, and would 
have been imagined by Eliot and her contemporaries,  the 
norm for their age. But perhaps the habitual association of 
this sort of intelligence as egoistic and self-serving—as 
“bad”—afflicts people like Eliot sufficiently that it still leads 
to attempts at penance, variant enough to include the likes of 
Eliot’s attempt to punish her likeness in her writing, and 
necessitates efforts to exonerate themselves from charges 
they belong to a dangerously degenerate age far removed in 
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purity from the “honest[y] [belonging to] [. . .] their 
ancestors” (20).
We know that Eliot is concerned to show how intrusive 
past events can be upon our present existence. Eliot tells us 
that Nancy “filled the vacant moments by living inwardly, 
over and over again, through all her remembered experience” 
(154), an experience Eliot characterizes as a “morbid habit of 
mind” (154). And with Godrey, Eliot shows us someone who 
cannot, simply by changing his patterns of thinking, free 
himself from torment. For even if Godrey was, with the 
gracious assistance of time, to forget his past, the past has not 
chosen to forget or forgive him! Eliot conjures up Molly as a 
revenant, as an embodied ghost who returns from the dead to 
punish Godrey. The passage of time, forgetfulness, actually 
works to Molly’s advantage, for she wants nothing more than 
to catch Godrey just when he feels safe enough from harm to 
venture out to pursue a relationship with Nancy. Eliot wishes 
Godrey had the moral courage to tell Nancy about his 
marriage to Molly earlier than he in fact does; but considering 
it is difficult to believe Eliot imagines this would not have 
ruined his chances with her, using his confession of 
wrongfulness toward Molly to express the wrongfulness of her 
own neglect of her past would seem untenable, a false-
confession—a lie. Eliot is, however, trying to demonstrate to 
internal persecutors, to ghosts nesting in her mind, that with 
Silas Marner she is remembering her forefathers—her 
“neighbors” from the past—and that she not only values 
them but, given the chance, would readily stand up for them.
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Eliot defends the Raveloe inhabitants both through 
subtle plot contrivances and through impassioned narrative 
rants. The members of the Raveloe community are described 
as simple and honest, but at times, also as vengeful and 
barbaric. At the beginning of Eliot’s account, it is only fear, 
born of superstition, which prevents Silas “from the 
persecution that his singularities might have drawn upon 
him” (9). And near book’s end, Silas’s isolation helps protect 
Eppie from “the lowering influences of [. . .] village talk and 
habits” (146). The result is that, since we never do witness 
their persecution of Silas, nor do we see Eppie grow into 
anything other than a pure child, we are most likely to 
associate the typical Raveloean with the benevolent Dolly. 
Eliot also has the chance to actively defend Nancy 
(apparently from some of the readers she has “invited along”) 
when she seeks to reprove “grammatically fair ones,” who 
cannot fathom how her “feelings can at all resemble theirs” 
(93). And Eliot sometimes even sounds like a proud member 
of the Raveloe community, especially when she mimics, with 
her diatribe against those who seek more than they were by 
nature ordained to possess, the Raveloean hatred for those 
who “wish to be better than the ‘common run’” (80).
With Silas Marner, Eliot proves to herself she is more the 
favored who embraces the past than a truant concerned to 
disparage it. As with Eppie’s soothing remarks to her father 
when he fears he may lose her upon marriage, that he is not 
so much losing a daughter as gaining a son, Eliot tells herself 
that as a successful modern writer she is not detaching herself 
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from the norms of her forefather but rather attaching, with a 
supposed respect for old folkways in her writing, a new age to 
her own. So doing, she hopes to replace her habitual 
conception of those “who ha[ve] more cunning than honest 
folks [. . .] [not using] that cunning in a neighbourly way” 
(77), with her preferred sense that “mind[s] [. . . ] of 
extraordinary acuteness must necessarily contemplate the 
doings of their fallible fellow-men” (102). She hopes, as 
proved true with Eppie, having placated her “relations,” she 
might better enjoy her own refinement and difference.
It is even possible that Eliot may not, at heart, truly 
respect her forefathers. Indeed, there are signs in the text that 
she thinks the poverty of “ordinary farmers” (68)—the 
prototypical inhabitant of our pastoral past—a condition they 
both could and should have freed themselves from. We feel 
this when she draws our attention to how similar in nature 
the Raveloe farmers are to Squire Cass, remarking that 
because they have “slouched their way through life with a 
consciousness of being in the vicinity of their ‘betters,’ [they] 
want that self-possession and authoritativeness of voice and 
carriage which belong[s] to a man who thought of superiors 
as remote existences” (68). Perhaps for Eliot, Raveloe is akin 
to the brown pot Silas keeps by his hearth: it is be kept and 
tended to only while its mistreatment might “bruise [her] [. . .] 
roots” (142)—that is, while its removal or replacement would 
disturb her. But just as Silas might one day come to 
experience his precious relic—the last remaining piece at 
book’s end of his dwelling’s old furnishings—as but a plain 
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old pot he’s too long kept near his side, Eliot might come to 
see Raveloe—or, rather, the composite of place, time, and 
people Raveloe represents—as irrelevant, and forget, now, 
exactly why she once placed so much interest in it. 
Considering Eliot’s previous loving sentiment, thoughts, and 
words, this would be a considerable betrayal of her 
forefathers, but as she herself tells us, “language is a stream 
that is almost sure to smack of a mingled soil” (78).   
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Introductions and Initiations (August 2002)
Phyllis Webb’s “To Friends Who Have Also Considered 
Suicide” is a deceptive poem. Rather than a dedication to 
those who have already considered suicide, it is instead a rite 
of passage, an initiation ritual conducted by an experienced 
master, who would have us share her enlightened state. The 
process is painful, and the rewards, mixed. We ascend at the 
expense of others. Our western heritage, our leaders, our 
institutions, are made to seem banal, tired. But she herself 
conveys so much urgency, so passionate a desire to show us 
the way, and displays an imagination so formidable it not only 
knocks down old worlds but conjures up colorful new vistas, 
that, in the end, we finish the poem excited, even grateful, 
despite her trickery.
After reading the title, we begin the poem wondering if 
she means for us to be reading it. Are we her friends? Does 
she mean to speak only to those she is intimate with and are 
in the know? While our status is uncertain, we know that we 
are attending to someone who pretends, at least, to be a 
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master: she begins with a confident, didactic, “It [is]” (1). And 
by the way she chooses to introduce the poem, we soon 
decide that the poem is actually written for those who might 
be anxious about exploring a poem about suicide, the 
uninitiated—us. The first two lines are kept short, as if giving 
us time to prepare ourselves. Each line is well balanced both 
visually and in syllabic weight, before and after “a” in the first 
line and “is” in the second line. When we consider what 
follows, these two lines seem a sturdy space to ready 
ourselves before crossing an obvious threshold.
The colon at the end of the second line, and a beckoning 
mystery, propels us onward. The first two lines are enigmatic. 
What is a “good idea” (1)—to consider committing suicide, 
or simply to consider the concept of suicide? What does 
exercise or discipline have to do with suicide? Isn’t suicide 
impulsive? Our master, by harnessing our curiosity, pulls us 
through a threshold—a succession of lines that begin with 
the words “to remember,” which momentarily confine us. 
We, too, in sympathetic response to this four-line structure, 
imagine ourselves as confined, our body as inflexible, as 
paralyzed, as is this sequence of the poem.
The movement in these lines is of something or 
someone else—perhaps death, perhaps suicide, perhaps the 
poet—who comes with each successive line closer and closer 
to us. From “street” (3) to “car” (4) to “clothes” (5) to “eat” 
(6), something moves from being distant and external to 
ourselves to the cusp of being within us. And, as if in through 
the mouth, into the blood, and into our brain, this presence 
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acts like a virus, which, now controlling our nervous system, 
has us use our musculature to kill ourselves. We are now 
initiated. The presence was that of our master, preparing us 
with bodily mutilations for our new spiritual ascension; and 
we are now most certainly amongst those who have 
considered suicide.
But as with all painful initiations, there is the promise of 
a reward. As if we now possess new powers, new capacities, 
she has us survey friends, family, philosophers, politicians, 
financiers—those we have formerly peopled our world 
with—and with advantage: we cause “emotions” (14), we 
cause “embarrass[ment]” (17), and we avoid the 
meaninglessness of lives which consist of setting up pointless 
activities, whether the “swim[ming] of lakes” (24) or the 
“climb[ing] [of] flagpoles” (24). In contrast, our “daily walk” 
(26), she argues, is no routine, no exercise, no contrivance 
that wastes life. It is instead an opportunity to live in such a 
way that our life fills with so much spirit it becomes almost—
like “sand in the teeth” (32)—an irritant to death.
But how rewarding is mockery? A new brethren of those 
whose daily occupation is to contemplate the sins of others is 
too much like that of a monastic brotherhood to be broadly 
appealing. Fortunately, our master would have us spend little 
time contemplating our “western fact” (35), our past, our 
collective waste of a heritage. We should now, like 
postmoderns, look eastwards.
Despite her manipulative—perhaps rude—introduction 
to us, we likely appreciate our time with someone with such a 
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passionate desire to take us places, to show and tell us things, 
and who declares over and over again with certainty and a 
life-affirming tone—“it is.” She doesn’t tell us what we can 
expect eastwards; but if there there are “bright crustaceans of 
the oversky”—such an evocative image—or if we might 
somehow fashion them there, we have cause to think 
ourselves newly enlightened and inspired by our poet, our 
enigmatic master, who walks with death. 
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Poet as Physician (August 2002)
Words are loaded with possibilities for those who well attend 
to them. We may choose to limit our response to them to 
creating our best simulation of the meaning we intuit its 
speaker (or writer) wants for them to depart. Or we can play 
off the visual sounds and oral properties of the word—which 
so often want to take us places their speaker never 
intended—and use them to travel elsewhere. Words, though, 
do not always invite active play. If a word impacts upon us as 
a blow, if it almost literally has punch, our reaction can be 
limited to recoil and recuperation. Daphne Marlatt’s 
“Healing,” with its appropriate one word title, explores how 
we can use language to respond to the power a single word 
can have on us to curtail play.
How might you deal with the painful experience of 
having a lover vulnerable in an operating room, being 
operated upon by a knife-wielding surgeon? As the form our 
encapsulation of this experience might take is of an 
implosion, of a contraction of all the energy, of all the pain 
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and worry funneling into a single moment, a single cut, we 
might react as the poet/lover of “Healing” does and 
surround this experience with an evocation of nature to 
cushion and challenge its impact. 
“Healing” begins with soft and softening images of 
nature. “Petals” (1), “blue irise[s]” (2), “moss” (2), and 
“dandelions” (2) accumulate into a pastoral image, and the 
poet is alone resting on a field, unhurried by time. Words, 
here, seem to relate to each other tenderly; they “kiss [the] 
middle distance” (1) between themselves. Then we encounter 
a word, “incision” (4), which interferes with the flow. 
“Incision” is not so much a word with dramatic impact as it is 
by itself a drama. More than a word, more than a wound, it is 
the entire story of emotions that began when two lovers 
realized the power of the lust and love between them would 
be challenged—replaced—by the anticipated impact and 
repercussions of a strange surgeon’s lunge. Nestled, though, 
amongst a softening scene, the poet uses words to help her 
anticipate a time when the impact of surgery, of the surgeon, 
no longer filled the “middle distance” between them.
Our first sense of the play of language transforming and 
easing trauma is the word sequence, “hours without touch” 
(3). There is an expression of loss, of absence, here—hours 
denied touch. But the same vowels we both see and hear in 
each of these words evoke meaning, too, that of 
accumulation, addition, growth. “[I]ncision to knit” (4) 
captures what the poet is trying to do: slowly she replaces the 
invading image of a stranger inflicting a wound on her lover 
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with an image that resonates of intimacy, of the lovers 
together, of wounds closed and healed. An example of this 
transformation is “i want to open you like a / butterfly” (11-
12), where she resuscitates the image of the surgery, but not 
only replaces the surgeon with herself, she substitutes a 
wound’s pain with the butterfly’s beauty. The arena for the 
operation is also shifting from the hospital (“open you” still 
brings to mind an operating room) to nature. 
The entire second stanza can be imagined as a re-
creation of the moment of the surgery and its after-effect(s), 
but within nature. The eagles, with their talons, with their 
predatory positioning (surveying from above) over prey, are 
natures’ substitutes for the knife-wielding surgeon. And their 
“scream” (13) challenges the impact of the implosion, of the 
wound, with an explosion that will help heal it. Words help 
mimic the dispersion of the eagles’ sound across both 
distance and time. “[G]lee” (14), “glass” (15), “glisten” (15), 
“glare” (15), glide us through the text, and as if each word 
modulates the effect of the scream on the poet as much as on 
ourselves, she reclaims with “(g)listen” (16) the right to act 
upon a word as much as a word had impacted upon her.
Presented first with “glisten,” she brackets off the “g,” 
leaving herself with “listen”—surely, to a poet, the most 
powerful of words. To listen with care is the command a poet 
makes of her reader. And as we take her direction and attend 
to this word, we see, hear, and feel both its clear resemblance 
and its challenge to “incision.” She proves that if we listen to 
her we will indeed come to know how powerful a physician a 
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poet is. The surgeon has made his mark. “[I]ncision” has had 
its impact. We know, however, she will “re-knit” her bond to 
her lover, and that they will begin to know “lust [. . .] all over 
again” (22). 
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Leaving Home (November 2002)
The speaker of Elizabeth Daryush’s “Children of wealth in 
your warm nursery” enters our “home[s]” (13) to warn us. 
S/he tells us we are prisoners, that our current home is a 
prison, and that our guardians cannot be trusted. S/he wants 
us to leave, to “go out” (9), but getting us to leave is a 
difficult task: s/he must provoke us to consider 
uncomfortable truths and to leave comfortable settings. The 
speaker must first gain our attention, then earn our trust, 
before we could consider no longer being “[c]hildren of 
wealth” (1).
The speaker explicitly addresses “[c]hildren of wealth in 
[. . .] warm nurser[ies]” (1), but implicitly addresses all those 
who live privileged lives amongst privileged surroundings 
(ostensibly including most Western readers of poetry). 
“Children of wealth” brings to mind “children of God”: s/he 
implies that we belong to a god, a false one, and that, whatever 
our age, we are de facto children. The speaker defines us with 
two objectives in mind: first, as s/he issues a warning, s/he 
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wants us to imagine ourselves as children so that we are—like 
the children deliberately “[s]et in the cushioned window-seat” 
(2)—more likely to listen, “watch” (2), and attend; second, 
“[c]hildren of wealth” suggests that we are captives, but does 
not suggest that affluence has irrevocably tainted, ruined, or 
spoiled us (as may have been the case if s/he had addressed 
us as “wealthy children”). Wealth claims but does not define 
“its” children: the speaker readies us for exodus.
The speaker wants us to “go out” and experience the 
outside world. Neonates, however, require preparation, and 
the speaker prepares us to accept two terrible truths: the 
world out there is “cruel” (6), and so too the negligence we 
have suffered at the hands of our custodians. We are, 
however, braced to hear these truths. The speaker shapes 
her/his warning so that it contracts (and intensifies) as s/he 
proceeds. We know that s/he has given us time in the initial 
octave to prepare ourselves for the expostulation in the 
quatrain and the prophecy in the concluding couplet. 
Whoever s/he is, we sense her/him tending to us.
In the octave we are told that we have little “knowledge” 
(8) of what “winter means” (6)—that is, about the outside 
world. The speaker forewarns that this world is as cruel as we 
might imagine it to be. But the second stanza’s expostulation, 
which encourages us to “[w]aste [our] [. . .] too round limbs” 
(10) and “tan [our] [. . .] skin too white” (10), implies that life 
outside of the “double-pane” (4) is harsh, but not necessarily 
devastating. Devastation—burning, not tanning—the speaker 
tells us, awaits those of us who linger “too” (10) long 
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hereafter in comfortable settings.
The speaker’s provocation in the concluding couplet to 
imagine “your [own] home” (13) burning, is daring and risky, 
but more so is her/his insinuation that our guardians may be 
responsible for the fire. “Your” parents, “your” ancestors, the 
speaker implies, may be negligent, or worse—malevolent—in 
creating a prison (a “citadel” [7]) and a fire-trap out of “your 
home[s]” and heritage. S/he risks alienating us; “parents” 
have a strong hold over their “children.” But perhaps our 
speaker’s risk-taking helps convince us of her sincerity and 
trustworthiness.
Indeed, we might conclude that our earnest speaker, so 
apparently aware of the worlds on either side of the “double 
pane[s],” was once a “[c]hild [. . .] of wealth” her/himself. 
S/he escaped dominion, we might conclude, and returns only 
to warn us. But if s/he isn’t, we might one day grieve if 
“[t]oday” (12) for fear of fire, we leave our cozy cushions for 
the cold “night” (12) of “winter” (6). 
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From Humble(d) Beginnings (November 2003)
As a boy, Samuel Taylor Coleridge was badly bullied. His 
brother Frank bullied him because he thought Samuel was 
their mother’s favorite son. Samuel became “fretful” and 
“timorous” (Weissman 110). Shunned by other boys for 
being a sissy, Samuel read books about adventures and 
playfully acted out the tales. But his father, believing Samuel 
to be overwhelmed by the books’ scary parts, burnt the 
books. This Coleridge was understandably pleased after 
writing “This Lime-Tree Bower,” because “Lime-Tree” was 
an imaginative attempt to shape his boyhood miseries into a 
boon. However, Coleridge had once both turned the tables 
on his brother and successfully braved an evening alone 
outside his home. And this Coleridge, the person he might 
have been had he not been bullied, the one who thought of 
himself as wild and free, is the person he tried to recover in 
subsequent poetry. Through first rejecting (in the re-write of 
“Lime-Tree” and in “Frost at Midnight”) the accommodating 
tone and the self-deceptive stance of “Lime-Tree,” Coleridge 
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regains the will in “France: an Ode” to once again brave 
placing himself before a threatening night sky. And out there, 
outside, Coleridge claims liberty from all “prisons,” self-
imposed or otherwise.
In “Lime Tree,” Coleridge characterizes himself as 
“lame,” “faint,” and “lonely.” He pretends that this status—
the consequence here of Sarah spilling hot milk on his foot—
is unusual. The norm, he pretends, was for him to roam 
about with friends. But Coleridge grew up denied the outdoor 
play others enjoyed. His brother Frank intimidated him until 
he became the sort of person—a sissy—other boys would 
have nothing to do with (Weissman 110). He compensated by 
reading adventure stories, but his father, “disliking the effect 
[. . .] which these books had produced” (Coleridge, “Dearest 
Poole” 346-50), burnt the books, just as Sarah burns 
Coleridge’s foot in “Lime-Tree.” Coleridge had his whole 
childhood to persuade himself that deprivation is a good 
thing, so his revelation in “Lime-tree” is better understood as 
a capitulation to the status imposed upon him by boyhood 
bullies than as enlightenment. But Coleridge penned “Lime-
Tree” prepared to repudiate the lame representation of 
himself in the poem as someone whose natural company is 
the hornless, stingless, humble-bee.
Perhaps buoyed by his friendship with the “great man” 
Wordsworth, and certainly building on the one night as a boy 
he had threatened his brother with a knife, Coleridge alters 
“Lime-Tree” in the re-write so he seems more commanding 
than accommodating. The accommodating Coleridge in the 
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first version is the one who discovers virtues in “narrow” 
places, and who states that “sometimes / [t]is well to be 
bereaved of promised good, / [t]hat we may lift the soul and 
contemplate [ . . . ] the joys we cannot share.” The 
commanding Coleridge is the one who in the re-write alters 
the dell his friends explore so it becomes awe-inspiring and 
threatening.
In the original version there is a “rifted dell, where many 
an ash / [t]wists its wild limbs beside the ferny rock.” In the 
re-write there is a “roaring dell, o’erwooded, narrow [ . . . ] 
[and] deep.” In the original version he imagines his friends 
only “look[ing]” into the dell; the re-write has them “winding 
down” into it. The result of this alteration is that when 
Coleridge addresses the sun, clouds, grove, and ocean, he is 
commanding these elements to do battle with the dell. 
Despite all of the exclamation marks ending statements such 
as “[r]ichlier burn, ye clouds!” and “kindle, though blue 
ocean!,” in the first version, because he has not evoked the 
image of a threatening dell, Coleridge’s address seems more a 
wistful plea for nature to tend to his long-suffering friend 
Charles Lamb than a command to rescue him from 
threatening surroundings. The reference to his friend’s 
deprived status as a city-dweller is still there in the re-write, 
but it is overwhelmed, outmatched, by the more evocative 
dell.
Lamb objected to being described in “Lime-Tree” as a 
“gentle” city-dweller that needed “rescuing,” and asked that 
Coleridge change how he characterized him in subsequent 
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versions of the poem (Wu 458). Coleridge never complied 
with his friend’s request; instead, in the re-write he ends up 
leaving out his own self-description as “lame,” “lonely,” and 
“faint.” The removal of these descriptors is appropriate, for 
in the re-write Coleridge acts in such a way that he no longer 
warrants being described as the human equivalent of the 
humble bee.
Coleridge, while he commands nature, does not in the 
re-write usurp his bower-prison. What he does do is italicize 
the word “usurp” in the text, which only adds to the many 
exclamation marks in the poem, a disturbance to its 
meditative mood. Coleridge does not usurp “prisons” in 
“Frost at Midnight,” either, but he makes clear in this poem 
the real reason he chose not to do so in “Lime-Tree.”
As was the case in “Lime-Tree,” Coleridge is denied 
access to “playmate[s]” in “Frost at Midnight.” Unlike “Lime-
Tree,” he boldly addresses rather than camouflages his 
perpetual boyhood experience of being “dr[iven] [ . . . ] from 
play” (“Dearest Poole” 346-50). What keeps him 
“imprisoned” in “Frost at Midnight” is not an accident but 
rather the “stern preceptor’s [intimidating] face.” And rather 
than discovering that there is “[n]o scene so narrow but may 
well employ / [e]ach faculty of sense, and keep the heart / 
[a]wake to love and beauty,” in “Frost at Midnight” “narrow” 
scenes lead inevitably to restricted happiness. “Cloister[ed]” 
living is not redeemed in this poem by discovering virtue in 
denied pleasures. Instead, Coleridge is regretful that he “saw 




In “Frost at Midnight,” Coleridge hopes his son will not 
be confined to narrow scenes as he once was. He hopes 
instead his son will “wander [epic landscapes] like the 
breeze.” However, because he refers to the night sky as the 
only redemptive element he knew as a boy, Coleridge may 
already be preparing to wander about awesome environments 
himself. Coleridge’s sole experience as a child of usurping 
bullies and enduring outside dangers involved spending an 
evening alone before the night sky. Though it may have been 
only one occasion, Coleridge had on this occasion known 
what it was to fight back “without running back to his 
mother, [. . . ] proving he was no sissy or tattletale” 
(Weissman 118). He ran outside his home and endured a 
“dreadful stormy night” (Coleridge, “Dear Poole” 352-56), 
proving he could handle the fearsome experiences his father 
thought him incapable of. And in “France: An Ode,” 
Coleridge leaves his bower-prison behind to wind his 
“moonlight way” “[t]hrough glooms which never woodman 
trod.”
Coleridge begins “France: An Ode” with an apology: he 
must apologize to nature for controlling it in the re-write of 
“Lime-Tree.” The clouds he had commanded to “richlier 
burn” become the clouds that “no mortal may control.” The 
woods that he had the “ancient ivy” “usurp,” now are 
“imperious” and master the wind. Coleridge has no interest 
here in the “sweet sounds” and “pleasing shapes” of nature 
that inspired capitulation in “Lime-Tree.” He is instead intent 
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on rediscovering amidst the “rude shape[s] [. . .] and wild 
unconquerable sound[s]” of nature, the obstinacy, the will, to 
refuse to “[y]ield homage” to those who would curtail his 
freedom.
He does not exempt himself. Coleridge repudiates in 
“France: an Ode” those who are “[s]laves by their own 
compulsion[,] [ . . . ] [who] wear the name / [o]f freedom 
graven on a heavier chain.” He likely is thinking of himself 
here—or at least the version of himself who pretended in 
“Lime-Tree” that deprivation can lead to “wis[dom],” 
“pur[ity],” and happiness. This Coleridge, who used his 
imagination to transform a prison into a holy site, needed no 
stern eye to keep him in place. Nor should he have feared 
punishment: he was willing to pretend that physical 
incapacitation can be a good thing.
The Coleridge in “France: An Ode” should expect 
punishment—but this Coleridge is not intimidated. Standing 
before nature he declares he will not be anyone’s slave. But 
because, despite the certainty of punishment, he had still as a 
boy managed to defy brother, father, and mother—those 
who had, as with Sarah in “Lime-Tree,” made him into a 
pitiful home-body—Coleridge had already learned that 
“obstinacy vanquish[es] [. . .] fears” (“Dear Poole” 352-56).
By rediscovering this insight, a more profound discovery 
than anything found in the bower-prison, outside, before a 
night sky, Coleridge also recovers what he hopes is his true 
self: “Oh Liberty, [he proclaims,] my [true] spirit felt thee 
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Alexander the Large (March 2003)
There were four of us to six of them[.] [. . .] So there 
we were dratsing away in the dark, [. . .] the stars 
stabbing away as it might be knives anxious to join in 
the dratsing. [. . .] Of the four of us Dim, as usual, 
came out the worst in point of looks, that is to say his 
litso was all bloodied and his platties a dirty mess, but 
the others of us were still cool and whole. It was 
stinking fatty Billyboy I wanted now, and there I was 
dancing about with my britva like I might be a barber 
on board a ship of a very rough sea, trying to get in at 
him with a few fair slashes on his unclean oily litso. 
Billyboy had a nozh, a long flick-type, but he was a 
malenky bit too slow and heavy in his movements to 
vred anyone really bad. And, my brothers, it was real 
satisfaction to me to waltz—left two three, right two 
three—and carve left cheeky and right cheeky, so that 
like two curtains of blood seemed to pour out at the 
same time, one on either side of his fat filthy oily 
PATRICK MCEVOY-HALSTON
204
snout in the winter starlight. (Burgess, A Clockwork 
Orange 14-15)
When Alex begins his nighttime adventure, he tells us that 
“[y]ou were not put on this earth just to get in touch with 
God” (5). In this passage, Alex shows just the sort of activity 
he believes constitutes living life to its fullest. He delights in 
recounting how he used his physical fitness and artistic 
finesse to ensure his own gang—outnumbered, as he twice 
tells us, six to four—masters Billyboy’s. He thinks his mastery 
of the dangerous but eventful world of the night qualifies him 
as a man-god, as an “Alexander the Large” (36), and, given 
how often others single him out, the evident pleasure he has 
in recounting his exploits, and our own possible admiration 
for those who would rather live than not-live, he may well be 
right.
This dramatic fight is framed by the night sky, by stars 
Alex imagines as “anxious to join in.” And, indeed, Alex’s 
clash with a rival gang is such a tantalizing drama it is easy to 
imagine the backdrop wanting in. The wonderment of seeing 
a combatant using his opponent as a canvas for artistically 
delivered razor strokes is such that we likely do not let Alex’s 
abundant use of similes distract or transport us from the 
action: the activity of this warrior of the night—this knight—
is much more interesting to us than is a barber on rough seas. 
This is Alex at his best; this is Alex most convincingly 
proving (“my brothers”) that “what [he] [. . .] do [he] [. . .] do 
because [he] [. . .] like to do” (31). And he is certainly more 
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compelling here than the restrained ordinary people, the 
“not-selves” (31), we imagine populating the day-world of A 
Clockwork Orange. So unlike them, Alex lives a risky, daring, 
and exhilarating life. So, too, do Dim and Billyboy; but unlike 
these brutes, Alex is so competent a fighter, has such an 
appreciation of and capacity for artistic expression and for 
play, that he orchestrates his tactical movements into a waltz, 
and ensures he leaves battles both “cool and whole.”
What Alex demonstrates in this fight is the synthesis of 
force and grace once thought to constitute the ideal knight. 
But Alex serves no one, and his jubilant egoism makes him 
seem more an example of Friedrich Nietzsche’s man-god, a 
superman. Alex only assumes the pose of a (self-abnegating) 
Christian knight to avoid experiencing crippling pain. And, 
amidst this later scene, where Dr. Brodsky demonstrates the 
success of his experiment, we remember Alex’s previous 
mastery. When Alex licks the actor’s boots, when he 
“throw[s] [his] [. . .] heart [at the actress’s feet] for [her] [. . .] 
to [. . .] trample [. . .] over” (95), we know that without the 
treatment Alex would have forced the actor into less palatable 
positions.
But this later scene, which resembles the gang fight in 
that it is also “staged” as a dramatic event, is one where Dr. 
Brodsky “controls the curtains,” inflicts the pain, and thus 
directs the show. However, it is still one where Alex plays the 
starring role, and we might wonder, considering that his own 
sense of himself as special is supported by his wide-spread 
public notoriety (the police tell him that “everyone knows [. . 
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.] [him]” [50], and later his face is all over the papers) and by 
being singled out for important roles (i.e., he is the first 
person “reformed” and the instrument for toppling the 
government and its opposition) throughout the novel, if he 
fascinates, if he is special to Burgess, too.
Considering that Burgess’s own wife was once raped, it 
would be crass to argue that he might want to be Alex. But 
given the novel’s setting of a homogenized, socialist dystopia, 
Alex’s youthful exuberance and playfulness, his manly 
competence and physical prowess shines that much brighter 
than it otherwise might. The result of the contrast between 
Alex and the suppressing, tyrannical world about him, is that 
we, Burgess, the press, as much as the stars, might all find 
ourselves as irresistibly drawn as we are repelled by the 
nighttime dramas of Alexander the Large.
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Greedy for Your Hurt (March 2003)
One of the hardest things we can ever admit to ourselves is 
that the source of our fears of death originates in our parents’ 
behavior towards us as children. We depend on them so 
much for love and security that we often resist, even in 
adulthood, acknowledging the effect that either their own 
hostility towards us, or their failure to defend us against the 
hostile wishes of others, had upon us. Though Del Jordan in 
Alice Munro’s Lives of Girls and Women, the narrator of Jean 
Cocteau’s Les Enfants Terribles, and Andrea Ashworth in her 
Once in a House on Fire, all associate death with parental 
violence or betrayal, they each vary in their ability to 
acknowledge parental sadism and thus the degree to which 
they conceal it in their narratives.
As there is nothing we more want to deny than our 
parents’ hostile impulses towards us (Rheingold 19), it is 
astonishing and exceedingly rare for Del not only to 
recognize but to demand we attend to them. After recounting 
her mother saying that you have to “face things sometime” 
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(52), Del faces up to the fact that many parents want “you” to 
suffer. When she relates her insight to us she does so fully 
aware that this is an insight many of us suspect is true but 
wish to deny. “Yes,” she tells us, after beginning by 
dispensing her insight carefully, referring to the hostility in 
“people” rather than isolating it in our parents, this “greed for 
your hurt” is “in parents too; in parents particularly” (52). But 
what Del does not so overtly relate to us is the effect this 
sadism had upon her. Given that she sandwiches this insight 
between her recollection of how she tried to “desecrate” (49) 
a dead cow and her desperate but successful struggle to resist 
seeing her Uncle Craig’s corpse, we intuit that it made her 
think not only of death, but of the horrifying potential to find 
oneself powerless in presence of death.
It is when she reflects on her father’s attitude when he 
decided to shoot their dog Major that the pairing of parents 
with powerlessness, betrayal, and death insinuates within her 
own family circle sufficiently for it to become personally 
relevant enough to startle her. Just as she was able to 
acknowledge that parents want their children to suffer, she 
emphasizes that they “want” (126; emphasis in original) others 
to die. But with this powerful insight, rather than keeping us 
tightly focused on the source of her inspiration, she lets the 
fact that it was her father’s “reasonable, blasphemous face” 
(126) that enabled her insight to lose its distinct importance. 
While her mother’s hostility was loosely concealed within the 
general category of parents, her father’s desire for death 
comes close to merging completely with that shared by 
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“adults, managers and executioners” (126).
Del’s relative evasiveness here is likely the product of a 
fear that, put in a position where others want her to suffer a 
stern punishment, her father might not be relied upon to 
defend her. Her Aunt Agnes had told her previously that she 
was a “mad dog” (61) who ought to be punished. Del felt that 
biting Mary Agnes—the cause of her Aunt’s anger—would 
draw upon her all the hatred of everyone at the funeral, and 
though she hoped that biting her would put her “where no 
punishment would ever” (61) reach her, she depended upon 
her parents to defend her against the sum of hostility directed 
at her. Her mother immediately did defend her reluctance to 
participate in a “barbaric” (62) ritual, but given that Del had 
previously discussed her mother’s betrayal— her mother’s 
own desire “for her hurt”—she needed to know that her 
father could be depended upon for support and defence. She 
therefore understandably understands her father’s intention 
to shoot Major for his mad-dog behavior as evidence that he 
may not be the pillar of support she would prefer and well 
needs him to be. Her dreams of her “kind, [. . .] calm, [. . .] 
reasonable” father “cutting off [her] [. . .] head” (125), her 
fears that he may not be counted on, inspire her to 
temporarily look elsewhere—to God—for support.
However, Del’s father’s reaction to Major’s behavior is 
unusual enough for Del to think it “blasphemous” (126). And 
Del’s mother, while she is simultaneously continuing her own 
private war against Death we see such strong signs of 
elsewhere in the text (e.g., in her explanation of what Death is 
PATRICK MCEVOY-HALSTON
210
[42]), is strong in her daughter’s moment of need. If Del 
hadn’t had parents upon whom she could, for the most part, 
rely upon for protection—or who were the sort of people she 
most needed protection from—she would likely have written a 
novel that betrays the same need to deny one’s vulnerability 
to death we encounter in Les Enfants Terribles. Del 
demonstrates strength, not weakness, when she tells us of her 
desire to desecrate a dead cow in an attempt to master death. 
She is able to acknowledge how greatly aware and affected by 
death she was as a child. Weakness, instead, lies in trying to 
persuade yourself—as the narrator of Les Enfants Terribles 
does—that children are simply “unable to imagine death” 
(18). What this narrator shows us is that, while adulthood 
might normally bring a broader understanding of death, with 
children who have experienced extreme parental abuse, 
“adulthood” mainly means a “maturing” of such early-learned 
survival skills like self-deception.
While the narrator claims he tells us the story of two 
children, it is more likely, given the way in which he describes 
Elisabeth and the way she relates to Paul, that he tells the 
story of an extremely immature mother’s (probably his own) 
possessive relationship over her son. Very immature mothers, 
mothers who were so unloved and unattended to in life they 
require their children to supply their unmet needs, interpret 
their children’s individuation as their rejecting them 
(DeMause 151). Their mothers’ anger over this perceived 
spurning often leads children to fear that, unless they 
somehow stop growing, they will suffer catastrophe, even 
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death, as punishment (Rheingold 137). They fear, in short, 
that they would suffer what Paul suffers at the hands of 
Elisabeth, when she understands not only that “her nursling 
was a child no longer” (62), but that he wants to grow up.
While the narrator repeatedly describes Elisabeth as 
mother-like (we are told, for instance, that she speaks “in the 
manner of a maternal” [52]; we are even told that her own 
mother “still lived on within her” [69]), it is when she is 
described as an old woman that we should begin to suspect 
that Elisabeth is a representation of the narrator’s own 
mother. The horrifying characterization of Elisabeth as “a 
madwoman [who] hunche[s] over a dead child” (67), 
captures, with its characterization of her as mad, and with its 
link to a child’s death, exactly the experience of a child who 
fears s/he will be destroyed by his/her angry mother.
So, too, does pretty much the entirety of part two, as it 
chronicles Elisabeth’s relationship to Paul when, as a 
consequence of his trying to individuate, Elisabeth “fear[s] 
that Paul had turned against her and was deliberately avoiding 
her” (107). While true that she is described as tenderly 
mothering him (she, for example, “drie[s] his tears, kisse[s] 
him, [and] tuck[s] him up” [119]), and as directing her “killer 
instincts” (119) onto others, she ultimately plans to use her 
“two weapons—death and oblivion” (148)—to destroy them 
both. Death is means for her to possess Paul forever, while 
life, growth, continuously opposes her plans. And while it is 
Dargelos’s poison which eventually slays him, given the 
number of times Elisabeth is referred to as a poisonous 
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spider in part two, we may have trouble not somehow 
believing that mad-“mother” Elisabeth is really the one 
responsible for the death of her “child,” Paul.
But if those who experience extreme parental sadism 
tend to displace its origin onto others, then what explains 
Andrea’s Ashworth’s capacity to so frankly portray her step-
father’s own killer instincts? Assuming that the narrator of 
Les Enfants Terribles was once in Paul’s position, and assuming 
that Elisabeth represents Paul’s mother, one accounting for 
her strength may lie in Andrea’s differing from Paul in having 
had another parent upon whom she could count on for 
support. However, the marked binary that Andrea sets up, 
with her mother as hero and her step-father as villain, may 
reflect the same need to displace hostility away from a parent 
that the narrator of Les Enfants Terrible demonstrates.
Early in her account, Andrea’s mother and stepfather are 
polar opposites: Peter is brutal, a villain, while her mother is 
kind, a helpful guardian. Peter pounds upon his family with 
“his hairy fist[s]” (18), brutally beating up both Andrea and 
her mother. He is a savage bully, an “ogre,” whose close 
resemblance would be found amongst the villainry in the 
book of fairy-tales he rips up. And Andrea’s mother is 
described as the sort of person who trips-up ogres’ intentions 
to mash up their prey. Just as Del was expected to look at her 
uncle’s corpse, Andrea is told by a guide to look at a “nasty 
ogre” (27), hidden in the cave’s shadows. And while Del’s 
mother was agitated and combative, Andrea’s mother soothes 
her child by tenderly squeezing her hand, and asking her, 
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“Well, who wants to see an ogre?” (27). Andrea knows her 
mother would help defend her against ogres, and she does, 
telling Peter, ‘Not in front of the girls!,’” while her “head 
whipped back like a doll’s” (49) from being hit by him; and 
also later when she directs the knife-wielding Peter’s attention 
onto herself, telling him, “[t]his isn’t about the girls” (66).
But while Andrea’s mother defiantly declares that Peter 
would “not lay a finger on them [her children]” (11), given 
that her stepfather had beaten her up the night before, 
Andrea also knows that her mother had not been able to 
prevent Peter from doing so. Knowing how much this truth 
would overwhelm her mother, Andrea protects her by not 
telling her about the abuse. She may, however, with her 
reluctance to explore why her mother frequently allows back 
into the home partners who beat up her children, also here be 
protecting herself from seriously engaging the likelihood that 
her mother not only at some level knows about the abuse but 
actually encourages it. She certainly shows us instances where 
her mother—shown to behave so differently than she did 
previously with Peter—aligns herself with Terry and betrays 
her children’s need for support. She tells us her sisters 
believed her mother had “betrayed” (228) them, but Andrea, 
speaking with more textual authority than her younger sisters 
are permitted, establishes them as simply in error about this.
But while Andrea likely displaces and rationalizes her 
mother’s hostility, there are signs in her text that show she 
suspects her mother is indeed “greedy for her hurt.” For 
instance, the importance of Andrea’s schooling as her means 
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of escaping an oppressive, dangerous—potentially even 
deadly—home life, is made clear in the text. And Andrea 
chooses to place her mother’s decision to move to 
Manchester—where there are no grammar schools—just one 
page after she informs us of her admittance to Lancashire 
Grammar (99-100). The dangers that await one in poor 
neighborhoods are overtly presented in the text too, and, just 
one page after describing an incident where a man tried to 
stab her, Andrea tells us of her mother’s decision to move 
where a “poor lass got dragged down [. . .] and raped” (153). 
However, there is always enough wiggle-room provided in 
her text that if we (and/or she) would prefer to understand 
her mother’s motives as essentially benign, we are able to do 
so without too much difficulty.
Andrea’s mother is, by the end of Andrea’s account, a 
more ambiguous figure than she was at the beginning, but she 
is no ogre. If Andrea’s mother retains some of the heroic 
status at the end of the account she had at the beginning, 
doubtless this is because, despite her periods of withdrawal 
during Andrea’s adolescence, she often was, or at least clearly 
wanted to be, available to help her. However, it is also likely 
that Andrea needed to have someone who could defend her 
against all the perils associated with living in a “house on 
fire,” and to some extent created this person in her narrative. 
The narrator of Les Enfants Terribles may do the same thing 
when, despite the frequent comparisons made between 
Elisabeth and monstrous things, he also likens her to “a 
captain on a bridge” (69), and to “a merciful judge” (114)—
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that is, to an enfranchised individual who might help rather 
than destroy him. If we allow ourselves to imagine, to 
remember how terrifying our own parents’ sadism was to us 
as children, indeed, how it made us feel as if they wanted us 
dead, we can better appreciate just how brave their attempts 
to explore it, to face it, are.  As for Del, who looks to God 
but can stare Death right in the face, she is the sort of hero 
we all might want to look to for support. 
Works Cited
Ashworth, Andrea. Once in a House on Fire. London: Picador, 
1998. Print.
Cocteau, Jean. Les Enfants Terribles. Trans. Rosamond 
Lehmann. Toronto: Penguin, 1961. Print.
DeMause, Lloyd. The Emotional Life of Nations. New York: 
Institute for Psychohistory, 2002. Print.
Munro, Alice. Lives of Girls and Women. Toronto: Penguin, 
1996. Print.
Rheingold, Joseph. The Mother , Anxiety, and Death: The 
Catastrophic Death Complex. London: Little, Brown, 1967. 
Print.
216
Marcher’s Merger (March 2003)
At the end of Henry James’s “The Beast in the Jungle,” John 
Marcher decides that he has done nothing with his life, but 
the truth is that he had once accomplished something 
noteworthy, namely, he acquired an autonomous identity for 
himself, only this acquisition did not come cheap. The price 
Marcher pays for individuating is his suspicion, his fear, that 
he is fated for an encounter with a Beast, quite capable of 
destroying him. He pretends to hunt the Beast, but since he 
likely feels he deserves to be struck down by its attack, fears 
of retribution have him thinking more of evasion and 
reparation than of combat. So even though it will mean the 
loss of the considerable bounty individuation provided him 
with, Marcher ultimately decides to return to a symbiotic 
relationship with someone he felt he had once terribly 
wronged, in hopes that he might thereby forestall 
catastrophe.
The Beast arrives at the end of the story, and Marcher 
crumbles in face of such a terror, but when we first encounter 
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him he fends off “beasts” quite ably and is no ordinary man. 
At Weatherend, he finds himself amongst a crowd so “wild” 
and “acquisit[ive]” that Marcher cannot avoid finding it 
“disconcerting” (62). He calls its constituents “dog sniffing,” 
but composed of “heads [which] nodded quite as with the 
emphasis of an excited sense of smell” (61), they seem more 
like a hydra, more like one enveloping mass than an ensemble 
of particular beasts. It resembles in its uncontrolled aggressive 
desires and neediness what Margaret Mahler suggests is 
characteristic of the symbiotic milieu—that is, the child’s 
original “undifferentiat[ed] [. . .] fusion with mother, in which 
the “I” is not yet differentiated from the “not-I,” [. . .] [and 
which] contains an undifferentiated mixture of libido and 
aggression” (9). However, though Marcher registers their 
presence, he remains someone who more “observe[s]” (62) 
its tendencies than is affected by them. He is more master 
than subject, for he is, as Gert Buelens argues, in “possession 
of an ego that is sharply differentiated from that of others, to 
the point of lending one ‘distinction’ [a word that carries the 
double meaning of separateness and superiority]” (18). He 
therefore is not only safe from the dissolution of one’s 
singular identity, one’s self control, from returning to mental 
states established in our early childhood that a crowd effects 
upon its constituents (Main 64), but is exactly someone those 
still mired in a symbiotic state would want and hope to 
become.
Of course, it is likely that the typical modern would 
prefer to be more the rugged individualist than the isolated 
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cosmopolitan, but Marcher manages something quite enviable 
in acquiring his own private sense of self. For individuation is 
scary, not only because it means the unknown but because it 
often means incurring the loss of what sustained us in our 
very first encounters with a brand new world: our parents’ 
love. More specifically, since “at the beginning of life we have 
a disposition to anxiety and an extraordinary perceptiveness 
of maternal attitude affecting our survival” (Rheingold 89), it 
means the intolerable loss of our mothers’ love. As Lloyd 
DeMause explains:
[I]mmature mothers and fathers [,that is, mothers and 
fathers who themselves were not reacted to warmly, 
affectionately by their own parents] expect their child 
to give them the love they missed when they were 
children, and therefore experience the child’s 
independence as rejection. Mothers in particular have 
had extremely traumatic developmental histories 
throughout history; one cannot severely neglect and 
abuse little girls and expect them to magically turn 
into good mothers when they grow up. [. . .] The 
moment the infant needs something or turns away 
from her to explore the world, it triggers her own 
memories of maternal rejection. When the infant 
cries, the immature mother hears her mother, her 
father, her siblings, and her spouse screaming at her. 
She then “accuses the infant of being unaffectionate, 
unrewarding and selfish . . . as not interested in me” 
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[Brazelton and Cramer 11]. All growth and 
individuation by the child is therefore experienced as 
rejection. “When the mother cannot tolerate the 
child’s being a separate person with her own 
personality and needs, and demands instead that the 
child mirror her, separation becomes heavily tinged 
with basic terror for the child” [255]. (151) 
Though we can’t be sure of what Marcher’s childhood 
was like, he behaves in ways which accord with what we 
would expect of someone whose mother viewed her son’s 
self-growth with suspicion and anger. Of the adult fate of 
such a child, we would, for example, expect him to either live 
selflessly or to do his very, very best to convince himself this 
is how he has been living. And, indeed, Marcher admits that 
his aim is to live in such a way that he might “regard himself, 
in a greedy, world, as [. . .] unselfish” (78), and toward this 
end tries to live “colourless[ly]” and generously (he attends to 
the needs of those purportedly no less “unsettled” [78] than 
he is). He individuates, but tries to convince himself that his 
enabling autonomy, his precious “organic identity” (78), arose 
from constant self-sacrifice, and is therefore proof of his 
selflessness not his selfishness in life.
But Marcher hasn’t been as good as all that, for he 
individuated by making use of a “greedy world” and by 
associating with the grandiose. He prefers not to think of 
himself as “acquisiti[ve]” (62), but his autonomy was very 
likely facilitated by his acquisition of a whole “new” set of 
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“friends” (63) and by repeatedly associating himself with far 
away places such as Rome, the “Palace of the Caesars” (65). 
His familiarity with his new friends makes those who remind 
him of old ones—in particular, May Bartram—difficult to 
become reacquainted with (67), and his familiarity with places 
where patriarch-fathers once ruled challenges the influence of 
his original dwelling place, the maternal home. Considering 
how many readers complain of Marcher’s selfishness, it is 
clear to most of us that he has been fulfilling his own needs 
as much as those of others, and given his hypersensitive 
response to Bartram’s suggestion that he wants something 
“all to [him]self” (73), Marcher likely knows he has been as 
well. He tells her, “It isn’t a question of what I ‘want’—God 
knows I don’t want anything” (73)—but it is in fact for 
“sin[ning] in that direction” (90) that he feels so strongly that 
something which “could possibly [. . .] annihilate [. . .] [him]” 
would “suddenly break out in [his] [. . .] life” (72). And since 
“fears of growth, individuation, and self-assertion that carry 
threatening feelings of disintegration lead to desires to merge 
with the omnipotent mother—literally to crawl back into the 
womb” (DeMause 94)—Marcher’s fears lead him to desire a 
return to a symbiotic state.
The Weatherend estate, a remainder, with its “old 
wainscots, old tapestr[ies], old gold, old colour[s]” (64), with 
its intense “poet[ic] and histor[ic]” resonance from a once-
familiar and affecting effete past, is an appropriate site to 
“stage” (67) his re-emersion into a maternally dominated 
environment. May Bartram, so familiar with “the dates of the 
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building [i.e., Weatherend], the styles of the furniture, the 
authorship of the pictures” (63), that the ghosts thought to 
haunt the great rooms might envy her familiarity with the 
place, who is “a part of the establishment” (63), is an 
appropriate person to serve as the representation of his 
mother returned. And so strong is his need to initiate 
symbiosis, that though Marcher encounters Bartram as 
someone who can “stray apart [so as to] feel in a proper 
relation” (62) to her “home,” when she chooses to “drift 
toward [and talk to] him” (63), he quickly permits the loss of 
his composure and self-command in her presence. Though 
Marcher first boasts that “[h]er face and her voice [were] [. . .] 
all at his service now” (64), he soon “falter[s] [and] [. . .] fears 
he should only give himself away” (69), and eventually 
suggests he has “complete[ly] surrender[ed]” (72) himself to 
her.
Marcher’s surrender to Bartram means “surrendering the 
source of his superior uniqueness to a power that is located 
outside himself” (Buelens 20). It means the loss of his most 
prized possession, and Buelens is probably right to suggest 
that only “part of Marcher craves such a surrender of the 
autonomous self” (20). But even if part of him still struggles 
against such a loss, Bartram, who senses Marcher’s desire to 
have “something all to [himself]” (73), contrives means to 
ensure the totality of her dominance over him. Since 
Marcher’s independence was supported by the establishment 
of temporal and spatial distinctions between himself and his 
mother and childhood home, Bartram fuses herself into his 
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sense of the intermittent years that have separated them so 
that Marcher comes to think that “[h]e hadn’t been” “alone a 
bit” (71). Since his independence was facilitated by linking 
himself to places with hypermasculine associations, she shifts 
their meeting place from the patriarchal home of the Caesars 
to Pompeii, a place subject to catastrophic dissolution and 
destruction (and a reminder of the Roman Empire’s own 
collapse). Bartram thereby collapses his preferred sense of 
himself as upright, independent, and respectable, and 
Marcher begins to suspect he is and always has been an “ass” 
(68). He still hopes he might in fact be a “hero” (88), but has 
become so dependent on another’s ostensible high opinion of 
him for some self-worth that he will be little more than a 
captive for the duration of the time he spends by Bartram’s 
side.
As Bartram now dominates and determines Marcher’s 
present and future existence, it is appropriate, with the 
acquisition of her inheritance, that she no longer is isolated 
and contained at ancestral Weatherend. She acquires a small 
home in London, and Marcher will come to know this home 
intimately and exhaustingly. We feel the weariness, the 
redundancy of his life there when we are told he “had turned 
once more about the little drawing-room to which, year after 
year, he brought his inevitable topic,” and when we are told 
that “generations of his nervous moods had been at work 
there” (86). These nervous moods are not, however, the 
product of his fears of a catastrophic visitation. Having 
returned to a symbiotic state, having returned to a mother-
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figure, those fears have been squelched: Marcher had “lost 
[his] [. . .] sense” (88) of danger, and “his original fear [. . .] 
ha[d] [been] lost” (87). What Marcher experiences is neurosis. 
Its cause—lengthy confinement. His new home is as 
confining as a cage, as a tomb. And Bartram herself is not so 
much “his kind wise keeper” (81) as she is the grim reaper of 
his adult life and identity. 
The narrator may think of her as something nearly as 
ghastly. He calls Bartram a “sphinx” (98), and later, a 
“creature” (120). In these instances he purportedly isn’t trying 
to be critical of Bartram, nor to link her to the Beast which 
hunts Marcher, but throughout his narrative he describes 
Bartram in a manner which cannot help but have us thinking 
of her as akin to the Beast. For example, when he describes 
Marcher considering whether he should allow “a lady” to 
“accompany” him “on a tiger-hunt,” that is, when he 
describes Marcher considering whether he will permit 
Bartram to share his “obsession,” we are told that Marcher’s 
concern was, that the “definite [sticking] point” was, the 
“inevitable spring of the creature” (79), and the damage it 
might cause her. The Beast, therefore, is something which 
springs and punctures—and so too is Bartram, who just a few 
sentences before was described as someone who, with her 
“penetrating questions[s],” caused the particular relationship 
she shares with Marcher to “spring into being” (79).
Since Bartram is the Beast itself, that is, his chosen 
representative of the vengeful mother who inspired his fears 
of a catastrophic visitation, Marcher ought to be more 
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concerned with the trouble he invites upon himself by 
bringing her along than the trouble he thereby invites upon 
her. And he likely is. Just after Marcher makes an early 
attempt to characterize the nature of Bartram’s attendance to 
him as her accompanying him (79)—which will later settle in 
Marcher’s mind as her “watch[ing] with him” (82)—the 
narrator tells us at length about the effects of Bartram 
“watching him” (80). She watches him, we are told, “in 
silence,” “because people watch [. . .] best [. . .] in silence” 
(80). Watching in silence over her prey suits a tiger pretty well 
too, of course, and as if feeling himself stalked prey, Marcher 
shows signs of nervousness. In response to reflecting on “all 
the looking at his life, judging it, measuring it” over the 
“consecration of [. . .] years,” we are told that Marcher almost 
suspects that Bartram has special designs on him, that there is 
something peculiar in her interest in him: “she almost set him 
wondering if she hadn’t even a larger conception of 
singularity for him than he had for himself” (80).
Bartram’s eyes—very likely “the very eyes of the Beast” 
(87)—become conspicuously present in the narrative as soon 
as Marcher and Bartram become attached to one another. 
Indeed, though Bartram and Marcher become isolated at the 
“margins” (83) of society, possessing a close, exclusive 
relationship that resembles in its exclusivity the bond between 
a mother and her young child, they seem part of their dyad. 
Their conspicuousness is appropriate in a story which 
explores a regression to a child-like state, because we first 
come to know our mother’s approval and disapproval 
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through non-verbal signals (DeMause 151). And while 
Marcher is concerned that “the light in [Bartram’s] [. . .] eyes” 
(70) might communicate sarcasm and mockery (70, 72), they 
do not, at first, because Marcher is very much a prodigal son 
returned to keep her company. But her eyes, potentially both 
“cold” and “sweet” (105), become for him the “evil eye[s]” 
(116), the eyes that disapprove, and finally, the “eyes that 
didn’t know him” (118), the eyes that will abandon him as he 
prepares to leave her side.
We are never told that Marcher actually wants to leave 
Bartram, but we have reason to suspect he has been gauging 
what it would cost to leave her behind, guilt-free, from the 
moment of their re-union. Unfortunately, an adult often 
conceives of his or her individuation as so massive a crime 
that the cost is astronomically, outrageously high: he 
estimated he “had endless gratitude to make up” (71) to her. 
He will weather years of caged pacing (which had worn down 
the carpets much like the “desks in old counting-houses are 
worn by the elbows of generations of clerks” [86]), and, 
almost like a criminal before a parole board, hope that he has 
demonstrated sufficient penitence to warrant release. But 
since she has no intention of releasing him, she responds to 
his claim that her “curiosity isn’t being [. . .] repaid” (85) by 
insisting that she expects she “will be [. . .] repaid” (86), but, 
alas, that that time had not yet come.
Bartram proves as effective in ensuring Marcher never 
succeeds in justifying his departure from her as she was in 
ensuring his dependence upon her. Her close affiliation with 
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him, for example, has negatively affected how people view 
her, and therefore not only adds more guilt to the “hump on 
[his] [. . .] back” (79) but simultaneously reduces the number 
of men he might slough her off on. Marcher knows that if he 
conceived of Bartram’s interest in him as selfishly, as opposed 
to unselfishly, motivated, he would have a way out, for “if she 
had been a totally different” woman and had made a “claim 
on him” (68), he would understand separation from her as 
perfectly justified. But Bartram, when she distinguishes 
Marcher from those men who have a “capacity to spend 
endless time with dull women” (84), takes care to distinguish 
herself from the sort of women Marcher could more readily 
imagine owing little to. And so even though he well knows 
how pleasurable and empowering it is to be the one who 
listens rather than the one who needs to be listened to (78), 
since Bartram’s machinations are not countered by a capacity 
on his part to conceive of her as impurely motivated, he 
remains for an intolerably lengthy time “the only food for her 
[the tiger Beast’s] mind” (90).
But Marcher did individuate from his mother, and 
Bartram senses that he is finally near-prepared to separate 
from her as well. We know this principally because she 
inflicts upon him the worst sort of punishment imaginable, 
the punishment that (immature) mothers inflict upon their 
children for daring to leave them—namely, a mother’s 
abandonment, her rejection. This is the same punishment for 
fear of which Marcher reunited with a mother-figure in the 
first place. It is the same threat which made him have feelings 
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of catastrophic annihilation, and the threat still kows him: 
“made [to] feel strangely abandoned” by “Bartram 
communicat[ing] with him as [if] across a gulf,” Marcher is 
afraid to “speak the wrong word” (99). We are soon made 
aware of just how much Bartram’s rejection concerns and 
affects Marcher. We hear that “withdrawal [was] imposed on 
him” (107), that “she had deceived him” (108), that “she 
dismissed him” (109), that “access to her [. . .] was almost 
wholly forbidden him” (114), that “[n]ot only had her interest 
failed him, but he seemed to feel himself unattended” (115), 
and that, after starting off on a current together (76), Marcher 
was “too helplessly at sea” (110). And though there are signs, 
as when he eventually braves telling her, “you abandon me” 
(103), that Marcher will brave her punishment and force his 
way free of her, Marcher’s escape is ultimately only brought 
about by Bartram’s demise.
After her death we are told that Marcher begins a “hunt” 
for “[t]he lost stuff of consciousness [which had become] [. . 
.] for him as a strayed or stolen child to an unappeasable 
father” (117). Marcher hunts, tries to recover, the lost stuff of 
consciousness he had most prized—his independent ego.  He 
lost it by reuniting with the mother-figure Bartram, by turning 
to a representative of his mother, and could not recover it 
owing to her unappeasable need for attendance and love. 
Marcher, however, would not mind being likened to a father, 
for Marcher needs to restore the masculine supports that had 
earlier assisted his development of an independent identity. 
And it is therefore no surprise that Marcher travels and visits 
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the “temples of gods and the sepulchres of kings” (119), that 
is, that he once again, though this time with Pharaohs, 
associates with them. Only afterwards does he revisit 
Bartram’s grave.
There we are told he was reminded that he had “once 
lived” and was “dependent on [the sense of this] not alone 
for a support but for an identity” (121). But though the 
narrator tries to convince us that Marcher’s return to 
traveling, to mobility, and to sites associated with patriarchs 
had little effect upon him, that he in fact “turned for 
nobleness of association” (120) towards Bartram’s grave, 
Marcher relearned abroad what it was to have lived and to 
possess an identity he would prefer not to lose. For when he 
returns home to visit Bartram’s grave we are told that “[t]he 
plot of ground, the graven tablet, the tended flowers affected 
him so as belonging to him that he resembled for the hour a 
contented landlord reviewing a piece of property” (120). We 
are reminded of the crowd at Weatherend, with their wild 
dreams of acquisition; we are reminded of how he once stood 
amongst them, a man of distinction; and understand that 
Marcher has again become someone whose stature makes 
Bartram “all at his service now” (64).
So though its importance is played down in the text, 
Marcher likely journeyed to the Egyptian desert in hopes that 
the echoing sounds of “the past glories of Pharaohs” (119) 
would counter the results of Bartram’s sphinx-like silent 
presence. And they do, but rediscovering his independence 
will also mean an eventual return of the terrible fear—again, a 
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fear he had lost while in Bartram’s attendance—of being 
punished for possessing it. For Bartram told a mistruth when 
she speculated that Marcher had lost his fear because he had 
“[l]iv[ed] with it for so long” (87). Instead, the fear, in a sense, 
left him—for as long as he was willing to abandon his claim 
to his own life. Though his fear was not “lost in a desert” 
(87), for visiting the land of the Pharaohs and for once again 
beginning the process of individuation, he once again finds 
himself terrified by the prospect of the Beast’s lunge. So 
much so that when he “perceive[s] [. . .] by a stir of the air” 
the “huge and hideous” Beast “rise,” in order to avoid it, he 
once again returns to the mother-figure Bartram—this time 
by “fl[inging] himself, face down on [her] [. . .] tomb” (127).
The narrator’s description of the Beast’s leap at the end 
of the story gives us a sense of the sort of truly terrifying 
visitation for fear of which Marcher reunited to a mother-
figure in the first place. Given that linking himself to Bartram 
forestalled its arrival, we should understand just why 
someone would choose to enter a relationship that would 
shear him of his preferred sense of self. But most critics of 
“The Beast in the Jungle” are not inclined to sympathize with 
Marcher. Instead, they judge him cruelly insensitive to 
Bartram, and rise to her defence.
A few scholars are trying to establish that Bartram does 
little to warrant a sympathetic reaction, but their efforts to 
influence the preferred sense of her may be frustrated by the 
inclination of readers to conceive of her as saintly. Gert 
Buelens, one of the critics intent on “dethroning May 
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Bartram” (18), is also one aware that this requires something 
more than pointing to the abundant textual evidence which 
illustrates her sadism and greed. When he writes that “the 
most common readings” (17) of Bartram are “suspiciously close 
to Marcher’s [own] perception of her throughout the story” 
(18; emphasis added), he clearly senses that critics seem near 
compelled to accept Marcher’s high estimation of Bartram’s 
worth and his low estimation of his own; and, if we recognize 
their relationship as one between mother and son, many of us 
may in fact be drawn to praise Bartram and to criticize Marcher, 
for we are “enjoined to show love for the mother, and failure 
to do so carries a threat, for the child must protect the 
mother’s defenses against her perception, and the perception 
by others, of her lack of motherly feeling or her hostile 
impulses. One must love his mother, or perish, or at least 
suffer guilt” (Rheingold 201; emphasis in original). When we 
praise Bartram, we establish her blamelessness, and since she 
represents our own mothers, we thereby feel less deserving of 
persecution. When we criticize Marcher we are trying to 
distinguish ourselves from his own self-centeredness, but are 
actually imitating his manner of establishing his own moral 
purity. Since many of us, unfortunately, are like Marcher, in 
that we inhibit “the fulfillment of [our] [. . .] emotional needs 
and wants [so as to avoid] [. . .] some unspeakable 
punishment or tragedy” (Branden 97), Marcher will likely 
receive a more sympathetic reaction only when fewer of us 
share his fear that our own self-growth has earned us a 
catastrophic visit by the Beast. 
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Privileging Marlow (June 2003)
Johanna Smith, in “‘Too Beautiful Altogether’: Ideologies of 
Gender and Empire in Heart of Darkness,” argues that Marlow 
is attempting to revitalize what had become an outdated 
conception of separate spheres. According to Smith, Marlow 
is an ideologue who presents his listeners with a new 
Kurtzian imperialism, in hopes of challenging and helping 
replace a feminine one. If Smith is correct in her suspicions, 
she certainly overemphasizes Marlow’s skill as a craftsman 
and his effectiveness as a spokesman, for his uneasiness with 
women is obvious in the text, and so too his ineptness in 
confining women away: he creates separate spheres wherein 
the masculine one notably includes at least one woman! But 
in his narrative, imperialism never looses a taint of feminine 
acquisitiveness, just as “influence” never seems to lose its 
taint as a feminine power. In fact, given his typical response 
to compromising situations, it is more accurate to assess 
Marlow as having far more used his privileged position as 




Marlow’s fascination with and fear of the power and 
influence of women is more evident in the text than Smith 
appreciates. Smith, hoping to emphasize the relevance of 
feminist analysis, prefers to imagine Marlow as a dangerous 
opponent. To her, Marlow is effective in construing women 
as essentially weak and delicate. His power, she tells us, “as 
the masculine narrator of his story” (Smith 173; emphasis in 
original), allows him to effectively silence, commodify, and 
belittle the women in his tale, and only the likes of discursive 
analytical training, of feminist criticism, will enable us to 
effectively counter his “narrative aim to ‘colonize’ and ‘pacify’ 
women” (170). Considering the surety of Smith’s 
understanding of Marlow’s intentions, and her high 
estimation of his competence, it is not surprising that Smith 
passes over evidence that discounts her thesis.
Smith believes Marlow is attempting to reinforce an 
ideology of separate spheres that was losing its influence by 
the late nineteenth-century. She believes he is attempting to 
create an ideology that establishes women as incapable of 
accepting and/or handling the purportedly hard truths of 
reality. Yet the first encounter we have in the text (other than 
with Marlow) with someone whose significant presence owes 
to her experience with truths of this kind, is the old woman at 
the Company’s Brussels office. She knows that few of the 
men that come before her will survive their experiences 
abroad. She seems “uncanny and fateful” (25), and makes 
Marlow very uncomfortable. Smith rightly recognizes the old 
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woman’s associations with one of the three Fates, but does 
not convincingly explain why Marlow, if he means to 
establish women as ignorant and incapable of handling Truth, 
would permit a figure whose Fate-like ability to divine men’s 
future is never really belittled in the text. The old woman’s 
callous attitude towards young men is characterized as a 
realistic and legitimate response to the fate she knows awaits 
most of those she meets. And it is an attitude that Marlow 
adopts, and is delighted to mimic, in his own treatment of his 
attendees onboard the Nellie (50) (and also while in the 
jungle, resulting in the pilgrims “considering him brutally 
callous” [87]).
Smith passes too quickly over another surprising 
association Marlow allows the old woman. Smith reminds us 
that Marlow portrays her as someone who “‘pilot[s] young 
men into the Company’,” and suggests that she is being 
likened to “the pilot who ferries the dead across the Styx into 
Hades” (175). Smith is aware that if there is an almost reliably 
exclusive masculine fraternity in the novel it is the 
brotherhood of seamen (182), of empowered loners, yet does 
not explore why Marlow, in effect, includes her within this 
fraternity! Comparing her to someone who successfully 
ferries doomed souls to the most hellish of places is an 
especially strange thing for Marlow to do if his intention was 
to argue that women are simply too delicate to venture 
abroad.
To be fair, Smith argues that Marlow attempts to 
“stabilize his masculinity,” a masculinity she recognizes was 
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threatened by the old woman in his relations to his aunt (and 
also the Intended) (176). She tells us that in his “farewell visit 
to his aunt, he abuses her lack of experience and debased 
imperialist rhetoric to construct the ‘sentimental presence’ 
that can be distinguished from an ‘idea’ and then rejected” 
(178). Smith, in understanding his encounter with his aunt as 
one where he uses her, does not allow that it could also be 
one where he too was used. Marlow himself describes his aunt 
as “triumphant” (27), and it is possible to read him as more 
reactive than active, as more a victim than a victimizer in this 
scene, and to judge his cutting after-the-fact commentary as 
mostly compensatory in nature.
Certainly it is an encounter in which his aunt’s influence 
and power in the Company—and potentially over him—is 
made clear to Marlow, and it is also one in which his aunt has 
both the tonal authority and assumed right to dominate a 
dependent attendee we would expect from a matriarch. When 
Marlow quotes her exact wording, we hear her patronizing 
tone, her presumed authority: “You forget, dear Charlie [—]” 
(27). As with the old woman, Marlow feels uncomfortable in 
her presence (27). This rebuke follows Marlow’s resisting 
her—whether simply her idealistic beliefs as we are told, or 
the entirety of her authority over him, we cannot be sure. His 
quibble with her views, assuming we trust Marlow’s account 
of this encounter, was delicately, even meekly delivered: “I 
ventured to hint that the Company was run for profit” (27). It 
is certainly not clear that his delicacy here owed mostly to 
civility, or out of respect of his aunt’s own delicate nature. 
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Rather more likely, it owed to his trying to figure out a way to 
contest her authority, but without thereby inviting upon 
himself a lecture. That is, he might have moderated his 
delivery mostly out of fear of reprisals than for any other 
reason. As it turns out, for his nanoscale show of impudence, 
he is patronized, lectured at, told to “wear flannel, [and to] be 
sure to write,” and afterwards is left feeling “queer” (27) and 
uneasy.
Marlow’s after-the-fact commentary on the supposed 
absurd nature of women shows he continues to be disturbed 
by this encounter as he recalls it. His diatribe reeks of 
retroactive compensation, as if he were still trying to counter 
the authority his aunt had over him. His assertions of female 
weakness are therefore compromised, and are hardly ideal for 
the project Smith believes they are intended to serve; for 
Marlow cannot well argue for separate spheres based on 
intrinsic female weakness and male hardiness when he as a 
man consistently showcases the failings from his own fear 
and weakness.
Not only does Marlow not manage to stabilize his 
masculinity in the presence of his aunt, his aunt, more so than 
even the old woman, continues to “bewitch” (38) his 
existence in Africa. While Smith misses who really has 
authority in Marlow’s encounter with his aunt, she is right to 
assume Marlow hoped his being keen to the true materialistic 
drive behind imperialism privileged him in some way. But 
even in Africa he finds that it is only his “dear aunt’s 
influential acquaintances” (41) which enables. The manager’s 
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agent, the brickmaker, erroneously believes Marlow possesses 
“influences in Europe” (42), and it is Marlow who recognizes 
his aunt as the source of his inflated reputation. He tells us 
that he “let the young fool [. . .] believe anything he liked to 
imagine as to [his] [. . .] influences [. . .], [but that he also] [. . .] 
thereby became in an instant as much of a pretence as the rest 
of the bewitched pilgrims” (42). And it is possible that the 
reason he compares himself to the bewitched pilgrims is that, 
despite his denial that there was anyone “behind” (43) him, 
he knows his aunt’s influence over him remains, that it is 
substantial, and that it presents him with tantalizing benefits.
The brickmaker, after all, likens Marlow to Kurtz (41). 
He believes him Kurtz’s potential competition for General 
Manager, that is, a rival, a potential equal. And while Marlow, 
so often forced to bite his tongue, finds nothing more 
appealing about Kurtz than his “impudence” (47), Kurtz can 
get away with being impudent only because his connections 
in Europe make him seem ear-marked for General Manager 
(41). Kurtz’s connections give him some immunity to 
reprisals (from rivals at least), so his insulting letters to the 
Central Station’s manager have not affected his star status. 
Since European capitals are characterized as effeminate places 
(88), Kurtz’s connections link him, if not to female relations, 
certainly to effeminate men. If Marlow permitted himself to 
make use of his aunt’s connections, he would likely become 
as empowered as Kurtz, or the person Kurtz directly 
rebuked—the Central Station’s manager—is. However, he is 
also aware that he would owe his status to his aunt’s efforts, 
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and that this dependence would render him pathetic. He 
would have power over others, but would conceive of 
himself as more his aunt’s pet than as someone in charge of a 
large swath of others. We know this because of the special 
interest Marlow takes in the manager’s special “boy” (37), and 
by the way Marlow characterizes the Central Station’ 
manager.
Other than the brickmaker, the only person at the 
Central Station who is favored by the manager is “his ‘boy’—
an overfed young negro from the coast,” who is to Marlow a 
despicable figure who “treats the white men, under [the 
manager’s] [. . .] very eyes, with provoking insolence” (37). 
The negro’s insolence owes only to his being the manager’s 
“favourite” (37), and we should not be surprised to discover 
that the manager is in significant ways a composite of the old 
woman and Marlow’s aunt. As with the old woman, as with 
his aunt, the manager is someone Marlow isolates as being 
able to make others feel uneasy (37) (and he tells us, “You 
have no idea how effective such a . . . a . . . faculty can be” 
[37]). It was the old woman’s looks’ “swift and indifferent 
placidity” (25) that affected Marlow, while it is the “trenchant 
and heavy” (36) manager’s gaze that affects him. Just as he 
characterizes his aunt (and women in general), Marlow 
describes the manager as existing in a bubble: 
When annoyed at meal-times by the constant quarrels 
of the white men about precedence, he ordered an 
immense round table to be made, for which a special 
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house had to be built. This was the station’s mess-
room. Where he sat was the first place—the rest were 
nowhere. One felt this to be his unalterable 
conviction. (37)
Like his aunt, the manager expects, demands, and, other 
than with Kurtz, receives dutiful attendance. And as was also 
true with her, “he paid no attention to [. . .] [Marlowe’s] 
explanations” (37).
Marlow comes close to literally running away from the 
manager. He saves his scathing commentary of him until “he 
flung out of his [the manager’s] hut” (38). Running away, or 
turning “his back on” (38) those who unnerve him, is as 
frequent a response of Marlow’s to feeling uncomfortable as 
is back-biting commentary. The two reactions usually go 
together, in fact. He doesn’t fling himself away from his aunt 
(mind you, as Smith points out, he goes to Africa as much in 
hopes of distancing himself from the influence of women 
[176] as to travel to the heart of the jungle), but he feels the 
sudden need to inform his listeners of how well “used to 
clear[ing] out for any part of the world at twenty-four hours’ 
notice [he was], with less thought than most men give to the 
crossing of a street” (27). His reaction to the Central Station 
manager is typical in that most often when feeling 
compromised, he does nothing tricky, he just physically 
moves away. However, to counter a connection he 
“acknowledges” between men of the power-hungry Company 
and their appetite for lies and his own (“Well, I went near 
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enough to it by letting the young fool there believe anything 
he liked to imagine as to my influence in Europe. I became in 
an instant as much of a pretense as the rest of the bewitched 
pilgrims” [44]), he does finally demonstrate what sort of 
power his entitled position as narrator affords him by 
imagining himself very far beyond them.
After admitting to some kinship, Marlow returns to the 
present to lecture his attendees onboard the Nellie. In this 
instance, he escapes becoming tainted—by traveling through 
time! He makes use of his narrative power to help persuade 
himself that, however much he might admit to being a liar, as 
perhaps akin in some way to Company men, what he still most 
truly is is a voyager, part of an untainted ancient brotherhood 
who have remained stalwart and the same since now vastly 
altered England was herself primordial. To seamen, it is the 
accomplishments of the human short-term that are 
unsubstantial. So too, even, the appeals of “secrets of a whole 
continent” (19). His return to the present is a return then to 
himself as a “trustworthy” “pilot” (17), to someone used by 
the unnamed narrator to represent—even if, owing to his 
wanderings, he isn’t typical of them (17)—all other seamens’ 
learned incuriosity, even before the most extravagant of 
discoveries, and is a technique of his (Marlow’s) to escape 
becoming contaminated by prurience.
Upon his return from his remembrances, and 
immediately after he finishes relating his encounter with the 
brickmaker, Marlow tells his listeners he sought “comfort” 
(44) onboard his boat. More than this, he tells us/them of his 
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associations with “the few mechanics there were in that 
station,” who, owing to their “imperfect manners,” were 
“despised” by the Company pilgrims (44); and of how he also 
pals-about with a “good worker” (44). Marlow takes pleasure 
in isolating himself from the Company men by both sharing 
and identifying himself with the few honest souls around him. 
Amongst people too “unimportant” (44) to draw attention, 
too “simple” (44) to be interesting to those fascinated with 
intrigues and mysteries, but seemingly unaffected by others’ 
opinion of them, Marlow is happy. It is possible that, more 
than anything else, the search for such simple happiness is 
what drives Marlow’s narrative. There is no doubt that 
women trouble him, and that they are construed in the 
narrative as dangerous. There can also be no doubt that he 
would be delighted if his narrative contributed to keeping 
men empowered over them. However, he idealizes the 
peripheral loner so much in the text, while condemning 
influence and power, that he does not establish any clear 
means whereby any man or company of men could succeed 
in constraining women without thereby demonstrating 
“unbounded” (178) feminine power and impudence.
Smith is correct that Kurtz’s “‘unbounded eloquence’” 
(176) delights Marlow; but just as Marlow is willing to admit 
he “was seduced into something like admiration” (71) for the 
significantly less impressive Russian attendant to Kurtz, it 
does not necessarily implicate him in holding a high 
assessment of this sundered man’s over-all worth. Marlow’s 
own manliness, despite his at times pretending to be immune 
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to continental attractions, actually ultimately depends on his 
success in resisting them. He knows that Kurtz’s eloquence 
makes him great; but also that it is entwined with a suspect 
desire for impudent self-assertion that ultimately is not 
distinguished from an unbounded and tragic desire for 
“success and power” (85). Marlow is therefore serious when 
he claims he is “not prepared to affirm the fellow [Kurtz] was 
exactly worth the life [a helmsman] [he] [. . .] lost in getting to 
him” (67). And Marlow is likely relieved, rather than 
saddened, to find that “[a]ll that had been Kurtz’s had passed 
of [his] [Marlow’s] [. . .] hands” (90). That is, Marlow, because 
it guarantees he will not suffer Kurtz’s fate, is glad Fate 
worked to circumscribe his influence.
Smith knows that what she labels as a Kurtzian 
imperialism is not something Marlow presents as arising out 
of the efforts of corruptible Kurtzs, but implausibly implies 
that it could arise of the “strength of [the] [. . .] homosocial 
bonds” (182) established between fellow helmsmen. That is, 
she thinks it will arise out of men who steer clear of power 
and whose virtues include the modesty of their ambitions and 
the narrowness of their focus. No kind of colonization is 
ultimately validated in the text. This includes Marlow’s 
commodification of the savage woman, as it brings to mind 
associations of the supposed insatiable desire of women for 
objects as much as it does the objectifying male gaze. And no 
hero is presented for leadership of any colonizing effort. This 
certainly applies to Marlow himself, who fears old women 
almost as much as he does his aunt, and whose sadistic 
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treatment of the Intended is obviously not evidence of male 
power but rather of cowardly retribution upon whatever 
unfortunate girl proved handy. (The Intended, one of the 
text’s less intimidating female/feminine figures, is the woman 
he revenges himself upon for feeling consistently awkward in 
their presence.) Marlow might admire and sometimes imitate 
the brutality of the hunter, but he prefers to hide. He takes 
pleasure in imagining himself a small anonymous beetle (51), 
and he is in fact too small and inconsequential to warrant the 
extent of the attention of Smith’s scrutinizing gaze.
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Sinister Advances and Sweet Returns (July 2003)
John Keats tells his readers the story, in “Ode to a Grecian 
Urn,” of a poet’s (and maybe his own) attempt to ravish an 
urn—that is, to demonstrate the superior status of the spoken 
word, of the poetic mind in action, and of the poet, to a 
beautiful, lasting, but static object of sculptural/visual art. In 
the first three stanzas the poet conveys efficacy and 
superiority as he manipulates the “sweet” (4) urn and “its” 
images to service his own self-image. However, in promoting 
himself through his self-reflexive involvement with the plight 
of those frozen on the urn’s surface, he is suddenly reminded 
of his own inescapable susceptibility to decay, and of his own 
inevitable demise. Reminded of his own need of a “friend” 
(44), of reassurances from someone/thing alien and superior 
to himself he could imagine having access to or as being 
linked to penultimate truths (to “eternity” [45]), in the closing 
stanza, the poet changes his intentions toward the urn. In the 
last stanza, that is, rather than ravish it, the poet attempts to 
restore to it the formidable powers of expression he had 
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previously downplayed and undermined.
The poet clearly wants us to imagine not only that a 
rivalry exists between the urn and himself, but that the 
outcome of this contest is undetermined. The urn, we are told 
in the very first line, is “still unravished.” We intuit that he 
means that the urn is as yet unravished—at least by its groom, 
“quietness” (1). Perhaps, we are encouraged to ask ourselves, 
with his rhyme, with his voice, the poet might yet accomplish 
what quietness could not—namely, a charged, oratorical, even 
“orgiastic” (Friedman 226) conquest of the beautiful urn. 
In the first stanza the poet skillfully demonstrates how 
he can use figurative language to undermine (undress) the 
authority and prowess of (off of) the urn. The poet gives lip-
service to the urn’s powers, and confesses the inability of his 
own rhyme to match the “sweet[ness]” (4) of its 
“express[ion]” (3), but his personification of the urn actually 
makes it mostly seem vulnerable and passive. By calling the 
urn a “foster-child” in the second line, he makes the urn seem 
abandoned, and thereby further emphasizes our sense of the 
urn as vulnerable. Further, he portrays it as a vulnerable 
creation, and thereby draws attention to the generative 
capacities of those who “birthed” it. When we are 
subsequently told that the urn “express[es] / A flowery tale” 
(3-4), the status of the urn as the story’s teller seems to us 
uncertain, unfixed, even unearned. If the tale originates in any 
one, is it not, we are prompted to ask, really the potter’s (s’) 
and/or the painter’s (s’) tale, told through the medium of their 
painted urn, as much as it is the urn’s proper? And, in making 
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the ostensible subject of the poem the urn’s beautiful tale 
and/or its capacity to tell a beautiful tale, we sense the urn’s 
dependency on the poet’s voice to convey its unseen beauty 
to us. Portrayed as both vulnerable and passive, we are 
encouraged to suspect the urn is merely a “shape[ly]” (5) 
body, “dressed” (34) up prettily. Personified, its identity 
amounts to that of a passive (“still” [1]) virgin “child” (2), 
vulnerable to ravishment, dressed up by long-lost parentage, 
and whose very dressings (i.e., its surface tale)—a perpetual 
source of discomfort: not only might the urn’s images not be 
the surface manifestation of its own tale, it might be an 
imposition provided by others which forever “haunt about 
[the urn’s] [. . .] shape” (5).
An argument could be made that the uninterrupted 
sequence of questions which end the first stanza show that 
the poet is greatly affected by the images on the urn, even if 
their exact relationship to the urn is uncertain. But while most 
critics believe that the readers’ own desire for answers, for 
satiation, is likely aroused by the poet’s questions, some also 
sense a coordinating, scheming intelligence at work in these 
lines. Andrew Bennett, for one, argues that “[i]n the micro-
narrative of lines 5-10, Keats prefigures the narrative 
movement of the next two stanzas, and, to a certain extent, 
the larger narrative movement of the whole poem [which he 
defines as ‘an attempt to capture the virgin meaning of the 
urn’]” (137). Since the questions relate to an anticipated 
sexual conquest, they remind us of the urn’s own unravished 
status and of the poet’s previous prompting to anticipate a 
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ravishment of the urn. I modify Bennett’s assessment of the 
poet and argue that the questions, then, rather than help 
demonstrate the images’ power, serve instead as notice that 
the poet intends to capture, so as to enrapture, the virgin urn. 
Further evidence that the images do not tease the poet 
out of narrative control is the confident manner in which he 
interacts with the images in the second stanza. Here he is not 
hoping for answers; instead, he is eager to and does dispense 
them. In the second, third, and fourth stanzas, in fact, the 
poet addresses images he portrays as sentient, as capable of 
hearing him, and as in desperate need of oratorical 
encouragement and soothing. He encourages “pipes” to “play 
on” (12). He uses logic to assist a “youth” (15), the “bold 
lover” (17), the “boughs” (21) and a “melodist” (22) to 
conceive of their immobility as a perpetual boon. What is 
inspiring his address to them, we note, is an aphorism—
“Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard / Are sweeter” 
(11-12)—he wills to mind. By choosing to refer to words to 
inspire his involvement with the images, the poet thereby 
privileges them as containers of wisdom. The purported 
power of visual imagery is at the very least left undeveloped 
by this choice, and more than likely is undermined.
The poet’s involvement with the images, though 
superficially tender, is self-serving, even rough. It is self-
serving because their ignorance and neediness call attention 
to his own knowledge and capacities as a healer and lover. 
Because the images’ immobility is the source of their plight, 
we take greater notice of the poet’s energetic mind as he 
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felicitously distills and dispenses oratorical “medicine.” It is 
rough because he first reminds each of the images of their 
plights—so to draw their attention to their dependence upon 
him—before administering to them. He therefore is a 
competent healer—well suited, we think, to tend to the 
vulnerable virgin urn’s distress as much as those of the 
images’—and also a muscular lover—well endowed, we 
conclude, for a subsequent ravishing of the urn.
Bennett argues that the poet literally manhandles the urn 
as he engages with “its” images. He argues that the poet is 
“mak[ing] his own story” out of the images “by turning [the 
urn]” (142). He believes that the poet uses the image of the 
heifer in the fourth stanza to define his (the poet’s) 
relationship to the urn. He argues:
[T]he heifer which is being led to the altar is a visual 
double of the urn itself: “What leaf-fring’d legend 
haunts about thy shape” becomes “And all her silken 
flanks with garlands drest.” This coincidence in visual 
detail makes of the urn a sacrificial victim and the 
poet a “mysterious priest[.]” (142)
Though I conceive of his handling of these images as a 
turning point in the poem where the poet begins more to 
want to surrender his authority than assert it, I find his linking 
of poet to the priest to be apt. In the first three stanzas the 
poet is a “mysterious priest” (32): we sense in his handling of 
the images someone capable of great mercy but also of 
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ritualistic (he deals with each image swiftly and efficiently) 
brutality. I suspect, however, that in the middle stanzas, 
readers experience the poet as involving himself more with 
the urn’s surface than with the urn proper. This is a 
distinction with a difference, for if we (at some level) 
experience his involvement with the images’ distress as him 
handling the physical dressings imposed upon its surface, 
following the logic of the poem’s developing plot, we suspect 
that a figurative ravishment of the urn’s body awaits us in the 
fifth and closing stanza.
The fifth stanza does indeed begin with renewed 
attention to the urn’s “shape” (41) and “form” (44), but we 
are meant to sense the urn’s power, not its depletion. In fact 
the disintegration attended to in this stanza is the “wast[ing]” 
(46) away of his own body. Why, lead to anticipate an 
inevitable ravishment, does the urn end up “remain[ing] 
[unaffected], in midst of other woe” (47)? The poet, unlike 
the urn, has not simply been “teas[ing]” (44) us. Instead, the 
portrayal of the urn in the final stanza is informed by his own 
vulnerability, and therefore by his own need for an 
empowered “friend” (48). He was able to use the immobility 
of the images to show up the rewards offered those living in 
“quick” time (as opposed to those existing in “slow time” [2], 
or frozen time), without simultaneously complicating his self-
enhancement with incurred self-doubt, because his activity 
created a momentary high. However, while denizens of 
frozen time cannot experience the pitfalls of a changing 
“terrain,” the poet knows that historical time offers its 
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traversers egregious falls as well as mountainous highs. After 
his happy rush, he becomes “parch[ed]” (30) and “pious” 
(37). He now contemplates the terror of physical 
degeneration that his purposeful activity had for a time kept 
away.
His awareness of the boon of eternal existence, and the 
blight of a terminal one, as well as the highly self-reflexive 
dynamic he created with his involvement with the images, 
now lead him to reflect upon his own fate.  We sense this 
narrative turn, this sudden emergence in the poem of signs of 
his own distress, when he engages the images in the fourth 
stanza. He does not seem as focused. Previously, the deftness 
and rapidity with which he dealt with the images 
communicated a confident, coordinated, teleological mind. 
Seemingly intent on plotting the urn’s molestation, he didn’t 
wander. In this stanza, however, he seems more someone 
who is searching in earnest than someone simply on a 
mission—there is genuine, open inquiry here, not the certain 
march toward an already ascertained goal. We witness him 
return to questioning. And this time, rather than help service 
his rhetorical mastery over the urn, his questions now reflect 
his vulnerability and genuine uncertainty.
His relationship to the images in the fourth stanza 
suggests his own desire for soothing answers. It suggests their 
(i.e., the images’) power: the heifer and the priest seemingly 
lead to his conjuration of the abandoned town. Unlike the 
aphorism he willed forth earlier, this illusion shows his 
vulnerability as a man, not his capabilities as a poet. The 
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town’s fate, we note, is one shared by those living in historical 
time. Much like the poet’s corporeal fate, with those who 
once filled its streets departed, the town is bereft, “emptied” 
(37) of its life-blood. The town does not receive the consoling 
response the poet provided the images in the second and 
third stanzas with. It is, rather, left to stand, representative as 
it is of his own distress. Its unheard anguish airs his own call 
for assistance from an empowered, mysterious source, and 
indicates the awakening of his full awareness to this desire.
When the poet inscribes the word “silent” at the end of 
the fourth stanza, we should see it as awakening the poet “out 
of [his self-reflecting] thought[s]” (44). Aware of his own 
unmet needs, he turns to the “foster-child of silence” (2) with 
a new goal in mind. Whereas in the last stanza he originally 
intended to showcase the richness of oration and writing, of 
rhymes, and the comparative bareness of visual art, he finds 
himself in no mood to do so. Instead, he tries to establish for 
the urn the prowess he had earlier declared it possessed but 
had thereafter worked to deny. Whereas in the first stanza the 
poet established the urn’s parent as “silence” and its groom as 
“quietness” (1), the fifth stanza finally emphasizes and comes 
close to establishing its own power as a “silent form” (44). 
Whereas before its feminine “shape” (5) suggested its 
vulnerability to masculine ravishment, its shape now links it 
to superhuman—or rather, alien—strength. As Geraldine 
Friedman notes, there is a “cycle of eros that runs between 
the impassioned close-ups of the individual panels, beginning 
in strophe one, to the renouncing of passion in strophe five, 
DRAINING THE AMAZON’S SWAMP
253
where the urn becomes a distant ‘Attic shape’ [41] and ‘Cold 
Pastoral’ [45]” (“Erotics of Interpretation in Keats’s ‘Ode on 
a Grecian Urn’” 226). Given the urn’s classical origins, by 
calling it a “form” (44) the poet likens the urn’s shape to 
eternal, to abstract Pythagorean forms, and thereby helps 
neutralize the urn’s sexy physicality. The urn’s teasings in this 
stanza, we note, reminds him of “eternity” (45), not of sexual 
conquest. 
The poet not only lends authority and mystery to the 
urn’s shape—in the fifth stanza, the images on the urn’s 
surface are commandingly owned by the urn itself. No longer 
images which haunt its shape, they constitute its “brede” (41). 
The urn repossesses the specific images the poet had earlier 
tainted with his own influence. The “[b]old lover” (17) he 
consoled, for instance, is now conflated within a multitude of 
unknown “marble men” (42): his influence upon him is 
humbled by the sudden algebraic multiplication of images. 
The urn’s authoritative repossession, its “[c]old[ness] (45) and 
“[f]air attitude” (40), are, however, the perfect salves to help 
temper his “burning” desire for an empowered, authoritative 
“friend” (48). They help reconstitute the urn so that its 
unheard, visual, sweet stories can better serve his newly 
prioritized need for an assured source of wisdom.
But if he means to inflate the prowess of the urn’s shape 
and visual images, it certainly seems to work against his 
purpose to end the poem with lines written on its surface. Yet 
while these written words do contest the power of 
pictorial/sculptural art, they still enhance the urn’s status. The 
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lines are an aphorism, and remind the poet that it was an 
aphorism which inspired his commanding encounters with 
the urn’s images. In hopes of conclusively establishing the 
urn’s potency, then, the poet shows the urn’s images affecting 
him, offers it genuine praise, has it repossess its images, and, 
finally, has it make claim to the very source of his more 
confident involvement with it. Given the poet’s previous 
sinister intentions, the urn’s lines can fruitfully be imaged as 
molesting the legitimacy of the poet’s earlier prideful 
encounter with the urn. And, in mimicking the poet’s 
rapaciousness, the urn thereby becomes much more than a 
story-teller: by ridiculing the poet, and by self-reflexively 
establishing its own stature, the sweet urn returns to become 
an efficacious dispenser of sweet justice. 
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The Other Crowd (August 2003)
Outside, in the dark, the street is body-tall,
flowered with faces intent on the scarecrow thing
that shouts to thousands the echoing
of their own wishes.) The Orator has risen! (15-   
18)
We might be inclined to interpret the dedication to Camillien 
Houde, in A.M. Klein’s “Political Meeting,” as a genuine 
gesture of Klein’s respect for Houde’s oratorical skills, but it 
may also be a gesture of sympathy for a man ensnared. For 
within the bracketed lines is content which calls into question 
the orator’s belief that he “has them” (11), that he commands 
“the” “crowd” (9). While the orator has “[an]other voice” 
(33), within these lines is another crowd, a very different 
crowd, seemingly, from the one “[with]in the hall” (14). We 
meet a “street” crowd, not a kowed “country” (20) crowd. 
We find this crowd, not caught “in snares” (9), but “intent” 
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on the speaker, intending to use him as a “thing,” as a tool, to 
service its own desires.
If the bracketed material was not included in the poem 
there would be little in it that casts doubt on the orator’s 
dominion over his audience. The poem would relate how an 
orator, “kith and kin” (29) with his folksy crowd, moves his 
gullible, guidable audience to thoughts of race war. When he 
moves from “sling[ing] slang” and “wink[ing] folklore” (36) 
to “[c]almly” “speak[ing] of war” (38), the orator shows that 
from the beginning of his oration he had had a war-plan in 
mind. He is a plotting and masterful manipulator, and his 
audience is manageable, malleable stuff: we learn from the 
poem’s opening lines that “they [a]wait” (2) in “folding seats” 
“on [a] [. . .] school platform” (1), the “chairman’s” arrival 
and “praise” (2). However, Klein’s inclusion of the bracketed 
lines ensures some uncertainty exists as to who really was in 
control of whom at this political meeting.
The brackets help suggest that whatever the nature of 
the material they enclose, it does not quite fit with the rest of 
the text. (And, indeed, in this poem, it doesn’t.) We might 
normally construe bracketed material—optional reading, but 
for two reasons we might not do so here: one, we were told 
that the chairman’s charm depends on him being “full of 
asides and wit” (12); and two, we know that the poem is about 
transformations and elevations, including the “rise” of the 
“Orator!”
Our first reaction to learning of the “thousands” 
“[o]utside” is likely to assume that they are an extension of 
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the crowd found within the hall. We might assume that these 
thousands serve, by suddenly suggesting the expansive 
breadth of the orator’s appeal, to cinch the orator’s 
transformation from ordinary “chairman” to awesome 
“Orator” at the end of line 18. But the text works against our 
likely instinctive desire to conflate the two crowds together. 
Because one is “[o]utside,” the other inside, because one is 
“in the dark,” the other bathed in “yellow [. . .] light” (7), 
because one is associated with “streets,” and the other with 
“school platforms,” the two crowds—hardly “kith and 
kin”—cannot easily be merged. Any crowd found “[with]in 
the dark” would be menacing—a street crowd, particularly so. 
And though the “inside” crowd ravaged a “ritual bird” (9), 
they do little but slavishly “[w]orship and love” (19) their 
“country uncle” (20). This “street” crowd, on the other hand, 
at a distance from the orator—and harder to imagine as as 
intimately involved with his “shouts” as the crowd within the 
hall is with his “asides”—seems more malevolent than 
malleable, more studious than servile, and more a potential 
heavy counter-weight to his influence than an easily 
“pin[ned]” (26) lightweight “oppon[ent] (26).
“[T]he street is body-tall”; it is a weight which might as 
easily overwhelm as enhance the orator/prophet’s “building” 
(13) oratorical mass. When we discover the semantic and 
rhythmic “echoing” of the “street” crowds’ “flowered faces” in 
the “country uncle’s” “sunflower seeds” (26), our sense that 
both harmony and dissonance exists in the relationship 
between the orator and this crowd is enhanced. We suspect 
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that it is what will be made of this crowd which matters, but 
we question what the orator can make of it. We cannot be 
certain whether the street’s “flowered faces” are more likely 
to blossom or wilt in the presence of a repellent “scarecrow 
thing.” Characterized as composed of “flowered faces,” as 
opposed to say, crowed countenances, this crowd still attends 
to the scarecrow thing with some of the same studious 
“intent” that surely facilitated the orator’s masterful 
manipulation of those within the hall. So while the orator has 
his “tricks” (21), the street crowd might be eyeing its puppet: 
how certain can we be that someone who services the desires 
of others, who “echo[es] / [. . .] [their] own wishes” is in any 
sense, or at any time, their master?
The “body-odour of race” (39) is what the orator 
summons at the end of the poem, not from those who 
“wait[ed]” in the hall but from those outside who comprise 
“[t]he whole street” (37). In retrospect, the repetition of 
“ou’s” in the bracketed lines (“Outside,” “shouts,” 
“thousands”) identify this temporary confine as the 
summoning circle of the poem’s penultimate visitation: the 
invisible odour. No surprise, however, is the summoning of 
body odour—the inevitable by-product of body heat—from 
this corporeal street mass. No real “trick” (21), either. And so 
while there is no question left at the end of the poem as to 
whether the orator’s rhetoric was inflammatory, we are left 
uncertain as to what transpired. Did the orator use the 
crowd? If so, which crowd? If the crowd inside the hall was 
directed towards thoughts of war, is it possible that the street 
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crowd, at least, used the “seed peddler” to bring to the 
surface their own deeply seeded racist thoughts?
Perhaps in “Political Meeting” Klein was bringing to the 
surface a “grim” (38) possible truth many of us still hesitate 
to consider. No doubt, even with the comparative ambiguity 
of the nature of the flowered/street crowd’s relationship to 
the orator, the potency of the orator’s power is conveyed in 
the poem. Almost certainly, the poem was born out of a 
modernist’s desire for, and fears of, the arrival of central 
leaders who might unite a fractured society together. But 
perhaps contained in its “shadow[s]” (38) is the terrifying 
realization that the Houdes and Hitlers of the world arise 
from the wishes of legions of “willing executioners” 
(Goldhagen).
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Adam’s Presumptuous, Adventurous, Bold, and Righteous 
(Re)Quest (December 2003)
For the most part, presumptuous, adventurous, and bold 
behavior is associated with fallen characters in John Milton’s 
Paradise Lost. Satan, for example, as he willfully journeys past 
every barrier in pursuit of his goal, is repeatedly described as 
bold. And, after she eats the apple, Eve too is described (by 
Adam) as “bold,” “presumptuous,” and “adventurous” (IX 
921). There is however one character in the text who behaves 
this way yet is neither a fallen character nor shown to fall as a 
consequence of this behavior—that being, Adam, when he 
asks God for a companion. Though it is typical of Adam to 
circumscribe his freedom—as he does, for example, after 
Raphael warns him his interest in the heavens is becoming 
lustful—and though we are most familiar with the willful act 
which dooms him, Adam relentlessly pursues his claim to a 
companion and does not stop until he achieves his “heart’s 
desire” (VIII 451). And though this encounter, especially as it 
advances, has all the feel of a trial that is testing Adam’s 
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disobedience rather than his obedience, it likely surprises by 
actually proving one where Adam demonstrates his righteous 
use of his God-given freedom.
One of the things Raphael does which convinces Adam 
to desist in his inquiry into the make-up of the heavens, is to 
remind him of all he has already been given by God. Raphael 
advises Adam to take “joy [. . .] / In what he gives to thee, 
this Paradise / And fair Eve” (VIII, 170-73), and reminds 
him of how God had “bid dwell far off all anxious cares” 
(185). However, later in book VIII, when Adam tells Raphael 
how he received Eve from God, he relates to him how, 
despite having just been given Paradise to lord over, and 
having being told that Paradise is a place where he need not 
“fear [. . .] dearth” (322), he chose not to “check” (189) his 
“apprehension [that] [. . .] in these / [he] [. . .] found not what 
[he] thought [he] [. . .] wanted still” (355). Instead, Adam tells 
Raphael he pressed God for more. Asking for more after 
already having received so much is a presumptive thing to 
have done, and by characterizing his request as 
“presumptuous” (367), Adam shows he knows as much 
himself. Though he doesn’t yet know that overreach is what 
doomed Satan, and what will doom Eve, he obviously has 
some sense that after already having received so much, to 
presume to ask God for more is at the very least 
inappropriate, and possibly, that it amounts to a significant 
trespass.
Though in his pursuit of “more” Adam may remind us 
of Satan’s ingratitude, the way Adam responds to God’s gifts 
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may have us thinking more of Jesus from Paradise Regained 
than of Satan from Paradise Lost. For just as Jesus responds to 
Satan’s presentations in Paradise Regained of, for example, “a 
table richly spread” (II 340) and a “wide domain / In ample 
territory” (IV 81-82), by informing him that he has offered 
him nothing of value, Adam responds to God’s declaration 
that “Not only these fair bounds, but all the earth / To thee 
and to they race I give” (VIII 338-39), by implying that God 
has failed to provide him with anything that will make him 
(Adam) happy or content (364-66). I draw this parallel to 
illustrate just how audaciously Adam begins his argument. 
Though Adam takes great care to avoid arousing God’s anger 
when he speaks to him, his reply to God’s gift-giving gesture 
nevertheless risks momentarily making God seem as 
impotent and foolish as Jesus’ reply to Satan’s lavish offerings 
made Satan seem.
God is not displeased with Adam, and my guess is that 
most readers are not surprised in this. For even if Adam is 
behaving outlandishly, God, after all, is (here still) a 
permissive deity, and Adam doesn’t thus far seem to have 
disobeyed. However, when Adam chooses to persist beyond 
the obstacle which had previously inhibited his pursuit of 
further knowledge of the heavens, we likely become less sure 
as to how God will react.
When Raphael told Adam his interest in the heavens was 
not sinful, that “To ask or search I blame thee not” (VIII 66), 
he followed by none the less trying to dissuade Adam in his 
concern to know more about them. He told Adam to 
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“admire” (75) God’s creations, to be content with what he 
has, and to “Solicit not thy thoughts with matters hid” (167). 
Similarly, though God smiles at Adam to let him know he has 
not (yet) transgressed, he follows by reminding Adam that his 
“realm is large,” and orders him to “Find pastime, and bear 
rule” (375). And when, despite recognizing God’s reply as an 
“order” (VIII 377), Adam chooses to proceed, we likely feel 
that he is (tres)passing into very uncertain territory. Adam 
understands that by proceeding he may be transgressing 
beyond a barrier intended to hem him in—this being, of 
course, God’s command that he desist and find happiness in 
all that had already been provided. And in fact, much like 
Satan before entering the abyss, Adam prepares himself as if 
embarking on a perilous journey. He implores God not to 
“Let [his] [. . .] words offend [him]” (379), and thereby is 
likely trying “to ward of the potential punishment by 
anticipating it” (Forsyth 119). But Adam does not advance 
meekly; instead, we sense his boldness, his aggressiveness, 
even his arrogance in his subsequent response to God.
Adam becomes judgmental and assertive. We sense his 
willfulness, for example, when he states that mismatched 
pairs “soon prove / Tedious alike: of fellowship I speak / 
Such as I seek” (VIII, 389-90; emphasis added). An encounter 
which began with God’s assertiveness, His egoism, clearly 
evident in the text (the result, in part, of the accumulating 
declarative statements God makes: “I have set” [324], “I warn 
thee” [327], “I give” [339], “ I bring” [343]), is becoming one 
where Adam is the more active and assertive of the pair. And 
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though we are again told that God was “not displeased” (398) 
with Adam, we may not be much assuaged by God’s reaction, 
for God responds to Adam’s assertiveness as if baiting him 
into making the same mistake that doomed Satan. That is, as 
if sensing that this encounter is becoming a battle of wills, 
God, in effect, sets Adam up—by making it so he must argue 
himself not just god-like but God’s superior in order to “win” 
their debate!
God tells Adam that he “see[s]” “A nice and subtle 
happiness” (VIII 399) in Adam’s state, and invites Adam to 
imagine how he (God), purportedly as isolated as Adam, 
feels. In order to prove to God that he truly is unhappy, then, 
Adam must both demonstrate he sees better than God does 
and that he has insight into the state of, if not God’s mind, 
then at least His heart. Now rather than call God 
shortsighted, Adam takes care to stress how “All human 
thoughts come short” (414) to that of God, and Adam is 
otherwise very self-deprecating in this passage. However, 
Adam nevertheless indirectly suggests that God’s sight has 
not provided with him with insight into the state of Adam’s 
mind/heart, and he does speculate as to the nature of God’s 
“need[s]” (419). And, after Adam finishes having 
“emboldened sp[oke]” (434), after having dared “to have 
equalled [or surpassed the reasoning/debating skills of] the 
most High” (I 40), he is handsomely rewarded with his 
“heart’s desire” (VIII 451).
God rewards Adam for the “permissive” (VIII 435) use 
of his reason and freedom, but given how presumptuous he 
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was just to initiate his request, how bold he was to disobey 
God’s apparent order and persist, and how adventurous he 
was to advance an argument which at times risked making 
God seem foolish and himself God-like, we might still feel 
that God rewards Adam here for the same sort of indulgent, 
disobedient behavior that doomed Satan and Eve. The 
likelihood we sense he got away with one is considerable, 
since emboldened characters normally are the ones punished 
in Paradise Lost, and since Adam normally circumscribes his 
freedom, as he does, for instance, when he learns his interest 
in the heavens is becoming lustful.
For me, at least, the non-typical nature of this encounter 
draws my interest in the same way that nature’s 
“disproportions” drew Adam’s (VIII 7): it also excites me to 
be presumptuous. Though my purpose here has been largely 
to focus on the oddity of Adam being rewarded for the sort 
of presumptuous, adventurous, and bold behavior which 
normally dooms characters in Paradise Lost, I cannot help but 
finish by speculating as to why this aberration exits. Though 
Adam is the only character in the text rewarded for behaving 
this way, there is another around who does the same but has 
not yet received judgment for doing so—that being, the 
narrator, or, if you will, Milton himself. My conjecture, then: 
perhaps if it was easier for the narrator/Milton to initiate his 
own admittedly “adventurous” (I 13), ambitious, and 
“presum[ptuous]” (VII 13) epic “song” (I 13) when he knew 
he would tell/sing of at least one man who “aim[ed]” 
“ambitious[ly]” (I 41), yet avoided being “Hurled headlong 
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flaming from the ethereal sky” (45) for doing so. 
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Not Meat (March 2004)
The thin muslin went flaring up the chimney like 
a magic bird and now off came her skirt, her woollen 
stockings, her shoes, and on to the fire they went, too, 
and were gone for good. The firelight shone through 
the edges of her skin; now she was clothed only in her 
untouched integument of flesh. This dazzling, naked 
she combed out her hair with her fingers; her hair 
looked white as the snow outside. Then went directly 
to the man with red eyes i whose unkempt mane the 
lice moved; she stood up on tiptoe and unbuttoned 
the collar of his shirt.
What big arms you have.
All the better to hug you with.
Every wolf in the world howled a prothalamion 
outside the window as she freely gave the kiss she 
owed him.
What big teeth you have!
She saw how his jaw began to slaver and the 
room was full of the clamour of the forest’s Liebestod 
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but the wise child never flinched, even when he 
answered:
All the better to eat you with.
The girl burst out laughing; she knew she was 
nobody’s meat. She laughed at him full in the face, 
she ripped off his shirt for him and flung it into the 
fire, in the fiery wake of her own discarded clothing. 
The flames danced like dead souls on Walpurgisnacht 
and the old bones under the bed set up a terrible 
clattering but she did not pay them any heed.
Carnivore incarnate, only immaculate flesh 
appeases him. (Angela Carter, “The Company of 
Wolves” 118)
In this passage a little girl becomes a woman, a wife, and a 
savior. When she calmly “combe[s] out her hair,” when she 
moves “directly to the man” before her, she for the first time 
acts with womanly composure and deliberation. But she was 
always capable of developing. Unlike other children, fear of 
the “teeming perils of the night and forest” (111) had not 
shriveled her capacity and desire for play and exploration. 
Indeed, unlike Little Red Riding Hood (and Little Red Cap), 
she was the one who made the decision to venture out into 
the woods. Yet though she had dreamed of having more, of 
being more, than the “rustic clowns” (114) of her native 
village, when she first sensed that the desirous courtly 
gentleman she encountered in the woods meant her harm, 
her first reaction was indistinguishable from that of other 
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folk, from that of prey. When she “pulled [her] scarlet shawl 
more closely round herself” (117) and temporarily allowed 
the wolf control over her fate, she was like the passive, 
pathetic young bride who “drew the coverlet up to her chin 
and waited and [. . .] waited and [. . .] waited” (112). She was 
acting just like how Little Red Riding Hood, the dressed-up 
puppet of mothers and wolves, would. But she shows in this 
passage that she is not so foolish as to believe—as many “old 
wives” (113) did—that decorum might tame wolves as much 
as it might little girls. Rather than “throw a hat [. . .] at [him]” 
(113), she disrobes him, and her “flesh” baits—and beats—
the wolf.
Though she begins the seduction by “st[anding] up on 
tiptoe and unbutton[ing] [his] collar” (118), this woman need 
not be dainty. Like the wolf who can move with facility from 
“delicate” (115) gestures to forceful advances, she soon 
“rip[s] off his shirt [. . .] and fl[ings] it into the fire.” The wolf, 
too, we remember, “strip[ped] off his” clothing and “flung 
off” (116) a blanket, and the matching of terms used to 
describe their actions helps make their physical and marital 
union seem appropriate. It is true that when she “laughed at 
him full in the face,” her action, in part, read as payback and 
revenge for the time he held clear advantage over her. While 
before the absurd innocence of a little girl who gazed upon 
the “little” compass he kept in his pocket “with a vague 
wonder” (114), drew him to laugh, now his inability to 
register that his fastidiously laid out plans have gone awry, 
that she may in fact be toying with him when she exclaims, 
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“What big teeth you have!,” draws her to laugh back at him in 
return. But they are both too much the same (and too 
different from others) for this response to establish 
something other than their equivalence. Both draw their 
considerable energy from potent inner resources; both are 
integrally linked to the plot’s key dynamic—that of invasion 
and repulsion/redemption—and her laugh is linked to a 
greater purpose: he, with “eyes full” “with a unique, interior 
light” (117), is one of a company of wolves who haunt a 
whole world with their howling pain, and she, with a 
“dazzling” “integument of flesh” will, with a laugh, alleviate 
it.
The wolves are the story’s perpetual intruders, but the 
narrator ensures that no one, no thing, escapes infestation. 
The villagers are visited by “infernal vermin” (116). The 
reader is brought “[in]to [a] [. . .] region” (110), “in[to] the 
forest” (112), introduced to the terrifying wolves and their 
“rending” (110) howl, then deposited at a “hearthside” (111) 
and told that though “[w]e try and try [. . .] [,] [we] [. . .] 
cannot keep [the wolves] [. . .] out” (111). Even the wolves 
suffer “so” (117). In a text where adjectives often infest, 
intensify, overwhelm, and corrupt their unfortunate “host” 
nouns (e.g., “acrid milk” [111], “malign door” [113], “rustic 
clowns” [114], and in this passage, “old bones”), the wolves, 
though “they would love to be less beastly” (112), are 
burdened by their own “inherent” beastliness. But various 
and indiscriminate oppression enables liberation to become 
more sweet, significant, and shared when it arrives. The 
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narrator is heightening the expectation for an epochal event, 
an act of resistance so powerful and reverberating that it 
might “open” the “door” (118) to a whole new era.
The young woman, described as “a sealed vessel,” as 
someone possessing a “magic space shut tight with a plug” 
(114), is ideally constituted to repel invasions. She is the 
perfect person to serve as the “external mediator” (112) the 
“carnivore[s] incarnates” are waiting for. And in this passage, 
where the gathering wolves invade the room with their 
“clamour,” where the dialogue follows the familiar pattern of 
folklore which leads to a wolf’s ingestion of a little girl, the 
young woman does not “flinch” (118). Since “flinch” is one 
of the innumerable words in this story (and in this passage) 
(e.g., “thin,” “skin,” “infinite,” “inherent,” etc.) which 
contains within themselves the preposition “in,” her 
imperviousness here is set up to seem especially significant. 
But it is her riposte, the expulsion of her own sardonic laugh 
“out loud,” not her parry, which counters and disrupts the 
story’s predatory inward movements and inaugurates a series 
of paragraphs in which she “wills” (118) the action and 
determines the fate of a land.
In this passage all the “wolv[es] in the world” come 
“carol[ling]” (117) on Christmas Eve, but they do not “sing to 
Jesus” (111). Instead, these feral witnesses serenade the 
mental maturation of a young woman well suited to keep a 
“fearful” wolf company and to “still” and “silence” (118) the 
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Securing Their Worth (March 2004)
Though their small stature and inexperience is what may first 
come to mind when we think of children’s vulnerable nature, 
children are both physically and emotionally vulnerable. They 
are not only unsure of how they might handle threats upon 
their lives, but of the value of the life that might be taken 
from them. Indeed, their need to feel special inspires its own 
fear—namely, that it might make them vulnerable to 
predators. Robert Louis Stevenson’s Treasure Island and E. B. 
White’s Charlotte’s Web well capture how much children hope 
to be thought worthy by discerning adults. Their child 
protagonists, Jim Hawkins and Wilbur, are initially unsure of 
their worth, and therefore also unsure of how much they 
deserve the high praise they first receive. They both, however, 
do find ways to assure themselves that they matter to those 
whose respect they so highly prize. 
Jim begins his account by showing himself as just an 
ordinary boy. It is Billy Bones, the fearsome pirate who visits 
his parent’s inn, that he describes as impossible to ignore. 
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Bones, then, Jim’s first textual representation of someone 
with presence, is the perfect person for young Jim to use as a 
touchstone to gauge his own importance. Most people were 
frightened by Bones (4), and though Jim tells us that he “was 
far less afraid of the captain himself than anybody else who 
knew him” (3), and though he tells us that the captain took a 
special interest in him, Jim portrays Bones as attending to and 
praising him only to make use of him. When he takes Jim 
“aside” (3), when he tells Jim that he “had taken quite a fancy 
to [him]” (8), both the reader and Jim sense that Bones thinks 
of him as but a potentially useful tool—never, however, a self-
evidently useful one. Jim is portrayed as having made little 
impression upon Bones; it is Bones, rather, especially when 
he tries to bribe Jim and thereby shows he really thinks him 
more common than special, who powerfully affects Jim.
Before Jim’s truly remarkable escapades on Treasure 
Island, whenever he receives praise, the praise ends up 
proving worse than worthless. For example, the squire, who 
has just met Jim, gauges “this lad Hawkins is a trump” (31), 
and proceeds to deplete this high assessment of all value 
when he subsequently also calls the “cook,” John Silver, “a 
perfect trump” (46). Silver lets Jim know right away he thinks 
him “smart as paint,” and then suggests just how dull and 
easily lead he really thinks he is by subsequently trying to 
persuade him that “none of the pair us smart” (45). (Jim, 
when he overhears Silver call another boy “as smart as paint” 
[58], is later provided with further evidence that Silver had 
actually judged him of little merit.) But before landing on 
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Treasure Island, Jim actually does little to merit being singled 
out as special, so it is appropriate that the praise he receives 
proves the kind readily dispensed by flatterers. For, though he 
retrieves a valuable map which launches a great adventure, 
though he spots Black Dog at the Spy Glass and puts all 
Long John Silver’s plans at risk, there is little sense that these 
actions could not have been accomplished by pretty much 
anyone.
Jim’s account ends up making the argument that if one 
wants to be certain that the praise or attention one receives is 
honest, it is really better to receive it only after accomplishing 
something others likely would not have managed, and after 
having first been underestimated. We know, for instance, that 
the only person whose status increased after his encounter 
with Bones was Doctor Livesey, who remained “calm and 
steady” (6) after the captain threatened him with a knife. 
Bones clearly had underestimated the “neat, bright doctor” 
(5), and as a result still has him on his mind months 
afterwards (7). And once Jim ends up accomplishing things 
that truly defy expectation, he too is provided with clear 
indication that significant personages had reappraised his 
worth.
After Jim leaves his friends and joins the pirates as they 
embark for the island, Livesey, who temporarily takes control 
of the narrative, talks of how he “wonder[ed] over poor Jim 
Hawkins’s fate” (96). As far as the Livesey was concerned, 
Jim was so much the vulnerable and frail boy he thought him 
sure to succumb to the various threats the island or—more 
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especially—the pirates would incur upon him. But by ending 
his narration with Jim’s sudden, dramatic appearance at their 
camp, he documents how much he had underestimated Jim’s 
survival skills; just how surprised he was to see him return 
unscathed. When he once again unexpectedly finds Jim 
before him, the doctor, who previously had a habit of casually 
interrupting him (29), shows how much he now respects him 
by listening to what he had to say in full and “in silence” 
(168) before responding. Livesey then tells Jim he judges him 
someone who at “[e]very step, [. . .] saves our lives” (168), 
and thereby provides him with a very flattering but still just-
plain-accurate assessment of his value to their party. Jim ends 
up surprising Silver with an unexpected “visit” as well, and he 
informs the person who had once so readily sized him up as 
simply an impressionable and needy young boy that he had 
killed some of his men and taken control of the schooner. 
And though Jim writes that he wasn’t quite sure whether or 
not the “curious” “accent” Silver adopts in reply showed he 
“had been favourably affected by [his] courage” (152), Silver, 
by subsequently putting all his cunning into saving Jim’s life, 
ends up showing that he too now considers him the sort of 
person who might very well end up saving his own life one 
day.
Because by the end of his account he has had a chance to 
show he thrives in dangerous situations, can do the 
unexpected and effect miraculous results, Jim likens himself 
to someone beside whom Billy Bones pales in comparison—
Long John Silver himself.  Jim even structures his narrative to 
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encourage a temporary conflation between the two of them. 
He does this by following the termination of the doctor’s 
control over the narrative with a chapter that ends with Silver 
now making a sudden and unexpected appearance at their 
camp. And Silver, the man who could so easily become a 
“bland, polite, obsequious seaman” (186) when it suits his 
purpose but whose true worth is never in doubt, is the 
perfect person for someone like Jim to try and make himself 
seem—even if only momentarily—comparable to. For, 
remembering how insignificant and invisible he seemed in 
comparison to Bones, Jim could never convince himself he is 
the “born favourite” (185) his miraculous accomplishments 
end up persuading others (specifically, Captain Smollett) he 
must be. He would, however, be able to convince himself 
that his adventure to Treasure Island has left him someone 
only the ignorant would mistake for but an ordinary boy.
In Charlotte’s Web, Wilbur tries to imitate Charlotte’s 
ability to spin webs. Like Jim, he wants to do things he knows 
would prove he’s of worth. Jim was to be a simple “cabin-
boy” (34) on the journey, someone who would tag along, 
whom others would need to protect. Similarly, Wilbur was 
assigned no role in the planning and execution of Charlotte’s 
efforts to save him. But whereas Jim repeatedly achieves the 
near impossible, and is therefore deemed someone not only 
competent to take care of himself but someone who would 
be counted on to save others, Wilbur of course fails in his 
repeated attempts to spin a web, decides that Charlotte is just 
so “much cleverer [and] brighter” (60) than he is, and tries to 
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content himself by admiring her own expertise.
His failure to spin a web is so deflating for Wilbur 
because, like Jim, he has little sense that he is worth all that 
much. Wilbur is a runt, the very opposite of a born favorite, 
and his status as the weakest of his litter, the one a farmer 
would rightly deem most likely to live a sickly life and incur 
an early death, makes Fern’s father think of him as simply 
something “to [be quickly done] away with” (1). Not even 
Fern’s frantic efforts to save Wilbur, nor her enthusiastic 
appraisal of him as “absolutely perfect” (4), provide clear 
evidence of his worth. For unlike Silver’s risky efforts to save 
Jim, which seemed appropriate not just because he might 
prove useful but because he is someone whose true nature, 
once revealed, draws instant respect from those who also had 
started early and thereafter had only known dangerous living, 
Fern tries to save Wilbur before he has actually done anything 
to warrant such an enthusiastic response from her. And 
though Fern likely values him for other reasons, it is clear that 
she judges Wilbur absolutely perfect primarily because she 
sees in him the ideal means to calm down fears she is 
currently suffering from. For her, that is, saving the new-born 
runt tends to her doubts that someone might not always be 
there to help her when feeling especially vulnerable.
Since being vulnerable, dependent, can be withering to 
one’s sense of self, taking charge of Wilbur might also have 
helped Fern develop a stronger sense of her own worth. She 
says she “feel[s] lucky” (7) to have him, and she is lucky to 
have him, for looking over Wilbur lets her conceive of herself 
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more as a benefactor than a dependent. Wilbur becomes her 
baby, someone she takes pleasure in “tak[ing] charge” (7) of. 
She nurtures him, she names him, and Wilbur greets her 
attention with his own “adoring eyes” (8)—with sure 
confirmation of her importance to him, that is. But as Fern 
grows older and becomes more desirous of attention from 
boys than from babies, it is no surprise that though she saved 
Wilbur’s life, she did not do much to make him sure enough 
of himself that he wouldn’t doubt the motives behind 
subsequent eager efforts by others to befriend him.
When Charlotte takes over Fern’s role as his guardian 
and protector, Wilbur conveys to her just how unsure he is of 
himself. He insists to Charlotte that he is “not terrific,” that 
he is really “just about average” (91), and he might thereby be 
trying to establish a clearer sense as to why Charlotte has 
taken such a keen interest in him. But Charlotte, seemingly 
oblivious or indifferent to how poorly others’ validation has 
hereto succeeded in making him feel special, tells him he 
should be content to know she finds him “terrific” and 
“sensational” (91). But actually Wilbur has very good reasons 
not to content himself with he praise. For one, the use of the 
word “sensational” suggests over-praise, that is—false praise: 
it is exactly the sort of word Charlotte might put in her web to 
suggest to others that they must surely be seeing what they 
clearly wouldn’t have seen, absent her miraculous advertising. 
For another, Charlotte, by choosing to plot Wilbur’s rescue 
all by herself, not only ensures Wilbur relates to her in the 
same dependent, worshipful way he related to Fern, but that 
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all credit for saving his life belongs to her alone.
It is not impossible that Wilbur suspects Charlotte is 
using him to make herself feel special. She certainly provides 
evidence that in reality she actually swoons far more over 
spectacular accomplishments than she does humble good 
tries. She tells him a true tale of her cousin successfully 
capturing a “wildly thrashing” (102) fish. It is a epic, “never-
to-be-forgotten battle” that will immortalize its hero—and so 
too then, surely, her own efforts to use webbing to ensnare 
not just a fish but beguiled whole crowds of astonished 
people.
The fully domesticated Wilbur, however, whose own 
high public regard shows only Charlotte’s cleverness and the 
public’s “gullib[ility]” (67), probably would have a hard time 
imagining himself akin to either of the noble combatants 
Charlotte describes in the tale. But he actually had once 
thrashed about as wildly and as spectacularly as the fish had, 
and he will end up capturing something as significant as the 
tale’s spider managed to obtain. Before he met Charlotte, 
before he accommodated himself to farm life, slippery Wilbur 
evaded farmer and farmhand alike, and, indeed, never was 
caught by any of them. And this activity resulted in his 
earning indisputably well-earned praise—of the sort, that is, 
which would lead him to truly believing he must in fact be 
“quite [the] [. . .] pig” (23). And whether or not Wilbur might 
have intuited the conditions necessary for him to once again 
be truly praiseworthy, Wilbur finally ends up capturing 
something of great value only when he once again finds 
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himself away from the barn, and without Charlotte there to 
assist him. At the fair, and with Charlotte near death, his 
quick-thinking and assertiveness results in the retrieval of 
Charlotte’s “magnum opus” (144; emphasis in original), her 
greatest creation—her egg sack. And the feint wink Charlotte 
gives him in reply no doubt outdoes all her previous web-
spinning efforts in making him feel special.
Both Jim Hawkins and Wilbur are uncertain of their 
worth, and both end up seeming worthy of recognition only 
after they are able to accomplish something of evident worth, 
that others, for lack of enterprise, could not have managed. 
This means performing bravely and with perspicacity, outside 
of environments they had become accustomed to and had 
been domesticated in. In both books, then, the potentially 
dangerous and unpredictable outside world is not simply a 
place children should fear, it is also a treasure trove in which 
they could discover true value, a strange fair in which they 
might fairly claim the respect they so highly prize.  
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Socrates and his God (May 2004)
Given what we hear from him in The Apology, it is not clear 
why Socrates “follows” his God, Apollo. There is evidence to 
support three explanations: 1) because he is compelled to; 2) 
because he wants to enable goodness; and 3) out of self-
interest.
At least in The Apology, Socrates never says he “follows” 
God. Instead, he characterizes himself as God’s gift to the 
Athenians. He says, “I am really one given to you by God” 
(437), and as such he is not so much someone who follows 
Him as he is an extension or a key possession of His. He 
argues that it is because he is a gift of God’s that he possesses 
a capacity to neglect “all [his] [. . .] own interests” (437), and 
why an affront to him amounts to an offence against his god. 
It is a self-conception that makes him seem most like a 
puppet, most like someone who follows God because He is, 
so to speak, pulling his strings, and explains why he argues 
that he “cannot” “disobey the god” (443; emphasis added).
But there is also evidence in “the Apology” to support 
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understanding him as not compelled to follow God but as 
drawn to follow Him. When Socrates says that through 
“oracles and dreams” (439) his “God commands” him “to 
wake [. . .] up” (436) his fellow Athenians, when he says that 
he was “posted” by God with a specific “duty to be a 
philosopher” (434-35), we sense he feels strongly obligated 
but not compelled to follow his god’s plans for him. The 
prophetic voice he hears “checks” him, it “opposes” (445) 
him. It is or has an “influence” (439) he strongly registers and 
which impedes his actions, but is not unequivocally presented 
as something which cannot be resisted. That is, we are left 
room to believe the primary reason he heeds its directions is 
because he “trust[s]” (441) its source, Apollo. He trusts 
Apollo because he believes Him “wise” (429) and good. 
Alone, though like everyone he would want to be good, he 
would never be sure what goodness was. But following the 
directions of his god makes him sure “there is no greater 
good for [his fellow Athenians] [. . .] in the city in any way 
than [his] [. . .] service to God” (436).
But his defence also provides evidence for understanding 
Socrates as following his god because servility has its 
(considerable) benefits. Socrates argues that following His 
commands has meant an arduous life, but also a life of 
hearing from a “familiar prophetic voice [. . .] even in very 
small things” (445). Unlike Oedipus, who felt abandoned by 
the gods, Socrates keeps constant company with his god—a 
god, who, yes, commands him to live a life which leaves him 
materially poor, but one who also leaves him feeling certain 
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he is important both to Him and to most important 
Athenians. Socrates suggests he has little or rather no interest 
in “title[s]” (429) or honor, but if we doubt his sincerity, he 
would have had to have done more than just point to his 
material poverty to prove he does not follow his god for 
riches.
Socrates may not be proud or self-interested, but we 
know that even if he was he would be very unlikely to admit 
this to himself, for he has much riding on his being thought 
good by his god. Socrates playfully imagines spending his 
time joyfully conversing with heroes such as Odysseus in his 
afterlife. He says that only God knows what awaits him after 
death; but the reason he might be thinking of an ideal 
ultimate fate for himself is because he feels sure “no evil can 
happen to a good man either living or dead, and his business 
is not neglected by the gods” (446).
We have evidence, then, to support several hypotheses as 
to why Socrates “follows” his god. Socrates would disavow 
the latter, and possibly the latter two, but all three 
explanations are backed by evidence. We might at least agree 
that Socrates follows God because he believes gods exist 
whom one might follow—but his accusers are given reason in 
The Apology to consider otherwise. Socrates constantly refers 
to his god in his defence, but one of the reasons he is on trial 
is because he is accused of being a dangerous atheist. In this 
position, a self-preserving atheist as much as a reverent 
follower of God, would be sure to intersperse his defence 
with references to Him. 
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Lie about everything under the sun (May 2004)
Poets are supposed to shine light on the actions of heroes 
and gods, but since they work with “shadows” (i.e., images), 
they are ill-prepared to do so. Because they “work far away 
from truth in doing [their] [. . .] work” (403), poets spread 
lies, not light, and they lie about everything under the sun. 
About justice and men, they tell us “that many men are happy 
though unjust” (189), an assertion Plato spends most of The 
Republic trying to disprove. About gods and heroes, they tell 
us these fundamentally good beings “beget evils,” a lie that 
ensures that “everyone will find an excuse for [themselves] [. . 
.] to be evil” (189).
But poets would work little evil if most people 
recognized their mistruths and deemed them ugly and 
repugnant. However, Plato argues that most people are 
unaware that poets “neither know nor have right opinion 
about what [they] [. . .] imitate” (402), and that they therefore 
find poets’ fables beautiful and appealing. No one more so 
than the young, for they have had little time to become 
acquainted with Beauty, and the “inferior part of the[ir] 
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soul[s],” the part which “hungers to be satisfied with tears 
and a good hearty cry” and which poetry “feeds” (405), is not 
yet under the control of the reasoning part. And once they 
have “receive[d] the honeyed Muse,” they can “be sure that 
pleasure and pain will be kings in their” (407) souls, for 
poetry works like a virus in that it “destroy[s] the [soul’s] 
rational part” (405).
The plenitude of “unenlightened” and undisciplined 
people explains why Plato is as concerned as he is about 
poetry’s ability to corrupt, but he believes poetry can actually 
be used to help people “see” Justice. But in order to do so it 
must be stripped of much of what makes it poetical—of its 
“honey.” Poetry must be purged of its rhetorical excess, 
which excites a soul that should be made temperate. It must 
also be limited to showing us good people and good deeds, 
for we alter our natures in correspondence with what we 
imitate. And the only people who can be trusted with 
censorship that determines whether poetry undermines or 
facilitates justice are those who truly have “seen the light”: 
the philosophers. 
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“Mi Casa, Su Casa” (August 2004)
A suburban, collegiate young man (hereafter SCM) has a very 
good reason to find pulp fiction attractive. Having spent the 
majority of his life under his parents’ rule, it must be a 
pleasure for him to engross himself within an imaginary 
world where people much different from his parents reign. 
But however much he might admire his heroes, he must 
wonder from time to time what these natural denizens of the 
urban jungle, these professional killers, would think of him if 
they were somehow to meet. I will be looking at Pulp Fiction 
as if it were an SCM’s daydream, a daydream in which such 
an encounter is staged as part of an attempt to conceive of a 
“space” wherein both he and his pulp-fiction heroes might 
respectfully, amiably—and most importantly—plausibly be 
imagined co-existing with one another.
When we first encounter Vincent and Jules they are 
conversing in a way that is easy to imagine as being both 
familiar and appealing to an SCM. SCMs can readily identify 
with Vincent as he recounts his first European experience to 
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Jules. They can easily be imagined as being fascinated by 
Amsterdam drug-culture, as enjoying hearing how the 
Quarter Pounder’s name was altered so that it would be 
better received in France. But though SCMs are likely to find 
much of the conversation recognizable—it isn’t much 
different from what you’d hear in a college dorm—clearly 
these two men are not to be found in a dorm near you. They 
are the urban jungle’s warriors, its professional killers, and it 
is appropriate that we hear the song “Jungle Fever” just 
before we meet them and that it continues to play in the 
background as we listen in on their conversation. They are 
the sort of formidable, undomesticated men SCMs would 
like, at least in some respects, to resemble. They the sort of 
men SCMs would especially love to call friends.
We soon find out that a group of associates of Vincent 
and Jules’ boss, Marsellus Wallace, have betrayed him, and 
that they have been dispatched to deal with them. When the 
two enter the traitorous group’s apartment we encounter the 
first insertion of the SCM into the film. Because both Vincent 
and Jules agree they should have been equipped with 
shotguns for the assignment, his appearance surprises us: we 
certainly were not expecting to discover that the associates of 
Marsellus’s are, as Jules correctly IDs them, kids: Vincent and 
Jules come across as simply too competent to warrant being 
concerned by college boys. Though neither show any sign 
they were expecting to encounter anyone different, Jules 
indirectly has us attending to how poorly they pass as 
associates. He repeatedly asks Brett what country he is from, 
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a question Brett has trouble answering. He also notices that 
these kids, by dining on hamburgers, are not eating what they 
should be eating for breakfast. Since Vincent and Jules were 
just discussing burgers, very likely the reason they are shown 
eating them is because it links them to their heroes. That is, 
the intruding burgers are really mostly the SCM’s interjected 
hope that his own familiarity with junk-food pop culture is 
sufficient to make his largely unadulterated real-life identity 
congruent with that of his pulp-fiction heroes’.
But even though Pulp Fiction is the SCM’s daydream, the 
insecure, inexperienced SCM simply cannot convince himself 
he would matter to Vincent and Jules, who up to this point 
are shown as seasoned professionals. The SCM has 
trespassed into a situation he does not belong in, in a world 
he fabricated but clearly doesn’t (yet) belong to. It is equally 
implausible that he would be an associate of gangster bosses 
as it is that he would be in the possession of a briefcase 
packed with beaming golden riches. Though the kids have 
gotten hold of something they shouldn’t have, the SCM’s 
inability to credit this scenario as plausible ensures they don’t 
get away with it. Jules pretends to execute biblical justice; but 
as he efficaciously disposes of the kids, what he most truly 
executes is poetic justice. And after being punished for his 
trespass, the SCM pulp-fiction reader makes sure to retract 
and then to reconstitute his daydream so that it now reflects 
pulp-fiction normalcy: with the insertion of Butch, the aging 
but renown boxer, the next scene manifests someone a 
gangster boss in a pulp-fiction story would be near-expected 
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to be seen doing business with.
The SCM’s first reaction to the humiliation is to stage a 
retreat, but the experience has him crave revenge. He 
therefore is eventually drawn to restage the encounter in such 
a way that Vincent and Jules become the ones punished for 
entering a world that they clearly don’t belong to. After 
Vincent accidentally shoots the young black man Marvin, 
Jules calls his friend, Jimmy, in hopes of finding sanctuary. 
Jimmy is a young man who lives in a well-kept suburban 
home, and who, despite being called a “partner” of Jules’s, 
certainly gives every appearance of being someone who 
works at a day job (as he says, “storin dead niggers ain’t [his] 
[. . .] business”). Jimmie’s world is one populated by soccer 
moms, not gangster mobs. And just as Jules was the one who 
called attention to the SCM’s incongruent appearance in the 
pulp-fiction universe, with his declaring, “This is the Valley, 
Vincent—Marsellus don’t got no friendly places in the 
Valley,” he acknowledges his own trespass into the suburban 
world.
Before their encounter with Jimmie, Jules is shown trying 
to persuade Vincent how important it is that they use tact 
when dealing with him. The fact that these professional 
bullies feel they will need to rely on diplomacy rather than 
guns to handle the upcoming situation, forewarns us that they 
are less likely to succeed here than they were before with 
Brett. Jules fears he might be the one who suffers most in the 
upcoming encounter with Jimmie—and rightly so, for since 
he was the one in particular who brutally shamed the SCM, 
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he will be the one upon whom in particular the SCM executes 
revenge.
After washing their hands and doing their best to appear 
respectable (a miserable failure: they stand before Jimmie as if 
two kids who have gone and spoiled their Sunday clothes), 
they are presumably ready to talk to Jimmie. Jules tries to 
soothe Jimmie’s anger, to handle him. Just like Brett had once 
tried to pacify Jules by politely asking his name, Jules 
compliments his coffee. But in neither situation does either 
one of them—as Jules would say—“talk their way out of this 
shit.” Brett was punished for an inexcusable trespass; Jules 
will experience the same—for the same—here. In this facsimile 
of the suburban parental home, Jimmie, not Jules, rules (later 
he will actually end up responding to Jules's complaints by 
saying, “My house, my rules”): the SCM understands from his 
childhood experience of suburbia that therein those 
connected to a respectable, “decent” way of life are those 
who are righteous and right (so no bible-quoting here from 
Jules).
In this SCM daydream it is therefore appropriate in this 
situation that Jimmie denies Jules control. He curtly tells Jules 
to “not Jimmie” him, and won’t let Jules interrupt him (he 
snarls, “I’m talkin,” when Jules tries to do so). He then asserts 
that Jules’ intrusion could well cost him his marriage. Just as 
Jules’s shooting of Brett’s friend served to terminate Brett’s 
argument and initiated Jules's fiery retort, here Jimmie’s 
accusation stops short Jules’s attempts to handle him, and 
initiates his own verbal harangue. While before Jules bullied 
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Brett by repeatedly asking him, “what does Marsellus look 
like? Does he look like a bitch?,” Jimmie now bullies Jules by 
repeatedly asking him if he “notice[d] a sign out front that 
said, ‘dead nigger storage?’” Just as Jules had forced Brett into 
muttering monosyllabic answers to his questions, Jules is now 
limited to the same. And though neither Vincent nor Jules 
end up being shot, clearly a facsimile of Brett’s execution is 
replayed in this scene, with this time Jules and Vincent ending 
up the victims. Though Wolf—a gangster concocted so to 
plausibly be conceived of existing in both domestic and pulp-
fiction worlds—is actually the one who sprays Jules and 
Vincent with the water nozzle/gun, Jimmie stands at his side, 
helps direct his spray, and takes evident delight in their 
discomfort.
Jimmie is no college student, but he is an SCM as he 
might imagine himself becoming not too long after college. 
Since his privileging in this scene depends upon his adoption 
of and respect for domestic, parental mores—that is, the 
same mores whose influence SCMs are trying to escape from 
when they read pulp fiction—he is not however someone the 
SCM really hopes to end up like: becoming like Jimmie would 
amount to their never having managed to leave their parents’ 
moral universe. The SCM neither wants to be Brett, nor 
Jimmie. He neither wants to conceive of himself as someone 
who would readily be bullied by or as someone who might be 
empowered to bully his pulp-fiction heroes—he wants these 
heroes as friends! But clearly, convincing himself he could be 
the sort of person his pulp-fiction hero would like to hang 
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out with will require some imaginative work on his part. He 
will have to imagine and create a character whose identity is 
significantly different from his own but who still remains 
recognizably an SCM. That is, as was required for the 
American “Quarter Pounder” to be accepted within French 
culture, to be credible in the pulp-fiction universe, he must 
make significant amendments to his image.
He makes some—and comes up with Lance, the 
suburban drug dealer. Though in some respects Lance is very 
much like Jimmie—they both appear to be about the same 
age, are married, and live in suburban neighborhoods—drugs 
and thugs go together much better than did dead niggers and 
uptight suburbanites. That is, Lance’s profession permits him 
to share the same space as Vincent without either of them 
seeming out of place. He is a sort of criminal the typical SCM 
probably believes exists in suburbia, the sort of criminal who 
might well have school as well as street smarts. Though more 
recognizable as a real person than Wolf is, he too is proficient 
in dealing with both suburban and street denizens. The SCM 
stages an encounter between Lance and Vincent, rather than 
between Lance and Jules, because Vincent is portrayed as the 
less threatening, more vulnerable of the two. Unlike Jules (but 
like SCMs), Vincent can be careless, even inept. After Jules’s 
masterful handling of the kids, for example, Vincent shows 
well-earned presumption semblancing back into clumsy 
amateurness, with his accidental shooting of Marvin. In sum, 
Vincent is selected because he is the pulp-fiction hero who 
most closely resembles the SCM.
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They encounter each other amiably, as friends, in Lance’s 
suburban home. There is an attempt on Vincent’s part to 
maneuver Lance into lowering his prices, and while Lance’s 
response, “you’re in my home,” resembles Jimmie’s response 
to one of Jules’s complaints, no one is made to feel 
subordinate in this scene. For the first time in the daydream 
we find an encounter between an SCM and a pulp-fiction 
hero where an attempt to facilitate friendly-relations through 
sharing possessions is successful. While neither Jules’s sharing 
of Brett’s burger, nor Jules and Vincents’ partaking of 
Jimmie’s gourmet coffee, helped nurture camaraderie, when 
Lance suggests to Vincent that they get high together and 
double-date (Lance essentially offers Trudy to Vincent), 
Vincent is shown pleased enough with the suggestion he 
might well have taken him up on it had he not already agreed 
to show his boss’s wife a good time.
When Vincent returns to Lance’s home, their friendship 
is tested: The SCM wants to stage an event that will help him 
better gauge just how strong and true a friendship might exist 
between an SCM and a pulp-fiction gangster. Just as Jules did 
previously, here Vincent calls upon a suburban friend—but 
to keep Mia from dying. There are some similarities between 
how Lance reacts to Vincent’s request and how Jimmie 
reacted to Jules’s. For instance, just as Jimmie points out 
there was no “sign saying dead nigger storage” on his lawn, 
here Lance says that Vincent can’t “bring some fucked up 
pooh-butt to my house.” But the person who sold Vincent 
the drugs responsible for the overdose cannot push suburban 
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propriety and be taken seriously. Vincent easily convinces 
Lance to assist him in bringing Mia into Lance’s home, and 
the result is that the scene Jimmie feared would end his 
marriage actually occurs here: a wife watches a body being 
dragged about her suburban home. But while walking in on 
such a scene might well have moved Jimmie’s wife to file for 
divorce, we know that human-pin-cushion Jodie is more 
accustomed to violent permeations of customarily sacred 
grounds.
Jodie yells at her husband—but she also ends up 
assisting Vincent and Lance in helping nurse Mia back to 
consciousness. And though we have a near-corpse and a 
violent stabbing in this scene, it ends harmoniously rather 
than in discord. That is, a scene pretty close to one we would 
find in a pulp-fiction novel occurs here within Lance’s 
suburban home, and it proves much more wild ride than 
disaster. As Mia recovers, and they breathe a collective sigh of 
relief, they realize they have shared an experience which 
brought them—disparate as they still are—closer together as 
friends. And whereas elsewhere in the film the deliberate 
repetition of another’s words alienates people from one 
another while racketing up the tension (i.e., Jules’ “say ‘what’ 
one more time—,” and Jimmie’s “don’t fuckin’ ‘Jimmie me,’ 
man”), Mia’s response to Lance’s request that she “say 
something” by saying, “something,” feels relaxed, and is 
easing.
Within his daydream, and in this disorderly suburban 
home, the SCM has successfully managed to create what 
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postcolonial critics call a “hybrid space,” that is, an “in-
between space,” a creative space wherein a “release from 
[traditional] singular identities” (Macey 192) becomes 
possible. He has fabricated a situation where an SCM uses 
what he always imagined he had over his pulp-fiction 
heroes—book smarts (though he never finds the black 
medical book, he does guide Vincent through the 
procedure)—to assist him in directing Vincent’s brawn 
(Vincent is the one who pounds a needle though Mia’s 
breastplate), so to make them a congruent pair. Indeed, this 
scene might serve to help the SCM imagine Lance as a more 
appropriate friend of Vincent’s than Jules is. Perhaps the fact 
that the SCM daydreamer essentially divorces the two by 
having Jules become biblical while keeping Vincent pulp, 
shows he has grown to think of himself as someone his pulp-
fiction hero might actually prefer to spend time with. It must 
be noted, though, that by the end of the daydream Vincent 
no longer seems as clearly identifiable as a pulp-fiction hero 
as he was at its beginning. Since he owes his demise to his 
interest in a pulp-fiction novel, Vincent might himself have 
become a hybrid—part pulp-fiction hero, part SCM. Perhaps 
in his daydream the SCM had a premonition of his virtual-
reality future and decided it not so unlikely he might one day 
step up from being a pulp-fiction reader to becoming a hero 
himself. In the 3D-world of tomorrow, he may have intuited, 
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Splendid Isolation and Cruel Returns (November 2004)
Does Robinson Crusoe, in Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, 
really believe he should have “settle[d] at home according to 
[his] Father’s Desire[s]” (7)? Since the text shows he deemed 
living at home a life of captivity, and that he found the island 
he was stranded on very fulfilling, it’s clear he’s suffering 
from considerable self-deception here. Does Gulliver, in 
Jonathon Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, really believe it was his 
misfortune that “Fortune, [his] [. . .] perpetual Enemy” 
prevented him from “pass[ing] the rest of his life among 
these admirable Houyhnhnms” (240)? Since he occupies 
himself much more with the affairs of his enemies than he 
does the accomplishments of friends, he clearly does not. For 
him as well, that is, the ostensible worst option is really the 
vastly preferred choice—for even if to gods, servitude is 
apparently only good if it empowers cruelty upon lessers 
upon your return home… allow me to elaborate.
It is hard to argue that Crusoe comes to regret his decision 
to leave his father, for just as soon as he “broke loose” (8) 
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from him he ostensibly knew right away what a colossal 
mistake it was to set out on his own. In fact, within the very 
same paragraph in which he broke loose he tells us he “began 
now seriously to reflect upon what [he] [. . .] had done, and 
how justly [he] [. . .] was overtaken by the Judgment of 
Heaven for [his] [. . .] wicked [decision to] leav[e] [his] [. . .] 
Father’s house, and [to] abandon [his] [. . .] Duty” (9). 
Crusoe’s not conveying any happiness or exhilaration upon 
breaking free is puzzling. Surely he must have felt somewhat 
elated afterwards, experienced some kind of victory-related 
rush—why not relate this feeling? Why in his account does he 
depict no moment, in public or in private, of how he 
celebrated his release? Maybe there wasn’t any such moment, 
but I highly suspect there was, only in recounting his 
departure from his father he felt compelled to avoid 
conveying the pleasure he experienced in both disobeying his 
father and in finally starting upon a self-directed life. 
Damning criticism of one’s parents is never an easy thing to 
just lay down—most times, our superego will in fact not stand 
for it, and will afflict us with the likes of castration anxiety or 
fears of abandonment should we insist on doing so. Crusoe 
certainly avoids overtly criticizing his father in his account—
he describes him, rather, very appreciatively. We are told that 
his father was “a wise and grave man, [who] gave [him] [. . .] 
serious and excellent Counsel” (5), that his father was 
affectionate—“he press’d me earnestly, and in the most 
affectionate manner, not to play the young Man”—and 
sincere—his “Tears r[an] down his Face very plentifully” (7). 
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He would deter his son from pursuing the life he wants to 
pursue, but for generous reasons: he wants his son to “slide[e] 
gently thro’ the World, and sensibly tasting the Sweets of 
living, without the bitter” (7). Essentially, he wants for his son 
what the speaker of Lady Mary Chudleigh’s “The Resolve” 
wants for herself, to be “happy in [his] [. . .] humble state” 
(21). Crusoe dares say he “broke free,” but largely avoids 
assessing his former life so he could not but admit to himself 
that it really was the obvious—a cage—he had succeeded in 
breaking free from. And when he departs, Crusoe attends 
only to his own character flaws. We learn that he was 
“obstinately deaf to all Proposals” (Defoe 8), and that he 
“consulted neither Father or Mother [about his departure] [. . 
.]; but left them to hear of it as they might, without asking 
God’s blessing, or my Father’s, without any Consideration of 
Circumstances or Consequences, and in an ill Hour” (9).
His father offers him a life where he “was under no 
Necessity of seeking [his] [. . .] Bread” (7). He would be fed, 
he would be safe. He would know a routine life, full of 
happiness, but void of excitement. He would never know 
from his own experience if the one his father presented him 
with was the best available, but his father tells him he would 
still know from everyone’s envying him (6). We might 
wonder, however, if everyone really would envy a man who 
could never find his way to “leave [his] [. . .] Father’s house” 
(9). Perhaps a good number might actually think that such a 
man, never knowing what it feels like to live on your own, 
lived but a posher one one would force upon a slave.
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I suspect Crusoe thought as much, but was fearful of 
directly lambasting his father’s intention to keep him rooted 
in place. However, if we accept Norman Holland argument 
that “unsavory wishful fantasies” are reworked in fiction so 
that they are “consciously satisfying [to] [. . .] the ego and 
unconsciously satisfying to the deep wishes being acted out 
by the literary work” (104), we find that he does convey his 
anger at this father elsewhere in his account.
Crusoe allowed for some textual padding, for some time 
to lapse, before making clear what it is about people and 
places that draws him to break free from them—not much, 
though, for just twenty pages after his departure, he recounts 
for us how he narrowly avoided living a life of captivity. A 
Moorish captain captures him at sea, admires him (he thought 
him valuable property for he was “young and nimble and fit 
for his Business” [Defoe 18]), and decides to keep him as his 
servant. Because he is being compelled to live the life of a 
domestic, forever “look[ing] after his little Garden,” tending 
to “his House” and “his Ship,” Crusoe decides his situation 
“could not be worse” (18). He would be “commanded” and 
“order’d” (30) about. He therefore “meditated nothing but 
[his] [. . .] Escape” (18), for he “was resolved to have [his] [. . 
.] Liberty” (21). Being a valuable slave, he might have been 
well kept, but what bothers Crusoe is that someone else is 
determining his life. He despises the idea of orbiting around 
someone else, of being someone who lives to satisfy other 
people’s needs. Though he does conceive of the Moorish 
captain as an agent of (his father’s) prophecy (28), he also 
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makes clear that the Moor is a tyrant, and that his thoughts of 
liberation are fully justified. But if he finds living a 
provisioning but kept domestic life so odious here, we should 
understand the true mover behind his leaving his father, not 
wanderlust, but rather staunch refusal of the caged life. He 
was capable of an honest assessment of such a life, but could 
manage it only where his honesty would not look to insult or 
condemn his father.
Crusoe, however, never admits to being right in 
disobeying his father. The way in which Gulliver relates to his 
Houyhnhnm masters is about how he would admit he ought 
to have attended to him. The Houyhnhnms and Crusoe’s 
father are similar to one another, valuing much the same 
things—“Temperance, Industry, Exercise, and Cleanliness” (251), 
by the Houyhnhnms, and “Temperance, Moderation, 
Quietness, [and] [. . .] Health” (6), by Crusoe’s father. 
However, unlike Crusoe, Gulliver ostensibly is never 
interested in breaking free from wise fathers, but rather in 
spending the whole of his life amongst his new-found betters. 
He tells us he was so eager to learn the Houyhnhnms’ ways 
that he “never presumed to speak, except in answer to a 
Question; and then [he] [. . .] did it with inward Regret, 
because it was a Loss of so much Time for improving” (259) 
himself. He admires how their young do exactly as their 
parents bid: “[Y]oung Couple[s] meet and are joined, merely 
because it is the Determination of their Parents and Friends: 
It is what they see done every Day; and they look upon it as 
one of the necessary Actions in a reasonable Being” (250). He 
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takes pleasure in being their servant, appreciates their 
reasoning nature, their evident superiority to him, and agrees 
to follow their directions to the best of his ability. Therefore, 
though he is commanded and ordered about (e.g., “my master 
commanded me silence” [2417]), he acknowledges no reason 
for complaint.
Gulliver believes he will live a life of relative peace and 
tranquility—the sort of life Crusoe’s father offers Crusoe. But 
“In the Midst of all this Happiness, when [he] [. . .] looked 
upon [himself] [. . .] to be fully settled for Life” (260), he 
learns that he must depart the island. He tells us he was 
devastated by the news—“I was struck with the utmost Grief 
and Despair at my Master’s Discourse; and being unable to 
support the Agonies I was under, I fell into a Swoon at his 
Feet” (262)—and upon later recounting it, damns Fortune for 
the terrible turn. But if Fortune was indeed responsible, she 
deserved better than that from him—for Gulliver really 
wanted to leave, only this wasn’t something he could own up 
to.
Gulliver becomes a servant, and we hear of how he 
obeys orders and commands—but I am not arguing that like 
Crusoe he wanted to depart so to be free from captivity. 
Rather, I think he was ready to leave the Houyhnhnms 
because he was done with them; they had served their purpose, 
and had nothing more to offer. The Houyhnhnms had heard 
all of his complaints concerning the European culture he 
loathed, validated his surly opinion of it, and provided him 
with justification for thinking himself superior to the rest of 
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the Yahoos. This done, it was time to return home to be 
within easy reach of said Yahoos, whom he could now 
subjugate without self-reproach.
The Houyhnhnms evict Gulliver from their island for 
fear that, however unlikely, he could yet still lead a revolt. 
They ultimately judge that Gulliver, still a Yahoo, is not to be 
trusted—and they are right in this, he isn’t. He quite readily 
misleads his readers, for instance. Though he claimed he was 
primarily interested in the Houyhnhnms, and though he does 
provide us with “some account of the manner and customs 
of” those “which it was indeed [his] [. . .] principal Study to 
learn” (249), he actually ends up spending the best part of his 
account detailing European life and manners. He says he was 
compelled to provide this information to the Houyhnhnms. 
His master was eager to be informed of “the whole State of 
Europe,” “often desiring fuller Satisfaction,” and his master’s 
immense desire (an example of excess in a Houyhnhnm?) 
ostensibly accounts for why the discussion of European life 
possibly seemed—for us—“a Fund of Conversation not to be 
exhausted” (228). He tells us he would rather have kept quiet 
and studied their ways, but since no one compelled him to 
relate all of these details to “us,” he clearly is much more 
interested in criticizing his previous home than in detailing 
the various what-nots of Houyhnhnms’ oh-so-compelling 
how-tos.
Note how even when establishing what his life amongst 
the Houyhnhnms was like he does so in a way which has us 
actually mostly attending to European life:
PATRICK MCEVOY-HALSTON
306
I enjoyed perfect Health of Body, and Tranquillity of 
Mind; I did not feel the Treachery or Inconstancy of a 
Friend, nor the Injuries of a secret or open Enemy. I 
had no Occasion of bribing, flattering or pimping, to 
procure the Favor of any great Man, or of his Minion. 
I wanted no Fence against Fraud or Oppression: Here 
was neither Physician to destroy my Body, nor 
Lawyer to ruin my Fortune: No Informer to watch 
my Words and Actions, or forge Accusations against 
me for Hire; Here were no Gibers, Censurers, 
Backbiters, Pickpockets, Highwaymen, House-
breakers, Attorneys, Bawds, Buffoons, Gamesters, 
Politicians, Wits, Spleneticks, tedious Talkers, 
Controvertists, Ravishers, Murderers, Robbers, 
Virtuoso’s; no Leaders or Followers of Party and 
Faction; no Encouragers to Vice, by Seducement or 
Examples: No Dungeon, Axes, Gibbets, Whipping-
posts, or Pillories; No cheating Shopkeepers or 
Mechanicks: No Pride, Vanity or Affectation: No 
Fops, Bullies, Drunkards, strolling Whores, or Poxes: 
No ranting, lewd, expensive Wives: No stupid, proud 
Pedants: No importunate, over-bearing, quarrelsome, 
noisy, roaring, empty, conceited, swearing 
Companions: No Scoundrels, raised from the Dust 
upon the Merit of their Vices; or Nobility thrown into 
it on account of their Virtues: No Lords, Fiddlers, 
Judges or Dancing-masters (258-59).
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Obviously, if this passage reflects how he experienced 
life amongst the Houyhnhnms, European life was very much 
on his mind while amongst them. And, in this passage at 
least, the outpouring of details, of complaint, cannot be 
accounted for by Houyhnhnms’ demand for fuller 
satisfaction.
Since the text shows that Gulliver enjoyed all his 
complaining, we should not think he was prepared to leave it 
all behind him. Rather, we should ask ourselves if what he 
really wanted was for his natural inclination to believe himself 
superior to find sanction from some higher power, noting 
that the Houyhnhnms, so “orderly and rational, so acute and 
judicious” (211), are also so perfectly suited, are so “right,” to help 
him out with this. Though they judge Gulliver a Yahoo, they 
deem him unique for his race—unlike other Yahoos, he, 
much like a Houyhnhnm, is “Teachable, Civil and Clean” 
(218). Why would he want that? Because he is sadist who 
wants to bully people, but needs validation to make his 
inclination sound. When he returns home, we note his 
domineering ways: the first thing he recounts for us is how 
quickly and unsparingly he established order in his household. 
He is disgusted by his family, and will not let them near him. 
He abuses us readers as well. After he explains how much his 
family disgusted him, he speaks to his “gentle Reader” (272). 
The Longman Anthology of British Literature teaches gentle 
contemporary students that Gulliver must be being ironic 
here, for his “‘gentle readers must be Yahoos” (2443). But 
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Longman is not on the mark, for not ironic or playful, Gulliver 
is here simply being cruel: he insinuates that his readers, who 
very likely would prefer to understand themselves gentle / 
genteel, are in truth, foul. As we observe from the way he 
treats his family, Yahoos aren’t worth being civil to, and 
cannot be effectively handled civilly in any case. They are 
savages that need to have their savagery pointed out to them 
(in between beatings, very likely) so they will know 
improvement, and just possibly, seek it out, however much 
beside the point.
There are other times where he expresses his dismay at, 
and his dislike for, his readers. When he writes, “[h]aving 
already lived three Years in this Country, the Reader I 
suppose will expect, that I should, like other Travelers, give 
him some Account of the Manner and Customs of its 
Inhabitants” (249), we sense him sighing, even sneering, at 
our expectations. His being resigned to placate us suggests he 
deems us “the most unteachable of all Animals, [with] [our] [. 
. .] Capacities never reaching higher than to draw or carry 
Burthens” (248).  Elsewhere he insinuates that his readers—
so unlike the Houyhnhnms—are largely uncaring and 
completely self-interested: “This is enough to say upon the 
Subject of my Dyet, wherewith other Travelers fill their 
books, as if the Readers were personally concerned, whether 
we fare well or ill” (217).
It is useful to think of Gulliver as intending to think 
himself literally put-off by his readers, in finding himself 
physically, spacially drawn away from them, for perhaps 
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Gulliver prefers to imagine us at a distance to avoid any 
reoccurrence of the physical revulsion he experienced when 
his wife embraced him upon his return home. However, it is 
of course more appropriate to look to Crusoe for an account 
of the pleasure had from commanding a wide-birth of 
physical space. One of Crusoe’s first actions on the island is 
to build a “Fortification” (59). But though he fears hostile 
engagements with savages, none occur until many years go 
by. In the meantime, he extends his knowledge of the island, 
the breadth of his domain. He develops a country bower and 
grows crops. Incrementally he “prepare[s] more [and more] 
land” (101). The expansion of his domain expands his sense 
of himself, until finally, as the scholar Pat Rogers argues, “we 
should consider Crusoe’s increasing readiness to see himself 
as ‘Governour’ [. . .] as [him feeling] the monarch of all he 
surveys” (44).
Crusoe certainly enjoys being “a monarch.” He tells us, 
“I descended a little on the side of that delicious vale, 
surveying it with a secret kind of pleasure [. . .] to think that 
this was all my own, that I was king and lord of all this 
country indefeasibly, and had a right of possession; and if I 
could convey it, I might have it in inheritance as completely 
as any lord of a mannor in England” (Defoe 99). Rogers 
argues that Crusoe was indeed having so much indulgent fun 
that “it is hard not to feel that Defoe was indulging at some 
level in a fantasy of himself as colonial proprietor” (45).
Michael Boardman argues that “[t]he situation of exile, 
even the peace that comes form his mastering of nature, 
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might seem less than ideal as a scene for the agonics of 
repentance” (56). I concur, and believe we should wonder 
just how much of even his initial despair owed to a concern 
to not show his father up. His father told him to avoid the 
“secret burning Lust of Ambition” (Defoe 7) and 
prophesized that “if he goes abroad he will be the miserablest 
Wretch that was ever born” (8), and Crusoe felt the need to 
prove his father right, insisting to the forefront of his 
consciousness that the island was his despair, while relaxing 
to his default—ready enjoyment of the island—when the 
guilt had been dealt with. But even when he despairs, the text 
actually works against summing up his overall experience of 
exile as despairing. For example, when he finishes listing the 
“Evil” and “Good” things about life on the island, he 
concludes that “here was an undoubted Testimony, that there 
was scarce any Condition in the World so miserable, but there 
was something Negative or something Positive to be thankful 
for in it” (58). Yet when we look at the list we notice that far 
more is written under the Good side than under the Evil side 
of the ledger. This discrepancy is especially significant since, 
unlike a listing of debits and credits, the Good side is written 
in response to that put under the Evil side. That is, the weight 
of his interest resides in countering what he’d put down on 
the ledger’s damning left-hand side.
As his account proceeds other things accrue to him that 
also ought fairly to be put on the Good side, if only he could 
manage it. Remarkably, for instance, he apparently loses his 
inclination to wander. Even though, after exploring the rest 
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of the island, he admits he “had pitch’d upon a Place to fix 
[his] [. . .] Abode, which was by far the worst Part of the 
Country” (100), he decides he would not “by any Means [. . .] 
remove” (101). Hearing this, we have further cause to wonder 
if he ever really suffered from wanderlust, that is, if perhaps 
he only felt the need to “run quite away” (7-8) when his life 
was being determined for him. Crusoe also acquires wisdom. 
He tells us he learned that “we never see the true State of our 
Condition, till it is illustrated to us by its Contraries; nor know 
how to value what we enjoy, but by the want of it” (118). 
And from this statement we know of another thing he 
wouldn’t but certainly ought to place under the Good side of 
his ledger—specifically, that his father was clearly wrong to 
deter him from setting out on his own. We remember his 
father telling him he should live the middling life, for that way 
he would “tast[e] the sweets of living without the bitter.” But 
Crusoe concludes that if one lives without being “expos’d to 
[. . .] vicissitudes” (6), one cannot enjoy life, for those who 
know only the good things in life would never know or “feel 
that they are happy” (7). Crusoe decides that the venturesome 
life, the life his father did not want him to lead, actually lead 
him to know and therefore savor happiness.
Crusoe individuates from his father on the island, a 
father, whose understanding of what was best for his son was 
clearly limited. Though even as an older man Crusoe still 
persists in believing he would have better off had he never 
left home, in his covert challenges to his father’s benevolence 
and wisdom, in his written articulations of the pleasures and 
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awareness he took from a way of life his father would think 
of as befouling, he establishes the evident rightness of his 
decision to set out on his own. He is to be believed when he 
tells us he “thought [he] liv’d really very happily in all things, 
except that of Society” (122), and later when he tells us how 
“in [his] [. . .] twenty third Year of residence in this Island, [. . 
.] [he] was so naturalized to the Place, and to the Manner of 
Living, that could [. . .] [he] have but enjoy’d the Certainty 
that no Savages would come to the Place to disturb [. . .] 
[him] , [. . .] [he] could have been content to have capitulated 
for spending the rest of [. . .] [his] Time there, even to the last 
Moment, till [. . .] [he] had laid me down and dy’d, like the old 
Goat in the Cave” (152). For Crusoe had found for himself 
pretty close to what the speaker of Anne Finch’s “The 
Petition for an Absolute Retreat” desperately wanted, namely, 
“A sweet, but absolute retreat, / ‘Mongst paths so lost, and 
trees so high, / That the world may ne’er invade” (3-5). 
Gulliver, on the other hand, since he never convinces us he is 
more interested in the Houyhnhnms than he is in criticizing 
European society, also never convinces us he wanted to leave 
it all behind him. Rather, he shows himself—as the speaker 
of Miss W—’s “The Gentleman’s Study” assesses Jonathan 
Swift—just someone who actually would rather “write of [. . 
.] odious men” (4) than “write of angels” (1). 
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The Devil Made Me Enjoy it (November 2005)
Though I am aware that many readers of Cormac McCarthy’s 
Blood Meridian are dismayed by the extent of the violence in 
the novel, I am not surprised to learn that many readers 
actually find the novel an exhilarating read. That is, I cannot 
pretend the pleasure readers take in the novel is a problem I 
would like to solve, for I too enjoyed the novel—and hold 
McCarthy accountable. Since being victimized can lead us to 
enjoy becoming perpetrators, McCarthy actually encourages 
us to enjoy Glanton’s mercenaries’ merciless but efficacious 
slaughter by first having us ride along side the hapless Captain 
White. When Glanton and his riders massacre the Delaware 
village, we may in fact not only understand it as an answer to 
the Apache’s slaughter, but experience it as a satisfying 
response to previous abuse. McCarthy thereby maneuvers us 
into agreeing with the judge that one lives best when one lives 
like Glanton and his riders do, by embracing one’s inner 
savagery.
McCarthy begins his novel in such a way that, regardless 
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of the nature of our past experiences, we will know what it is 
to be weak and vulnerable. He involves us in his story-world 
by speaking directly to us and by encouraging us to identify 
with the protagonist, kid. In the text’s first line his narrator 
explicitly speaks to us. He acknowledges our presence: we 
thereafter cannot pretend to be detached observers, distinct 
from what we “observe.” He beckons us forward so that we 
“[s]ee the kid”; and when he then refers to the “[n]ight of 
your birth” (3), we might still think him speaking to us. He 
sets the kid off on a journey similar to our own: we all venture 
into unfamiliar territories. And as the unfamiliar land quickly 
also proves a very dangerous one, mightn’t we as well hope to 
hitch alongside some of those already accustomed to it while 
we acclimatize ourselves? I am suggesting that when the kid 
signs up with Captain White he brings with him other 
riders—us, the readers of McCarthy’s novel. McCarthy has us 
associate with White’s gang, if only for comfort and security. 
And more the pity, for Captain White’s expedition serves as a 
kind of exemplum, the sort of story the judge would use to 
demonstrate the rightness of his understanding of men.
At the end of the novel the judge proclaims that there 
are three sorts of men. There are those who aren’t warriors, 
who can’t move other men—the least of men. Then there are 
two sorts of warriors: those who can dance, and those who 
can’t.  True dancers are those “who have offered up 
[themselves] [. . .] entire to the blood of war” (331). True 
dancers kill because killing “speaks to [their] [. . .] inmost 
heart” (331). False dancers, on the other hand, try and 
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establish the moral righteousness of their killing ways. Since 
Captain White sees himself as an “instrument of liberation in 
a dark and troubled land” (34), White is one such false 
dancer. He aims, that is, to civilize a land, to protect citizens 
“from the notorious packs of cut-throats presently infesting 
the routes which they are obliged to travel” (34). No doubt he 
enjoys the slaughter, but as he is apparently intent on being a 
wealthy landowner, he hopes for some future glimpse of 
pastoral order rather more than he does ongoing war. Those 
whom the judge would deem true dancers, sadden and 
disgust him. When the kid first meets White, the kid notes 
that he was apparently “sad[dened]” (33) by the efforts of “a 
heathen horde [which] rides over the land looting and killing 
with total impunity” (33). Unable to give himself entire to the 
blood of war, White can only imagine them as those “who 
cannot govern themselves” (34).
Since the judge believes that “[m]oral law is an invention 
of mankind of the disenfranchisement of the powerful in 
favor of the weak” (250), he would despise White’s 
justification for war. He would judge White doomed in his 
efforts to enlighten a dark land, for he believes that moral law 
is essentially very weak. According to him, since men are 
natural killers, moral law cannot help but be “subvert[ed]” “at 
every turn” “by [h]istorical law” (250). And in how he 
portrays White and his riders’ journey through the desert, 
McCarthy confirms judge’s assessment that those who aim to 
civilize a naturally chaotic world are weak in spirit, and 
doomed to failure.
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White and his party travel through a hostile landscape. 
Nature can only be thought of as provisioning in that it 
doesn’t forsake them the forewarning of their doom: “[t]hose 
first days they saw no game, no birds save buzzards” (42). 
And we notice how oppositely they are described. We are 
told that “the mountains on the sudden skyline stark and 
black and livid like a land of some other order out there 
whose true geology was not stone but fear” (47)—the 
mountains are stark and menacing; the riders, in contrast, are 
meek and anonymous: they “rode with their heads down, 
faceless under their hats” (45). Nature’s beasts are mythical 
and magnificent, its horses “rac[ed] on the plains pounding 
their shadows down the night and leaving in the moonlight a 
vaporous dust like the palest stain of their passing.” (47). In 
contrast, the riders’ “animals were failing [. . .] [:] the 
wretched ponies huddled and whimpered like dogs” (47). 
Nature eagerly anticipates devouring White and his men; at 
dusk, the sun stood like a “head of a great red phallus [that] [. 
. .] puls[ed] malevolent[ly] behind them” (45). The sun brings 
shadows as “tentacles [determined] to bind them [i.e., White 
and his riders] to the darkness yet to come” (45), and White’s 
men are fearful: “They halted in the dark to recruit the 
animals and some of the men stowed their arms in the 
wagons for fear of drawing the lightning” (47). And they 
behave as those who are desperate would, as those who 
suspect they might soon die would—they pray to God.
The judge gauges that it requires a “largeness of heart” 
(330) in order to survive the desert. It requires, that is, ample 
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inner resources and readiness to use them. White’s men are 
portrayed as if they lack the inner resources to deal with such 
a harsh terrain. Unprepared to deal with a landscape which 
refuses to just offer up either game or water, and disinclined 
to look to themselves to improvise, they ask God for help. 
We should note that turning to God is always a bad idea in 
Blood Meridian, for if God answers, He answers in blood. For 
instance, the kid stumbles upon corpses of Christina 
Mexicans who “barricaded themselves in [a] [. . .] house of 
God against the heathen” (60). These Christians owed their 
death, not their salvation, to those above: “savages had 
hacked holes in the roof and shot them down from above” 
(60). Since just previous to their request we are told of how 
“[t]he thunder moved up from the southwest and lightning lit 
the desert all about them, blue and barren, great clanging 
reaches ordered out of the absolute night like some demon 
kingdom summoned up” (47), we sense that God is at work 
concocting an equally appropriate deliverance for Hayward 
and his men.
When White’s sergeant finally sees the “heathen horde,” 
he exclaims, “Oh my god!” (53). Since this is the first time 
“God” appears in the text since Hayward’s prayer, McCarthy 
has us understand the horde as His response to (wayward?) 
Hayward’s prayer. It seems an appropriate response to deliver 
to men who, even though they understand His lands as “the 
high road to hell” (45), still insist on understanding Him as 
responding sympathetically to requests from the 
downtrodden. The portrayal of the Apache warriors—that is, 
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to the devastating “legion of horribles” (52), which ride 
“down upon [White and his riders] [. . .] like a horde from a 
hell more horrible yet than the brimstone land of christian 
reckoning” (53)—also responds to White’s assessment of the 
fighting strength of uncivil men. The captain had informed 
the kid that those they were fighting were a “race of 
degenerates” (34) who could be bested by “unpaid irregulars” 
(34). McCarthy shows, instead, that those who kill with 
impunity are the strongest, not the weakest, of men.
McCarthy ensures that Captain White’s last words show 
him up as a fool. In response to the sergeant’s query 
regarding the identity of the group advancing before them, 
White answers, “I make it a parcel of heathen stockthieves is 
what I make it” (51). We, of course, might first appreciate 
why White thought defeating these “thieves” would prove 
such easy “sport” (51), for McCarthy restricts our vision so 
we see no more than what White and his sergeant can see 
through their telescope, meaning we see that there “were 
[but] cattle, mules, horses [. . .] [,] [and] a handful of ragged 
indians mending the outer flanks of the herd with their 
nimble ponies” (51). McCarthy situates us on the desert plain, 
draws us into contemplating the nature of the group before 
us, and thereby positions us so that when the horde 
materializes, we should count ourselves amongst those caught 
out in surprise and subsequently trodden upon. Very likely, 
we feel some of the horror, some of the devastation 
experienced by White and his riders before they perish. And 
most certainly, unless we are masochists, it cannot be a 
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pleasure to be conjoined to Saxons who come to know this:
 
[S]ome with nightmare faces painted on their breasts, 
riding down the unhorsed Saxons and spearing and 
clubbing them and leaping from their mounts with 
knives and running about on the ground with a 
peculiar bandlegged trot like creatures driven to alien 
forms of locomotion and stripping the clothes from 
the dead and seizing them up by the hair and passing 
their blades about the skulls of the living and the dead 
alike and snatching aloft the bloody wigs and hacking 
and chopping at the naked bodies, ripping off limbs, 
heads, gutting the strange white torsos and holding up 
great handfuls of viscera, genitals, some of the 
savages so slathered up with gore they might have 
rolled in it like dogs and some who fell upon the 
dying and sodomized them with loud cries to their 
fellows. And now the horses of the dead came 
pounding out of the smoke and dust and circled with 
flapping leather and wild manes and eyes whited with 
fear like the eyes of the blind and some were 
feathered with arrows and some lanced through and 
stumbling and vomiting blood as they wheeled across 
the killing ground and clattered from sight again. Dust 
stanched the wet and naked heads of the scalped who 
with the fringe of hair below their wounds and 
tonsured to the bone now lay like maimed and naked 
monks in the bloodslaked dust and everywhere the 
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dying groaned and gibbered and horses lay screaming. 
(54) 
I, at least, was sufficiently revolted by this scene that I 
essentially counted myself amongst those downed, and 
therefore was disappointed that McCarthy continued to 
compound my sense of the kid as a perpetual victim. Yes, the 
kid “wondrously” (55) survives the attack, but following the 
Apache raid the kid again and again experiences what it is to 
be weak and vulnerable.
The kid is as vulnerable as a little kid in this part of Blood 
Meridian. When a Mexican captain offers him water, the 
captain lets the kid know he could just as easily have slain 
him. The captain likens him to a little lamb that calls for his 
mother, that is, to someone ripe for slaughter by wolves (65). 
Though wolves don’t catch him, Mexican soldiers do, and 
McCarthy describes him as such easy game: “the kid was 
standing by the cart pissing when the soldiers rode into the 
yard. They seized him and tied his hands behind him and they 
looked in the cart” (69). While he’s imprisoned, we learn that 
“[a]ll day small boys perched on the walls and watched by 
shifts and pointed and jabbered. They’d walk around the 
parapet and try to piss down on sleepers in the shade” (71). 
The kid throws a stone at one of them and manages to scare 
them away, but by now we likely wish him capable of a more 
devastating response to tormentors.
Social service professionals would tell us that those 
who’ve been badly victimized can be expected to join gangs 
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for revenge—but this would come as little surprise to us, for 
after repeatedly having his vulnerability exposed and 
exploited, surely we are willing the kid to ride with winners 
for a change, whatever their disposition. And as if perhaps 
responding to our need, winners do show up: Glanton and his 
outriders come into town. Better—they’re recruiting.
Our first description of Glanton and his riders makes 
them seem the sort of men who would have anticipated and 
therefore could have dealt with the Apache horde that 
devastated White and his entourage. Like the Apaches, 
Glanton’s riders are described as a formidable “horde” (79) 
whose visage is so horrifying and awesome it “stun[s]” (78) 
onlookers. They are “viscous looking humans mounted on 
unshod indian ponies riding half drunk through the streets, 
bearded, barbarous, clad in the skins of animals stitched up 
with thews and armed with weapons of every description, 
revolvers of enormous weight and bowie knives the size of 
clay-more and short twobarreled rifles with bores you could 
stick your thumbs in” (78). Unlike White, the leader of this 
gang is a true dancer. We know early on— for example, from 
his making animals “dance” while testing his guns—that 
Glanton will not pretend to be a moral crusader. Being a 
member of his company is made to seem a privilege, 
unworthy of most: the kid and Toadvine have to pass 
themselves of as “seasoned indiankillers” (79) in order to be 
counted part of it (all the kid had to do was to best and kill a 
non-combatant [i.e., a bartender] for White to seek him out). 
And in a way, it is: while the kid rides with him, the kid 
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doesn’t know defeat for some time. Riding with Glanton, in 
fact, seems to respond to, to quit, a number of unpleasant 
experiences the kid had while riding with White.
For example, McCarthy has us attend to how nature 
“relates” to Glanton and his gang, just as he did with White 
and his riders. But whereas with White nature was an 
opponent, nature has no interest in besting Glanton or his 
riders—they seem, rather, in accord. We are told, for 
example, that “their track across the land reflected in its faint 
arcature the movements of the earth itself” (153), and that 
“the men as they rode turned black in the sun from the blood 
on their clothes and their faces and then paled slowly in the 
rising dust until they assumed once more the color of the 
land through which they passed” (160). We shouldn’t be 
surprised that nature and Glanton’s riders coalesce, for as we 
have seen, nature is often portrayed in the novel as 
malevolent, black-in-spirit—and therefore akin to Glanton’s 
riders who “tread[ed] their thin and flaring shadows until they 
had crossed altogether into the darkness which so well 
became them” (163).
Some of the activities hereto associated with defeat in 
the text are recalled and transformed while the kid rides with 
Glanton. For the reader, they begin to accrue different, more 
appealing, associations. For instance, urinating has thus far 
been associated with the kid’s capture and humiliation. But 
while the kid rides with Glanton, he hears from the ex-priest 
how their companion, the judge, miraculously once saved all 
their lives by getting them to piss into a gunpowder mix he 
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was preparing. McCarthy phrases the judge’s request for urine 
in a way that has us recall Hayward’s prayer for help. The 
judge tells them to “piss, [. . .] piss for your very souls” (132), 
and we might remember as we hear this White’s men 
encouraging Hayward to “[p]ray it up” (47) for rain. But while 
Hayward’s prayer for rain may have rained down upon them 
the horde, the judge’s request for urine ensures an easy 
victory: the text could not provide surer evidence that those 
who rely on their own resources are the ones who can expect 
to thrive.
Some might object to my linking the kid to the judge as 
they are never characterized as natural companions in the way 
that the judge and Glanton for instance are. However, both 
of them are to be counted amongst those referred to when 
“Glanton’s riders” becomes the composite “they,” and owing 
to the preponderance of paragraphs which begin with his 
pronoun (often with “They rode” or “They ride”), many of 
us likely come to imagine them as conjoined throughout their 
journeys. The narrator overtly tells us at one point that: 
“They rode on. They rode like men invested with a purpose 
whose origins were antecedent to the, like blood legatees of 
an order both imperative and remote. For although each man 
among them was discrete unto himself, conjoined they made 
a [. . .] communal soul” (152).
Since I hold the description of the Apache attack as too 
vivid to be readily shaken off by the reader, I believe that as 
we hear of Glanton and his riders’ communal aspects, of how 
they ride and ride, and of how they ride with a purpose, that 
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many of us sense and at some level hope, their mission is to 
provide a Saxon response to the Apache’s massacre we are 
still suffering from. I previously quoted a lengthy passage 
from the Apache’s massacre of White’s riders hoping I would 
thereby remind my reader of how affecting, how awful it was 
to encounter that passage for the first time. I also did so in 
hopes of persuading my reader that this scene involving 
Glanton’s riders’ massacre of the Delaware village recalls, 
replies to, and quits it:
Within that first minute the slaughter had become 
general. Women were screaming and naked children 
and one old man tottered forth waving a pair of white 
pantaloons. The horsemen moved among them and 
slew them with clubs or knives. A hundred tethered 
dogs were howling and others were racing crazed 
among the huts ripping at one another and at the tied 
dogs nor would this bedlam and clamor cease or 
diminish from the first moment the riders entered the 
village. Already a number of the huts were afire and a 
whole enfilade of refugees had begun steaming north 
along the shore wailing crazily with the riders among 
them like herdsmen clubbing down the laggards first. 
[. . .] When Glanton and his chiefs swung back 
through the village people were running out under the 
horses’ hooves and the horses were plunging and 
some of the men were moving on foot among the 
huts with torches and dragging the victims out, 
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slathered and dripping with blood, hacking at the 
dying and decapitating those who knelt for mercy. 
There were in the camp a number of Mexican slaves 
and these ran forth calling out in Spanish and were 
brained or shot and one of the Delawares emerged 
from the smoke with a naked infant dangling in each 
hand and squatted at a ring of midden stones and 
swung them by the heels each in turn and bashed 
their heads against the stones so that the brains burst 
forth through the fontanel in a bloody spew and 
humans on fire came shrieking forth like berserkers 
and the riders hacked them down with their 
enormous knives and a young woman ran up and 
embraced the bloodied forefeet of Glanton’s 
warhorse. (156)
As with the Apache attack, we have a “great vomit of 
gore” (98). The difference is that it is more appropriate to 
describe the narrative discharge this time as orgasmic. I say 
this because we now ride with the perpetrator, not the victim, 
in an excited release upon of a village we likely felt we had 
been preparing for.
Like before an orgasm, the paragraphs that preceded the 
attack have a regular rhythm. Again we are offered a 
succession of paragraphs that begin with “they.” Specifically, 
we are told that “They followed” (149), that “They passed” 
(149), that “For the next two weeks they would ride” (151), 
that “They cut the throats” (151), that “They crossed the del 
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Norte” (152), that “That night they were visited” (152), that 
“Toward the morning they saw fires” (152), that “When the 
company set forth in the evening they continued south as 
before” (153), that “They saw to their arms” (154), that 
“They’d driven a stick into the ground” (154), that “They 
reached the north end” (154) before hearing how “They led 
the [. . .] horses” into war” (155). On the Vintage edition of 
Blood Meridian, a case for my argument can be made just by 
looking at the paragraphs on the page preceding the attack 
(page 154). Each paragraph is roughly the same length, is 
reasonably short, and begins with a monosyllabic word 
beginning with “T.”
The effect of encountering these two massacres 
sequentially is very different than if we had done so 
simultaneously. It is as inappropriate to point to the narrator’s 
referring to Glanton’s “chiefs” (156) and argue that with this 
McCarthy shows he would not have us mistake these pitiless 
Saxon marauders as any different from the Apaches they’re 
about to decimate, as it is to argue that the American CNN 
embeds who rode tanks intending to lay waste to Baghdad in 
response to the 9-11 New York devastation, showed the 
essential equivalence between Muslim and American warriors. 
No, just as those who felt victimized by the 9-11 attack 
rooted for the American tank divisions while they crushed 
Baghdad, since we suffered from the Apache attack, we are 
drawn to ride with Glanton and root for his gang—likely 
whatever the total number of body cavities they end up caving 
in, arms and legs they end up cleaving off, pleading, sunken, 
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defeated heads they return only to decapitate. And we would 
done so even if they had dressed themselves near Indian out 
of fraternal respect for Apaches’ true warrior blood. That is, 
if we experienced the Apache attack as our defeat, the 
Delaware massacre is only our revenge.
Some might argue we aren’t likely to root for puppy-
killers, but I believe McCarthy portrays Glanton so that even 
if we hate him, we likely still admire him. Glanton is someone 
who “eats lead and shits bullets”—an unrelenting force (His 
bravado never ceases, not even at the moment of his death.). 
But not just this: for while in battle, most sentences that 
begin with “Glanton” are usually followed with him 
accomplishing the difficult in a meticulously perfect manner 
(An example: “Glanton brought the rifle to the crook of his 
arm and capped one drum and rotated the barrels and capped 
the other. He did not take his eyes from the Apaches” [158]; 
and another: “Glanton drew his rifle from its scabbard and 
shot the two lead horses and resheathed the rifle and drew his 
pistol and began to fire between the actual ears of his horse” 
[156].)—Glanton is so perfect in this environment most often 
we feel the universe is simply ceding his antagonists to him, 
because in awe, it knows it doesn’t have a hope. And for all his 
compelling competence and charisma, we are his as well.
McCarthy manipulates us into admiring Glanton, just as 
he manipulates us into enjoying Glanton’s evil ways, and we 
must ask ourselves why he does so. Would he have us 
shotgun and tomahawk our way through life? Does he want 
us to give ourselves entire to the blood of war, even if this 
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just means spilling over carts toward the last available bit of 
clearance at a grocery store? I would like to think he wrote 
the novel hoping to make us aware of our susceptibility to 
manipulation, but since I am arguing it affects us primarily 
subliminally, I don’t think this was intention. Instead, for all 
his talk of God, McCarthy has me thinking he clearly wrote it 
while “the devil was at his elbow” (19).
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Worthy Companions (March 2005)
Evelina, in Frances Burney’s Evelina, and Werther, in Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe’s Young Werther, might seem the 
opposite of one another, for they seek out such opposite 
company—Evelina, the high-born, Werther, the low-
grounded. However, though their eyes are cast in different 
directions, their inclinations are one and the same: they both 
seek admiration from whomever most appropriate, to 
confirm themselves superior to their own particular worst-
sort of people.
After Evelina’s first social outing in London, Mrs. 
Mirvan relates to her, Lovel’s, Lord Orville’s, and Sir 
Clement’s assessment of her (i.e., Evelina’s) behavior at the 
party. Since Evelina, as much as Mrs. Mirvan, essentially has 
been eavesdropping, we know that her desire to know what 
others think of her is strong enough for it to out-duel her 
concern to be seen as well-bred—and this is saying 
something, as we shall see. Evelina attends most closely to 
how Lord Orville judged her. In the letter in which she 
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informs Mr. Villars of how they assessed her, Evelina 
ruminates only on those words Lord Orville used to describe 
her—“‘A poor weak girl![,]’ ‘ignorant or mischievous!’” (40), 
and for good reason, since Lord Orville is characterized as 
exactly the sort of gentleman whose good opinion mattered 
most in eighteenth-century English society.
Paul Gordon Scott argues that social order in eighteenth-
century England required the cowering presence of superior, 
singular gentlemen, who, along with ideal manners, possessed 
a penetrating “voyeuristic gaze that disciplines subjects by 
observing them” (88). Gordon argues that the ideal 
gentleman in eighteenth-century English society was, then, 
someone who both caused and eased social dis-ease. He was 
someone like Lord Orville, whose own judgmental gaze is 
employed in ensuring that bad behavior, which according to 
Orville requires “immediate notice [. . .] for it encroaches 
when it is tolerated” (113), is policed. Lord Orville’s gaze is 
ideal for the purpose, for his vision is informed by “the cold 
eye of unimpassioned philosophy,” which allows him to view, 
for example, women and art simultaneously without allowing 
“the heart [. . .] to interfere and make all objects but one 
(namely, a beautiful woman) insipid and uninteresting” (119).
Sir Clement is the one who makes this assessment of the 
prowess of Lord Orville’s singularly disinterested “eye,” and 
in the scene where the three men assess Evelina’s character, 
he finds the eye focused in on him. Sir Clement calls Evelina 
an “angel” (38), but Lord Orville, disliking an inflated 
assessment of her informed principally by Sir Clement’s 
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desire for mischief, insists she is not a “Helen” (39) but rather 
a “pretty modest-looking girl” (38). Lovel, having been 
humiliated by her preference for Lord Orville, eagerly makes 
use of Sir Clement’ suggestion that Evelina might be a 
“parson’s daughter” (39) to deem her coarse and lowly. Sir 
Clement insists she is “too sensible to be ignorant” (39), but 
Lord Orville will not play along, as he is uninterested in 
recovering her character for libertine play. He knows she 
“affront[ed] [Lovell],” probably guesses right that her laughter 
betrayed her “enjoy[ment] [of] his mortification” (40), and 
understands that regardless of whether her behavior was born 
out of ignorance or out of mischief, it remains inexcusable. 
But simply because the behavior is so unacceptable to Lord 
Orville he deemed it unnecessary to inquire as to motive, 
does not mean we should assume both explanations for her 
behavior are equally damning—for they are in no way that! 
For if her behavior owed to ignorance, she is doomed: she 
has no chance of ever judging herself worthy of Lord Orville. 
But if she is and was mischievous, the novel suggests she may 
not be so much fallen as she is endowed.
The exchange between Lovel and Sir Clement helps us 
understand “ignorance” as the opposite of sensible, the 
opposite of genteel. For Evelina, to be ignorant would mean 
to be less the country gentleman’s daughter Sir Clement 
prefers to see her as and more the country bumpkin the likes 
of Lovel and Madame Duval (75) are convinced her 
upbringing has made for her. Anyone akin to Madame Duval 
or to the Branghton family has no chance of becoming 
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sensible. Mr. Villars at one point expresses his wish that he 
could change Madame Duval’s plans, but argues that “[h]er 
character, and the violence of her disposition, intimidate me 
from making the attempt: she is too ignorant for instruction, 
too obstinate for entreaty, and too weak for reason” (142). 
We know, too, that Evelina gauges the Branghtons so 
obstinate their manners cannot be improved upon; in fact, 
she guesses they probably already consider themselves genteel 
(195).
Several characters characterized as libertines (with the 
exception of Lord Merton), on the other hand, are not only 
redeemable—witness what happens to Evelina’s true father at 
the end of the novel—but possess positive qualities which 
make them more similar to than different from the novel’s 
most sensible characters. Sir Clement is a libertine. He, unlike 
Lord Orville, takes pleasure in hearing how Evelina 
humiliated Lovel. But he is also someone whose own status 
as genteel is not compromised in doing so. In this, Sir 
Clement bears resemblance to the restoration libertines who 
engaged in “shaming rituals [which bore resemblance to that] 
of non-urbane and impolite society” (24) to “enforce rather 
than dissolve social hierarchy” (James Grantham Turner 247). 
And we note that throughout the novel he involves himself in 
activities that help distinguish the genteel from the lowly, 
which seem designed, intended, to remind the lowly of their 
dooming inadequacies. If we understand Sir Clement and 
Lord Orville as representing two different sorts of gentlemen, 
both of whom had their time as socially sanctioned 
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embodiments of moral righteousness, then we can 
understand Evelina’s decision to twice establish how exactly 
their seemingly similar or even identical social behavior 
actually do actually differ, seem but an appropriate thing for 
her to do.
The very fact that Evelina compares the two makes them 
similar, for according to Evelina it is “unjust” (199) to 
compare people who are fundamentally different from one 
another. Owing to the fact that Sir Clement alone possesses 
superior “address and manners” (199), she will not, for 
example, compare him to Mr. Smith. She will however liken 
herself to Sir Clement. Though Evelina overtly refuses Sir 
Clement’s suggestion that they possess a similarly “frank [. . .] 
disposition” (49), we note that she actually makes the link she 
more overtly avows herself uninterested in forging. We know 
Evelina is aware of every key word used by the three men 
who judged her merits at the private ball. Lord Orville’s 
assessment commanded her keenest interest, but she shows 
later in her letters a remembrance for a word—“Nobody” 
(320)—used by, appropriately enough, the least of the three 
men, by Lovel. We have reason to conclude, then, that she 
knew that by calling Sir Clement a “genius” (52) in a letter so 
soon after he used that word to describe her (40), she was 
herself facilitating the connection between them that Sir 
Clement had already begun to create. She actually makes 
them seem perfectly complimentary, writing in the letter, 
“[a]nd thus was my deviation from truth punished; and thus 
did this man’s determined boldness conquer” (48).
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Evelina calls Sir Clement her “champion” (39)—which is 
but fair, for though Evelina is surrounded by the base, 
through crowds of coarse Sir Clement still seeks her out. So 
doing, he does her an enormous favor; for though we might 
normally be prepared to understand his attentions as a threat, 
since her biological and physical closeness to the base put her 
status as “a lady” into question, his attentions reinforce her 
self-understanding as someone who actually has something 
“high” to lose. Early in her association with Madame Duval 
and Captain Mirvan, Evelina says “the[ir] continual wrangling 
and ill-breeding [. . .] made [her] [. . .] blush that [she] [. . .] 
belonged to them” (65). Fortunate for her, then, that Sir 
Clement’s persistent interest in her, and lack of interest in her 
companions, makes it seem as if he is competing to have her 
all to his own. “Sir Clement takes interest in the Captain; he 
“stud[ies] all [his] [. . ] humours” (83)—but only so as to 
ensure his access to Evelina. He tells her he “pa[id] court to 
the gross Captain Mirvan, and the virago Madame Duval,” 
only to “procure [for] [him]self” (381) her company. And 
though he comes within reach of the coarse but for her 
finery, the times when he fixes more squarely on them helps 
her out as well.
The significant example of this good service occurs when 
Sir Clement helps Captain Mirvan “sport” with Madame 
Duval. Madame Duval ends up on the ground, covered with 
dirt, disassembled and inarticulate, while Evelina remains 
unharmed, still subject to Sir Clement’s keen interest. 
Clement detaches her from Evelina and literally brings 
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Madame Duval down to earth: he helps create a memorable 
moment for Evelina to use to help understand herself as surely 
not at all to be compared to her horrid grandmother.
Though in one sense Evelina was not dirtied by her 
involvement, in another, not so much. For though she voices 
her dissatisfaction with the plot, we know Evelina failed to 
warn Madame Duval about the danger she was in. And we 
have reason to believe Evelina actually enjoyed the sport, but 
would not admit this to herself in her letters, because when 
Sir Clement targets someone (a non-family member—Mr. 
Smith) that permits her a more open laugh, so to speak, she 
does not let the opportunity go by unwasted.
Evelina does not actually laugh, as it would unbecoming 
to do so, but she does admit that after seeing the results of 
his (i.e., Mr. Smith’s) sudden awareness of Sir Clement’s 
interest in her, she “could almost have laughed” (225). As 
before with Madame Duval, Sir Clement makes Mr. Smith 
decompose—“he seemed to lose at once all his happy self-
sufficiency and conceit” (225). In a way, he also makes Mr. 
Smith physically low—“he [. . .] seemed himself, with 
conscious inferiority, to shrink into nothing” (225)—as well 
as physically distant: “[he] again retir[ed] to an humble 
distance” (227). Of course, Sir Clement is frequently 
described as someone who when he closes in on Evelina, 
causes her significant distress. But we notice that Evelina 
seems to so need being likened to Sir Clement that she risks 
doing so physically, and just after Sir Clement had discovered 
her in a situation that legitimizes an even more predatory 
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stance toward her. After listening to Mr. Smith lecture about 
a painting, she writes, she “saw Sir Clement bite his lips; and 
indeed, so did I mine” (227).
Sir Clement also helps Evelina by providing her with 
good reasons for reproving him; and until she meets Mr. 
Macartney, it is primarily through these reproofs that she 
keeps some claim to the lady-like—on being high, and 
therefore at all like Orville. But it is the fortuitous discovery 
of Mr. Macartney that is key for a more deeply sourced 
display of highborn conduct. She saves his life, an act that 
required courage. It make her seem great-souled, but note, 
not unladylike or manly, for “courage was not a masculine 
prerogative in the early modern period [read 16-18th 
century])” (Carolyn Williams, “Women Behaving Well,” 72; 
emphasis added).
But though Mr. McCartney proves highly useful for her 
ascension, she actually achieves Lord Orville heights as much 
by others’ shrinkage as from their boost. That is, Lord Orville 
lowers his standing some as the text proceeds. She portrays 
her involvement with both Sir Clement and Mr. Macartney as 
making Lord Orville jealous. He shows social unease—“he 
look[s] away” (369) while at a social gathering, when Evelina 
looked upon him—and demonstrates a further slip in social 
grace: “Lord Orville’s reception of us was grave and cold: far 
from distinguishing me, as usual, by particular civilities, Lady 
Louise herself could not have seen me enter the room with 
more frigid unconcern” (372). Evelina portrays him here as 
de-evolving in precisely the way she feels vulnerable to, that 
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is, she describes him so he as well seems susceptible to being 
compromised by unflattering relations.
Evelina conceives of herself, then, as someone who 
manages what her own beloved Orville could not: she never 
devolves; she never allows her initial burst of laughter at 
Lovel’s ridiculousness to make herself seem lowly or 
bumpkinish. Instead, she portrays herself so that she—much 
as an earth-bound angel might—ascends.  In contrast, 
Werther devolves. Though he does not consider them 
“equal” (Goethe 28) to him, he associates with the lowly, and 
he plots his narrative so that he moves from being relatively 
happy to being a perpetually tormented person. Yet since in 
his imagination the heavenly can be found as much amongst 
the low as it can the highly placed, devolution, finding himself 
amongst lowlifes, the ostensible dregs, is actually his means to 
purity.
The sort of people Werther doesn’t want to be 
associated with are those like Evelina—the “sensible” (61) 
“who devote their creative energies [. . .] to moving one place 
higher up a table” (77). Werther suggests that sensible types 
often secure for themselves the kind of security Evelina 
hopes marriage to Lord Orville will afford her. But he also 
believes that since they are interested primarily in placement 
and not in love, though sweetly “housed” they “will 
[nevertheless] be done for” (33). He relates the fate of a 
wealthy woman who, like Evelina, was concerned to insinuate 
herself within Property and barricade herself before 
barbarians: she had “no pleasure apart from looking down on 
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middle-class citizens from the heights of an upper-storey 
window” (76).
Werther would surely question the soundness of 
Evelina’s assessment of Lord Orville as the best of men, for 
in some respects Arthur possesses similar character traits to 
Lord Orville’s, only they aren’t anywhere near so flatteringly 
portrayed. Admittedly, just as Evelina judges Lord Orville 
“the most amiable man in the world” (Evelina 41), Werther 
actually writes that Albert is “the best fellow on earth” (59). 
However, Werther dooms him in his own estimation by 
associating him with all other “sensible people” (61). In the 
letter in which he does so, Albert makes a declaration 
concerning bad behavior that is easy to imagine Lord Orville 
making. Albert says, “[b]ut you will grant that certain actions 
are wrongful [. . .] no matter what their motives” (60). 
Werther tries, just as Sir Clement once did with Lord Orville, 
to suggest that motives do in fact matter, and can and should 
affect our estimation of what truly is wrong, but Albert won’t 
budge. Indeed, Werther portrays Albert as inflexible and 
unimaginative, someone whose coldness, someone whose 
fundamental belief in the rightness of his opinion, along with 
his desire to preach, make him worthy of mockery not praise 
(61). (Werther again mocks “cool, respectable gentlemen” 
[33] elsewhere in his letters.)
Other than Albert, most of those Werther identifies as 
sensible ostensibly do him a favor by treating him with 
disdain. For instance, he describes a doctor who “considered 
[his] [. . .] conduct beneath the dignity of sensible people” 
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(45). This assessment would be embraced by Werther, 
however, for he despises the “officially” dignified and finds 
fabulous things “close to the earth” (27). He says he prefers 
to associate with those most frequently accused of lacking 
dignity: the “rabble,” “[t]he common people” (28). Though 
there are exceptions—for example, the foul youth who ruin 
others’ moods, and the grumpy lady who cut down the 
walnut tree (mind you, she is one with pretensions to be 
respectable [94])—it is clear to Werther that common people 
are a rather fine lot. They have not lost their capacity to love, 
something the sensible have in fact done, and they possess an 
intrinsic awareness and (however unlearned) appreciation of 
the truly noble (they can’t help but love Werther). “The 
common people,” he says, “already know and love [him], the 
children in particular” (28). He is particularly apt to identify 
himself with children—those who are, in one sense at least, 
the lowest of the low. He describes his encounters with them 
in some detail, and in each case they are described as 
possessed of an inherent “harmony” (35) and soulfulness—
that is, as if they share the same passion and “aliveness” he 
himself is ostensibly in the possession of (and draws our 
attention to in his letters, in part by likening himself to a 
child).
Since associating himself with the lowly better 
demonstrates his gentility, we have reason to wonder if he 
thinks being “interred in the cold earth” (127) would 
somehow show just how great he really is. Considering he 
conceives of Nature as something always grand and noble (if 
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not always beneficent), and that he longs to merge himself 
within its oneness, perhaps he imagines his decomposition—
i.e, his decline from being healthy and happy to being 
despondent and depressed—as preparing him for atomic 
integration within it. But we note that Werther for the most 
part imagines himself in his after-life as, so to speak, in the 
clouds, alongside God. And we should suspect that Werther 
makes use of the low for the same reason Evelina makes use 
of Sir Clement: they are not to them really the best of people, 
but because barriers exist which prevent them from long-
associating with those they truly want to be with, they yet 
remain the best at hand. Werther writes that, in death, he is 
bound to be by his Father’s (i.e., God’s) side, and that his 
Father will “comfort” (128) and value him. We know he has 
glimpses of this reality while counting himself amongst the 
living, that is, that he has for a time associated with the truly 
high and noble—worthy Baronesses, Counts, and Princes—
and that he portrays them as prizing his presence above all 
others, but also that he could not for long associate himself 
with them in peace. Just as Evelina’s coarse relatives work 
against her effort to associate herself with Lord Orville, those 
Werther abhors succeed in frustrating his ability to stay long 
at court.
Both Evelina and Werther, then, are similar in that both 
are characterized so that they portray the kind of artfulness 
and cunning they pretend to abhor. They differ in that 
Evelina can admit to being somewhat sinister (as she 
essentially does when she says, without self-reproof, that “she 
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will take “some pleasure in cutting up” “fools and coxcombs” 
[326]) because there is a still-contested understanding of the 
duties of the genteel that legitimates and even commends 
their policing through ridicule (note that even Lord Orville 
calls Lovel a “coxcomb” [37]), while Werther needs to claim 
more straightforward purity to distinguish himself from sour 
aristocrats, those who “g[ive] [. . .] [looks] [. . .] in their [. . .] 
oh-so aristocratic way” (81). That is, for a time, it actually 
serves Evelina’s intentions to portray herself as nasty, while 
Werther is the one who must take care not to appear the least 
bit a rogue. Both of them are, however, at the very least 
incidentally beneficent, in that they each provide readers 
means to conceive of their own character flaws and current 
lack of placement as signs of their inherent worth. If you are 
regularly dismissed as ignorant and uncouth, Werther’s sure 
to be your guy, and if you have a tendency to make others 
your sport but still know, which fork, which spoon, Evelina is 
surely your lady. But there is no doubt that associating with 
either of them has its (self-consoling) benefits. No wonder 
many of the trod-upon but still aspiring, once did. 
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The Visible Invisible Man (March 2005)
In Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man, the invisible man repeatedly 
draws our attention to how he captures the attention of 
discerning individuals. Supposedly, this is not the sort of 
attention he craves. What he really wants, he tells us, is for 
others to take an interest in him, but not only so to better 
discern if he is useful or a threat. Unfortunately, “[n]o one 
really wished to hear what [he] [. . .] called himself” (573). We 
have reason to believe, however, that the attention he does 
receive is exactly the sort he craves—or, rather, the sort he 
can enjoy and still live with. For not only does he consistently 
show in his account that he attends to whether or not people 
take “special” (301) notice of him, he shows he prefers they 
not interact with him in a manner that makes it difficult to at 
some point leave them behind.
When the invisible man drives Mr. Norton about town, 
he remembers an experience from his early school years that 
influenced him profoundly. He recalls having seen 
photographs of black men and women who appeared “almost 
DRAINING THE AMAZON’S SWAMP
345
without individuality, a black mob,” along with “striking” 
white people who possessed “clear [. . .] features” (39). 
Believing his association with the Founder’s college has 
already provided him with some status, he obviously hopes 
that the distinguished white man, Mr. Norton, will reinforce 
his preferred sense of himself as “not just another face in the 
crowd.” However, Mr. Norton makes him feel as he wasn’t 
actually “seen” by him, that is, as if Mr. Norton saw “only 
[his] [. . .] surroundings, [him]self, or figments of [his] [. . .] 
imagination—indeed, everything and anything except [the 
invisible man]” (3).  He says things which seem to suggest that 
the invisible man matters to him, that his particular identity, 
who he is and who he will become, is important to him. For 
example, Mr. Norton says that his own “fate” (44) depends 
upon the nature of the invisible man’s progress through life. 
He also suggests that an intimate connection exists between 
the two of them—“So you see, young man, you are involved 
in my life quite intimately, even though you’ve never seen me 
before” (43). However, the invisible man detects something 
about the way they are interacting which has him doubt how 
much he actually does mean to him. He gauges that Mr. 
Norton talks to him “like someone in a book” (44) would, 
and if he means here that Mr. Norton is not speaking to him 
in a manner which suggests that specific context he is in, the 
specific person he is talking to, interest or affect him enough 
to determine his delivery, he is exactly right.
Mr. Norton likens the invisible man to a “cog” (45), and 
he does deal with him as if he were just another “cog in a 
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machine” (396). We know this in part because of how he 
interacts with Trueblood. Though Mr. Norton is described at 
first as an easy-going gentleman, we know he cannot remain 
thus while talking with Trueblood. Trueblood truly fascinates 
him, for he presents him with proof he has long been 
searching for: specifically, that it is possible to “survive” (51) 
having incest with one’s daughter. Upon discovering this, he 
suddenly is no longer the gentleman with the “easy, informal 
manner” (37), and instead becomes an impassioned, “excited” 
(52) man. He tends to Trueblood; he makes him comfortable, 
and encourages him to tell his tale. He also truly attends to 
him—while Trueblood tells his tale, Mr. Norton listens to 
him with due care.
The invisible man attempts to draw Mr. Norton’s 
attention several times while Trueblood is speaking, but is 
repeatedly ignored. Specifically, we are told that he “ignored 
[him] [. . .], [as he] star[ed] into Trueblood’s face” (51), that he 
“was listening to Trueblood so intensely he didn’t see [him]” 
(57), and that, after he tries once again to get his attention, 
“[h]e didn’t even look at [him]” (61). And the invisible man is 
not pleased that Trueblood is the sole focus of Mr. Norton’s 
attention. In fact, very likely the real reason he is so upset that 
Mr. Norton gave Trueblood a hundred-dollar bill is because 
the sum does fairly represent the considerable interest Mr. 
Norton took in him. Trueblood, therefore, and not the 
invisible man, is someone Mr. Norton had “never seen [. . .] 
before” (43) yet took a particular interest in.
After subsequent misadventures the invisible man fears 
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Mr. Norton was “angry at” (98) him. However, Mr. Norton 
shows again how little the invisible man affects and/or 
interests him by telling Mr. Bledsoe, “‘the boy [was not] 
responsible,’” and that “‘[he] may send him away, [as] [they] [. 
. .] won’t need him now’” (103). Unlike Mr. Norton, however, 
Dr. Bledsoe suspects there is something amiss in the invisible 
man’s account of what befell him—and rightly so, for the 
unusual adventure began when the invisible man “suddenly 
decided to turn off the highway, down a road that seemed 
unfamiliar” (40). Dr. Bledsoe is described as looking the 
invisible man “up and down” (141); he understands the 
invisible man as someone who has produced an “accident” of 
a magnitude not seen in “seventy-five years” (103); and he 
therefore attends to him very closely to determine how much 
of a threat the invisible man represents, and how best to deal 
with him. He also “looks [the invisible man] in the eye,” and 
speaks “sincere[ly]” (143) to him; and though it is possible he 
is simply performing here, taking care to appear sincere 
would also imply that he is not taking the invisible man 
lightly.
Dr. Bledsoe sees the invisible man as someone who 
could ruin his empire; and though he pretends there is little 
the invisible man can do to destroy him, the subsequent 
interest he takes in him suggests he is much more concerned 
about the invisible man’s potential to ruin him than he lets 
on. Thereafter, Dr. Bledsoe’s eyes are always on him, even if 
he appears interested in other things. We are informed that 
Dr. Bledsoe “passed without seeming to see [the invisible 
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man] [. . .] [,] [but] as he reached his door he said, ‘I haven’t 
changed my mind about you, boy. And I don’t intend to!’” 
(148). So unlike Mr. Norton, who lost what little interest he 
had in the invisible man as soon as they parted ways, Dr. 
Bledsoe remains interested all the while he remains at the 
Founder’s college. We therefore have reason to suspect that 
the invisible man found Dr. Bledsoe’s attention more 
reparative than he did punitive. And even though Dr. Bledsoe 
set him up to be ruined in New York, since Dr. Bledsoe’s 
plot involves making the “most important men in the whole 
country” (163) aware of him, in this, yet again, he supplies 
means for the invisible man reason to believe himself hardly 
just another face in the crowd.
In the letter, Dr. Bledsoe identifies the invisible man, not 
as an ordinary cog, but as an extraordinarily “rare” “case” 
(191). And we know that the invisible man will soon be 
closely attended to by someone else who finds him rare and 
special—this time, an important white man, one of the 
leaders of the Brotherhood, Jack. When Jack first meets the 
invisible man he provides him with the sort of attendance he 
hoped to receive from Mr. Norton but that Trueblood 
received instead. Just as Mr. Norton shows urgency in his 
desire to hear Trueblood’s tale, Jack “hurried” after the 
invisible man, making a “puffing, bustling effort” (285). Mr. 
Norton provided Trueblood with attention, and Jack gives 
the invisible man the same. He “watches [him] [. . .] 
intensely” (290), and also “flatter[s]” (288) the invisible man, 
saying he “ha[dn’t] heard such an effective piece of eloquence 
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[. . .] in along time” (289). Jack admits he was looking for 
someone to play a role, but also that he had been “waiting for 
months” without finding anyone “who could do what [the 
invisible man] [. . .] had done” (304). And just as Mr. Norton 
provided Trueblood with money, we know that Jack will 
provide him sufficient funding for him now to be in 
possession of hundred-dollar bills, a fact he draws his and our 
attention to by providing Mary with one of them.
Just as Dr. Bledsoe attends to invisible man in a way Mr. 
Norton did not, Jack attends to the invisible man in a way 
that many of his Brothers do not. When the invisible man first 
meets a gathering of the Brotherhood, they barely notice him. 
He writes, “no one paid me any special attention. It was as 
though they hadn’t seen me, as though I were here, and yet 
not here” (301). Though he will later conclude that the 
Brotherhood “didn’t see either color or men” (508), some of 
them likely ignored him owing to his being black, and 
therefore, to them, his being indistinct by nature. We are told 
they assume he must know how to sing since (to them) “all 
coloured people sing” (312). Jack, however, knows 
differently; with irritation he tells his Brothers that the 
invisible man “does not sing” (312). And though the invisible 
man doesn’t actually describe how he reacted to Jack’s 
defence of him, since he admits that he “resented having 
others think that [coloured people] [. . .] were all entertainers 
and natural singers” (314), we should again imagine him as 
feeling both flattered and well attended to.
Soon the invisible man is deemed atypical by both the 
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community he serves and by his fellow Brothers. He becomes 
the “focal point of [. . .] many concentrating eyes” (336) as he 
speaks to crowds, a fact not lost to the editor of “a new 
picture magazine,” who seeks an interview with “one of [their 
community’s] [. . .] most successful young men” (396). 
Though the invisible man replies to the request by stating that 
he desires nothing more than to be “a cog in a machine” 
(396), he still agrees to the interview. As a result Brother 
Westrum declares he is an “individualist” (401), someone 
who aims to stand out from the rest of the brethren. Soon 
the rest of the Brotherhood—Jack, most notably—come to 
see him as a threat. The invisible man describes how, after 
providing Clifton with the “funeral of a hero” (466), they 
awaited in a room, ready to interrogate him. Jack, just as Dr. 
Bledsoe once was, is described as “studying him with his 
penetrating eyes” (462). To this point Jack had largely 
assumed the invisible man would perform the role expected 
of him; now, however, evidently fearing the invisible man 
might topple the Brotherhood, he takes a “new interest” 
(473) in him, and attends to him just as or even more closely 
than he had upon first encountering him.
Jack is infuriated with the invisible man. Just as Mr. 
Norton “forgot himself” when he met Trueblood, Jack is so 
infuriated by the invisible man’s behavior he lets up his 
“father[ly]” (470) guise and, greatly assisted by the loss of his 
false eye, becomes more easily identified as either a 
“Cyclopean” (474) monster or an odd barnyard animal (476). 
Appropriately, the invisible man finds himself disgusted by 
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Jack. He is in fact through with him: he understands Jack now 
as someone who doesn’t give a damn about human life, and 
wants nothing more to do with him. He declares he “would 
never be the same” (478), but at least in respect to the sort of 
attention he craves, we have reason to believe he doesn’t 
subsequently change all that much: for he is this purportedly 
forever-altered individual when he writes his account, and yet 
we notice just how well he still remembers and chooses to 
attend to instances where he is ignored or well attended to. 
Though he will in his imagination “merge into one single 
white figure” the likes of “Jack and Mr. Norton” (508), he 
more effectively distinguishes the two men from one another. 
That is, one of them—Jack—is portrayed as having taken a 
keen interest in him, while the other—Mr. Norton—as none 
at all.
By deciding to end his account with a description of how 
he finally succeeds in capturing Mr. Norton’s attention, he 
makes Mr. Norton seem an elusive prize-animal he long 
sought and finally bagged. It is appropriate that he decides to 
end both his description of his surface life and of his account 
with this encounter, for in the way he describes it he shows it 
was not insubstantial for him. The invisible man tells us that 
“seeing [Mr. Norton again] [. . .] made all the old life live in 
[him] [. . .] for an instant” (577). He “smile[s],” (577) at first, 
but soon regards Mr. Norton “with mixed feelings” (578). He 
likely remembers (if he ever really forgot: he tells us at one 
point, “I can neither file nor forget” [579]) Mr. Norton’s lack 
of attentiveness; and it may be his remembrance of it that is 
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behind his ultimately successful attempt to agitate, mock, and 
terrorize him. He asks Mr. Norton, “Don’t you know me?,” 
and “You see me?” (578)—but of course he already knows 
the answers to these questions—no, he doesn’t. He revenges 
himself upon Mr. Norton by making him feel like a “cornered 
animal” (578), but he also provokes him into displaying a 
reaction which unambiguously shows him affected by, as fully 
registering, and not being able to simply presume, the 
invisible man’s presence. In response to the invisible man’s 
question, “‘[A]ren’t you ashamed?,’” Mr. Norton becomes 
“indignant,” is lured into exclaiming “‘ASHAMED!”’ (578), 
and hastily retreats from him.
Evidently, the invisible man is greatly affected by being 
ignored, but those who attend to him with some kindness 
also distress him, for he cannot then so readily extricate 
himself from them. Those who show themselves monsters, 
like Dr. Bledsoe and Jack, are more or less cleanly left behind. 
He thinks of revenging himself upon them, but having done 
their worst, and being mostly finished with him, it is his 
option if he wants to relate to them further via revenge 
(something he either chooses not to do [with Dr. Bledsoe], or 
for but a brief period of time [with Jack]). They, however, no 
longer pursue him. Those who have cared about him and/or 
he engages more intimately with, such as Sybil and Mary, 
however, trail him (literally so, with Sybil) as he flees through 
the streets of New York.
The invisible man guesses that Sybil, as with everyone 
else, wants to use him—in her case, to make him into her 
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“entertainer” (521). However, he admits she does feel “true 
affection” (529) toward him; and, after he pretends to have 
raped her and ends the “game” (523) he wants no part of, 
they engage in more affectionate, intimate play. She 
compliments his laugh, and tells him she had “never seen 
anyone like [him]” (525). He asks her if she is “sure” (525), 
but unlike the time he asked Mr. Norton the same question, 
the invisible man is likely asking the question in earnest, for 
he had up to this point described her as someone who was 
not “kidding nor trying to insult [him]” (517). Though he 
replies that “it’s good to be seen” (525), his mind is 
elsewhere, something she is not so drunk not to espy. She 
accuses him of being mostly interested in trying “to get rid of 
her” (525), and she’s right, he is—only this doesn’t prove 
such an easy thing to do. And quite possibly, what lies behind 
her ludicrous success in trailing him through the streets of 
New York is the invisible man’s desire to use the episode to 
dramatize his difficulty in getting her out of his head. That is, 
he ditches her, and as a result feels the need to in some way 
convey the guilt he experienced in doing so.
The invisible man knows he has reason to feel guilty: not 
only does he suggest that Sybil to some extent cares about 
him and that she can engage with him sincerely, the invisible 
man overtly acknowledges he made use of her. He is the one 
who made her drunk, and who enjoyed imagining the 
humiliation George would ostensibly experience upon seeing 
the message he inscribed upon her belly. In addition, he is the 
one who suggested they continue meeting with one another, 
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and he cannot convince himself that it was not within his 
power to do otherwise. In fact, he comes to understand the 
entirety of his encounter with Sybil either as something he 
“had [. . .] done to her” or as something he “allowed her to 
do” (525).
It is also likely that the invisible man felt guilty upon 
leaving Mary, for though he knows she also intended to use 
him, he is well aware that he owes her plenty for having for 
some time treated him with generosity. He suspects, in fact, 
that he was the one who hadn’t treated her fairly. Specifically, 
he gauges that he actually inflicted upon her the crime he is 
so primed to damn others for, for he involved himself with 
her but “had never seen her” (297). In addition, as he 
prepares to leave her, he tries to de-personalize their 
relationship, to de-humanize her, by trying to persuade 
himself that their relationship was nothing more than one of 
“landlady [to] [. . .] tenant” (322). And though she doesn’t 
trail after him, an object he associates with her most certainly 
does—namely, “Mary’s broken bank and coins” (539-40). He 
tries to rid himself of the bank, specifically because it would 
“remind [him] [. . .] of [his] [. . .] last morning at Mary’s” 
(320), but is unable to unload it. It seems appropriate that the 
package remain with him, however, for even once he has left 
her, and even though he fears associating with her threatens 
engulfment—that is, to transform his singular identity into 
but a component of her own (316)—he seems drawn to 
return to her, perhaps because he believes himself still in her 
debt.
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Who he is really indebted to, though he isn’t capable of 
admitting this to himself, is Jack and the Brotherhood, for 
just after admitting that Mary represented a threat to his 
singular identity he pretends that he would have preferred to 
stay with her, but, alas, the Brotherhood forced a parting of 
ways (315). And the Brotherhood may therefore be 
responsible for helping him ease the “feeling of dread [he 
experienced owing to his awareness] that [he] [. . .] had to 
meet her face to face” (322). But of course, as the clinging 
package suggests, he is never quite successful in leaving her 
behind. We know, for instance, that he finishes his account 
by suggesting he will exit his hole and perform a “socially 
responsible role” (581).
Granted, it is possible that he may actually be thinking 
here of attempting to satisfy both Mary’s and his grandfather’s 
expectations of him, for though Mary’s “silent pressure” 
(259) to do the same surely afflicts him, his grandfather is 
someone who also wanted him “to keep up the good fight” 
(16) in pursuit of a more moral world. And most certainly, his 
grandfather is another person he cannot quit, even though he 
was someone whose advice is persistently described as having 
made the invisible man “fe[el] guilty and uncomfortable” 
“whenever things went well for [him]” (16). In the hole, he 
even admits to being “plagued by his deathbed advice” (574); 
advice given to him by his grandfather (through his father)—
someone who ostensibly did not mean him harm—proves 




Those who come closest to seeing the invisible man in 
the manner he proclaims he desires, therefore, may actually 
end up causing him more distress than those who value him 
for averse reasons. I understand, however, that no one in his 
account is portrayed as being uninterested in using him, but I 
actually believe that he in fact never wants to meet such a 
person, for he would be drawn to abandon him or her at 
some point, leaving him/her still with him as a source of 
intractable guilt. He would abandon him/her because his life 
consists of “phase[s]” (576) which have him repeatedly 
departing places that once meant something to him. Each 
phase features a locale, wherein he finds a comfortable home. 
He makes clear that his hole is not “damp and cold,” but 
rather “warm and full of light” (6); he for sometime 
experiences the Founder’s college as a “calm[ing],” 
“pleasur[able]” place, wherein he felt “sheltered” (111); and 
the Brotherhood provides for him both security and a “clean 
and neat” (332) apartment he is delighted with. In each locale 
his actions garner attention that distinguishes him from 
others. (Even in the hole he feels sure he has an audience 
interested enough in what he has to say to slog through five 
hundred plus pages of his “rav[ing]” [581].) And at some 
point he eventually dislodges in pursuit of a new one. (True, 
Dr. Bledsoe will force him out of the Founder’s college, but 
he is the one who chooses to depart for New York 
immediately, who feels rejuvenated once he arrives in the 
North [156], and who never decides to revisit the South.)
Why he patterns his life so, I cannot be sure. If I were to 
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hazard a guess, I would suggest he has difficulty staying with 
any one person or place without at some point feeling more 
smothered than comforted. The individuality, the sort of 
visibility I believe he covets, then, can be obtained when 
significant people within an organization deem him very 
different from everyone else, but also lost if he lingers around 
too long within one. He is therefore a visible man, and should 
only be thought of as invisible in that he is rarely in the same 
place for long. We must note, however, that he is no 
Rinehart, for he imagines this slippery rogue as obligated to 
enmesh himself in relationships and “games” (523), and the 
visible invisible man can’t be having any of that. 
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Useful Object (April 2005)
Maureen Folan, in Martin McDonagh’s The Beauty Queen of 
Leenane, is constantly grumbling about the daily chores she 
performs for a mother she is rarely shown not fighting with. 
She dreams of being comforted by and of going away with a 
man, but since these dreams arose her lack of surety 
concerning her actual appeal to men, they actually serve to 
strengthen rather than loosen her ties to her mother. 
However, the play argues that a man is exactly what she needs 
for her to leave her everyday life behind her. For though 
Maureen initially tries to make use of a strong, gentle man 
who enters her life—Pato—as if he were just another prop 
with which to wage her ongoing war with her mother, he is 
actually means for her to forget all about that, and begin a 
better life for herself.
I do not mean to suggest, however, that Maureen is your 
typical lady-in-distress. Indeed, she is at times shown to be 
tyrannical; notably over her mother. However, at at least one 
point in the play, her domination of her mother actually 
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serves to strengthen her desire to be united to her. In scene 
two, after catching her mother in lie, Maureen makes use of 
her mother’s “crime” to justify a commanding stance toward 
her. Buoyed by a sense of righteousness, she tells Mag 
something she “sometimes” dreams of to make herself 
“happy” (24). She tells Mag she dreams of being 
“comfort[ed]” (23) by a man while at Mag’s wake. The man in 
her dreams also courts her, makes her an offer to join him at 
his place, to which she remarks, “what’s stopping me now?” 
(24). We note, however, that another person needn’t be intent 
on stopping her, for she stops the day-dream plot before it 
explores what it might be like to become involved with a 
man. She does so because the idea troubles her, for just after 
describing her dream to her mother she prompts a 
conversation clearly designed to result in both of them 
repeatedly agreeing that Mag will surely “hang on forever” 
(24).
Maureen might in this particular instance find comfort in 
her mother’s taunt that she will be around forever, because 
unlike when Maureen summons her dream while “scraping 
the skitter out of them hens” (24), she cannot at this moment 
discuss her dream without feeling some of the trepidation 
from anticipating an opportunity to soon realize it. Maureen 
has just been invited by Pato to a party, a party which would 
involve “gallivanting with fellas” (22)—that is, the sort of 
event Maureen thinks of as having propelled her sisters into 
marriage. Therefore, she may sense that a man might very 
soon enter her life. We also know that Maureen is not entirely 
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wed to the idea that she must wait for her mother to die 
before she might leave her. In conveying her dream to her 
mother, she works her way to proclaiming that she might 
leave with a man, “[a]t [her mother’s] [. . .] bloody wake, sure! 
Is even sooner!” (24). But leaving her mother cannot but be 
terrifying for Maureen: not only is she a virgin whose one 
experience away from home is associated with a mental 
collapse, she is someone who is accustomed to and finds 
some self-validation in taking care of her mother.
The play directs us to understand Maureen as someone 
whose identity is inextricably linked to routine daily chores 
and household rituals. More specifically, it suggests that her 
purpose in life has become nothing more than making use of 
the objects involved in these rituals to engage in an ongoing 
battle with her mother. Complan and porridge are their 
weapons of choice; they are the primary objects used by 
Maureen and Mag in their ongoing dispute over who is 
master of whom in their household, a title neither of them 
has clear claim to. When Maureen caught Mag in a lie, for 
instance, Maureen utilized the preparation of Complan to 
force her mother to demonstrate her acknowledgement of 
her guilt by drinking it, despite her ill-stomach. But earlier we 
observed how Mag used the preparation of Complan to force 
Maureen to acknowledge her being culpable of having once 
seared Mag’s hand (5). And given her familiarity with this way 
of life, and given she knows that mastering her mother offers 
reliable rewards (i.e., feelings of elation and self-validation), it 
is not surprising that Maureen seems more comfortable 
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conceiving of a man that enters her life as an ideal object she 
can use to humiliate her mother than as someone who might 
lead her away from all that.
Maureen brings Pato back to her home, and he ends up 
staying overnight. Though they are shown flirting with one 
another, to be genuinely interested in one another, we suspect 
that Maureen brought him home primarily to triumphantly 
frustrate and humiliate her mother. Maureen knows her 
mother is disgusted by just the idea of her having sex: she 
“laugh[ed],” after her mother called her a “[w]hore” (23) for 
imagining herself enjoying being intimate with two men. 
Maureen now has the opportunity to experience how Mag 
would react to actually seeing her with a man she had slept 
with, and she will not let it slip away. She convinces Pato not 
to sneak out before her mother awakens, something he had 
intended to do, and wastes no time making use of him in the 
morning to antagonize her. She comes in “wearing only a bra 
and slip,” “goes over to Pato,” “sits across his lap,” and 
“kisses him at length” (39). She obviously wants her mother 
to believe they had had sex the night before: she says to Pato 
that he’ll “have to be putting that thing of [his] [. . .] in [her] [. 
. .] again before too long is past” (39). Maureen is of course 
referring to his penis here, and it is no surprise that Pato 
reacts to Maureen’s statement by “get[ting] up and idl[ing] 
around in embarrassment” (40).
Pato’s discomfort leads to his insisting he must soon be 
off: “I’ll have to be off now in a minute anyways. I do have 
packing to do I do” (40). But Mag, intent on making full use 
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of him, persists in relating to him in ways he finds 
uncomfortable. She orders him into the kitchen to “[s]mell 
the sink” (41). He does so, and he is described as being 
“disgust[ed]” (41) by the smell of Mag’s urine. But though 
Maureen has effectively made use of him to disturb her 
mother, Mag is equally facile at making use of whatever is at 
hand to manipulate and manage her daughter. She responds 
by informing Pato of Maureen’s stay in a mental hospital, and 
this is effective in upsetting Maureen, causing her to lose her 
assurance and her control, and to run over, “fists clenched” 
(42), to assault Mag. Pato, however, prevents her from 
landing blows—an act which ends his stance in this scene as a 
passive tool/observer. He physically intercedes between the 
two of them (he “steps between the two” [42] of them), and, 
in comforting her and reassuring her that she is not 
abnormal, that she is sane, makes claim to all of Maureen’s 
attention and interest. After Pato says, “[t]hat’s all past and 
behind you anyways” (44), Maureen responds by “look[ing] at 
him awhile” (44). In her daydream she imagined being 
comforted by a man, a consideration scary enough to have 
her follow it by strengthening her attachment to her mother. 
Here now, likely for the first time, she actually experiences 
being comforted by a man she cares about, and it proves 
sufficiently compelling that she replies by attending more 
closely rather than by backing away.
True, she does make use of her renewed intimacy with 
him to better sell her story that she was not the one who 
burned Mag, but she may do so primarily now to ensure Pato 
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continues to find her desirable—the first time that morning 
she shows this concern. She clearly begins to see Pato as 
someone who could assist her in leaving her current life. She 
“look[s] straight at him,” and asks, “[d]on’t I have to live with 
it?” (45). Much seems to depend on how he responds to this 
question, for her disposition changes abruptly when Pato 
responds simply by requesting she put some clothing on. She 
becomes “sombre again” (45), looks “down at herself” (45), 
and concludes that Pato had from the beginning not found 
her good-looking enough to excite him.
But though Pato failed to supply the reassurance she 
needed to brave the continuation of their courtship, the scene 
offers uninterrupted evidence of how much his interest in her 
has affected and changed her. Mag re-enters the room 
“waving papers,” she even “stopp[s] Pato’s approach” (46), 
but neither of them seem to notice her, something she is 
shown cognizant of in her asking, “Eh?” (46), after allowing 
sufficient time for them to respond to her discovery of the 
Difford Hall papers. But Pato “look[s] [only] at Maureen,” 
and Maureen will “look at her a moment” (47), but only after 
Pato has left her home. Maureen will again speak to Mag, but 
has lost all interest in combating her. After “linger[ing]” (47) 
over her dress, she says in “passing [to] her mother,” “Why? 
Why? Why do you . . .?” (47), but is not really interested in 
her response. Mag is left “holding [the] [. . .] papers rather 
dumbly” (47), and though she subsequently tries to make use 
of a more familiar object—her porridge—to engage her 
daughter’s attention (something she managed to do at the end 
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of scene one), the scene ends with her all alone, speaking to 
no one but herself.
After she concludes that Pato is not interested in her, 
Maureen returns to her habitual means of engaging with her 
mother, but Mag knows her daughter would be doing 
otherwise had she not intercepted Pato’s letter to her. 
Though Maureen tries to persuade herself that she and Pato 
are incompatible, Mag remarks that she knows her daughter 
attends to her now only because he did “not invit[e] [her] [. . 
.] to his oul going-away do” (61). And, indeed, whereas it was 
once the only relationship Maureen was comfortable being 
involved in, their relationship now serves as compensation 
for the one Maureen failed to secure with him. Maureen has 
proven herself to be just like her sisters in that she too can 
lose herself in a man, and she will once again show how 
quickly she can forget about Mag upon learning that Pato had 
not in fact rejected her but actually had invited her “to go to 
America with him” (68). After hearing this, Maureen is 
described as “in a daze,” as “barely noticing her” mother 
(even though her mother lies on the floor, “convulsing” and 
“screaming” [68]). And we note this scene is also one that 
ends with Maureen talking only to herself.
Pato ends up marrying someone else, and once Maureen 
is made aware of this, her fate is sealed: she will forever after 
be “a dried up oul” (23) bitty. While she still believed it 
possible she would join him in America, she aggressively 
removed from her kitchen shelves those objects—Complan 
and porridge—most clearly associated with her life with her 
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mother. But without a man to lead her out of her previous 
existence, she even more closely fuses herself to her, and all 
promise of her having her own life is over.
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Maintaining the Peace (May 2005)
Alfred Tennyson’s “The Lady of Shalott” is the sort of work 
Victorians might have turned to for reassurance. It provides 
the reader with a soothing, predictable space/world, wherein 
s/he is well prepared to encounter and process the New. 
There is disequilibrium in the poem: Lancelot is described as 
such an unusual, affecting sight that his appearance shocks 
the Lady of Shalott (hereafter, “Lady”) into activating the 
curse. However, the Lady’s subsequent activity is equal to and 
nullifies his emblazoned entrance, leaving us with an 
appropriate pairing: a gentle knight, amidst a newly becalmed 
realm.
The first stanza reassures us that throughout the poem, 
throughout the world it evokes, we will find ourselves well 
grounded in the familiar, the already known. We know that 
both “side[s]” (1) of the river have the same expansive “fields 
of barley and of rye” (2). Visual and auditory echoes of this 
pronouncement are found in the stanza’s first line: “river” is 
enclosed by “either” on one side, and by “lie” on the other. 
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Throughout we find words within the same line which seem 
visually and/or audibly related. Sometimes the same word is 
repeated—“four” in line fifteen, for example. Sometimes we 
get overt, obvious assonance and/or alliteration—e.g., “surly 
village churls” (52). And sometimes we get visual rhymes—
e.g., “weaveth steadily” (43). The result is that we do not 
simply progress as we read and, in effect, jettison the words 
already encountered in the line; rather, there is a sense that we 
are encouraged to read forward as we progress across a line, 
and backward as we reach its completion. That is, we are 
provided with some sense of the stable, eternal “medieval” 
present while we move our way through the poem.
The same sense of familiarity provided by seeing/hearing 
resemblances between words on single lines, is also enabled 
by re-encountering the same words throughout the poem. 
Nouns are frequently repeated, and so too many adjectives, 
including “little,” “broad,” and “bearded.” The repetition of 
these words again reinforces the poem’s stability and 
regularity, maintained most obviously by the repetition of the 
refrain, “The Lady of Shalott,” which terminates most all of 
the poem’s stanzas. There may be something very soothing, 
too, in discovering as we read antonyms of many previously 
encountered words. Without having seen “under” (102) 
before encountering “Over” (16), without having 
encountered “In” (29) before encountering “Out (114), we 
might have lost some of the ease the poem provides by its 




Since we are told both what is “up and down,” and what 
is “left and right” (137), after being told of the “stormy east 
wind” (118) that emerges with the activation of the curse, we 
might at some level be unsettled to learn that we never hear 
of what lies westward. But we would be looking in the wrong 
direction, so to speak, if we looked to the stanzas that 
delineate the Lady’s subsequent transformation for the 
poem’s discordant element. Instead, we must look to 
Lancelot. And how can we not? Unlike the poem’s “two” 
“knights” (61) and Camelot’s “four [. . .] towers” (15), that is, 
unlike other “objects” in the poem associated with medieval 
order and even numbers, Sir Lancelot is “One” (94) singular, 
irregular knight.
Sir Lancelot, though a knight, is described in a manner 
due a monarch. He is associated with the “sun” (163): he 
and/or his equipment is described as “flamed” (76) and 
“blazoned” (87). His equipment is also likened to “stars” (84), 
that is, to equally endowed objects in the night-sky. But he 
himself is imagined as a “meteor” (98), that is, to a singular 
object whose appearance in the night-sky cannot but 
command attention away from all else. The packed stresses of 
“broad clear brow” (100), “war-horse trode” (101), and “coal-
black curls” (104), complement the meteor simile by making 
him seem energized, deliberate—the opposite of easeful. 
Unlike all other subjects the Lady espies in her mirror, he 
alone is given sustained attention—the rest are given but one 
or two accompanying adjectives.  Sustained, too, is the 
sequence of “b” words used to describe him, such as “bow-
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shot” (73), “brazen” (76), and “blazoned” (87), which again 
emphasizes our understanding of him as bold, pronounced 
and dangerous.
The extensive description of Lancelot’s passage is 
followed by an equally extensive description of the Lady’s 
entrance into Camelot. And we note just how much the 
imagery involved in the Lady’s passage down the river 
counters that associated with Lancelot. He is associated with 
a sun which “blazed” (76), she with “pale yellow woods” 
(119). He is likened to a “meteor, trailing light” (98), she 
floats “down the river’s dim expanse” (127). His helmet is 
likened to a “flame” (94), her white clothing, to “snow” (136). 
In a sense, the Lady’s passage can be thought of as providing 
us with a “down” to his “up,” or with a “left” to his 
“right”—that is, with his natural complement. Lancelot and 
the Lady are made to seem similar opposites. Together, they 
are the harmony that comes when opposites unite.
The Lady’s entrance into Camelot spooks “All the 
knights at Camelot” (167), but Lancelot calms them down. 
No longer a man constituted by tightly packed energy, he 
instead seems easeful. This transformation is effected 
rhythmically, as he is no longer the man whose “war horse 
trode” (/ / /) but one who “mused a little space” (168) (/ ˘ / 
˘ /). We also note that “God” and “grace” (170)—both 
stressed words—are used to bookend the poem’s second to 
last line: The poem terminates as it began, with peace 
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Getting Noticed (June 2005)
In his poetry Matthew Arnold deals with abandonment in a 
way which struck me, at least, as un-Victorian. His speakers 
rage against the perpetrators; the fault is with them, not with 
the speakers. But Arnold settled on a different reaction to 
abandonment and isolation as he “matured”: re-union, a 
desired community, he decided, can be created, so long as the 
critic/poet remains resolutely faithful and good. But 
fascinatingly, other poets in the Victorian era suggest through 
their works that they think abandoning parents are drawn 
mostly to acts of misbehavior, not to notable instances of 
right-thinking, pure intentions, or good works. Specifically, 
we can look to works such as Robert Browning’s “Caliban 
Upon Setebos” and Edward Fitzgerald’s “Rubáiyát of Omar 
Khayyám,” for evidence that at least some notable Victorians 
understood that gods (and other parental figures) are most 
quick to attend to their flock when they spot them out in 
blatant acts of disobeyance.
Several of Matthew Arnold’s poems argue that 
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abandonment, a fracture of a wonderful community, is 
effected by willfully negligent, blameworthy others. In “The 
Forsaken Merman,” for example, a mother’s children desire 
nothing more than her return and the renewal of her 
attention. They are “wild with pain” (16), and try and 
convince themselves that “[s]urely she will come again!” (17). 
But the merman knows “[s]he will not come” (28), that she 
has decided not to—too much fun to be had indulging in 
surface “joy[s]” (95)! The children are in pain; the merman is 
both pained and angry. He deems his wife “cruel” for 
abandoning forever “[t]he kings of the sea” (144). Angry, too, 
is the speaker of Arnold’s poem, “To Marguerite—
Continued.” The speaker of this poem rages at “[a] God” (22) 
who seems to have isolated him out of cruelty: “Who ordered 
that their longing’s fire / Should be as soon as kindled, 
cooled?” (19-20). But upon maturing as an essayist Arnold no 
longer uses his craft to rage at others’ flaws; instead, he is an 
ascetic who admonishes himself to question his own worth 
and righteousness—that is, someone who must learn to 
“banish from his mind all feelings of contradiction, and 
irritation, and impatience” (“Preface to the first edition of 
poems” 1278). The Arnold whose speaker in “To 
Marguerite” castigated such a formidable figure as God for 
restricting the pleasure offered to man, became the man who 
in his “Preface to the first Edition of Poems” praised other 
reified personages—the ancients—for their “severe and 
scrupulous self-restraint” (1276). The Arnold who granted his 
speaker such authority in his declamation of God, who did 
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not make him (i.e., the speaker) seem inappropriately 
ungrateful or possessed of limited intellectual reach, became 
the pious essayist who reifies Elders as being the only ones 
qualified to see things in their entirety: according to Arnold, 
the ancients could “regard the whole,” while he and his 
generation could but “regard the parts” (1273).
Arnold writes that the critic who desires a community 
united in contemplation of great thoughts and deeds will “at 
last convince even the practical man of his sincerity” (“The 
Function of Criticism at the Present Time” 1300) through 
speaking Truth rather than falsehood. Because he ultimately 
chose to believe that a determined, resolute effort to bring 
people together would attract notice, he moves away from 
embracing the possibility raised in “Merman” that however 
much one “c[alls]” (15), however “dear” (14), however right 
one’s voice, one will never be heard.
I am surely not alone in thinking Arnold become an 
advocate for “right behavior” because it helped him 
understand his fate as in his control, and because it permitted 
him to drop the disturbing consideration of God (and 
existence) as intrinsically brutal. His first stance was the 
braver one, however, but he could not sustain the more 
difficult worldview. For the same reason, the Robert 
Browning who wrote “Caliban Upon Setebos” is to be 
preferred over the Browning who wrote “Rabbi Ben Ezra.” 
“Rabbi” seems very Victorian in the way Matthew Sweet 
argues contemporaries (that is, ourselves) prefer to imagine 
the age: that is, as “religiose” and “puritanical.” We find in 
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this poem a mind at work that would transform any 
misfortune, any reason for doubting whether one is cared for 
or lovingly attended to by God, as an opportunity to 
demonstrate one’s faith and good character. We sense in 
“Rabbi” a Browning similar to the Tennyson in “In 
Memoriam,” the poem The Longman Anthology of British 
Literature rightly judges as one where “the poet’s hard-won 
religious faith finally triumphs over science-induced despair” 
(1016). We sense someone who could not in the end handle 
either the consideration that God may not exist, or that he 
exists but may not in fact be beneficent, and so settled on an 
optimistic, edifying stance—that is, someone like Edmund 
Gosse’s father, whom Gosse described as one who “took one 
step in the service of truth, and then [. . .] drew back in an 
agony, and accepted the servitude of error” (Norton 1344).
But Browning was capable of engaging the latter 
possibility in his poetry. However, he does so through a 
speaker—Caliban—that ensures his point of view could 
subsequently readily be dismissed (by him, by others) as 
corrupt and wrong-minded. Walter Bagehot, in 
“Wordsworth, Tennyson, and Browning,” characterizes 
Caliban as an “incongruous” (1316) mind.  According to him, 
Caliban certainly is not someone who should be understood 
as espousing a point of view which is “in [Browning] [. . .] but 
not peculiar” (1310) to him, that is, a point of view universally 
shared by all men. The Norton Anthology of Literature essentially 
agrees with Bagehot’s assessment of Browning’s motives, 
arguing that Browning shows how “the mind of a primitive 
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creature may operate” (986), i.e., not how Browning’s mind at 
some level operated. Though it is disappointing to discover 
that, even today, many critics prefer to imagine Caliban as 
Browning’s example of a despicable manner in which to 
participate in and construe the world, in truth, Caliban 
expresses some of the same rage at a seemingly non-benign 
deity who cares little for his creations that the “proto-typical” 
Victorian Matthew Arnold expresses in his earlier poetry. 
Both Caliban and the speaker of “To Marguerite” look to 
God’s craftsmanship, to his created world, to establish His 
character. Caliban understands that Setebos could and would 
have made life better for his creatures had he not desired to 
fashion them so they were forced by their limitations to 
attend to and worship him: “This blinded beast / Loves 
whose places flesh-meat on his nose” (181-82). The speaker 
of “To Marguerite” also realizes that God could have made 
the world without the seas that forced the separation of man 
from man. In both poems “God” is portrayed as a malicious 
entity: he does not “exercise [his craft] [. . .] / [. . .] for the 
love of what is worked” (188).
But Caliban would at least appreciate Arnold’s concern 
to become more pious and ascetic as he aged. After all, while 
Caliban could only brave a harsh critique of his god while 
hidden “under holes” (267), Arnold did so through a speaker 
who would be taken by most to be Arnold himself. Caliban, 
too, when discussing what he would do if he were overheard, 
admits he would react by trying to “appease Him” (272) in 
some way. Though he imagines sacrificing parts of himself—
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or the entirety of others—to do so, a move toward pious 
reverence would certainly be something Caliban would 
consider. But he wouldn’t deem it a strategy which would 
necessarily appease His wrath, for Caliban knows God to 
despise most especially those who think they have him 
figured out: “Repeat what act has pleased. He may grow 
wroth” (224). According to Caliban, finding means to avoid 
or appease God is a difficult task. It is in fact life’s primary 
“sport: discover how or die!” (218).
There is a sense in “Caliban,” however, that being good 
is means to escape His wrath, for the poem ends with 
Setebos’ vengeance being visited upon him for airing 
disrespectful thoughts. However, we should note that if 
Caliban’s primary irritation with God was His lack of interest 
in him (and it might well be: we note that he is well aware of 
how Setebos “favours Prosper, who knows why?” [203]), 
unconsciously he might have hoped to be overheard so to 
obtain much desired attention. Like a deprived child comes to 
sense as he acts up as if spoiled, he may have come to know 
that being thought of in anger is to be preferred over not 
being thought of at all.
One wonders if some Victorian poets wrote in hopes of 
inviting upon themselves the wrath and disapproval of their 
society’s social censors. In Edward Fitzgerald’s “Rubáiyát of 
Omar Khayyám,” the speaker presents a creator who may not 
be malicious but who cannot be impressed by any one human 
soul. He proclaims that “[t]he Eternal Sáki from the Bowl has 
poured / Millions of Bubbles like us, and will pour” (184) 
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more. The personified world “heeds” “our Coming and 
Departure” / “As the Sea’s self should heed a pebble-cast” 
(187-88). He capitalizes “Coming” and “Departure” to 
convey our own preferred sense that our presence in the 
world mean something, that it should mean something, to He 
who begat it. But though Fitzgerald portrays God as 
insensitive to small disturbances, there is a sense in the poem, 
as there is in “Caliban,” that blaspheme can be counted upon to 
draw the attention and ire of gods. Caliban’s God (Setebos) is 
forever on the lookout for those who would either dare 
critique Him or “who seem too happy” (258). And just as a 
raven, an agent of Setebos, of God, appears immediately after 
Caliban registers his compliants, in “Rubáiyát” “[t]he little 
Moon looked in that all were seeking” (357) “while the 
Vessels one by one were speaking” (356). (Note: In reference 
to the moon, Fitzgerald writes: “‘[a]t the close of the Fasting 
Month, Ramazán . . . the first Glimpse of the new Moon . . . 
is looked for with the utmost Anxiety’” [Broadview Anthology of 
Victorian Poetry 155].) There is a sense in both poems, then, 
that the best means to attract notice is to be bad. We note 
that the speaker in “Rubáiyát” articulates his preference to be 
visited upon by God, under any circumstance, than to remain 
alone:
 
And this I know: whether the one True Light
Kindle to Love, or Wrath—consume me quite.
    One Flash of It within the Tavern caught




Fitzgerald attracted intense irate attention through 
making known his belief that we should praise, not fear, “the 
grape” (361)—the indulgent life—for we know that 
Browning composed “Rabbi Ben Ezra” in order to refute 
Fitzgerald’s speaker’s point of view. Perhaps, too, poets such 
as Dante Gabriel Rossetti unconsciously wrote their sensuous 
verse hoping to attract the attention of a parental censor. If 
the speaker of “Jenny” is meant to represent Rossetti, he 
certainly felt guilt-ridden and shameful, and anticipated a 
moment of ultimate “[j]udgement” (218). Maybe Rossetti 
wrote a poem in which he admits to sharing the prostitute’s 
sinfulness (“And must I mock you to the last, / Ashamed of 
my own shame” [383-84]), hoping he would be punished for 
not sufficiently “reck[ing] [God’s] [. . .] rod” (Gerard Manley 
Hopkins, “God’s Grandeur” 4). It might seem strange to 
suggest Rossetti wrote some of his verse actually hoping to 
provoke the sort of angry, mean-spirited attack he ended up 
receiving by critics like Robert Buchanan, but as Julia Saville 
argues in A Queer Chivalry, “literal flagellation in the 
nineteenth century earned the designation ‘the English vice’” 
(153). Punishment, according to Saville, brings pleasure to the 
masochist, because it draws out a “realization [of a desired] [. 
. .] union” (156)—that is, because it serves as clear evidence 
that one is desired by, still matters to, still very much needed 
parental figures.
Though the Victorian age is typically thought of as one 
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that had to come to terms with how God and the natural 
world were being pushed further and further apart, we note 
that a good many of its poets still preferred to imagine the 
world’s unpleasantness as being effected—whether for good 
or ill—by an intending Other (i.e., God). Because they 
insisted on believing He was still “out there,” however 
distant, to breach back into intimacy, they enabled their hope 
they might secure His attendance if they behaved in just the 
right way. Some, such as Arnold, followed the prescribed 
path for notable artisans, the one English poets as far back as 
Chaucer followed, in either trying to produce pious work later 
in their life or distancing themselves from work they did in 
their youth. Many others, however, decided the best way to 
catch His eye was to live a life that was sure to earn the 
intolerant Censor’s lash.  
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Critical Introduction (October 2005)
Sinclair Ross’s As for Me and My House is exciting to many 
who study Canadian literature. As we read criticism of the 
work, again and again we encounter critics who make use of 
their essays to announce their delight in knowing of at least 
one Canadian writer who wrote something which can 
unapologetically be called modernist. This is the broad 
significance of the work: apparently, its merits are so obvious 
that it announces, beams like a bat-signal to all interested that 
Canada did manage to produce a work of fiction between the 
two wars that not only is not an embarrassment, but which 
might well be a modernist masterpiece. Without it, it 
sometimes seems, critics of Canadian literature would have 
evident reason to study Victorian Canadian fiction—that is, 
fiction written by Canadians during the Victorian era (because 
nothing more could have been expected of them)—and of 
course our bounty of postmodern literature, but would not 
have much justification for studying literature “between the 
gaps” (which really could and should have been so much 
more.) By itself, that is, it seems to justify further explorations 
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into the literature written in Canada between the wars (for, 
for such a work to exist, presumably there must have been 
something very worthwhile about the Canadian milieu, as 
well, during this time period).
What makes it a modernist work? To begin with, since it 
hasn’t much been commented upon, its aristocratic tone. Our 
narrator, Mrs. Bentley, views much about her with disdain. 
She shares an attitude—a particularly modern, modernist 
attitude—that the unsophisticated plebs about her aren’t 
capable of understanding either her or her husband. Her 
disdain even makes it difficult to designate the book as 
regional literature, for it can be difficult to resist agreeing with 
her (indeed, some critics seem to be in love with her—e.g., 
Robert Kroetsch) that the particularities of those about her, 
of those who populate her immediate Horizon, aren’t much 
worth delineating or understanding at all.
The natural environment is worthy of her attention, 
however. And it is a ravaging environment, of the type so 
common in Canadian literature. But her descriptions of it tells 
us more about her than about her surroundings. And it is 
clear that Ross is mostly interested in her, in how she 
experiences the world, how she shapes the world about her to 
suit her needs—and it is also clear that she describes her 
surroundings to suit her purposes. The elements are more 
than brutal: they are, conveniently, primeval, fundamentally 
opposite the human community she so loathes. The elements 
seem at times her allies, but the house she lives in wars 
against her. She thinks it hates her as she hates it, and it does, 
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in a way—for those who built it, who previously inhabited it, 
would have been the type to despise her had they been privy 
to her innermost thoughts. Her descriptions of the house are, 
therefore, in a sophisticated way, quite realistic, however 
surreal. They register both her and Ross’s superior awareness 
of what it is like to be in an environment, contrived by people 
very unlike yourself.  
Numerous critics have noted that Me and My House 
challenges the straightforward conception of time as linear. 
They argue that the book, indeed, ostensibly like life itself, is 
essentially plotless, with each day the same as any other. I’m 
not sure about this myself, however. What I sense in the 
seeming sameness of the everyday goings-on, in the 
repetition, is Ross’s keen awareness of psychoanalysis—
particularly of masochism. The ending which disappoints 
many critics, that is, the happy ending that seems to them so 
false given all that preceded it, is in fact very appropriate if 
we, like Ross, understand just how the masochist’s mind 
works. The masochist does not believe that happiness is 
something he or she deserves. It can be made claim to—but 
only after much suffering. The novel shows us this process at 
work. Much suffering, much failing afflicts the Bentleys. This 
accumulation amounts to a kind of progression, however. That 
is, repetition, the losses the Bentley’s suffer—of their adopted 
son, of their dog, for instance—is not stasis. It is instead 
expansion, which the Bentley’s are well aware of, and which 
will at some point amass sufficiently to warrant their 
emerging from the Horizon wasteland. Eventually, after 
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enough suffering, the masochist feels he or she has earned 
respite.
Ross is very aware of psychoanalytic theory. The 
encounters between the Bentleys register his own awareness 
of the sadism and masochism in married life. My own interest 
is in object-relations psychoanalysis, and Ross also seems to 
have an intuitive appreciation of the sort of conclusions 
object-relations theorists have come to regarding human 
behavior. Mrs. Bentley registers throughout her entries her 
husband’s resistance to being held captive. He seems both 
attracted to and repelled by his wife. Object-relations theory 
suggests that we relate to our partners as we once related to 
our mothers. We desire to be close to them, but at the same 
time fear losing our sense of selves as separate individuals 
while in their proximity. Mrs. Bentley’s opinion, which some 
feminists might identify as Ross’s sexist assessment of 
women’s needs, that she needs for her husband to be 
stronger than she herself is, to be able to resist her, is also not 
a surprise to those familiar with object-relations theory, for 
this theory holds (at least according to one of its foremost 
theorists, Margaret Mahler) that women, more than men, 
have difficulties separating themselves from their (after all) 
same-sexed mothers, and in fact seek out strong men to assist 
them in this. Latched on to such men, they feel less likely to 
become overwhelmed by feelings of powerlessness, of being 
forever trapped within the maternal matrix.  In short, if we 
are being offered sexist fair in this modernist novel, it is at the 
very least reasonably updated and sophisticated—modern—
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A Good Place for a Pump and a Dump (December 2005)
The critic Norman Holland believes that a literary work is 
something we turn to in order satisfy “rather unsavory 
wish[es]” (104), without alarming our conscious ego or 
superego censors. We might expect such a viewpoint from a 
critic heavily influenced by psychoanalytic thought, and it is 
one I will use as the basis of my exploration of Bertram 
Brooker’s Think of the Earth. I contend that for certain readers 
this book can serve as a fueling site, a place where oral needs 
for attendance and love are satisfied, and also as a dumping 
site, a place where undesired aspects of oneself can, if only 
temporarily, be expunged from one’s system.
Freudians, who understand everyone’s psyche as 
similarly structured—id, ego, and superego—still of course 
accept that human beings are not then a homogenous lot. 
They would of course acknowledge that some texts better serve 
a particular reader’s therapeutic needs than others would. 
And who might best make use of Think of the Earth? The 
reader would have to be one who could readily imagine 
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himself akin to Tavistock, for in order to make best use of 
this book a reader must be able to use him as a proxy. So 
most certainly he will be male, and very likely, college 
educated—someone who possesses a liberal education 
and/or is familiar with at least some of the Great Books. This 
person will be in his twenties and thirties, that is, just beyond 
the age where excessive periods of pensive contemplation is 
only to be expected and maybe even appropriate, and who is 
(or at least feels that he is) beset by members of an older 
generation asking him what he’s going to do with his life. 
And, most importantly, this person (hereafter: “ideal reader”) 
will have a substantial need for self-validation.
If you can imagine oneself as Tavistock, you can for the 
duration of the book situate yourself amongst a provincial, 
primitive surround, possessed of admirable “sunsets” (81) but 
absent anyone who might draw or write about them at all 
well. So why on earth would you want that? The sad answer is 
because the ideal reader of this book is not only unsatisfied, 
he is insecure, and therefore couldn’t bear it if for the 
duration of the book Tavistock was placed amongst those 
equally gifted young men the Canon was once familiar with 
(during his College years). Situated in this particular setting, 
however, the ideal reader is well placed to easily imagine 
himself affecting people in the same way we are told the 
sudden sight of an unusual tree had upon those who had 
never see its like before: that is, as if hereto they had never 
before known anything “tall, [anything] [. . .] that soars, 
[anything] [. . .] mysterious” (80).
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These provincials not only contrast very nicely with 
Tavistock, they also recognize and appreciate his ostensible 
substantial depth and greatness, his real humanity. Gregory, 
the foreman, for instance, had many discussions with Webb 
concerning Tavistock, and came to conclude that though 
“[h]e’s high and mighty, [. . .] “there[’s] [. . .] [also] something 
gosh-awful human” (28) about him. Fetterly, the lawyer, we 
are told, “looked at Tavistock as though he suspected him of 
being out of his mind, but in the burning eyes there was a 
light of compassion so contagious that his manner 
immediately softened” (45). Gawthorpe, the editor of the 
Monitor, decides that “[t]here is a queer kind of magnetism 
about him [Tavistock], even in repose” (124), and eventually 
that “[h]e had never felt such sympathy for anybody in his 
life,” that “[h]e is a wonderful fellow,” that he’d never met 
such a fellow” (127).
Each one of these men should be counted amongst the 
town’s most respected citizens, and the text attends far more 
closely to their reactions to Tavistock than to anyone else’s. 
Indeed, the two most respected men in town, the Canon and 
Dr. Bundy—two men who cannot walk public streets without 
“[p]eople hush[ing] their chatter as they went by, ready to nod 
or speak if either of them should glance their way” (13)—
judge Tavistock a profound, deep-feeling, sensitive man. The 
Canon is also awed by Tavistock’s vitality. The doctor, 
thought by many to be Tavistock’s intellectual equal, does not 
react reverantly to him until the very end of the text, but he 
does do so. With all the textual attention to how people come 
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to respect Tavistock, the ideal reader cannot be one who 
really wants to detach himself from society. He might, like 
Goethe’s young Werther, slip further into his inner self, or 
link himself to celestial and/or literary patriarchal orders; but 
his greatest wish is to be brought down to earth and count 
himself amongst an earthly one. But he would want this only 
when the time is right, specifically, only when the text makes 
clear that most work is just busy acquisitiveness, and only 
after the notable elder townsmen consider him more 
someone to be respected than someone who hasn’t yet 
amounted to much.
We note that these men respect Tavistock, not simply 
owing to his intensity and profundity but because they sense 
in him a profoundly generous, selfless nature. They assess 
him as someone who is sensitive to other people’s pains, and 
who intends to do all he can to do away with as much of it as 
possible. Basic and base desires, held by most, have no hold 
on him: he is quite willing to divest himself of his family 
fortune if it might help Linklater’s grandchildren. He is the 
perfect person for the ideal reader to identify with, for the 
ideal reader, despite his immense need for attention, cannot 
admit to the enormity of this need, cannot admit to using the 
text to satisfy this need, without thereby arousing the 
disapproving attention of his super-ego—always alert, as it is, 
to press down with guilt the rising of any such deeply felt 
need to indulge. The text enables him to think of himself as 
selfless—as Tavistock—while all the while actually satisfying 
his need for worship-like interest and attention.
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Tavistock does, however, admit to feelings of egotism. He 
admits to himself that, concerning the great act he would do 
for humanity, he “had looked past the act to its 
consequences,” that he had enjoyed imagining himself “a man 
whose life and death would be looked back to by countless 
generations” (248). But this comes at the end of the text, that 
is, after his ability to attend to those in need has already been 
demonstrated and/or referred to, and just before the 
omniscient narrator informs the reader of how Tavistock had 
divested himself of all egotistical motivations. But he still 
admits to being needy. Would this admittance arouse the ideal 
reader’s punitive superego? Likely not. For even if Tavistock’s 
owning-up to selfish needs might draw the ideal reader to 
attend to and reflect upon his own neediness, upon how his 
own needs are being satisfied, quite possibly, at this point of 
the text, the reader feels absent any desire in need of a 
punitive hemming-in.
Tavistock’s ostensible goal is to wipe the world clean of 
its guilt; the text provides means for the ideal reader to be 
cleansed of any he felt loaded down with. It accomplishes this 
by providing him with another proxy, one he can use to 
dump all aspects of himself he would be rid of—Harry. Both 
Tavistock and Harry are likened to one another, which makes 
it easy for the reader to split off all his good qualities into 
Tavistock and all his bad into Harry. Both are charismatic. 
Both are familiar with the arts (a rarity in that part of the 
world). Both have “been places,” and are the subject of 
Laura’s keen interest. And both are in fact initially assessed in 
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the very same fashion—as high and mighty. But the key 
difference between them is that while Tavistock’s ostensible 
real depth and worth eventually becomes apparent to those 
who get to know him, those who get to know Harry come to 
think of him as a superficial jerk.
So though Tavistock contends there is no such thing as 
good and evil, the text actually encourages this binary: there is 
Good—Tavistock, absent of all id desires—and also Evil—
Harry, in possession of nothing else. The reader can identify 
with Tavistock and enjoy, with the disposal of their now 
pollutant-filled proxy, feeling delightfully absent of sin.
If the ideal reader is someone who wants to feel clean 
and virtuous, one should ask if Tavistock’s intention to 
murder someone (even if to effect greater good) means rather 
fewer of them exist to take advantage of the book than I’ve 
made seem the case. In my judgment, however, ideal readers 
might still not mind identifying with Tavistock, despite his 
murderous intent, for they would understand his desire to 
murder as a risky but still necessary means to address their 
proxy’s gentleness, which could readily be mistaken for 
insufficient manliness, for impotence. Tavistock conveys the 
ideal reader’s concern that he needs to do more with his life, 
that he needs to act more and think less. And, given that the 
reader must attend to others’ appraisals of their proxy as 
“nurse[-like]” (29) and “womanish” (30), given that he must 
endure having not just hapless Pitt but manly Ruff, the 
Russian revolutionary, think him too gentle to harm anyone, 
he is no doubt pleased that everyone who thought they knew 
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him, including Pitt and Ruff, come to believe him fully 
capable of murder.
But though the ideal reader wants to be thought of as a 
man, this isn’t to say he’s averse to being associated with 
strong women. Tavistock admits at one point that his 
purpose in life had been profoundly moved by his mother’s 
lineage, that “his long held idea belonged to the cold 
Maunders, after all” (208). And it is through drawing on his 
mother’s influence, upon her cold but potent strength, that he 
feels empowered to “confront Death and ‘stare him out’” 
(208), “to face the idea of murder—in cold blood” (255). To 
chill his blood to murder, he might be drawing on Clara’s 
strength as well—on her “cold vehemence,” which he admits 
“could chill his blood even now” (38). Since he admits there 
is “truth” behind Clara’s assertion that “a man who cannot 
kill is only half a man” (255), and that he was surprised by her 
preference of Pitt over himself, we know that Tavistock 
wants to be thought capable of murder so he can make claim 
to her full respect.
With their being portrayed as cold and powerful, as 
haunting, determining, and empowering Tavistock’s present 
purpose, Tavistock’s mother and Clara are described in such a 
similar manner we should take them as being the same thing, 
both mother-figures, this is, with Clara simply being a 
duplicate, a proxy, of his mother, manifested in his early 
adulthood. The needy ideal reader would be someone denied 
the love he needed from a mother incapable of well attending 
to him—the primary source of his long-lingering need for 
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attention. This mother wouldn’t have attended to his needs 
because she needed him to satisfy her own, and when he 
moved apart, he experienced his mother’s anger and 
dissatisfaction, i.e., “the cold vehemence” of her nature. He is 
drawn to obtain her respect and love, but also to associate 
himself with her strength, so he can see himself as capable of 
defending himself against her sadism, something not 
sufficiently well accomplished by running away or by 
associating himself with biblical, literary, or earthly 
patriarchies.
The ideal reader would have to be one, then, who 
though he seeks to establish himself amongst a patriarchal 
order, most certainly doesn’t mind keeping some links to a 
matriarchal one. He would also have to be one who could 
bear having a woman almost be responsible for the action his 
proxy believes will accomplish his great gift to mankind—that 
is, he would have to be one who doesn’t mind that the text 
plays with having Laura be the one who performs the miracle 
of committing murder while remaining sinless. The ideal 
reader would not be troubled by this, however, and in fact 
would be delighted by it. For, however briefly, Laura is 
likened to the reader’s (and Tavistock’s) cold mother, and 
Harry inflicts upon her the one action the ideal reader’s 
superego cannot see effected without also needing to see 
crushed: namely, he is allowed to rage at her for her lack of 
warmth—for her not adequately attending to his needs.
Laura is accused by Harry of being “grudging and cold” 
(199), a crime Harry intends to punish her for: “You will 
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listen to me. [ . . .] You’re out here and you’re gong to stay 
out here till you’ve heard what I’ve got to say” (199-200). 
And though Laura is elsewhere in the text described as gentle 
and attendant, we note that just before we learn of Harry 
accosting her, she, like Tavistock’s mother, like Clara, is also 
described as being able to control others through her 
coldness—specifically, through the coldness of her tone 
(198). Moreover, just pages afterwards, the text helps 
establish the link between Laura and Tavistock’s mother by 
having Tavistock dream of “his mother’s face—and 
Laura’s—[. . .] [being] queerly mixed in his dreams” (206).
Since we are told his “words rang again in her ears,” and 
that, though she managed to block out some of what he had 
to say, she couldn’t “banish” (200) the image of him from her 
mind, Harry gets to Laura—he rattles her. And then he dies—
no doubt to the delight of the ideal reader: for Harry 
expressed the rage the ideal reader has for his own 
unattending mother at this mother-substitute, and the 
expected punishment is met out to him, not to the reader. 
And perhaps, with his rage expressed, the ideal reader may 
share Tavistock’s ability to subsequently bring to mind all the 
vile qualities of another of the text’s mother-figures—Clara—
with tolerance and acceptance (250).
For some, then, Think of the Earth offers considerable 
satisfactions. But given that few are acquainted with thinking 
of literature as a place we visit to satisfy oral needs and 
sadistic desires, those who would prefer others read this now 
neglected Governor General Award-winning book would 
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probably be better served to direct potential readers to its 
other notable qualities. They might argue that it is to be 
admired for its modernist spirit, that through Tavistock’s vital 
soul-searching, through his search for a deeper, perhaps more 
mythic way of being, it amounts to a challenge to Canadian 
realism and mundane Canadian respectability. Yet even with 
its perhaps atypical endorsement of the rebellious modernist 
spirit, the text’s argument that you ought to think of others 
before you think of yourself is hardly foreign to the average 
Canadian. Foreign would be the argument I have been 
advancing, that the preference for modesty and selflessness 
always goes hand in hand with intentional neglect, with the 
designation of certain human beings as pollution-filled refuse 
to be dumped from sight. 
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Consolidating Gains (December 2005)
Jahan Ramazani, in Poetry of Mourning, argues that we have 
great need of elegies. “[We] need them because people die 
around us every day,” and we are powerless to do anything 
about this as “neither science nor technology can fix death, 
reverse loss, or cure bereavement” (ix). However, Ramazani 
may underestimate what we are capable of doing with 
technology, for we make use a certain kind of technology—
our narratives—to make us feel less susceptible to death. 
Indeed, we may ask even more of them—and for an opposite 
purpose. Particularly in his mother-son poems, Stanley 
Kunitz for instance uses poetry to consolidate himself to his 
life’s gains, making it for him foremost an instrument of 
acquisition, and perhaps never truly of defense or repair. 
Even true for his many elegies, that is, his poems are much 
more about the better claiming of still-available riches than 
they are about recovering from what’s been lost to him.
Especially when he was young, Kunitz feared his hold on 
life was not secure. In an interview with Leslie Kelen in 
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American Poetry Review, Kunitz says that as a young man he 
hoped to find a “language that saves,” which would help him 
from feeling vulnerable to “[t]he destruction of the self, the 
loss of identity, becoming nameless” (52). He feared losing 
his own autonomous identity, which had been hard-won, for 
life had shown him that it is very difficult to move beyond 
one’s roots. He refers to the terminating poem of Intellectual 
Things—a book he originally planned to title, Against 
Destruction (52)—and, after quoting select parts of it, says, 
“The young man whose voice I hear in that poem is telling 
me of his discontent and his determination to change his 
circumstances and himself. He knows that he must test his 
resolve in the crucible of experience. At the same time he 
realizes that he cannot escape from his sources: in his end is 
his beginning” (52). The beginning from which Kunitz 
emerged was a household ruled by an especially “dominant” 
(51), dominating mother—someone who had “lost [the] [. . .] 
capacity [to demonstrate affection] [. . .] through all the tragic 
circumstances of her life” (54). And if we attend both to what 
object-relations theory has to say about the lifelong effects of 
having had parents who were denied affection, and to his 
poems (note, not just to his “mother-son” poems), we have 
basis for concluding that many of them restage early 
experiences where attempts to detach himself from his 
mother lead to his becoming familiar with, and being strongly 
cowed by, the threat of annihilation.
Unlike conventional Freudian psychoanalysis, which 
holds that the boy fears his father will castrate him unless he 
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desists in his claim upon the mother, its branch, object-
relations, understands children as first coming to know the 
threat of bodily mutilation, of parental sadism, through 
experiences with their mothers, the primary object one relates 
with that. And unlike Freudian theory, where growth, 
emergence from the maternal fold, is something the child, 
though he does not desire it, finds easy to manage, as it is a 
path the father encourages for it being a detour away from his 
own claims, object-relations theory is more likely to posit that 
growth, separation from the mother, is often very difficult for 
the child to achieve. For as Lloyd DeMause explains,
 
[I]mmature mothers and fathers [,that is, mothers and 
fathers who themselves were not reacted to warmly, 
affectionately by their own parents] expect their child 
to give them the love they missed when they were 
children, and therefore experience the child’s 
independence as rejection. Mothers in particular have 
had extremely traumatic developmental histories 
throughout history; one cannot severely neglect and 
abuse little girls and expect them to magically turn 
into good mothers when they grow up. [. . .] The 
moment the infant needs something or turns away 
from her to explore the world, it triggers her own 
memories of maternal rejection. When the infant 
cries, the immature mother hears her mother, her 
father, her siblings, and her spouse screaming at her. 
She then “accuses the infant of being unaffectionate, 
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unrewarding and selfish . . . as not interested in me” 
[Brazelton and Cramer 11]. All growth and 
individuation by the child is therefore experienced as 
rejection. “When the mother cannot tolerate the 
child’s being a separate person with her own 
personality and needs, and demands instead that the 
child mirror her, separation becomes heavily tinged 
with basic terror for the child” [255]. (151) 
Kunitz rarely overtly wrote about his relationship with 
his mother until later on in life (his early family poems were 
father-son poems), until after she died. It would seem 
appropriate to consider them elegies, then, but the difficulty 
in doing so is that it is difficult to understand them as 
registering any mourning. Nor should they have, for Kunitz 
says that the death of his mother and sisters was empowering: 
“The disappearance of my family liberated me. It gave me a 
sense that I was the only survivor and if the experiences of 
my life [. . .] were to be told, it was within my power to do 
so” (qtd. in Keillor). And many of his mother-son poems 
portray their relationship so that her disappearance would be 
cause for jubilation, for they consistently show her as 
someone whose own tragic life experiences made her 
incapable of tolerating his own desire for independence and 
attendance.
Peter Sacks suggests that many elegies, through the 
“sacrifice or mimed death of the personification of nature,” 
function to “reverse [man’s] [. . .] passive relation to the 
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mother or matrix” (21). “My Mother’s Pears,” if it is an elegy 
to his mother, would have to be considered an unorthodox 
one then, for it is one in which the Mother and her matrix 
exert their dominance over Kunitz. It is one of many of 
Kunitz’ mother-son poems which begin with him enjoying 
some object, some activity, outside his mother’s influence. 
This poem begins with a gift being presented to him by 
“strangers” (The Collected Poems 13). And what a gift! He writes 
that a “nest” (7) of “[p]lump, green-gold Worcester’s pride” 
(1) pears were “deposit[ed] at my [i.e., his] door” (6; emphasis 
added). He prefers to believe the gifts were for him, that he 
was the intended recipient, not just of their pears but of the 
warm intent, the “kindness” (14), that moved the strangers to 
give them to him, but his mother intrudes to correct him in 
this.
Kunitz introduces her so that she seems either a natural 
complement to or a rival of the strangers. The tercet—
“Those stranger are my friends / whose kindness blesses the 
house / my mother built at the edge of town” (13-15)—in 
effect has the house (and Kunitz, since the blessings occurred 
at “my [i.e., his] door”) sandwiched between the two 
influences. They “bless,” the mother “builds”: these 
influences could work in tandem, except the poem makes the 
comparison simply to show how different they are from one 
another. “Build” is singular, no nonsense. It might suggest 
pride, but not play. The blessing strangers built an abode 
too—they put together the “crinkled nest” of pears—but the 
work involved seems pleasant. The pears were “hand-picked 
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and polished and packed” (5). We sense craftsmanship and 
communal effort; and with the alliteration, with similar but 
pleasantly variant (“tic, tac, toe”) words, we sense play. Even 
“transport[ing]” them might have been pleasant, for they 
were “transported through autumn skies” (2), at “harvest 
time” (12). Moreover, since the work was pleasant, and since, 
though “[a] smaller than usual crop / [,] [they] [. . .] still had 
enough to share with [him]” (11-12)—that is, since they 
didn’t deprive themselves in order to provision Kunitz, their 
gifts do not invite guilt or obligation. How different from his 
mother’s gifts, then, for they lead to household disrepair and 
personal destitution. We are told that she “marr[ied] again” 
(19), “for her children’s sake” (18), and that this would lead to 
a home where “windows would grow dark / and the velvet 
drapes [would] come down” (20-21). Since the poem has 
already associated the essence of an object with the state of 
mind involved in crafting and delivering it—proud pears are 
provided kindly—the foreclosed house is a metaphor for her 
own withdrawnness. The mother, then, is quickly established, 
not just as someone who would oppose their influence, but as 
the one clearly in need of their benefaction. Her “dark” home 
should have welcomed in the gift of “polished” “pears,” with 
their “bright lea[ves]” (9). The “velvet drapes [which] [came] 
[. . .] down” require the same sort of attendance as the pears 
received, which were carefully “picked and polished and 
packed.” And yet there was her son, pretending they were his 
rightful property—that they had come to “[his] door.”
He is made to seem an interloper. His interception is 
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made to seem a transgression worthy of punishment, and one 
is handed out. He is set to work—hard work. He finds 
himself “knee-deep in dirt / with a shovel in his hand” (24-
25). The gift-giving strangers have been banished from the 
poem. Further punishment?—quite possibly. For in the 
following tercet—and as if he is not now to be receiving 
visitors—the mother is overtly shown sending away those 
who “appear on the scene” (28) without their being there at 
her bequest. Of course, the “visitors are his “sisters” (28), not 
“strangers,” but the alliterative resemblance between the two 
sorts of visitors is marked, and so too the poem’s portrayal of 
them—especially in comparison to how the poem portrays 
the mother. The strangers were kind, the sisters, fun: “they 
skip out of our sight / in their matching middy blouses” (32-
33). We note the alliterative play here too, and it reminds us 
of how the pears were prepared. The mother, however, is a 
no-nonsense commander: though her “glasses [may] glint” 
(24), there is no play in the manner in which she is described. 
“Mother has wrapped a kerchief round her head” (26), and 
this commander “waves them [i.e., his sisters] back into the 
house” (30). She waves them away so that they can “fetch [. . 
.] pails of water” (31); but since we learn of the real cause for 
their dismissal only at the beginning of the next verse unit, 
the poem’s eleventh tercet—that is, given the severe 
indentation of each of this poem’s tercet’s terminating lines, a 
ways off—we are left to conclude that their unexpected 
entrance amounted to a considerable offense.
The poem ends with alliteration, but not with alliterative 
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play. There is nothing fun about the lines, “‘Make room / for 
the roots!’ my mother cries, / ‘Dig the hole deeper’” (37-39), 
when we know Kunitz is already “knee-deep in dirt.” She is 
directing him to plant a tree on her property—a pear tree. No 
further need for strangers’ pears: henceforth he will be eating 
his mother’s pears. He is participating in his being further 
constrained within the “orbit created by his mother’s 
gravitational power” (Orr 9): he is here, digging his own 
grave. And it is significant that the poem terminates with him 
associated more with roots than with pears—pears, after all, 
are expected to fall from pear trees—for since this tree is 
associated with the mother, the poem ends with him being 
linked to the tree’s sustenance, not its extensions. The poem 
finishes with him being likened to her, with him mirroring her. 
The terminating tercet, which begins with “It is taller than I” 
(37), is followed by these two commands of his mother’s, 
where as well the same consonants are used to begin and end 
each of them.
Kunitz finds himself rooted in the earth at the end of 
“My Mother’s Pears,” and his freedom to move as he pleases 
is also lost to him by the end of another mother-son poem, 
“The Testing Tree.” In this poem he is actually shown 
enjoying two things in particular—his mobility (freedom) and 
his precious “perfect stones” (7). His enjoyment of the 
former is the subject of the poem’s first section. As in “My 
Mother’s Pears,” alliteration is used to convey the pleasure 
and play of action: 
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then sprinted lickety- 
split on my magic Keds 
from a crouching start,
scarcely touching the ground
with my flying skin
as I poured it on (10-15)
The capital “k” “Keds” stand out in these lines—an 
object enables, helps generate his speedy flight. He slows to a 
“walk” (55), but not owing to the difficulties a different 
object—a “bend,” which would end his fun by “loop[ing] 
[him] [. . .] home” (25)—presents him with, but because he is 
preparing to participate in a great game which requires he stay 
calm and in control. So he “walked, deliberate / on to the 
clearing / with the stones in [his] [. . .] pocket” (55-57). And 
there we are told: 
In the haze of afternoon,
While the air flowed saffron,
I played me game for keeps—
for love, for poetry,
and for eternal life—
after the trials of summer. (73-78)
Pairs pale in comparison; it is indeed difficult to imagine 
a greater bounty. And so it is no surprise that to assist him in 
winning it, he asks for help—that he asks his father to “bless 
[his] [. . .] good right arm” (72). We don’t know if his father 
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obliged, but we do know that, just like after he received 
kindness from strangers in “My Mother’s Pears,” once again 
his mother intrudes.
He has been avoiding home. He has sought out and 
found environments where there was “no one no where to 
deny” his play (19-20). And so, in apparent response, his 
mother, his “home,” come to him—and do far worse than just 
tame him. The previous three sections attended to his will 
and prowess, the fourth attends to and features his mother’s:
In my recurring dream
my mother stands
 in her bridal gown
under the burning lilac
with Bernard Shaw and Bertie
Russell kissing her hands (79-84)
This sentence is made to seem a response to the one 
which terminated the third section, which also began with “In 
my.” The details in these two particular tercets respond to the 
details in the previous section—his mother’s will loops back 
around his own: she checks, opposes her son. While he 
“stood in the shadow” (61) [. . .] “of the inexhaustible oak” 
(63), she “stands” “under the burning lilac.” He desires love, 
poetry, and eternal life, and she makes claim to all three. He 
desires poetry; she is associated with the burning lilac—fiery 
desire and flowered poesy are hers already. He seeks eternal 
life; she, with her “owl’s face” (86), who “makes barking 
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noises” (87), already seems a grotesque of ancient myth and 
Jung. He wanted love; she has Shaw and Russell kissing her 
hands, kissing from out of her hands. That is, though she 
stands in her “bridal gown,” two men other than her husband 
attend to her. And owing to her son already having claim her 
husband’s attention, we are left to wonder if his [Kunitz’] 
action is responsible for her being attended to by these wrong 
men.
That is, in this mother-son poem as well, we are lead to 
associate the narrative turn of what had hitherto been a poem 
about play and enjoyment, not just with his mother’s 
appearance, but with his own ostensibly blameworthy 
behavior: there may be reason for guilt, reason for him to 
sabotage his errant run. We note that we are no longer drawn 
to attend to legs—the action has moved on to arms and 
hands. “Good right arm” becomes “kissing her hands” 
becomes “[h]her minatory finger points” (88). While the shift 
from walking to running conveyed his increasing vitality, 
appropriately, the microscoping arm images foretell its 
constriction. Her command may well have tamed Shaw and 
Russell into making a supplicant’s gesture; and faced with the 
power implicit in this threatening gesture, he no longer wills 
his way through the landscape but rather at her bequest. He 
passes under a “cardboard doorway” (89): the great oak, we 
note, is replaced by what has been built from the wreckage of 
trees. He is directed to a well, to a hole—a hole, which, as it is 
filling up with dirt, seems grave-like. He obliges his sudden 
feeling that it is “necessary to go / through dark and deeper 
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dark” (166-67), but unlike before when he had “kept his 
appointment” (60), he is not now rewarded for doing so. 
Instead, he finds himself far away from his testing-tree, and 
without his stones. He hasn’t lost them; they were taken 
away—or at least that is what his cry, “Give me back my 
stones!” (111), suggests is what he thinks occurred. There is 
protest in this line, and, according to Sacks, one of the elegy’s 
traditional conventions is to voice protest (though usually 
through “the form of a question” [22]) as it helps the 
mourner transform “grief” and/or “rage” into something 
purposeful. But according to Sacks the protest normally arises 
from having lost one’s first and primary object of desire—
one’s close association with one’s mother—not from just 
having lost the consolation prize, the object we were to 
transfer our love to and were supposed to get to keep. 
Conventional elegies, that is, are supposed to be “places” 
which enable a “substitutive turn” (5) away from the mother.
The narrative does not establish beyond doubt that his 
mother took the stones, but since she is the only threatening 
and commanding figure in the poem, she seems not just the 
likely but the only possible culprit. She is unmistakably the one 
responsible for eliminating the ostensible consolation prize in 
another mother-son poem, “The Portrait,” however. Like the 
visiting strangers, like the testing tree and the precious stones, 
it is again something not readily associated with the maternal 
environment. But while in “My Mother’s Pears” the object 
was brought to his door, but while in “The Testing Tree” he 
sought and found the object away from his door, in this 
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poem he has the effrontery to bring the object—the portrait 
of his father—straight to her! In protest. Just after describing 
how his mother had “locked his [i.e., his father’s] name / in 
her deepest cabinet / and would not let him out, / though I 
could hear him thumping” (7-10), we learn that he “came 
down from the attic / with the pastel portrait in [his] [. . .] 
hand” (11-12). She would not let him out, but Kunitz, by 
delineating many of the portrait’s details—never an innocent 
activity in his mother-son poems, for it always means his 
greater involvement with an object—sets him free. He would 
free the person she had enslaved, and by so doing 
demonstrate his intention and capacity to be free from her 
control. And in response, she demonstrates her power over 
him. As in many of his mother-son poems, the contest 
between the pair is staged through the use of their hands, and 
as is the case in other poems [even, debatably, in “The Magic 
Curtain], the contest is won by the more dominant power—
by the mother, who rips up the object he covets, and then 
“slap[s] [him] [. . .] [so] hard” (18) he never forgets the blow.
Though I am assuming he intends to document his own 
life experiences in these poems, I am reluctant to accept that 
Kunitz manages to convey them without significant 
distortion. For these poems do not, in my judgment, portray 
the sort of struggle that would inspire recurring fears of 
annihilation. Indeed, there is in each of these poems nearly as 
strong a sense of his ability to make claim to his “name”—
i.e., his own independent identity apart from his mother—as 
there is his difficulty in doing so. He describes his 
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relationship with his mother as “a battle of wills,” that “there 
were two strong wills in that household, hers and mine” 
(Busa 68), and even though the mother is portrayed as the 
victor, as possessing the superior authority, she is not the 
only one in these poems possessed of strong will. In “My 
Mother’s Pears,” the mother feels the need to make two 
commands to feel sure of her hold on him. With his hand on 
his shovel, with his declaration, “I summon up all my 
strength” (34), we sense his early manhood: she has him, but 
is already losing her hold on him. He is worthy of being 
contended with, unlike his sisters, who are girls, who are 
children, and who are appropriately readily waved away. In 
“The Testing Tree,” though he loses “the prize of mastery” 
(16), we don’t doubt he felt himself near to be “the world’s 
fastest human” (21)—that he knew from his movement from 
boyhood to adolescence what it was to feel an exhilarating 
sudden acquisition of previously unknown power. We might 
suspect, too, given our sense of him in the poem as 
efficacious, that in real life he probably hit the tree more 
often than not (in his interview with Christopher Busa, he 
says that he “almost never missed” [78]). And as I have 
suggested, in “The Portrait,” the slap across his face 
acknowledges his willful desire to contend with her, as well as 
their mutual awareness that gestures alone were no longer 
sufficient to keep him in line.
Perhaps he experienced his mother as these poems 
suggest he did, that is, as a castrating Father. Perhaps he first 
experienced her intention to thwart his will at the age he 
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portrays it as having occurred in his poems, in his late 
childhood—way past when Freudians argue the castration 
complex occurs, but not at any event in infancy. But Kunitz 
never got over feeling vulnerable to annihilation, and since 
traumas that can be recalled in significant verisimilitude don’t 
“demand” constant re-engagement, for “they [haven’t been] [. 
. .] split off [and therefore] need not be repeated” (DeMause 
203), we have reason to wonder if Kunitz is in denial 
concerning the greater truth regarding his struggles with his 
mother. He indeed says “there was a good deal of denial that 
was associated with my childhood” (Kelen 54). And arguably, 
since he admits he is “closer to women and animals than [he 
is] [. . .] to any other category of living creature[,] [that he] [. . 
.] was brought up in a household of women, and that “[t]here 
wasn’t a male presence around and it seem to run through a 
whole life pattern,” yet it is only in his “later poems [that] 
powerful, combative women suddenly appear” (54), he may 
be very reticent to portray, or may actually be incapable of 
portraying, just how vulnerable he felt when his mother’s will 
first pressed down  on his own.
If he first experienced intense feelings of maternal 
resentment—the equivalent of the slap—when he was still an 
infant, then it could have been the source of lifelong feelings 
of annihilation, for it would not then have been readily 
accessible to the conscious mind to deal with, and would be 
too overwhelming to overtly grapple with in any case. And 
though perhaps never in his overtly mother-son poems, he 
may yet have manifested—however innocently—in some of 
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his other poems what it felt like to receive that slap at an age 
when her disapproval, her anger, would have felt absolutely 
life-threatening. “Robin Redbreast,” for example, features 
something small and vulnerable about to be devoured by 
something vastly larger and more powerful—a god-like entity. 
It could have been plotted as “The Testing Tree” was. That 
is, before seeing it decimated we could have been made 
witness to its glory. Indeed, in other animal poems titled to 
suggest they tell of the greatness of the animal being attended 
to, such as “The Wellfleet Whale,” this is how they are 
plotted. That is, unlike other poems in which a defeat of 
some kind occurs, we never are provided a sense of the 
protagonist when he ruled “his element” (23); we encounter 
here only the scenario “since Eden went wrong” (6). In “My 
Mother’s Pears” and in “The Testing Tree,” he gets dirtied, 
but the subject of this poem—the robin—is introduced to us 
not just dirtied but defeated: “It was the dingiest bird / you 
ever saw” (1-2). In “The Testing Tree” he “stood in the 
shadow” in the “saffron” “air” (72) and asked his father to 
“bless [his] […] right arm”; in this poem the bird “stand[s] in 
the rain, / friendless and stiff and cold” (4-5). In “The 
Testing Tree” he (may have) needed assistance only because 
his self-assurance had him aim so high; this drained, 
“luck[less]” (22) bird requires assistance or he will simply 
suffer then die.
Given how the robin is depicted, the title seems absurd. 
We are expecting greatness and see no sign of it until we 
encounter the vital “blue” (32) sky—the sky, that is, that 
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would devour the pathetic little, “color[less]” (2) bird. That is, 
if the poem was to be about something great the proper 
subject of this particular poem, we are encouraged to think, 
should have been the sky. There is no battle of wills in this 
poem, for the bird is “wit[less]” (31)—the sky shines through 
its skull with its vital blue radiance. There is a sense that this 
pathetic bird made claim to something he did not possess 
sufficient resources to protect: as Kunitz portrayed himself in 
“My Mother’s Pears,” the robin here is made to seem a guilt-
worthy interloper. And this is how a child would feel as he 
began to make claim to independence in face of his primary 
caretaker’s resistance. This is what it would feel like to be 
vulnerable to becoming nameless, to being demolished in a 
battle of wills. This is what it would feel like if at heart those 
magic Keds you wore, those boyhood pretensions to 
greatness, were really more evidence of your ongoing 
uncertainty than they were your joyful sense of yourself as a 
budding young adult.
Of course, this poem need not be understood as staging 
a contest between a parental power and a child. And even if 
one sees it this way, one could see it as a conflict between 
father and son. Gregory Orr, for instance—even though he 
argues that Kunitz’ poetry amounts to a quest for identity, 
and that “the motive and priority [of this quest] must be 
sought in the mother-son relationship,” and that “[i]n order 
to locate the quest for identity at one of its origins, we must 
comprehend the situation of a boy who is left fundamentally 
alone with a powerful mother,” and that “the mother is 
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consistently seen [in Kunitz’ poetry] as powerfully destructive 
of or inhibiting the son’s quest for autonomy” (9)—insists 
that the sky is a “cosmic force of male violence” (198; 
emphasis added), that the poem concerns Kunitz and his 
father. In my judgment, however, the sky’s personality—its 
“cold[ness],” its “unappeasable[ness]” (33)—should have us 
more thinking of Kunitz’ mother than of the father he never 
knew, for she was the one who “was unable to demonstrate 
affection” (Kelen 54), she was the one whose coldness to him 
he admits sourly affected him throughout his life. And if we 
look at how powerful women are portrayed in his poems, we 
note that so often they are often devouring and unappeasable. 
(In “The Daughters of the Horseleech,” for example, we 
encounter “[t]he daughters of the horseleech crying ‘Give? 
Give?’ / Implore the young men for the blood of martyrs” 
[1-2]; in “Careless Love” we hear of how “[t]his 
nymphomaniac enjoys / Inexhausibly is boys” [15-16]; and in 
“Cleopatra” we understand that Cleopatra will soon “ravish [a 
young man with] [. . .] her beauty” [5].) But since even a critic 
who understands Kunitz’ mother as the powerfully destructive 
force in Kunitz’ life, could yet still deem the destructive force 
in this poem as the Father, Kunitz may have been able to 
make use of this poem to convey what it felt like to be 
vulnerable and powerless to maternal predations without 
thereby necessitating an engagement with something he 
hadn’t yet the resources to deal with.
If he felt the need to manifest in his poems what it felt 
like to be vulnerable to annihilation, he might have made use 
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of “In the Dark House” for this purpose as well. In “In the 
Dark House,” Orpheus awaits a “frenzied mob” (59) of 
women whose thirst for vengeance would not be satiated 
“except by [his] blood” (60). It is a terrifying poem—it ends 
with “trampling on the stairs” (62). The protagonist seems as 
vulnerable as the robin in “Robin Redbreast” is; but while in 
“Robin Redbreast” the reason for his forthcoming 
evisceration is subtly suggested to be his audacious claim on 
greatness—to possess a brilliant red breast which rivals in 
striking color the vital blue sky—in this poem it is not so 
much his physical vulnerability which undermines him as it is 
his own belief that he deserves punishment. We are asked, 
“How could he deny that frenzied mob, / not be assuaged 
except by blood, / when his own heart cried worse?” (59-62).  
And just as in so many of the overt mother-son poems, 
associating with forbidden objects invites punishment, here, 
making claim to Eurydice becomes cause for his eradication 
by predatory female beasts.
One might argue that it is inappropriate to identify 
Kunitz with Orpheus in this poem. After all, it begins with an 
epitaph that quotes Primo Levi—someone who, in that he 
felt pursued by terrors until “the end,” Kunitz imagined to 
have suffered Orpheus’ fate. But even if Kunitz saw Orpheus 
as Levi it does not preclude us from judging that he still 
largely had his own mother in mind when he wrote it. We 
imagine the maternal differently, but Peter Sacks believes that 
the Orpheus and Eurydice myth cannot but be used by the 
poet to document the effect his own parents had on his life, 
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of his early experiences and encounters with them. (Sacks in 
fact argues that Milton’s “Lycidas”—the poem that ostensibly 
determined the subsequent nature of all elegiac 
conventions—is a poem which is “not only affected by the 
loss of his mother but also designed for the eyes of his 
father” [106].) And we note that unlike the traditional pastoral 
elegy, unlike “Lycidas,” the person elegized is not in the end 
conjoined to an empowered, eternal, masculine order. That is, 
the poem lacks the traditional elegy’s “consoling apotheosis” 
(Zeiger 8). Yet it may have been consoling for Kunitz 
specifically because it lacks such an apotheosis. That is, if the poem 
was largely about his own concerns, about what being 
devoured by female terrors felt like, but managed to make 
Orpheus seem not the least his proxy but rather instead a part 
Orpheus-part Levi compound, then it may have helped him 
feel less susceptible to such a fate himself—for through 
sacrifice comes (some) appeasement.
Using one’s ability to craft poetry/narratives to stage 
sacrifices sounds morbid and sick, but in his note to “The 
Gladiators,” Kunitz shows he knows the connection between 
sacrifice and obtaining respite. He writes that the actual 
scandal he narrates in this poem, where another weak subject, 
the “monk [,] [. . .] [who] is running onto the field, / [who] [. . 
.] is waving his scrawny arms / to interrupt the games” 20-
24), is eradicated by a “mob [who would] tear him to bits” 
(25), “lead to the proscription of man-to-man combats” 
(Kunitz, The Collected Poems 270). Kunitz may in fact have 
delighted in exposing his subjects to annihilation. He admits 
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as much in an interview with Bosa. In reference to “King of 
the River” he says, “[i]t may be pertinent that I experienced a 
curious elation while confronting the unpleasant reality of 
being mortal, the inexorable process of my own decay. 
Perhaps I had managed to ‘distance’ my fate—the salmon 
was doing my dying for me” (70).
Though Orr acknowledges that in some poems Kunitz 
“interpose[es] [others] [. . .] between the destructiveness 
implicit in the son-powerful mother dilemma” (209)—a way 
of making the unfortunate interposer seem a sacrificial 
lamb—he believes Kunitz was hoping to demonstrate his 
superiority to her. He points to “The Magic Curtain” and 
argues that here “forgiveness” is shown to “triumph” over his 
mother’s “never forgiving,” which thereby “affirms his 
identity as distinct from his mother’s” (11). But if in “The 
Magic Curtain” he indeed triumphs over her, the victory is 
squeezed in at the end: it is mostly yet another mother-son 
poem in which so much of promise ends up being lost to him 
(in this case his love, Frieda, and all objects associated with 
her). At least in interviews, Kunitz never acknowledges that 
his mother intended him harm. In response to Kelen’s 
conclusion/query, “I believe it took you half your life to 
begin to forgive your mother for what she withheld from you 
when you were growing up,” Kunitz replied that, “She loved 
me, and encouraged me in every way. But she was unable to 
demonstrate affection. She had lost that capacity through all 
the tragic circumstances of her life” (54). Here he sees her as 
a source of encouragement, not discouragement. 
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Furthermore, we notice that he deflects the blame elsewhere, 
onto whomever or whatever traumatized her. And so often in 
interviews and in his poetry, Kunitz establishes his father as 
the primary source of her distress.
Since in so many of his mother-son poems his growth is 
associated with blameworthiness, it is possible that he used 
his poetry to help persuade himself that someone else was 
really the blameworthy one. He may been trying to find an 
ideal sacrificial victim—that is, someone he could imagine as 
the true target of his mother’s disapproval, of her anger, for 
attending to needs other than her own. I’ve argued that “The 
Portrait” dramatizes Kunitz’s own desire for autonomy, and 
that the slap manifests her intention to keep him rooted to 
her, but this poem could readily be interpreted as one where 
neither the mother nor the son are truly the ones at fault. The 
blameworthy person is instead surely the one who left her 
without help, who left him without a father—his father. 
Admittedly, the poem plays at making her seem an ogre—the 
first line, especially, suggests that her unwillingness to forgive 
makes her nearly monstrous—but it quickly attends to all 
sorts of particulars that make her husband (and his father) 
seem errant and irresponsible. “[K]illing himself,” we note, 
makes suicide seem primarily an act of self-attendance, not of 
self-disregard—it makes it seem selfish. He killed himself 
away from home, away from her in a “public park” (4). His 
action is made to seem scandalous; lude, even. And it is worth 
noting that at least in one interview, when Kunitz discusses 
his father’s suicide he suggests that it couldn’t just have been 
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his subsequence absence which tormented his mother. He 
says “there must have been another woman, too, or mother 
wouldn’t have made the subject taboo” (Rodman 19). The 
poem therefore makes his father seem the bad boy, and he is 
the one who suffers the horrifying fate Kunitz (in real life) 
feared he himself was susceptible to. He becomes nameless; 
the father is the one who has “his name” [locked] / in her 
deepest cabinet” (7-8). We soon learn that the name is a 
synecdoche for the father himself: his father becomes subject 
to a fate Kunitz himself suffers in most of his mother-son 
poems, in finding himself trapped, encased in a “deep” (8) 
space.
But he doesn’t always make use of his father as he did 
the robin and Orpheus. He isn’t always or even often 
represented as a hapless victim. For in several poems his 
father is someone who could not easily be entrapped, is 
someone who possesses a marked capacity to attract, endure, 
and resist Kunitz’ mother’s hostile attention. For example, in 
“The Unquiet Ones,” as Orr argues: “he is able to give equal 
weight to the mother and to the father” (285). Before they 
“slip through narrow crevices / [. . .] / glide in [his] [. . .] cave 
of phantoms” (16-18), he has the two of them focused on 
one another. They are both “dissatisfied,” for “in death as in 
life / remote from each other, / having no conversation / 
except in the common ground / of their son’s mind” (9-15). 
They fuse at the end into one “two-faced god” (21), but 
throughout our sense of them is of two separate entities, 
linked because they are “my [i.e., his] parents” (2) and 
DRAINING THE AMAZON’S SWAMP
419
because they cannot disengage from their personal feud. 
Lines such as “Father and mother lie” (3) and “in death as in 
life”—that is, lines in the poem that possess two subjects, 
two nouns, intractably connected to but spaced apart from 
one another—help establish his mother and father as both 
forever attached to and forever apart from one another. The 
poem may have helped Kunitz convince himself that his 
father played as important a role in his life as his mother did. 
His father was never there, but if he could convince himself 
his mother’s mind was always on him it would seem 
appropriate to allot them equal weight in his poems—it 
would seem appropriate to assume that when she was angry 
at him (i.e., Kunitz), she probably more had his father in 
mind. Though he fashioned many father-son poems in his 
youth, they probably didn’t serve to make him feel less 
deserving of and therefore less vulnerable to annihilation. 
Moreover, they probably betray his own vulnerability and 
neediness (Kunitz clearly knew as much, for in poems such as 
“Three Floors” and “Halley’s Comet,” his father appears in 
the poem after his mother has either checked up on him to 
make sure he “was sleeping” [“Three Floors” 4] or after she 
had “scolded” [“Halley’s Comet” 24] him.). “The Portrait” is 
a masterful contrivance whose creation likely had to wait until 
he felt capable of fully manifesting his angry mother in his 
poetry—the likely reason his mother, someone whom he 
admits was the primary influence on his life, only emerges in 
his poetry later in his life.
Kunitz found means to use his poems to feel less 
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vulnerable to annihilation other than through the staging of 
sacrifices. He found a way to “narrate” his own life, his own 
self, so that he felt entitled and became empowered to better 
maintain his gains. Exaggerating his physical prowess could 
backfire, for it would draw attention to his real weakness as 
well as invite upon him—as we saw in “Robin Redbreast” 
and “The Testing Tree”—angry vengeance. His poetry 
suggests that what actually works to make gains seem less 
susceptible to loss is for him to conceive of himself as having 
witnessed and endured more of life’s pains that its gains—to 
imagine himself, that is, a perpetual mourner.
The robin in “Robin Redbreast” is incapacitated, but we 
know that moments before being shot down all he knew was 
glory: arrogant pride and ebullient joy bring about vengeful 
decimation. But there is no arrogance evident in “I Dreamed 
That I was Old,” a fantasy involving his elegizing his lost 
youth. He imagines himself as an old man, as someone who is 
“in stale declension” (1) and has lost his “cat-nimbleness” (3). 
He clearly isn’t enjoying the like of ripe fruit and sporting 
games here. Nor is he indulging in the aroma of “flower[ing] 
saffron—in fact, it is easy to read “stale stench” into “stale 
declension” (1). Rather than receiving visitors, he remembers 
“when company / [w]as mine” (2-3). For Kunitz, those two 
words—“was mine”—are, however, words of power. He 
sounds convinced that the gifts aging brings pail in 
comparison to those stubborn youthfulness provided him 
with, but he is not to be believed, for, as I have shown, youth 
and pleasure so often invite disaster and entrapment in his 
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poems while crippling old age actually enables successful 
evasion, as well as a surer hold on his name.
In “Passing Through,” to be aged means that in response 
to someone he identifies as “the first, / [. . .] to bully [him]” 
(15-16), he could confidently say that “[w]hatever you choose 
to claim / of me is always yours; / nothing is truly mine / 
except my name. I only / borrowed this dust” (29-33). It 
means that despite “hav[ing] no documentary proof / that 
[you] [. . .] exist” (14-15), you know for certain you possess a 
name, and not to be all concerned if another tries to cage, 
claim, or capture it—there is no protest registered in these 
lines, for he is unlikely to lose hold of it. That is, the wisdom 
he thought he’d possess as an old man in “I Dreamed That I 
Was Old,” he possesses in this poem, and it makes him seem 
more self-composed but less accessible. Thus: “Sometimes, 
you say, I wear / an abstracted look that drives you / up the 
wall, as though it signified / distress or disaffection” (18-20).
Since in Kunitz’ poetry being young means not just being 
playful but a potential victim, we understand how 
empowering it must be for him to arrive at a point in his life 
where he might believe himself “too old to be / anybody’s 
child” (“The Quarrel” 13-14). Being too old to be anybody’s 
child also means being old enough to be someone else’s 
parent. It means to be in a position where one finally might 
possess the same power a child grew up believing his parents 
possessed—the god-like power to create and destroy. If 
Kunitz imagined the aged, wizened speaker of “The Tutored 
Child” as himself, he portrays himself so he seems akin to his 
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parents in “The Unquiet Ones,” and even to the god-like sky 
in “Robin Redbreast.” Just as in “The Unquiet Ones,” his 
mother and father “slip through narrow crevices” (16) “into” 
(18) Kunitz’ mind, and just as in “Robin Redbreast,” the 
“cold flash of the blue / unappeasable sky” (32-33) shone 
through the hole of the robin’s “tunneled out [. . .] wits” (31), 
here he (or at least, the speaker) “[c]limbs through the narrow 
transom of [the child’s] [. . .] will” (15).  In that it features an 
entity—the untutored child—who is “unlucky” (9), who is 
shown to suffer from the “touch” of others—“Mortals will 
touch you and your taste be spoiled” (12)—who is 
“vulnerable” (16), it is a poem reminiscent of “Robin 
Redbreast.” But here he actually is empowered to do 
something about wounds (which in this poem he caused), for 
he has nothing here to fear. No one looms over him in 
disapproval; instead, he arches over the child, with the final 
couplet describing his sympathetic attendance to the wounds 
and pains delineated in the preceding four quatrains. That is, 
while in “Robin Redbreast” his apostrophe “Poor thing! Poor 
foolish life!” (19) only briefly draws attention to him before 
we attend to the much stronger dramatic power—the sky—in 
“The Untutored Child” his [speaker’s] verse “My poor poor 
child whose terrors never cease” (69) terminates the poem 
and helps establish him as the poem’s true “star,” with no 
reprisals.
His final gesture in “The Tutored Child” is akin to the 
one he makes in “My Sisters.” Kunitz said that the death of 
his parents and sisters was empowering, and in this poem 
DRAINING THE AMAZON’S SWAMP
423
(“My Sister”) we see the sort of pleasure the death of loved 
ones provides him with. Though he consoles his sisters, in 
that it shows there are still things he can do which can 
positively affect the deceased the poem performs the 
consoling function elegies are supposed to perform for the 
mourner. But it isn’t clear that his actions should be 
understood as kindly motivated. That is, even though the 
poem does convey his sisters’ love for Kunitz, as well as his 
own for them, like so many of his mother-son poems it stages 
a contest between family members. Just as attending to hand 
gestures is important to appreciating the full drama staged in 
many of his mother-son poems, attending to body-
positioning is crucial to properly understanding the contest 
being staged here. At first his sisters—however benignly—
loomed over him: “they bend over [him] [. . .] / to comfort 
[his [. . .] night fears” (13-14). With their death, he imagines 
himself over them. His action reverses and mirrors their own: 
very likely we imagine him bending over them while he tends 
to them. He does as much with his dead parents in “The 
Unquiet Ones” as well. Though in that poem he doesn’t 
console their fears (though, we note, he is not afraid of them: 
he is quite willing to identify them as “unwelcome guests” 
[19]), he does imagine them as, in part, confined to “cribs” 
(4): at least at the beginning of the poem, he infantilizes them, 
places them so he can imagine himself standing over them, as 
being appropriately placed to, if he should choose, haunt or 
terrorize them.
But if in these poems he contests the dead, they yet 
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remain elegiac, for in classical elegies the mourner must 
actually “wrest his inheritance from the dead” (Sacks 37). 
Given that he was raised in a household of women, making 
use of an elegy for some tit for tat also keeps it within the 
elegiac tradition, for elegies work to “reverse [one’s] [. . .] 
passive relation to the mother or matrix, perhaps even 
avenging himself against her and his situation” (Sacks 37).
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Quitting Home (January 2006)
If we were to assemble a canon of Canadian texts based on 
their ability to help Canadians live better lives, we would do 
well to include Sinclair Ross’ As For Me and My House as one 
of its core texts. The text is not simply “prairie lit”; it actually 
speaks to the concerns of most contemporary Canadians. The 
text’s narrator, Mrs. Bentley, often expresses in her journal 
her fear that she lives in a threatening environment, yet she 
ultimately portrays her environment as more secure than 
insecure. It is in fact inspiring—the various pressing threats 
are manipulated so they actually empower her. And for the 
reader, the reading experience would not be anywhere near as 
claustrophobic and uncomfortable as we might assume it to 
be, given her frequent complaints of Horizon’s horrors. The 
text in fact often feels spacious, roomy, and offers the reader 
pleasing variety, and ultimately serves as a place to settle in 
awhile while we learn to make our re-engagement with the 
real world more purposeful and legitimate.
After 9-11, even literary critics have been left considering 
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whether we might now more exist within a concurrent, 
traumatic world than we do a postmodern one. But even 
before 9-11 made the world seem so threatening, Canadians 
well knew what it was to feel threatened by their 
surroundings, for if psychohistorians such as Lloyd DeMause 
are correct, throughout history most people have not received 
sufficient support from their caretakers—specifically, from 
their mothers—to be empowered to feel otherwise. He 
believes most people are prone to imagine the world as a 
threatening place, for most of us learn early on that to be 
apart from our mothers, to belong to a world outside of her 
near environment, means feeling abandoned and alone. The 
reason separation comes to seem so threatening owes to most 
of us not having mothers themselves loved and cared for 
enough to be accepting when we turn away from them and 
focus mostly on our own concerns. Instead, our departure is 
experienced as us abandoning them—as a deliberate, 
neglectful act, that is—and they retaliate in kind: they 
withdraw their love and support, to our psychic devastation. 
The result, as Joseph Rheingold explains, is a perpetual fear 
of death:
Basically, it is generally agreed, separation means 
separation from the mother. It may hold no 
connotation of punishment, but its more significant 
meaning is desertion by the mother. Although in 
infancy the mere absence of the mother is a threat to 
survival, separation becomes associated with purpose, 
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that is, with abandonment. Death is equated with 
willful withdrawal of the mother. Separation anxiety 
seems to be universal and is a major source of death 
anxiety throughout life. (17)
As a psychoanalyst Rheingold devotes himself to 
assisting patients feel less overcome with death anxiety. He 
believes his profession empowers him to help, for “[t]here is 
no more powerful corrective force than the ‘good-mother’ 
protectiveness of the therapist” (227). But perhaps even if not 
as good, texts—that is, alternative worlds, traumatized, 
abandoned readers might immerse themselves in—also 
function as a powerful corrective force, by provisioning 
readers with some of the security they need to live healthy, 
non-cloistered, lives.
Psychologists and literary theorists are developing an 
increasing respect for the importance of texts as therapeutic 
aids, with most discussion now not on whether or not they may 
ease suffering but on which sorts of texts are most helpful 
(Vickroy 12). Though the study of reader immersion has “not 
been particularly popular with the ‘textual’ brands of literary 
theory” (15) as “it conflicts with [their] [. . .] concept of 
language” (92), reader-response literary theorists and 
cognitive psychologists who study readers’ involvement in 
texts generally agree that reading involves the reader in 
“creating” a world that “stretch[es] in space, exist[s] in time” 
(Gerrig 15). The cognitive psychologist Richard Gerrig argues 
that the text actually “serve[s] as [a] habitat” (15) for the 
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reader, that readers are “placed” within it as “side-participants 
or overhearers” (119). He does not believe that 
“transportation into a narrative world is dependent on 
narrative skills” (95), but surely not all texts draw readers in 
equally. We know that realist texts were once accused of 
evoking emotional responses to an unprecedented degree, 
and it may be that modernist texts, though sometimes 
imagined as implacable, as deliberately designed to actually 
refuse the reader (even if only to drive some select few of them 
to pursue on to greater depths), are potentially even more 
involving than realist fiction is. According to Norman Cantor, 
“the burden of the modernist novel [is actually the] [. . .] 
existential discovery of a deeper, mythic, more human self” 
(53); it “does contain a story, which may be by turns elaborate 
and minimal, but it serves only as a vehicle for the 
exploration of sensibility on the part of the author, which 
helps the reader to discover him—or herself” (53). If Cantor 
is correct that texts which explore an author’s sensibility can 
lead the reader to profound personal discoveries, then As For 
Me and My House, which is all about the exploration of the 
psychic/emotional life of Mrs. Bentley as she explores her 
new habitat, Horizon, might be an especially immersive text 
for the reader to inhabit. However, if readers are likely to 
share Mrs. Bentley’s “process of locating and displacing 
herself” (Kroetsch 217) in Horizon, if they are thereby drawn 
to vicariously experience her own emotional response to her 
environment, how, if they are indeed insecure, could they 




It’s an immense night out there, wheeling and windy. 
The lights on the street and in the houses are helpless 
against the black wetness, little unilluminating glints 
that might be painted on it. The town seems huddled 
together, cowering on a high, tiny perch, afraid to 
move lest it topple into the wind. Close to the 
parsonage is the church, black even against the 
darkness, towering ominously up through the night 
and merging with it. There’s a soft steady swish of 
rain on the roof, and a gurgle of eavestroughs running 
over. Above, in the high cold night, the wind goes 
swinging past, indifferent, liplessly mournful. It 
frightens me, makes me feel lost, dropped on this 
little perch of town and abandoned. I wish Philip 
would waken. (8)
We should note that insecure readers (i.e., those who 
experienced feelings of maternal abandonment) would be 
especially affected by this description, as they would be the 
ones to lend themselves most to it. As Bessel Van der Kolk 
writes: “Many traumatized people expose themselves, 
seemingly compulsively, to situations reminiscent of the 
original trauma.” (389). But if this passage merely satisfied a 
reader’s repetition compulsion, little good would come of it, 
for though “Freud thought that the aim of repetition was to 
gain mastery, [. . .] clinical experience has shown that this 
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rarely happens” (Van der Kolk 389). But though it begins and 
consistently throughout arouses readers’ fears and anxieties, 
As For Me and My House ultimately does more assuage than 
pointlessly recall and revisit them.
The nighttime environment has readers share Mrs. 
Bentley’s harrowing vulnerability, but there are those about 
whose company can help them feel at ease. Readers might in 
fact be looking to find sanctuary within a maternal 
environment, for as Rheingold argues, fears of abandonment 
“motivate the wish to return to the uterus” (18), to the 
empowered mother, and they find someone aptly suited to 
safeguard them in Mrs. Finley. They encounter her 
immediately after hearing of Mrs. Bentley’s fearful nighttime 
experience, and it is doubtful whether she could have been 
made to seem more its perfect counter. The night could make 
the houses “helpless,” but it is hard to imagine it doing 
likewise with Mrs. Finley, for she is “austere” (8) and forceful. 
The night sky could make the town cower, to be “afraid to 
move lest it topple into the wind.” Hardly fearful, she is 
instead the town’s “leader,” with a “crusading steel in her eye 
[which] [. . .] warns she brooks no halfway measures” (8), and 
with a “hand that never falters” (9). The night sky blankets 
the “little” town, but since she “manag[es] the town [, ] [. . .] 
[and] mak[es] it over in her own image” (8), she too keeps the 
town under wraps.
More than someone who is “self-important” (185), as the 
scholar Frank Davey understands her, she is important to the 
town: there is no indication that she is anything less than its 
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leading matriarch. “[S]elf-assumed” (8), but alone as its head, 
nevertheless. But she may indeed overall strike us as less 
someone who is distinct and particular than as someone who 
is simply another member of the matronly mass that rules 
Horizon. Mrs. Bentley tells us that “Mrs. Finley and her kind 
are the proverbial stone walls against which unimportant 
heads like [hers] are knocked in vain” (17), making her seem 
fated to be as casually managed by them as their husbands 
already are—to become like Mrs. Finley’s “meek little man” 
(9) of a husband, who exists with a “cage drawn over him” 
(9), or like Mrs Lawson’s, whose life is akin to that of “a 
plodding Clyde” “managed [by] [. . .] a yelping little terrier” 
(27). That is, though she is made to seem someone who 
would safeguard Mrs. Bentley (and the insecure reader), she is 
also someone who could command from her her own self-
command and individuated status; an affliction those who out 
of fear seek refuge with the maternal can only expect 
(Rheingold 17).
Because Mrs. Finley is made to seem part of a matronly 
mass which not only rules but define the town’s space, she 
also threatens upon the reader their envelopment. That is, 
though Robert Kroetsch’s argument that to be “in” Horizon 
is to be within a “feminine” “space” (“The Fear of Women in 
Prairie Fiction” 114) has proven influential, readers 
nevertheless more experience Horizon as maternal and 
matronly than as feminine. Most of the women in the novel, 
we note, are described as portly—we are to think of them 
quite literally as a surround. This would be something we 
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would notice in any case, but the text begins so that we are 
cued to take in Mrs. Wenderby’s “portl[iness]” (5). For just 
before being told of her rotundity, we were told she came by 
to “size [the Bentley’s] [. . .] up and see how much [they] [. . .] 
own” (5): no doubt, that is, we reciprocate, and size her up as 
well. We are subsequently told of how “[t]he town seeme[d] 
huddled together,” which has us thinking of its structures as 
bodily conjoined. And emerging from the huddle is the 
town’s most distinctive and important structure—the church, 
a structure described to seem a maternal, birthing, womb-like 
structure. Though Helen Buss believes that the church, which 
is “black even against the darkness, towering ominously up 
through the night and merging with it,” is clearly a patriarchal 
structure (196), for insecure readers whose defining 
experience of abandonment is associated with the maternal, 
the fact that it merges with the abandoning nighttime 
environment works against it being thought of in this way. 
And while it is true that linear height is at times associated 
with masculinity in the text—his looming height probably 
helps make Mr. Bentley seem resolute and manly, for 
instance—at this point in the text masculinity is more clearly 
associated with squareness than with linearity—we 
understand, for example, that though linear Main Street is 
presided over by “Main Street hostess[es]” (9), no such claim 
is made upon Mr. Bentley’s “stalwart, four-square, Christian 
sermon” (7).
Triangles, however—which suggest the birthing body, 
with its emphasis on lower girth—are initially made to seem 
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maternal, and the next substantive description of the church 
has it likened to a vast triangular structure—one which births. 
That is, when she describes her own home for us in her third 
journal entry, Mrs. Bentley describes its relation to the church 
so that the church seems akin to a birthing mother. She says, 
“It’s a small, squat, grayish house, and pushed up against the 
big, glum, grayish church it looks so diminutive that [she’s] [. . 
.] reminded of the mountain that did all the fussing and gave 
birth to a mouse” (18-19). The church has already been made 
to seem as if possessed of matrons for innards, for when the 
church congregation is described we hear only of the 
“women in their humdrum forties” (14), and when the 
church choir is described, we learn that it too is composed of 
“matrons, middle aged and on” (15). The delineation of 
another triangular, wide-hipped “entity” follows immediately 
afterwards in the text. We meet Mrs. Ellington, and learn that 
she is a “large, Norwegian woman, in shape and structure 
rather like a snowman made of three balls piled on top of one 
another” (19), and that “[h]er broad red face is buttoned 
down like a cushion in the middle with a nose so small that in 
profile it’s invisible” (19). Her nose is to her face as Mrs. 
Bentley’s house is to the church: both are tiny or near 
invisible in comparison to the more relevant structure. In 
addition, we are also told that Mrs. Ellington’s home houses 
“boarders and chickens” (19). Hens seem more maternal than 
chickens, but since we are told their eggs are brought over to 
the Bentleys for dinner, they are made to seem maternal 
enough.
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The environment As For Me and My House affords the 
reader, then, faces them with the drawbacks of seeking an 
escape to a maternal fold out of fear of an abandoning world; 
and, indeed, Mrs. Bentley repeatedly complains of how living 
in Horizon means to live in a domineering and smothering 
environment. Her journal in fact begins with evidence that 
the Bentleys do become like the matrons’ husbands in their 
doing as directed. We find Mr. Bentley hard at work “putting 
up stovepipes and opening crates” (5). He is poor at this sort 
of work, but he does it because the matrons expect him to be 
the one who “get[s] up on the roof and put[s] a few new 
shingles on” (8). Mrs. Finley is not to be fiddled with; the 
Bentleys “defer” (10) to her, and accept that survival will 
mean adapting themselves so they serve the matrons’ needs 
rather more than their own: “I’m afraid it [i.e., Mrs. Finley’s 
crusading intent to shape all ‘in her own image’] may mean 
some changes for Philip and me too” (8). It means that they 
will have to show they have the needs of the community 
foremost in mind, exactly the position children are placed in 
in regards to their immature mothers. And we note how in 
Mrs. Finley’s presence Mrs. Bentley can become girl-like: 
Finley “sent [her] [. . .] fiddling with [her] [. . .] apron like a 
little girl” (8). If they act the way they want, Horizon will 
notice and disapprove. So since Mrs. Bentley knows that Mrs. 
Finley and her kind would disapprove if she associated too 
closely with Judith, even though she would really like to 
become more familiar with her she concludes that she “will 
have to be friends with Judith warily” (8). And in the same 
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passage, she also hurries her journey home, out of a fear that 
Horizon will be reminding [them] [. . .] of [their] [. . .] 
extravagance” (17) should they see “two lamps burning” late 
at night.
But if readers feel inadequate, if they feel insecure, if they 
feel unattended to, alone, abandoned, they will enjoy knowing 
that the person they are most likely to identity and associate 
with—Mrs. Bentley—is fussed over as much as she in fact is 
in the text. For equally evident in the text as the matrons’ 
command over her is, is the great interest they take in her. She 
clearly matters to them. We are told that Mrs. Bentley is in 
fact understood mostly as a valued commodity, for associating 
with the minister’s wife means elevating one’s status in the 
town (58). Respect for her high value is apparent right from 
the start: we are told that Mrs. Finley “must have spent hours 
preparing for [them] [. . .], cleaning her house, polishing her 
cut glass and silver” (9). Of course, the attendance Horizon 
provides is frequently made to seem mean-spirited and 
hostile, however subtly worked in, but Mrs. Bentley herself 
admits that a hostile environment is to be preferred to an 
indifferent one—and the reader might well share her 
preference. In regards to a different environment—the 
wilderness—she says, “The stillness and solitude—we think a 
force or presence into it—even a hostile presence, deliberate, 
aligned against us—for we dare not admit an indifferent 
wilderness, where we have no meaning at all” (131). And we 
note a hostile environment actually has its use, for it can 
enable the expression of what might otherwise remain kept-in 
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rage. Rheingold argues that those who’ve experienced 
maternal neglect are usually loath to express their anger at 
their mothers, that “child[ren] fear the consequences of not 
loving the mother or of bearing her animosity” (200). “The 
child is enjoined to show love for the mother, and failure to 
do so carries a threat, for the child must protect the mother’s 
defenses against her perception, and the perception by others, 
of her lack of motherly feeling or her hostile impulses. One 
must love his mother, or perish, or at least suffer guilt” (201). 
So it is indirect—Mrs. Bentley never vents her anger at 
mothers, specifically—but the reader does often experience 
her fearlessly and forcefully expressing her anger at what the 
reader has been primed to consider actually mostly a maternal 
environment—Horizon. They experience, for instance, her 
desire for the wind to “work its will” (57) and destroy the 
town, for “[her] [. . .] fingers itch to smudge it out” (92), for 
her husband’s “fingers on the town’s throat, smiling exactly 
the same way” (95), and for her piano playing to be 
“charge[d’]” “to the town’s complete annihilation” (18).
Though not as gruesomely nor as violently, she does still 
yet express her irritation and disdain for the town’s matrons 
as well; and when she does, she seems much more the risible 
adolescent fed up with limits than she does the small child 
defaulted to fiddling with her clothes. And in these instances 
she most definitely evidences her need that “adults will help 
keep [her] [. . .] anger, greed, frustration, and other negative 
emotions in check” (224), a need the child psychiatrist Stanley 
Greenspan argues we all needed to have satisfied when we 
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were young, but may have missed out on. If readers missed 
out on such attendance they might enjoy both vicariously 
participating in her expression of rage and in sharing her 
having her more truant behavior kept in check. At times Mrs. 
Bentley describes her truancy so we sense her desire to be 
caught out and reprimanded for it. One description in 
particular could not make her more seem an adolescent 
concerned to provoke a reigning-in from parents—
specifically, when she describes how she allowed “grizzled, 
dirty-looking men” (103) to give her a ride back home. We 
note she could have had them drop her off before she 
reached town, but preferred to see if she could sneak into 
“Main Street unobserved” (103). Of course, she ends up 
finding herself “tongue[-tied]” and “helpless” (103) before 
the matrons. She pretends to have hoped to have avoided 
such a fate, but nowhere else does she more seem the 
unreliable narrator than here: that is, since throughout the 
text she describes how Horizon’s eyes are forever watching 
her, it is difficult for us to believe she didn’t expect to have 
her mischief noticed, even punished.
Smothering, too, is something Mrs. Bentley must endure. 
Over and over again we hear of how her surroundings press 
down upon her. We note that when she wants to convey her 
claustrophobia, she does so by writing tightly packed 
sentences—ones with clumped adjective or noun clusters. 
Her house was originally described to us as “a small, squat, 
grayish house [. . .] pushed up against the big, glum, grayish 
church”: the adjective clusters help convey the smothering 
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proximity of the structures. This description occurs in her 
third journal entry, an entry that makes clear why her house is 
so depressing, why it provides little privacy from onlookers, 
and this entry, in particular, is filled with these clusters. We 
hear of “insistent little bright pink roses that stare at you like 
eyes” (17), of a smell which is “not just a bad, aggressive 
smell, just a passive, clinging one,” of “faded old carpets, 
trying the hard, leather easy chairs with broken springs” (18), 
and of heat that is “dense, rigid” (110), “dense, sickly” 
(114), and “dense, clotted” (150).  And it is no wonder she 
wants to flee the “hot, dry, dusty little cupboard of a house” 
(93), for when words are “jam[med] [. . .] up so close” (56) 
together we feel how her living in it means being pinched 
within a “vice” (21).
But contrary to the opinion of literary critics such as 
David Stouck who believe that Mrs. Bentley’s “narration” is 
“claustrophobic” (103), most readers likely overall experience 
her journal as more spacious than tight. Helen Buss 
understands Mrs. Bentley’s “abandon[ment] […] of the 
structured, practiced world of the pianist for the ‘longer, 
looser mode’ of the diarist” (193), as an effective means for 
her to feel less constrained. But we should note that the diary 
is composed of many Augustan sentences, and that they too 
assist the text in feeling less cramped, for they make 
sentences feel girded. She writes that her and her husband’s 
“muscles and lungs seem[ed] pitted to keep the walls from 
caving in” (97). The key words in this sentence—“muscles,” 
“lungs,” pitted,” “keep,” “walls”—are evenly spaced apart, 
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and may indeed be experienced by readers as if they are 
support columns within the textual world that keep it from 
caving in. In the same passage she declares that “[t]he wind 
and the sawing eaves and the rattle of windows have made 
the house a cell” (97): yet again she spaces the pressing 
subjects so that the sentence feels more a sturdily constructed 
and roomy house than a tight cell. Often, however, her diary 
is written as if she experiences her everyday world casually, 
non-chalantly. We get, for instance, “We had eggs and bread 
and butter and tea, and a spoonful of honey for Steve” (7), 
and “[m]y peas and radishes are coming through. I spent a 
long time up and down the rows this morning, clearing away 
the dust that was drifted over them; and at intervals, so that I 
wouldn’t attract too much attention” (89), and “Philip needs 
shoes and a hat. His Sunday suit is going at the cuffs again, 
and it’s shiny at the seat and knees” (53). This is pedestrian 
subject matter presented to us in a routine, everyday fashion.
Rather than rushed and packed, then, many of the 
sentences are lengthy and unhurried. Both sorts of sentences 
may however combine with all the repeated sorts of imagery 
to make the text feel of pleasing variency: it may make the 
overall read a satisfying window-shopping experience akin to 
the sort of experience Mrs. Bentley might have enjoyed at 
Christmas had it not reminded her of her poverty (194). We 
encounter a pleasing variety of different mythic pantheons 
(Greek, Christian, Nordic, Gothic), for example. Soil, earth, 
and metal imagery are put to various and interesting use as 
well. I have already suggested that shapes affect our 
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phenomenological appreciation of the text, and so too 
colors—indeed, she showcases them, makes them seem clue-
laden. We likely sense that something of Judith’s oddness has 
to do with her “queer white skin” (211), that something 
important lies behind Mr. Bentley’s decision (in regards to the 
choice of color for Steve’s coat) to “cast his vote for blue” 
(53), that Paul’s “bright red spotted handerchief” is surely 
what lends him his “histrionic dash” (53), that El Greco’s 
“green and shin[y]” (169) eyes are what make him seem wolf-
like, and that Mrs. Holly’s “green, freshly-laundered dress, 
and [. . .] green ribbon” (35) is what makes Mrs. Bentley green 
with envy—“with clothes like that I might be just as 
attractive” (35).
As Buss notes, there is a terrific play with imagery as 
Mrs. Bentley experiments here and there with the potential 
the “words of her diary offer her” (198) to counter 
oppression and liberate herself. She believes that Mrs. 
Bentley, “given [. . .] only the narrow private world in which 
to exercise her creativity, uses what she has, in the way a male 
artist might use the larger world at his disposal, as material for 
the realization of the self” (198). But if those psychologists 
who argue that children of immature mothers end up 
inhibiting their participation in the world for fear of evoking 
memories of maternal disapproval are correct, readers need 
not be hemmed-in women to enjoy Mrs. Bentley’s use of 
whatever handy to enfranchise herself.  But before delineating 
how she subverts imagery to do so, it is worth noting that as 
the journal writer, as the tale-teller, she is in a position to 
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empower herself over her readers—and certain sections in 
particular do read as if she crafted them with an awareness of 
her position over them foremost in mind.
Though I maintain that the text is less tight and dense 
than some critics assume readers experience it, she still does 
at times get the reader to tighten up. She will intentionally 
switch from evenly spaced to tighter phrasing for this 
purpose. For instance, she follows telling us how “[t]he sun 
through the dust looks big and red and close” (96), by 
informing us that it is “[b]igger, redder, closer every day” (96): 
she helps ensure that we too are more likely to experience “a 
doomed feeling, [to fear] that there is no escape” (96). Like 
Percy Shelley, she at times co-opts the will of the wind to 
make us experience how it’s affecting her, especially when she 
tells us that: 
Sometimes it sinks a little, as if spent and out of 
breadth, then comes high, shrill and importunate 
again. Sometimes it’s blustering and rough, sometimes 
silent and sustained. Sometimes it’s wind, sometimes 
frightened hands that shake the doors and windows. 
(52)
We, too, are encouraged to consider the wind “nerve-
wracking” (52), but it was the delineation of the wind’s 
characteristics, her power over us as journal writer, which 
ultimately rattled our nerves. But though I think she at times 
writes with readers in mind, and though I think she exploits 
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her power as narrator to not just delineate truths but to 
discomfort those who’ve let themselves to be susceptible to 
her, I agree with Buss that Mrs. Bentley is mostly concerned 
to use words to empower herself against oppressors.
Early on in the text, Mrs. Finley is associated with 
crusaders. We note that just after she finally contrives means 
to rebuff the town’s matrons, Mrs. Bentley makes use of 
swordsman imagery to portray how she feels and behaves. Of 
course, she often describes herself as “steeling” herself 
against her environment (her husband, in particular, is 
frequently described as having steel or leaden eyes—ones, we 
note, that can “clear a room” [116]), but it is really when she 
likens herself to a swordsman who parries blows that she 
effectively co-opts this imagery to make herself equal to the 
town’s matriarch, to all the town’s oppressive “weaponry.” 
After successfully using scripture to legitimize her claim to 
Steve, she writes, “I parried them, cool and patient” (81). Her 
successful rebuff leads to her feeling protected, to her now 
feeling as if she possesses a “false front” (81)—a structure 
associated with Horizon’s smothering drabness but also with 
its resilience and persistence. She had need of it, for the 
matrons’ disapproval was leading to her feel compressed, 
with her own house, hardly her ally. Though she had tried to 
get it to “respond to her” (34), to help ward against a 
disproving outside environment, she wrote that “[t]here’s 
something lurking in the shadows, something that doesn’t 
approve of me, that won’t let me straighten my shoulders. 
Even the familiar old furniture is aloof. I didn’t know before 
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it was so dull and ugly. It has taken sides against me with the 
house” (34). But exhilarated by the front she herself has 
created, she can now block out unwelcome attention. She 
writes, “And none of them knows. They spy and carp and 
preen themselves, but none of them knows. They can only 
read our shingle, all its letters freshened up this afternoon, As 
For me and My House—The House of Bentley—We Will Serve the 
Lord (81).”
The perpetrating “outside” also has difficulties with her 
husband’s office space. That is, though she actually finds a 
way to imagine her home as an ally, she consistently describes 
her husband’s study as being “always loyal to him” (85). It 
rebuffs all intruders, and it may in fact be described as a 
“stronghold” (85) so that Mrs. Bentley can better see it as an 
effective counter to the stone walls she knew she would 
repeatedly knock her head against in vain. Both he and his 
office space possess power akin to that held by the wilderness 
hills. In reference to the hills, she says, “We climb them, but 
they withstand us, remain as serene and unrevealed as ever. [. 
. . ] We shrink from our insignificance” (131). And in 
reference to her husband and to his study, she says:
 
I like Philip’s study, but I’m seldom in it. Not even 
when he’s out, except to clean and dust. It’s reserved 
somehow, distant, just like him. It’s always loyal to 
him. It sees and knows him for what he really is, but 
it won’t let slip a word. This study and the others 
before it—they’re all the same. You don’t obtrude. 
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You don’t take liberties. It’s like being a child in the 
presence of grown-ups who have troubles that can’t 
be explained to you. The books understand, but you 
don’t. (61)
It may be that Mr. Bentley’s association with the hills 
helps counter his association with the mountainous maternal 
church, an enclosure which, though it first promised escape, 
proved only to circumscribe his life.
He is made to seem a potential rival to the town’s leading 
matriarch, for, just after delineating Mrs. Finley’s ability to 
manage the town, Mrs. Bentley informs us that her husband 
“has a way of building in his own image, too” (9). But we 
note that after having had first establishing him as an upstart, 
Mrs. Bentley now tells us of how weary he has become. At 
times, she needs for him to be weary, needs to think of him as 
weary, out of deference to a superior need many readers 
might also share—security. She needs to know that if she 
leaves a dispiriting but familiar life that she is fully prepared 
for what may lie ahead. Those who flee the town too hastily, 
we note, are humbled, even decimated. Judith, we are told, 
when she suddenly left her family to seek work abroad, 
couldn’t manage her way in the world, and El Greco dies, 
after suddenly following upon his instinct to make for the 
wilderness. That is, when she writes that “with a man like 
Philip, you don’t predict the future from the past” (15), she 
expresses her fears as well as her hopes for the man. She 
needs to imagine him as strong and unpredictable as “an 
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existential hero” (Moss 141) so that he seems suited to lead 
her away from a dispiriting life, but also fears his strength and 
erratic nature because it could leave her once again alone and 
fearful. But Mrs. Bentley proves not just an empowered 
writer but a clever and effective manager.  She doesn’t 
adversarially manage her husband about like a trained terrier 
would a plough horse, but she still prevents him from 
expressing his hatred at a moment which would have lead to 
their pre-mature eviction from town. And if insecure readers 
want to feel at ease while reading the text, they would be 
pleased with her here, for they too would not want to risk (at 
some level) re-experiencing abandonment. So though Mrs. 
Bentley blames herself for doing so, she did the right thing: 
she needed time to better prepare herself so that departure 
from her familiar life seems more righteous and (therefore) 
less threatening—that is, as not just as something she needed 
or wanted for her own benefit.
Though near the end of the text Mrs. Bentley writes of 
how she is not “progressing” (196), this is actually opposite 
the case. We know that she makes this claim while she is 
accumulating sufficient funds to provision a new life for 
herself; and she may in fact be using her journal to 
progressively work toward believing she deserves to make use 
of her accumulating funds to accomplish what she really 
wants in life. Her journal, we note, is replete with delineations 
of just how impoverished she is. She lives a drab and 
disappointing life: we hear, for instance, of her drab house, 
her drab dress, and her (ostensibly) drab (same ol’ same ol’) 
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everyday experiences. Just as often she makes clear how most 
others live nowhere near as drably as she does. Every once in 
awhile she expresses her belief that she deserves more, but 
she says it with more conviction as her journal progresses, 
particularly after another key plot development—her 
husband’s affair with Judith. This is quite the betrayal, and 
does enormous harm, for she had earlier made clear that he 
alone could have made life in Horizon bearable. But it is also, 
however, liberating, for she writes that since “he’s been 
unfaithful to [her] [. . .], [she] ha[s] a right now to be free” 
(163): his betrayal empowers her better justifying her own 
needs. We note after she makes this assertion how assured 
her complaints of others’ indulgences become. Thinking of 
payments owed them by Kirby (a town they had once lived 
in), she says, “There wasn’t a woman in the congregation 
whose clothes were as dowdy and plain as mine. They never 
missed their little teas and bridge parties” (165). She seems 
irritated, but also determined. She admits she “want[s] to get 
away now more than ever” (166), and may now be ready for 
the move, for if she and Philip moved on to a better life their 
accomplishments there wouldn’t feel so undeserved.
This—suspecting at heart you’re unworthy of 
happiness—is what would draw a masochist to undermine 
any success she achieved, to as speedily as possible deplete 
any store of sums she had patiently acquired, and by so 
frequently making use of her journal to delineate all the 
various wounds Horizon and her husband have inflicted 
upon her, she gives every appearance of being one. But even 
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if she isn’t (but really, she is), many of her readers might be, for 
masochism is a psychic defence adopted to help fend off 
concerns of maternal retribution. As Rheingold explains, “It 
takes its origin in the child’s compliance with or appeasement 
of the destructive attitudes and impulses of the mother” (21), 
and helps the child pretend that she isn’t really attending to 
her own needs, really isn’t behaving in any way worthy of 
maternal punishment. The text, though, may help masochists 
in feeling that they too can narrate their life so that self-
growth becomes more acceptable. Maybe, they might be 
more likely to conclude, others out there are indulging 
themselves much more than they themselves have been—
perhaps they are the ones who truly deserve punishment, not 
so much the comparatively modest ourselves. Maybe, they 
might conclude, the severity of their own past suffering and 
stress—the insecurity owing to world conditions after 9-11 
but a source—has been such that they are now finally entitled 
to a reprieve, that they are now actually owed some 
happiness. Some psychohistorians argue that ancient 
civilizations used to practice child sacrifice to feel they might 
now be allowed to keep, not only their crops but their 
remaining children (DeMause 137). Perhaps the lose-one-
keep one “logic” behind infant sacrifice holds true for those 
clearly nowhere disturbed enough to be infanticidal—
perhaps, that is, the loss of Steve and El Greco might help 
Mrs. Bentley feel more entitled to keep her husband’s and 
Judith’s child. Just as she deemed Kirby’s indulgent behavior 
fair reason to firm up her claim to the money owed them, 
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Judith’s indulgence might make her feel more entitled to take 
her (i.e., Judith’s) baby away from her.
At one point in her journal she suggests that Horizon is 
unnatural for it being out of sync with the earth’s underlying 
rhythms. For such disregard and disrespect, it (i.e., Horizon) 
is obstinate and “insolent” (23)—bad. We note that she might 
then have been making way for her own departure from town 
to be in account with nature—and therefore ultimately 
appropriate and “right”—for her departure is in accord with a 
rhythm—that of expulsion, following inflation—which 
determines how and when relevant objects appear and 
disappear from Horizon. Just before “they t[ook] Steve away” 
(152), she tells us that the heat of the town “had been 
gathering and tightening [. . .] for weeks” (150). She writes 
that “[i]t’s like watching an inflated, ever distending balloon, 
waiting with bated breath for it to burst” (150). Just before 
they “lost El Greco” (196) we are told that, after looking “at 
the houses and thinking of all the suspense and excitement 
inside,” after thinking of how in contrast her own “little 
house [. . .] seemed [. . .] dead and dry [,]” she felt “like an 
abscess [was] gathering [inside her] [. . .] [which promised] 
release” (195). Especially given the text’s substantial 
attendance to the Bentleys’ need for a child, the plotting 
would be understood by the reader as of birth following late-
term pregnancy. Her exodus from town seems natural and 
appropriate because it follows, accompanies, her husband’s 
baby’s emergence from Judith’s birth canal. Her exodus is 
primed and timed to seem as if it well could be overlooked, 
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because Horizon’s appetite for hubris is satiated by the 
adulteress Judith’s demise (which, we note, is [essentially] 
concurrent with the baby’s birth).
Would an insecure reader benefit from Bentleys’ birth 
into a new world? Indeed they would: they would find their 
own emergence from the textual world less jarring. More 
substantively, they would at some level sense that when the 
world about them feels most oppressive, most depressing and 
dispiriting, there might, somewhere in the near horizon, in 
fact be a promising new world about to receive and relieve 
them. In the meantime, the text served as a secure place to 
equip themselves with the narrative and reasoning resources 
to help manage the world in its current and still very 
threatening state.
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Matricide in the City (2006)
Chapters twelve to fifteen of The Invisible Man, in which the 
invisible man moves away from the mother-figure Mary 
toward Jack and the Brotherhood, might be read as staging 
the Freudian drama of the child’s move away from his 
mother at the father’s command. But since with Freud the 
child prefers to remain united to the mother, and since the 
invisible man—despite his claims to the contrary—clearly 
does not want to remain alongside Mary, the drama here isn’t 
a Freudian one. What it is, instead, is a dramatization of the 
story behind modern, thriving New York in the 1920s, for 
New Yorkers believed their freedom depended on detaching 
themselves from the influence of the preceding age, an age of 
smothering subservience, lorded over by Victorian 
matriarchs, and in creating its counterpart, its counter—an 
unforgiving Masculine era.
In Terrible Honesty, an examination of New York in the 
’20s, Ann Douglas argues that “slaying of the Titaness—the 
Mother God of the Victorian era—was the most important 
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instigation of the modern urban era” (252). “Cultural 
matricide,” she argues, “gave fresh access to an adventurous 
new world of uninhibited self-expression and cultural 
diversity, a world the Titaness’s bulk had seemed designed 
expressly to block” (253). She says she finds it peculiar that 
moderns felt the need to slay the Victorian matriarch, the 
Titaness—that is, the “[w]hite middle-class women [who] had 
seized the reins of national culture in mid-and late-[American] 
Victorian era” (6)—since the “women they criticized most 
savagely were dead and buried by the 1920s” (243). But she 
concludes that moderns imagined the Victorian matriarch as a 
Goddess, as something too powerful to be counted on not to 
linger—to more than linger—on.
Why they imagined her this way becomes more evident, I 
think, if we take John Watson’s—the behaviorist, popular 20s 
“child expert,” and mother-hater supreme—conception of 
the typical child’s experience along side his/her mother as an 
indication of how mothers actually interacted with their 
children at the time. Watson wanted children to spend as little 
time with their mothers as possible, for he believed that from 
infancy on children experience their mothers as oppressors—
as far more a source of trauma than nurturance—for “[m]ost 
mothers [. . .] displace[d] their unsatisfied sexual longings 
onto to their children under the guise of ‘affection.’” (43). To 
support his attack on the myth of selfless maternal devotion, 
Watson attends to how infants react to their mothers’ 
handling of them. The revulsion he claims children 
experienced, and which he himself experienced while watching 
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mothers swarm over them, is akin to the revulsion the 
invisible man experiences after finding himself pressed up 
against a large woman in a subway train while on his way to 
Harlem—that is, when he found himself “crushed against a 
huge woman in black who shook her head and smiled while 
[he] [. . .] stared with horror at a large mole that arose out of 
the oil whiteness of her skin like a black mountain sweeping 
out of rainwet plain” (Ellison 158).
If most moderns had in fact experienced their mothers’ 
bodies this way, if their earliest experiences were of such 
intolerable smothering, it would explain why they felt the 
need to distance themselves so strongly from maternal 
figures, and why, also, they feared they would never quite 
extricate themselves from them. But because this encounter is 
by accident, that is, because it is not one in which the wide-
bodied woman encouraged his enmeshment within her, it is not 
one which illustrates why moderns feared that unless they 
slew the Matriarch they would remain her proxy and pet. 
More than a hint of this, however, can be found in the 
invisible man’s accounting of his time with Mary.
Just as his first negative encounter in New York was his 
being sandwiched against the large-bodied woman in the 
subway train, his second emergence, following his leaving the 
factory hospital, is introduced so that once again it seems as if 
he will find himself in an anxious situation, brought upon by 
grossly large maternal masses. But though his “wild, infant 
eyes” are confronted with “[t]wo huge women [. . .] [,] [who] 
seemed to struggle with their massive bodies as they came 
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[toward him], their flowered hips trembling like threatening 
flames” (251), they pass him by without incident. He hasn’t 
long escaped, however, for just afterwards another wide-
bodied woman—Mary—rescues him from the streets, and 
becomes his constant, becomes his only, company for some 
time thereafter. Living with Mary, he finds himself in the sort 
of exclusive mother-child dyad Watson rails against. He 
describes himself as childish several times while living with 
her, and in her over-solicitousness, with her presumed 
intimacy, it is clear she is meant to be conceived as a mother-
figure—the sort of black mama ostensibly to be found 
everywhere in the South, and the sort moderns believed 
everywhere to be found in their Victorian American (read: 
Boston-centered) past. He says “he had no friends and 
desired none” (258), but he clearly desires some sort of relief 
from Mary’s company. His first instinct was in fact to 
“inwardly reject” (252) her, and living with her invites upon 
him experiences he would but cannot repel. He complains 
about her “constant talk of leadership and responsibility” 
(258), but one senses that what bothers him most is not so 
much what, specifically, she asks of him—though this clearly 
does bother him—but her constant pressure, her pressing, 
her manifest presence, for he is equally disturbed by her 
“silent” as he is by her audible “pressure” (259) for him to 
become a race leader. Indeed, he makes his stay with Mary 
seem a perpetual intake of her in one unpleasant way or 
another, for he calls attention not only to how agitated her 
voice makes him feel but to how repulsed he is by the smelly 
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cabbage meals he feels compelled to eat. (We note she seems 
to be forever feeding him—never clearly, we note, at his 
bequest.)
Just as moderns believed the Victorian Titaness inhibited 
individuation and individualism, the invisible man begins to 
complain of how he had “lost his direction” (258). After 
voicing the complaint, he flees Mary’s home, extremely 
agitated. Unlike, as I will soon explore, his room, the streets 
outside of Mary’s home cannot quite be imagined as part of 
her surround. Though when she first met the invisible man 
on the street near her place, she showed she was telling the 
truth when she bragged of how “everybody kn[ew] [her] [. . .] 
around this part of Harlem” (252) by successfully recruiting 
some men to help her take the invisible man back to her 
home, and though the streets of Harlem do seem haunted by 
a presence who would claim its streets—Ras, the Exhorter, 
who at times, in that he imagines himself someone who is a 
true “son of Mama Africa” (370), as someone who has not 
“betray[ed] his own mama” (371), seems the good son who 
always abides his mother—the streets of Harlem are just as 
frequently made to seem peopled by those who would forget 
the past entirely, who would forget all about their irrelevant 
ancestors and their now fully redundant ways. But he actually 
finds respite from home after wandering to a part of Harlem 
situated within downtown. Downtown, we note, is delineated 
throughout the text as a location, if not quite opposed to, 
certainly clearly differentiated from, Harlem; it is for instance 
the place the Brotherhood relocates him to once his influence 
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in Harlem had become too strong for their liking.
He considers taking in a movie—but what he actually 
takes in are a few yams he purchases from a street vender. In 
that he makes of the purchase a declaration of his intention to 
not abandon his Southern roots, the purchase seems to move 
him closer to becoming the person Mary prefers he become. 
But the reason I think it actually reads more as a repudiation 
than as an acceptance of her, is that he believes it an act in 
defiance of those who would have him “do only what was 
expected of [him]” (266)—that is, an act in defiance of people 
just like Mary. 
After purchasing the yam, after expressing how suddenly 
empowered and free he feels, he subsequently also expresses 
a covert desire for matricide. Thinking of Bledsoe, of 
revenging himself upon him, he imagines him reacting to an 
accusation as if he had been accused “of raping an old 
woman of ninety-nine years” (265). Whether or not one 
agrees that what he is expressing here is his unconscious 
desire for Mary to be punished for all her stifling attention, 
the kinds of experiences he has with her are of the sort that 
moderns believed moved desires for matricide. Douglas 
writes: “It is the mother’s infernal overattentivenes, her 
grotesque solicitude, what the feminist critic Madelon 
Sprengnether calls ‘the threat of castration imminent in her 
overwhelming love,’ her conviction that her child cannot live 
in the world without her guidance and pity, her self-serving, 
self-sanctified efforts to keep her child out of what Sidney 
Howard called ‘the dangerous place[s],’ where young people 
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take risks and experience adversity and pain, and perhaps, 
grow up—it is all this that drives men to matricide, Wertham, 
[a modern New York psychiatrist] implies” (246).
Mary has certainly been this sort of a mother-figure to 
the invisible man, almost to the letter. But it should of course 
seem debatable as to whether or not he is airing here his own 
desire for matricide, for such a desire, though it must in some 
way surface, is supposed to be suppressed: the superego will 
not permit its overt expression, as inhibiting the overt 
expression of such a betrayal is in fact its principle function. 
Of course, if he fabricated the next event he participates in 
there would be no debate as to whether or not he was 
indulging in thoughts of matricide, but clearly his stumbling 
upon the eviction of an eighty-nine-year-old woman is Ralph 
Ellison’s responsibility, not his own. However, though he says 
he felt shame in being “witness” to something he “did not 
wish to see,” he does admit the eviction “fascinated” (Ellison 
270) him. And though he isn’t responsible for the violent 
incident, he hijacks its momentum by associating what was 
happening to the old woman with what very possibly could 
happen to Mary, for he identifies her first as “motherly-
looking” (267), then as “somebody’s mother,” then as his 
own mother, and finally—though later, after he has met 
Jack—as Mary.
He ends up assisting the old woman by speaking to and 
garnering support from a gathered crowd; and we note that 
he thereby again looks to be developing into the person Mary 
wants him to become: just as was true with his eating of the 
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yams, his oral performance links him to Southern ways. But 
because he had just described his experience with Mary as 
“exceedingly irritating,” as it involved constantly listening to 
her preaching, his opportunity to speak and have others 
attend to him outside her home, actually works to counter 
and repudiate uncomfortable past experiences with her. 
Moreover, because so soon afterwards he finds himself in 
Jack’s company—that is, along side someone who approved 
of his action but who wants him to repudiate his past, to 
repudiate Mary—it is an action which by itself does not 
necessary identify him with her.
Jack is the one responsible for construing the eviction of 
the old woman as “A Death on the City pavements” (290). 
He is the one who is ostensibly responsible for the invisible 
man imagining Mary “being ground to bits by New York” 
(295). The blame’s on him, on somebody else—and this is 
how moderns would have it too. For he is thereby made to 
seem the sort of ruthless but also formidable father-figure 
they hoped would help define their era, help distinguish it 
from their Victorian predecessors’, help them slay the 
Victorian Titaness, once and for all. Douglas writes: “Really 
to kill such a god, to finish her off for good and all, the 
moderns needed another god; to free themselves from the 
devouring, engulfing mother god, a savage and masculine god 
was required, and for this purpose they reinstated the punitive 
god of their Calvinist forebears, a god operating by 
inscrutable and malign laws and recast in the image of 
Calvin’s heir Freud” (Douglas 243).
PATRICK MCEVOY-HALSTON
460
Douglas goes on to suggest that what the moderns most 
liked about Freud was his emphasis on, his substantiation of, 
masculine power. She writes, “[w]hat is apparently at issue in 
Totem and Taboo [—a book, incidentally, she identifies as 
‘offer[ing] the tale of the murdered father as a front behind 
which Freud can accomplish the murder of the mother’ 
[230]—] [. . .] is male authority and male conflict, male 
transgression and male retribution” (231). It is a book which 
“furthers masculine cultural hegemony by hypothesizing the 
origins of history and religion in an altogether patriarchal 
story, a world of, to borrow a title from Hemingway, ‘Men 
Without Women’” (231). As I began by suggesting, Jack can 
very easily be imagined, particularly at this point of the text, 
as the Freudian Father. Though obviously he is not intent on 
keeping Mary “all to himself,” he is evidently another 
parental-figure who would take the invisible man under his 
wing, and whose near first instruction is for him to leave her 
behind.
Jack and the Brotherhood are unwaveringly committed 
to discouraging him away from Mary. The invisible man now 
airs few complaints about her, and instead conveys his regret 
that he would, alas, have to leave her. But he does voice one 
more: comparing his stay with Mary to his initial involvement 
with the Brotherhood, he says: “[T]here are many things 
about people like Mary that I dislike. For one thing, they 
seldom know where their personalities end and yours begins; 
they usually think in terms of ‘we’ while I have always tended 
to think in terms of ‘me’—and that has caused some friction, 
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even with my own family. Brother Jack and the others talked 
in terms of ‘we,’ but it was a different, bigger ‘we’” (Ellison 
316).
The Brotherhood, though a communist organization, is 
in its ethos, its manners, strongly reminiscent of New York in 
the ’20s. As was true of New York then, the Brotherhood is 
unsentimental and ahistorical: Jack, presenting the 
Brotherhood’s view of things, says that history necessitates 
that people such as Mary—hangers-on, that is—need more 
than just be gradually left behind, but rather pruned away so 
that they don’t block the emergence of the new. The 
Brotherhood speaks in precise, “scientific” language; it 
prefers clear delineation and crispness to soft, feminine verbal 
blending, making it the perfect embodiment of “urban 
moderns,” “whose primary ethos” “was accuracy, precision, 
and perfect pitch and timing” (Douglas 8). Just as it believes 
words ought to be distinct from one another, just as it clearly 
differentiates the “woman’s question” from all others, just as 
it would have the invisible man not confuse the “class 
struggle with the ass struggle” (Ellison 418), the Brotherhood 
desires and helps ensure that each of its members have a 
clearly defined, differentiated, secure space to inhabit.
The Brotherhood offers the invisible man a room to live 
in. His new room is spacious but not grand, the landlady 
polite but business-like. He exults in the space, and also 
delineates it, makes claim to it, identifies with it, in a way he 
chooses not do with his room at Mary’s. His stay with Mary 
was never about making claim to a space: it was, rather, 
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actually all about resisting becoming too involved in her own 
space—the true reason behind his choosing not to concern 
himself with her affairs. His new apartment is never scene to 
invasion, and in this it is different from his room at Mary’s. 
(His office is vulnerable to “invasions,” but we note that 
when brothers invade his space, he takes pleasure in his 
repelling them from it.) We sense just how much his room at 
Mary’s is not so much his space but rather part of Mary’s—
part of Mary—the last day and night he spends there. He 
describes the experience so that her home becomes all about 
invasion, permeability, filth and shame—that is, as something 
to be left behind in great urgency! Noise enters his room, but 
so too, very nearly, does Mary. She has her hand on his 
room’s doorknob, and unless he is unclothed she would enter 
and discover him in an ostensibly shameful act—his breaking 
of the bank. This minor disaster is worth our attending to, for 
again it dramatizes just how much Mary inhibits him. He 
fears Mary might misconceive what happened, resulting in 
upset and embarrassment. Yet on the street “breaking” (263) 
the yam showed his disregard for how others saw him, and 
was an exultant, freeing experience. (We should also consider 
the breaking the bank a sort of displaced matricide: the bank 
is of a rotund figure whose sole role is to—hand to mouth—
ingest coins, which well captures both his experience of 
Mary’s neediness and as well all his constant intake of her 
prepared food—that is, near the entirety of how he 
experienced his living with her.) He can break the bank, but 
cannot force a clean break from her: their familiarity with one 
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another, their casual, familiar discourse, even, inhibits him 
from effecting a routine tenant-landlord departure—from 
managing something akin to the evicting police officer’s “just 
‘doing [his] [. . .] job, ma’am.’” He aims to pay her back in 
full, to owe nothing more to her, but she manages to make 
the one hundred-dollar bill—a bill, whose crispness and large 
denomination make it seem charmed to ward off “simple” 
folk like Mary—into another claim upon him: she will now 
have the resources to take him back whenever he feels the 
need to return. Again, since her home is at the time 
associated with swarming cockroaches, oily coffee, cabbage 
smells, bodily invasion, powerlessness and ineptness, “home 
will always be there for you” is much more here an affliction 
than it is in any way a rescuing balm.
Fortunately the Brotherhood is behind him and will not 
see him go astray. They are the ones who chose his apartment 
for him, they are the ones who evict him from Harlem when 
he is becoming too familiar with the people there, they are 
ones who rescue him when he finds himself confusing the 
“ass for the class struggle”—that is, when he makes a mash 
of his handling of the “woman’s question.” And the invisible 
man makes clear that the Brotherhood will always be there: 
though he leaves them, they are at the end of his account 
portrayed as being well in charge of things.
After his stay with her, the nature of his subsequent life 
shows how the Brotherhood helped him secure a break from 
Mary, and he never does return to her (though a hole in the 
ground is to be thanked for this as much as the 
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Brotherhood). The grotesque last experience with her is 
fortuitous in that— because it can so readily be encapsulated 
as “grotesque”—it is made to seem something which can be 
countered, en totale, simply by coating himself in the brand 
spanking new. The delight he takes in purchasing new 
clothes—something he does at least twice in the text—also 
likens him to moderns, for they were all about the new, all 
about harshly ascribing even the just recently current as but 
the squallor of yesterday’s news. Moderns liked to believe 
they were living in a time of momentum in which experiences 
did not accumulate, build upon one another, but instead were 
mostly incommensurate—that what once held true “then” 
could not, would not, hold true now. New clothes identified 
their wearer as of the moment—distinctly in the clear, that is, 
from the deadening past and all its tendrils.
The past does prove to linger, though, for Invisible Man 
was actually written in the forties and yet seems still akin in 
spirit to works written in the ’20s. In fact, the ethos of ’20s 
New York more than lingers on today. Popular films 
continue to dramatize New York as a city whose it’s-not-
personal masculine ethos matter of factly ruins all maternal 
claims on striving up-and-comers. Fair to assume, then, that 
the Matriarch must still be around for the “Brotherhood” to 
yet remain afoot: apparently, moderns needed, and we still 
need, more than just a new god in place to finish “[H]er off 
for good.” 
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Grabbing Hold, for Departure’s Sake (April 2006)
Max Vigne makes use of the ostensibly dangerous Himalayan 
mountain range as if it was a Green World, that is, as a place 
which facilitates experimentation, self-discovery, and renewal. 
It’s an odd place to use as a playground, but he needed some 
place that would serve: it is clear that his life in England was 
safe but routine—hum-drum. It is what was afforded him 
after a shock—his mother’s death—necessitated a life moved 
by necessity rather than by romance. Though he at first 
makes it seem as if his surveying position abroad is really 
about bettering his position at home, not long into the text it 
becomes apparent that it is really about rediscovering a life of 
“charm” (22), a life he had been familiar with before his 
mother died.
But this is not to say, however, that his initial way of 
characterizing the point of his travels inhibits self-discovery. 
Instead, very likely, it enables it—for those who’ve been 
traumatized by the loss of a parent can be overwhelmed by 
too much change. Because for them experimentation/play 
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can be as much about the loss of the familiar and comforting 
as it is about the acquisition of the new and pleasing, it is 
risky business, to be undertaken with care. Therapists know 
that the traumatized need first to be made to feel secure 
before they can be brought to engage with the world 
experimentally, and Max may have prepared himself for a 
risky and playful re-evaluation of what he wants to do with 
his life by first having established himself as a respectable 
bourgeois Victorian—that is, by constituting himself as the 
sort of gentleman his own culture would lift up as a good 
example for other young men to emulate.
His journals entries delineate a sort of threat the 
Kashmir environment could present him with—namely, 
becoming lost and freezing to death—and his first action is to 
make himself feel less vulnerable to this threat. He does this 
by distinguishing himself from the lost man “found on a 
mountain that is numbered but still to be named” (17). While 
the lost man was untethered, unconnected, someone who 
traveled alone, Max is “attached to a branch, however small 
and insignificant, of the Grand Trigonometrical Survey of 
India” (17)—is part of confident Victorian expansionism 
abroad. But he is in fact connected to two empowered entities 
which lend support and security in this new environment. 
That is, as important to his sense of security as is his 
attachment to a respectable and grand survey company, is his 
attachment to his wife at home, who is made to seem so 
much the suffering angel in the house. Though he attends to 
the difficulty he experiences in connecting to her through 
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letters, though our attention is drawn to all he cannot convey 
to her for fear of frightening her, we should not overlook the 
fact that she is someone he can turn to for attendance and 
nurturance—she is someone he expects will attend closely to 
whatever she receives from him, to whatever he has to say to 
her. She writes “mothering” letters to him. His companions 
laugh at her advice for him to “wear [his] [. . .] woolly vest” 
(22). But he doesn’t need to deem them—simply jealous—in 
order to find some comfort in their jabs, for her letter helps 
establish her as the sort of admonishing but nurturing and 
empowered mother-figure Victorians believed determined the 
nature of their public sphere. It helps establish her as the kind 
of mother-figure we all needed to know we could turn to for 
periodic support, when we first explored the exciting but 
strange world we were born into.
The particular nature of his life back home provides him 
with a secure departure point; he maps for himself a secure 
arrival point in the future, the end of his journey, which will 
ostensibly mean a better position at home; and he has linked 
himself to a company which makes him feel securely placed 
in the present: there is a sense that he helps make himself feel 
secure through what might aesthetically feel like the sort of 
triangulation he attempts to effect for his wife at the end of 
the text, in an effort to make her feel secure. But of course he 
is on a journey, he is moving: he is never a set, stationary 
point that can be clearly demarcated on a map. But his 
movement is made to seem as if it amounts to little more 
than moving from one secure point to another one well 
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within sight. He describes his team as tied together. He 
moves with a “line of men”—“chainmen” (27).  This 
formation makes his movement through the mountains seem 
rigid and limited, but also delimited—known.
And in some ways this manner of journeying is akin to 
the one he was already familiar with back home: it follows the 
beaten path. He travels with men who literally are not 
trailblazers. They are those who follow paths first established, 
demarcated, by “the dashing scouts of the triangulating party” 
(26)—that is, by those who “dig through feet of snow” so as 
to “expose” “level platforms” and “supporting pillars” (26) 
for them to stand and step on, by those who are the ones 
most susceptible to falling victim to insecure snow bridges, to 
falling into crevasses. The crew Max is associated with 
“merely” adds “muscle and sinew on their bones” (27). In a 
sense, though he tells his wife that “[e]verything [he is] [. . .] 
seeing and doing is so new,” that “so much is rushing into 
[him] [. . .] all at once [that he] [. . .] gets confused” (26), it is 
not quite accurate to depict his life abroad as involving 
constant encounters with the wholly strange and new: in 
truth, much has been already been processed for him by the 
brave scouts at the forefront of the party, at the forefront of 
experiencing an as-of-yet unmapped world.
He encounters his new environment to some extent as a 
tourist would some place he’d never been to, or as a watcher 
or reader of a never-before-seen play would experience 
everything he witnesses within a Green World environment, 
or as he and his wife encounter their letters to one another, 
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which they know will be edited so that much of what could 
frighten has been removed. That is, he encounters “the new” 
without fear it will shock or disorient. When he tells his wife 
“that all one’s pleasures [there] [. . .] are retrospective [. . .] [, 
that] in the moment itself, there is only the moment, and the 
pain” (42), he comes close to universalizing not just how one 
would experience the Himalayan mountain range but how 
one might experience any unfamiliar environment. But of 
course not everyone takes more pleasure from recalled than 
they do from immediate experience. We note that Annie 
Dillard’s narrator in Tinker Creek, for example, often exults in 
unprocessed, intense, even overwhelming experience. She 
prefers to look upstream rather than downstream; she prefers 
to expose herself to the impact of the new rather than situate 
herself so all lived experience amounts to what has already 
passed at least someone by—to a perpetual re-encounter with 
history. And it may be that people who have not learned early 
on that life could at any moment present them with 
experiences they are unprepared to deal with, share Dillard’s 
narrator’s preference for unmediated, unprocessed 
experience.
Both temporal and spatial distance from threats help Max 
develop a mental state well suited for self-reflection and 
exploration. The company he travels with can threaten him: 
Michael is one of three men who make sexual advances upon 
him. But he rebuffs them; and since this action leads to 
Michael, at least, “ceas[ing] to deal with him directly,” for him 
to “communicate [to Max] by sarcastic notes” (30), it 
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effectively distances them from him and makes their 
communication something under Max’s control: he 
determines when to read Michael’s letters, and can thereby be 
sure to be well braced to deal with whatever they might 
contain. Though even when in a crowded group he still finds 
ways to create room for himself—he tells us of how he 
successfully created “the solitude he so desperately need[ed]” 
through writing to Clara, and of how his reading led him to 
feel drawn to, closer toward, those whose works he had been 
reading—clearly he prefers to keep physically distant from the 
rest of his company whenever possible. He manages just this 
the evening Michael tells a triangulator to tell a tale Max 
knows could lead to campground disorder. When he guesses 
things might get out of hand, he “fle[es] the campfire [. . .] 
and roll[s] himself in a blanket in a hollow, far from everyone, 
carved into the rocky cliffs” (46). So ensconced, he is safe 
from whatever carnage developed that evening. And he 
thereby positions himself so that upon his return he would 
once again deal only with processed, denatured experience: 
when he returned to the site in the morning he would 
encounter only the remains of whatever happened the night 
before.
We note that by having fled he thereby enabled more 
play for himself. The next morning offers a surprise: what 
developed from the evening of story-telling. He hides, and 
therefore the next morning, can seek! And there is play in 
another instance in which he creates physical distance 
between himself and his companions—specifically, the time 
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he falls into a fissure after having left his companions, who 
had prematurely set up camp. He escapes the crevice by 
essentially making himself into a bridge—that is, through 
play. He admits he actually enjoyed being in the crevice; and 
given that it meant being physically removed from and to 
some extent protected against “capture” by a group that 
annoyed him, we can understand why he found the “cold and 
quiet” (37) seductive. But he might take pleasure in the 
incident for another reason: because it staged for him exactly 
the sort of calamite he feared he was most vulnerable to while 
journeying and let him know that he was in fact capable of 
handling dangerous situations without aid. Though he 
eventually will be shamed into deeming this episode not so 
much something he shouldn’t write home about but something 
not worth writing home about, it provides him with the sort of 
experience he can use to make himself feel less the tourist 
and more a manly adventurer.
It is not quite accurate to say he relied only on his own 
resources to emerge from the crevasse, though, for we are 
told that “it was the thought of not getting to read” his wife’s 
letters which inspired his efforts. It is, then, an incident which 
shows how strongly he needs to think of his wife as someone 
he must return to, as someone to draw strength from. But it is 
also one which speeds up his reliance upon, his attachment 
to, other people. His next letter is moved by his enthusiasm 
to tell her about his developing letter relationship with Dr. 
Hooker, and to inform her of how drawn he is to men such 
as Darwin, Gray, and Hooker. It is one where he tells her he 
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“plans to share his records with Dr. Hooker and however else 
is interested” (42). We note that when he first mentioned 
receiving a letter from Dr. Hooker he made contact with him 
seem akin to his seeing K2 for the first time. That is, he made 
it seem akin to what a tourist would feel upon closing upon 
greatness: it enraptures, but does not obligate—it could 
forever after be an encounter he might dazzle others with but 
which doesn’t necessitate any soul-shifting on his part in any 
substantive way. When he first describes his renewed interest 
in botany to his wife, he makes it seem something which 
would enhance but not “deform,” harshly alter, their life 
together upon his return; it will simply allow him to point out 
more things to her in their garden. But in this letter it is 
evident that his involvement with Hooker, and his 
rediscovery of his interest in botany, will involve distancing, 
not closing, the distance between his wife and himself.
At the end of the text we are told of Max’s need to 
prepare his wife to accept difficult truths, and he shows the 
need to slowly prepare himself for as much as well. When he 
first mentioned great personages he is or is becoming 
connected to, such as Hooker or his relation Godfrey Vigne, 
he made their connection to him seem indirect and 
inconsequential. He actually says that he is (only) 
“tangentially” (20) related to Vigne: he tells himself there is 
no direct, pressing link between them. When he mentions 
Hooker’s letters to him, he identifies them as an effort of 
Hooker’s “to encourage an amateur” (40)—that is, he 
chooses to believe that Hooker writes to him more out of 
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kindness than out of respect for the work he had undertaken. 
But though from such statements of his as, “What draws me 
to these men an their writings is not simply their ideas but the 
way they defend each other so vigorously and are so firmly 
bound” (40), it is clear that though he looks to these men as 
those he might bind himself to, he is not yet prepared to 
make firm the link. But he is preparing himself, constructing 
“bones” upon which, after he comes to believe that he is in 
fact worthy of sustained communication with Hooker and/or 
of identifying himself more squarely with his great relation, 
“muscle” and “sinew” can be added later.
He more boldly characterizes himself to seem more 
similar than dissimilar to these men—and different from his 
wife—after he re-establishes a link to his childhood life, to his 
mother. He becomes fully aware of the continued existence 
and relevance of this link after his fall into the crevasse. After 
that experience, he writes, “He himself has changed so much 
he grows further daily from her [i.e., his wife’s] picture of 
him. It is his mother, dead so many years, who seems to 
speak most truly to the new person he is becoming. As if the 
years between her death and now are only a detour, his 
childhood self emerging from a long uneasy sleep” (48). Did 
the landscape somehow help consolidate his attachment to 
his past life? There is reason to believe so, for he fell into the 
crevasse after wandering through an environment that made 
him feel as if he was stepping backwards through time. And 
he admitted his desire to sleep, perhaps to hibernate, while 
enclosed within snow at the bottom of the crevasse. Though, 
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then, his wife helped extricate him from the crevice, he 
emerged someone prepared to believe his life with her but a 
long detour, to make himself feel more awkwardly related to 
her than to greats like Godrey Vigne.
His wife is made to seem a kind of useful object. In a 
Winnicotian sense, she is the primary object to be left behind 
only once the venturing “child” has securely attached himself to 
transitional ones. She is someone who must be construed as 
good and pure, as someone he desperately wants to map his 
soul for, as someone to return to, until he feels less in need of 
her support and love. After he has revived and reattached 
himself to his early childhood self, and after he has begun to 
link and identify himself more and more with Hooker, he is 
prepared to admit to himself that his previous home is not 
something he is actually all that eager to return to. Initially he 
said that both he and his wife decided he should go abroad, 
even though it was clear the decision was mostly his own. 
Initially his complaint about being away from her was that he 
was unable to keep in constant contact, to provide her with a 
well-documented map of his soul. Now we hear of him 
choosing not to write to her for months at a time. His 
experience with Dima is something he uses to help him 
reassess his time with her. He compares her to his wife, and, 
as he witnesses Dima’s charm fade away, admits that much of 
his life with his wife lacked charm: it lacked precisely what he 
knew along side his mother as a child and what seems newly 
available to him should he continue to add to his already 
established relationship with professional botanists.
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He leaves Dima behind, but his attachment to her 
facilitated his peers’ acceptance of him. It lends him some of 
the mystique men such as Dr. Chateau, of those who have 
been in the mountains for decades doing—who knows what?, 
possess. It lends him some of the mystique his relation 
Godrey possessed. Fitting more naturally to his new 
environment, he begins to distance himself from terminology, 
ways of thinking, he had adopted earlier. We are told, 
“Nobility, duty, sacrifice—whose words are those? Not his. 
He is using them to screen himself from the knowledge of 
whatever is shifting in him” (54). He may well have used 
them, however, to enable such shifting to occur in the first 
place, for they too made him seem to embody, to partake in, 
a buoyant Victorian ethos. We note, though, that he describes 
himself as morosely beginning to doubt the real benefits and 
righteousness of Victorian expansionism. But he may be 
beginning to doubt the rightness of efforts by those such as 
Hooker he had previously hero-worshipped, because he is 
better prepared to detach from them as well.
That is, when he begins to doubt the legitimacy, the 
righteousness of his mapping efforts, he has become a skilled 
draftsman who has learned through trial and error how to 
articulate his environment through maps and notes, and an 
adventurer, who has successfully lead men through 
mountains. He is no longer an amateur. He has demonstrated 
to himself that he is worthy of the attention of people like 
Hooker. But perhaps, because not adjusting his estimations 
of Hooker and Godrey would entail an obligation to continue 
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becoming like them, would limit his freedom, his ability to 
establish his own future, he now cooperates in making them 
seem less worthy of his loyalty. Time has come for him to 
leave even more behind him, to forage on ahead, a true 
trailblazer—now no mere servant of the map.  
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Moderns and their Mothers’ Reach (May 2006)
In Terrible Honesty, Ann Douglas argues that moderns felt they 
needed to find a way to free themselves from the influence, 
from the control, of their Victorian predecessors, and 
discusses how their cultural products were means to this end. 
Free, they created one of the richest cultural periods of all 
time. But she also argues that moderns well knew that a price 
would have to be paid for all this self-fulfillment and self-
growth. She writes that they knew that at some point the 
Maternal—the “object” they repressed and beat back—would 
stage a return and make them pay for their insolence. Some 
theorists—notably those influenced by object-relations’ 
thought—argue, however, that how most of us experience 
our own self-growth and freedom ensures that moderns 
would themselves stage the return to a matriarchal 
environment—that is, that she wouldn’t need to return, for 
they would feel compelled to pay her a visit. In this essay I will 
argue that prominent modernist plays served to both help 
effect the matricide Douglas argues modernist cultural 
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products produced, and to provide means to temporarily 
vicariously return to the maternal environment moderns so 
loathed and feared. Specifically, I will explore how Brick and 
Margaret in Tennessee Williams’ Cat on a Hot Tin Roof, and 
Biff in Arthur Miller’s Death of a Salesman, are made to seem 
empowered moderns who exist outside of a maternal 
environment, but who risk upon their return to it the loss of 
their hard-won independence.
Douglas makes a very bold argument in Terrible Honesty. 
She more than argues that modern New York effected 
cultural matricide, that it warred against mothers and 
everything maternal—she argues that modernism itself was 
mostly a weapon used in the fight. According to Douglas, 
moderns preferred, for instance, crisp, precise, 
straightforward prose that “cut through all the bull,” because 
it was a prose style opposed to that preferred by Victorian 
matrons—because it was deemed non-matronly.  She believes 
that moderns were at war against leading matrons of 
(American) Victorian society, who—according to them, at 
least—made use of everybody around them, of their children, 
especially, to service their own needs. She acknowledges that 
moderns’ successful effort to create a vital, original culture 
depended on them feeling as if they had, if not slain Her, at 
least beat back the Victorian Titaness enough to create room 
for their own growth, but she cannot fathom—why such a 
strong need to war against those already deceased before any 
of them were even born?
Given how she familiarizes us with the difficulties key 
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moderns had with their mothers, given her arguing that the 
entirety of Hemingway’s opus should be understood as his 
revenging himself upon his own (222), it is odd Douglas 
doesn’t consider that they warred primarily with them, rather 
than with Victorian matrons. She chooses to conflate John 
Watson’s—the most prominent 20s child psychologist—
observations concerning how mothers “attend” to their 
children and the effect this attendance has upon them, into 
her larger argument that moderns were at war against the 
Victorian epoch. But if for many children Watson’s belief that 
mothers as much harm as help their children is in fact an 
accurate assessment of their influence upon them, we have 
reason to believe that moderns needed to make use of 
whatever handy, of whatever they might produce, to help 
cope with difficulties arising from efforts to extricate 
themselves from their control.
According to Ann Hulbert, Watson should be counted 
amongst a host of child experts in the modern era who 
believed mothers used their children to satisfy their own 
unmet needs (Raising America 141). He observed that mothers 
tend to over-handle their children, kiss them obsessively, 
“stroke[e] and touch [their] [. . .] skin, lips, sex organs and the 
like,” and argues that no one should “mistake it for an 
innocent pastime” (141). In short, he argues that mothers 
made incestuous use of their children. He argues that children 
must be kept in separate beds, separate rooms, else suffer the 
inevitable results of being over-handled (Douglas 43)—
debilitation: the child would thereafter have difficulty leaving 
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behind his/her “nesting habits,” and would therefore be 
unlikely to be able to “conquer the difficulties it must meet in 
its environment” (141).
Watson’s view of mothers is, we note, about polar 
opposite the popular Victorian one—nowhere in his writings 
is one to find a conception of mothers as angels. That is, in 
his conception of them, mothers are not those who despite 
all ills somehow still provide moral guidance, while sustaining 
the warm hearth. Rather, as noted, he understands them as 
near compelled to make use of their children in some effort 
to cheer up themselves. His account of mothers should fit 
very well with those who argue that most women through 
time (and still today) have been insufficiently nurtured and 
respected by the societies they grew up in. That is, it should 
fit well with those who argue that most women grow up in 
patriarchal societies—societies, that is, which to a lesser or 
greater extent set up their female members as suspect, and 
treat them accordingly. Patriarchy’s effect on encumbering or 
debilitating female self-esteem is hardly something mother-
hating Watson can be imagined concerning himself about, but 
it is something psychohistorian Lloyd DeMause, a 
contemporary independent scholar whose conclusions on the 
effects of mothers’ incestuous handling of their children to 
some extent mirror Watsons’, is very much interested in. He 
writes: 
[I]mmature mothers and fathers [,that is, mothers and 
fathers who themselves were not reacted to warmly, 
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affectionately by their own parents] expect their child 
to give them the love they missed when they were 
children, and therefore experience the child’s 
independence as rejection. Mothers in particular have 
had extremely traumatic developmental histories 
throughout history; one cannot severely neglect and 
abuse little girls and expect them to magically turn 
into good mothers when they grow up. [. . .] The 
moment the infant needs something or turns away 
from her to explore the world, it triggers her own 
memories of maternal rejection. When the infant 
cries, the immature mother hears her mother, her 
father, her siblings, and her spouse screaming at her. 
She then “accuses the infant of being unaffectionate, 
unrewarding and selfish . . . as not interested in me” 
[Brazelton and Cramer 11]. All growth and 
individuation by the child is therefore experienced as 
rejection. “When the mother cannot tolerate the 
child’s being a separate person with her own 
personality and needs, and demands instead that the 
child mirror her, separation becomes heavily tinged 
with basic terror for the child” [255]. (DeMause, The 
Emotional Life of Nations 151)
DeMause argues that since we cannot help but grow in 
life, that “fears of growth, individuation, and self-assertion 
that carry threatening feelings of disintegration lead to desires 
to merge with the omnipotent mother—literally to crawl back 
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into the womb” (94). These feelings of disintegration arise 
owing to our belief that we will be, that we deserve to be, 
punished for our growth. Throughout our life we are drawn 
to make a return to our mothers; but reunion also returns 
upon us all the troubling feelings that necessitated our leaving 
her behind in the first place. He writes, “fears of growth, 
individuation and self assertion that carry threatening feelings 
of disintegration lead to desires to merge with the omnipotent 
mother, literally to crawl back into the womb, desires which 
immediately turn into fears of maternal engulfment, since the 
merging would involve total loss of the self” (94).
DeMause clearly does not believe we return to our actual 
mothers when we experience feelings of growth panic. His 
interest is in the social sphere, in how, when we feel the need 
to stage a return to the maternal, we construe our social 
sphere so that it helps us feel as if we are back within a 
maternal environment. If he is right in this, moderns, 
suffering from growth panic and its associated fears of self-
disintegration, and feeling the need not only to slay the 
maternal “beast” but to return to her, may then have used 
their theaters—with their womb-like surrounds—and their 
plays—with their involving transports to potentially hyper-
real, less distilled, “truer” worlds—for such a purpose, as they 
provided ideal venues for this quintessential drama to take 
place. They may have gone to plays like Tennessee Williams’ 
Cat on a Hot Tin Roof and Arthur Miller’s Death of a Salesman, 
that is, not actually so much for their professed reasons, but 
more to facilitate their vicarious return to a maternal 
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environment to witness the mother-returned brought back 
down to size.
Before delineating how in Cat on a Hot Tin Roof, Big 
Daddy’s home is actually made to seem a symbiotic, maternal 
space, lorded over throughout much of the play (especially in 
the first two acts, but also to some extent in the third) by Big 
Mama, there is something significant to be said about the 
particular nature of our likely avatars—Brick and Margaret—
who have ventured into it. Though the study of reader 
immersion in texts has “not been particularly popular with 
the ‘textual’ brands of literary theory” (15) as “it conflicts 
with [‘their’] [. . .] concept of language” (92), reader-response 
theorists and cognitive psychologists who study readers’ 
involvement in texts generally agree that reading involves the 
reader (or audience member) in creating a world that 
“stretch[es] in space, exist[s] in time” (Gerrig 15). The 
cognitive psychologist Richard Gerrig argues that the text 
actually “serve[s] as [a] habitat” (15) for the reader, that 
readers are “placed” within the text as “side-participants or 
overhearers” (119). He does not believe that “transportation 
into a narrative world is dependent on narrative skills” (95); 
but he does believe it depends on how well we identify with 
the principal protagonists. If Douglas is correct in her 
characterization of moderns, it seems likely that they would 
appreciate Brick and Margaret as near kin. Both are loners: 
Brick shies away from physical contact, from any kind of 
intimate involvement in pursuit of the “click” that promises 
complete detachment, and Margaret imagines herself a cat 
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bent on her own self-interest. And if they were making use of 
the play to engage a threatening maternal environment, 
moderns would be pleased that both protagonists seem 
appropriately equipped for use as avatars. Brick’s name 
suggests he is all-protected, that he is, with his detachment, 
with his sense of himself as entirely—as already—defeated, 
impervious to further debilitation. He is in fact mostly walled 
against the world, but not completely so. However, as I will 
explore, the fact that he has a weak spot, that he requires a 
click before he feels safe, may in the end empower him, for it 
makes him seem a natural complement to Margaret, the 
stronger of the two, the one particularly well empowered 
against incorporation within the maternal surround. Margaret 
is made to seem akin to a weapon—specifically, to an archer’s 
bow. She is likened to Diana, Greek goddess of the hunt. 
And though Henry Popkin is surely right to see Brick—who 
is likened to a “godlike being” and to “Greek legends” (43)—
as akin to the Greek hero Adonis, the handsome athlete 
(“Plays of Tennessee Williams” 45), he may also, with his one 
weak spot, be fairly likened to Achilles as well. That is, he 
might fairly be imagined a man-god whose one weak spot 
happens to be one the goddess of the hunt would be 
expected to spot and effectively strike.
He, then, is a barrier, resistant to influences, she—an 
object that punctures through them. Both should prove 
problematic for an environment that would remove from 
them their sense of themselves as individuals. We note this is 
the threat, according to Watson and object relations-oriented 
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researchers such as DeMause, the mother confronts her 
children with, and it is the threat Margaret obsesses over in act 
one. She is set on social climbing, on not falling from her 
current place on the social ladder into waste. In an effort to 
make herself feel secure, she declares just how different she is 
from those she deems well off the ladder—one of these being 
Gooper’s wife, Mae, whom she claims belongs not above but 
rather along side the odious, base human lot. Specifically, she 
deems Mae someone who serves their (i.e., base humanity’s) 
needs, whose beauty and body is at their service. She depicts 
her as the carnival queen who must “smil[e], bow, and blow 
kisses to all the trash in the street’ (21). And also as a 
breeder—she uses the fact that Mae has given birth to five 
children already with at least one more on the way, to make 
her seem as responsible as any for gross societal overflow and 
numbing lack of distinction. She also distinguishes herself 
from Mae’s children, repeatedly calling them “no-neck 
monsters.” They’re monsters, demons of appetite, for lacking 
the neck needed to claim some distinction for the potentially 
determining head. She insists that Mae gave them dog names, 
and intending through cruel intent not to make them seem of 
the same team but simply of different castes, imagines them a 
pack she might use in a hunt. She leads; they would follow. 
She, a goddess; they—pack animals. She differentiates herself 
from them once again, and most effectively, when she likens 
herself to a cat, for unlike dogs, cats can’t be conjoined within 
a pack, and unlike Mae, the carnival queen, their claim on the 
aristocratic is intrinsic not farcical.
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We note, though, that in act one neither Brick nor 
Margaret is made to seem comfortably empowered over 
those around them; instead, they find themselves hard-
pressed to fend off invasions. Though Brick’s susceptibility to 
Margaret will end up helping him feel protected, in act one 
Margaret’s ability to upset him actually makes him seem 
vulnerable. And Margaret’s ability to strike, deflect, dodge, 
and wound is put to test in the first act as well; and ultimately 
she too ends up seeming someone more at risk of being used 
than someone who’ll end up managing everyone to her own 
advantage. Brick and Margaret have to deal with invaders: 
first, the no-neck monsters, whose screams permeate their 
room, and then Big Mama, who authoritatively encroaches 
upon what is ostensibly only fairly mostly their own turf—
their bedroom. Margaret’s first line in the play, “One of those 
no-neck monsters hit me with a hot buttered biscuit so I have 
t’change” (15), foreshadows her subsequent difficulties in 
dealing with encroachments throughout the act. Soon 
afterwards she comments on their “screaming” (16). The 
children scream twice in the first act, and count amongst the 
numerous unwelcome noises that assault the room. The 
children’s screams, Mae’s footsteps, Big Mama’s booming 
voice, the phone’s ring, croquet sounds—all encroach upon 
and also call into question their claim to privacy. We are made 
to understand that, though they have their own bedroom, 
they are hardly distinguished from the goings-on in the rest of 
the home.
Their bedroom’s walls aren’t much of a barrier, and 
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neither is its door. Though Mae asks if she may enter their 
room, Big Mama attempts entry without asking permission, 
and is irritated to find herself refused by their lock. Before 
she finds an alternative entry, Brick retreats to the bathroom, 
shuts its door, and leaves it to Margaret to deal with her. 
Margaret tries to assert herself while talking to her, but 
cannot rebuke her. By entering unexpectedly through a 
different—the gallery—door, Big Mama catches Margaret by 
surprise. Big Mama’s loud voice, too, “startle[s]” (33) and 
unnerves her. Margaret tries to persuade Big Mama there is a 
need for privacy in a home, but Big Mama replies, “No, 
ma’am, not in my house” (33). She would advance upon her 
son, even though Margaret told her Brick was dressing. But 
seeing her adult son’s naked body is not something to balk 
her; she argues that she has seen him so countless times 
before, and clearly understands passage into adulthood more 
as a test of the familial bond than as confirmation for its 
rescinding—she for example is driven throughout the play to 
subject her son to the sort of “kiss[ing] and [. . .] fuss[ing] 
over” (50) she subjected him to as a child and well knows he 
cannot stand. She is however more than willing to show 
others her own bare body: she lifts up her skirt so that 
Margaret her see bruises, something she hopes makes clear 
that she, not Margaret, is the one still so functioning within a 
comfort zone that she can boast arrogant, blaisé authority 
even while within “their” bedroom. Even there, it is still most 
honest if she acts and says as she pleases, very much to the 
extent of degrading insult: she suggests to Margaret that she 
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(i.e., Margaret) is without child because she can’t please in 
bed; an affront that clearly fazes Margaret.
Big Mama is not successful in her effort to retrieve her 
son—but Margaret is not responsible for her departure. 
Instead, someone calls her, and in a proprietary fashion she 
“swe[eps]” (37) out of the room herself. And by slamming 
the door shut on the way out, she loudly conveys her 
irritation at their efforts to balk her. Only after she has left 
does Brick exit the bathroom. He actually “hobble[s]” (37) 
out, an act we likely cannot but compare to Big Mama’s 
emboldened exit, and understand as just how right she is 
concerning her strong stretch over her household.
Big Mama’s subsequent entrance into a room, which 
occurs immediately after the intermission at the beginning of 
act two, proves even more brazen and assertive. We are told 
that “instant silence [is] [. . .] almost instantly broken by the 
shouting charge of Big Mama, entering through hall door like 
a charging rhino” (49). We are also subsequently told that her 
dress, “her riotous voice, booming laugh, have dominated the 
room since she entered” (50). She is characterized as a 
maternal-figure intent on enveloping other people within her 
enormous body. She is again looking for Brick, to smother 
him with attention, but instead ends up subjecting the 
Reverend Tooker to the sort of overwhelming close contact 
she’d prefer to lavish on her son. She pulls the reverend close 
to her, “into her lap,” and exclaims in a shrill laugh—“[e]ver 
seen a preacher in a fat lady’s lap?” (51). Indeed, as nerve-
wracking as the first act must have been for matron-weary 
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moderns, the second must have proved even worse. But soon 
enough—welcome respite: Big Daddy, believing himself free 
of cancer, decides it’s time somebody put an end to her 
influence.
According to Douglas moderns understood the great 
matriarchs of the Victorian period as Titanesses. She writes 
that they felt the need to create a god equal in power to the 
Victorian Titaness, a male god, capable of defeating her. 
Specifically, she writes: “Really to kill such a god, to finish her 
off for good and all, the moderns needed another god; to free 
themselves from the devouring, engulfing mother god, a 
savage and masculine god was required” (243). She believes 
Freud’s (conception of the) Father, for instance, was readily 
embraced by moderns because of Freud’s sense of Him as 
inherently more dangerous than the Mother. While Freud 
enabled the Father through fact, artists did so through fiction; 
and given the way he is portrayed, Big Daddy is himself such 
an artistic construction, for he rudely manages to tame the 
maternal-figure Big Mama, who had been near unopposed, 
was expanding, and looked unstoppable. 
Though with the size of his girth it seems absurd he does 
so, Big Daddy is one of two characters in the play (the other 
being Margaret) that rails against reckless expansion. 
Thinking of Mae’s sixth child, Big Daddy complains that once 
one obtains property how soon “things [. . .] [get] completely 
out of hand!” (61). He responds to Brick’s conjecture that 
“nature hates a vacuum,” by arguing that “a vacuum is a hell 
of a lot better than some of the stuff that nature replaces it 
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with” (61). He is set to inhibit Big Mama’s dominance over 
the household, her presumptive management of all he 
understands his own. In a rant he rails not only against her 
household reign but against her presumptuous use of her 
body, saying:
I went through all that laboratory and operation and 
all just so I would know if you or me was boss here! 
Well, now it turns out that I am and you ain’t—and 
that’s my birthday present—and my cake and 
champagne!—because for three years now you been 
gradually taking over. Bossing. Talking. Sashaying 
your fat old body around the place I made! I made 
this place! [. . .] [A]nd now you think you’re just about 
to take over. Well I am just about to tell you that you 
are not just about to take over. (58)
 
Big Daddy’s bullying of his wife to some extent means 
the end of her dominance through the remainder of act two, 
but he loses his self-confidence and largely vanishes from the 
play once he learns he actually does have cancer. And with his 
absence, Big Mama returns to prior form. In act three, and 
after Big Daddy’s declaration that the house is nobody’s but 
his own, she shows she still believes otherwise. She says, “I 
said, hush[,]! I won’t tolerate anymore catty talk in my house” 
(114), and says the equivalent several more times through the 
remainder of the act. She returns to advancing upon Brick, to 
physically pressing upon him. We are told that she 
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approaches her son, puts her hands through his hair, 
ruminates about what he was like when he was a boy, and 
Brick backs away as “he does from all physical contact” (117). 
She then insists that they “all got to love each other an’ stay 
together, all of us, just as close as we can, especially now that 
such a black thing has come and moved into [their] [. . .] place 
without invitation” (117).
But if Big Daddy’s attempt at matricide was insufficient, 
incomplete, Big Mama is still too shaken by what might have 
seemed both to her and to the audience like another act of 
matricide—namely, the family’s convergence on her to 
inform her of the bad news—to be capable of all she 
managed before. Big Mama has had her time and now 
Margaret is the one who will impose herself on everyone else. 
She takes advantage of Big Mama’s lapse to make full claim to 
Brick. Margaret is ideally suited for such a purpose, for Big 
Mama actually sees Margaret as an “other”: not part of her 
brood, she is alien, an outsider. The text actually primes us to 
imagine her as existing outside the household while still 
within it. She is a cat who dances on a roof; and also Diana, 
goddess not only of the hunt but of the moon, an object 
Brick focuses on in the third act in hopes of distancing 
himself from the household’ goings-on.
Brick looks to the moon for escape, and at the end of the 
play he wants Margaret to look over him for the same reason. 
Sex with her, we note, would involve none of the closeness 
that so repels him. She says he will satisfy her desires, but we 
know this is best done when he is detached and uninvolved. 
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In act one, that is, she declared that he was “[s]uch a 
wonderful person to go to bed with, [. . .] mostly because [he 
was] [. . .] really indifferent to it” (24). Maggie, too, we note, is 
singular and alone. There is a sense that their love-making 
would be very different from the kind Big Daddy “enjoyed” 
with Big Mama. For though Big Daddy declares he only 
“humped” his wife, he believes that forty years of such 
humping left him drained, depleted, in need of revitalization; 
conversely, sex between Brick and Margaret will be kept to a 
minimum. And though at the end of the play we know she 
will become a mother, it is very unlikely we imagine Margaret 
as at all maternal. She is shown to loathe young children, in 
fact, and very likely strikes us as the sort of mother Watson 
argued children ought to have—specifically, one who would 
give her child the bare minimum of attention before 
absconding off elsewhere in a fickle, cat-like fashion.
Another play that served moderns’ need to stage a return 
to a maternal environment and effect matricide is Arthur 
Miller’s Death of a Salesman. The plot involves Biff being 
summoned home by his mother so he might help her with 
her failing, fraying husband, Willy. Willy’s begrudged before a 
hundred different villains, but like Big Daddy, his foremost 
problem is his wife. Big Daddy argues that his wife had slowly 
taken over, and that forty years of living with her had been a 
lifetime of living with someone he loathed. He declares he 
will not be servile to her, but even though he does to some 
extent beat her back—feeling newly refreshed and ascendant 
for having done so—he still mentions to Brick that they 
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should keep their voices down for fear of being overheard: 
that is, there is perhaps never a sense in the play that the house 
he lives in is some kind of manor, ranged over by its lord. 
Willy may be thought of as someone who, owing to the fact 
that he could not ignore his wife’s wishes and commit to 
leaving Brooklyn, found himself trapped within a space 
managed by her, a munchkin in the home, sport for 
everything else each time he stepped outside it. Like Big 
Daddy, within the house he huffs and puffs, he efforts to be 
proprietary, in a loud and bullying manner, but this just 
shows how pathetic he’s become.
Because he proved someone who could not get away to 
some place better suited to him, Willy spends a life 
perpetually fending off threats, threats enfranchised for 
grabbing at him while remaining in their own element. While 
in discussion with Bernard, he voices his suspicion that his 
real problem, his tragic flaw, is that he cannot escape. He 
believes that a moment was once presented him where he 
might embrace a more manly life, but in failing to take 
advantage of this opportunity he doomed himself to being 
walled-in for life. He plays back in his mind the moment his 
brother Ben offered him Freedom—that is, when Ben 
offered him a chance to join him in Alaska. Ben had gone 
there, we note, in search of his father. Linda finally persuades 
Willy he would be better off not leaving, in choosing, instead, 
to continue on as a salesman, but it seems clear that Linda 
had her own interests in mind here, and was really working 
him into relapse. She found contentment in the stable life, 
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and sought its continuation. And in her convincing him to 
remain, she emasculates him, makes him a victim of her own 
accomplishments.
Willy, then, fails to leave behind a life his wife finds 
comfortable in pursuit of a life that he, rather, would enjoy. 
He is, then, the sort of pathetic figure moderns feared they 
might become unless they made their culture wholly 
inhospitable to matriarchs. As discussed, they managed this 
by sustaining and legitimizing theories and cultural products 
that made the Father seem empowered. But they also did so 
by making themselves seem the sort mothers could not readily 
be imagined being able to handle, and would in fact likely 
fear. If her conception of moderns is correct, they must have 
readily identified with Biff, someone who in his youth, we 
note, mothers feared (40), and who, unlike his father, found 
means to leave his old life behind.
Like Brick and Margaret, then, Biff has some ability, 
some power, which would encourage moderns to use him as 
a proxy. But just as Brick upon his return to his old home 
seems at genuine risk of once again being subject to his 
mother’s plans for him, Biff too is at risk of being caught 
(out). Linda would have Biff rescue Willy, but as Christopher 
Bigsby argues, “[t]he price of saving Willy may [. . .] be the 
loss of his own freedom and autonomy” (Arthur Miller 104). 
As with Cat on a Hot Tin Roof, the play begins with the mother 
as highly reckon-worthy. Though there is never a point in the 
play in which Willy’s interrupting her makes her seem weak 
(for the most part it works to make her seem very tolerant—
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and therefore also surely more than fully justified in whatever 
demands she might insist on him), at this point of the play 
her own interruptions make her seem commandant. She 
commands the stage, she commands her sons—and also very 
effectively makes them feel guilty for their not attending to 
their father. And so Biff decides that he even though he 
“hate[s] this city [. . .] [,] [he’ll] stay” (58) and help out.
The means for Biff’s escape from a life he really wants 
no part of to some extent mirrors that used by moderns to 
empower their resistance to Victorian morality. According to 
Douglas, moderns came to understand Victorian morality as 
built of a shallow appreciation of life’s true variegatedness, 
and therefore also as discardable. She writes that they did not 
detach themselves from the responsibility of doing right, but 
rather had come to understand that “doing right” is a more 
complicated and sometimes counterintuitive business than 
their predecessors had assumed. Specifically, she writes: “The 
older generation was quick to accuse the younger one of 
lacking moral standards, but in truth the moderns wanted not 
fewer ethics but more searching ones” (33). Linda manages to 
control Biff by suggesting that abiding by her simple request 
(to stay and help save Willy) is the right thing for him to do. 
But just like moderns learned to be less intimidated, less 
impressed, by conventional morality, Biff finds way to not let 
his mother’s sense of what is right triumph over his own. At 
the end of the play he would confront his father and tell him, 
amongst other things, that he intends to once again live the 
life he wants to lead. He intends to bust through the lies he 
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feels have cloaked and smothered their household all of their 
lives. Believing him instead intent on more cruelty, Linda tries 
to dissuade him. Much like before when she denigrated her 
children for their “inappropriate” behavior, she calls them 
“animals” and “louses” (124). But while before calling Happy 
a “bum” and accusing Biff of being selfish and uncaring, 
helped tame them, Biff is not here deterred. Rather, he 
casually accepts her brutal characterizations of him as true, 
apparently grants that he surely is “scum of the earth,” but 
knowing that doing what is actually right for his father will 
inevitably suffer her condemnation, still presses on “with 
absolute assurance” (125).
We note that this sense of Biff as an ultimately 
disregarding, merciless truth-teller is exactly how Douglas 
argues moderns preferred to imagine themselves. She argues 
they “[o]pposed every form of ‘sentimentality,’ they prided 
themselves on facing facts, the harder the better” (33). Their 
understanding was that since they sought out the kinds of 
unsettling truths Victorians at-all-cost avoided, they were 
their superiors, with no real warrant to look to them for 
guidance. Biff, as he makes his way past Linda, certainly 
seems the stronger of the two. His concern to hash it out 
with Willy makes him once again seem as manly as Texas—it 
makes him seem someone we readily believe had as a youth 
frightened the holy dickens out of moms. Linda believes Biff 
could only succeed in hurting Willy in his confronting him, 
but in fact the confrontation revives him—only not in a way 
Linda would delight in. She hoped Biff would help save 
PATRICK MCEVOY-HALSTON
498
Willy’s life, keep him, his habitual way of living, afloat. But 
Willy understood this life as insufficiently masculine, as 
cowardly, even, and we note that Linda herself thought it 
sufficiently hampered that she could without pause proclaim 
him “not great,” someone who, when things went awry, went 
about “a little boat looking for a harbor” (76). Biff helps 
make his father feel great again, as he did previously in his 
youth with his athletic accomplishments and his clear 
admiration for him. Their confrontation shows Willy the 
extent to which his son still cares about him, something he 
had been unsure of for some time. Biff, then, is a relative 
from afar who offers him great joy—and he clearly does 
imagine this visit as akin to the one Ben once paid him. 
Emboldened, he imagines Ben once again by his side, and 
persuades himself that one last opportunity still remains to 
demonstrate he is in fact a provider, a doer, a risk-taker—a 
real man. Bigsby writes that “Linda trumpets the fact that 
they have repaid their mortgage as if this was in some way the 
objective towards which their lives had been directed” (103), 
and it certainly does seem Linda’s key objective. But it was 
one Willy never saw realized, for he died before the last 
payment on the house was made—Linda actually says at the 
funeral, “we were just about free and clear” (103; emphasis 
added). The play ends with the two seeming very disparate: 
not only is Linda alive and Willy deceased, she is left thinking 
he died just before freedom would come to his rescue.
Willy escapes her understanding and her grasp, and so 
too Biff: we know he will once again live the life he wants to 
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lead. Just as with Cat on a Hot Tin Roof, the play ends by 
making characters moderns likely identified with in the 
ascendant, and their feared predecessor—the matriarch—
depleted, disparaged, disposed. Both plays, then, are ideally 
fabricated to help produce the merciless displacement of 
predecessors Douglas argues moderns’ cultural products were 
actually mostly intended for. But given the extent to which 
the matriarch in each of these plays is allowed room to range, 
perhaps they also worked to satisfy a need their freedom and 
growth ended up empowering—namely, to revisit and re-
experience maternal power so potent it could command from 
you your obeisance and cause more than the errant miss-step 
in your ongoing efforts to live your own life. 
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How Insensitive! (July 2006)
Historians once assumed that the termination of the slave 
trade showed that Britons are—or at least can be—a 
genuinely sensitive people. That is, they didn’t understand 
eighteenth-century sensibility as a culture, a phenomenon, a 
cult. Things have changed, however, for outside of popular 
history little history is being done these days where sensibility 
is taken at face value. In this exploration of how historians 
are currently characterizing mid-to-late eighteenth-century 
abolitionists and their ostensibly sensitive audience, I suggest 
that historians now prefer to characterize them, not as bad, 
but as calculating and self-interested. But if the current 
preferred conception of the sensible “man of feeling” is as 
either a rational man or a man of artifice, there are murmurs 
arising from current research into pornography and 
abolitionist literature which suggest that he is in the process 
of becoming understood, rather, as perverse, lecherous—as a 
subject worthy neither of admiration nor of dispassionate 
assessment, but simply of scorn.
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Contemporary historians generally identify mid-to-late 
eighteenth-century “men [and women] of feeling”—those 
who would fashion and/or read and/ enthusiastically respond 
to philanthropic causes—as people who saw in (the fashion 
of) sensibility, means to improve their status in society. 
Though it is true that in his well-known “The Birth of 
Sensibility,” Paul Langford identifies sensibility as a cultural 
phenomenon which helped stabilize British society by 
working against deism and by improving the over-all wealth 
of the British nation, he presents sensibility primarily as a tool 
with which the middle class empowered itself vis-à-vis the 
upper class. According to Langford, in an era which prized 
money and property, gentility was the ultimate prize. And to 
be genteel in an age of sensibility you needn’t be aristocratic; 
indeed, since the court was seen as artificial, it could count 
against you. So long as you had wealth, property, and could 
demonstrate successfully both to yourself and to others that 
you truly sympathized with the suffering of others, you could 
be counted amongst the genteel.
Langford’s conception of sensibility as the means by 
which self-righteousness and social position was rooted fits 
very well with the conception of the sensitive offered by 
other prominent contemporary historians of British society 
such as Anne Mellor, Linda Colley, and Barker-Benfield. 
These historians often characterize sensibility as a tool used 
intentionally for purposes of self-empowerment and 
satisfaction. Those who saw themselves as sensible were not, 
then, as they preferred to imagine themselves as, as free of 
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artifice— “natural;” indeed, Langford explicitly states that 
“naturalism was a cover for ever more contrived artifice” 
(477). Sentiment, he argues, was fundamentally about the 
individual and his/her own feelings (481). It was something 
fundamentally about one’s own needs, not those of others. He 
argues that such a conception of sentiment was recognized 
(by whom, Langford does not explain) as “dangerous” (481), 
but was “rendered useful” (481) by making it ostensibly about 
others, about attending and giving to others in need (the 
transformation of “sentiment” to “sensibility”). Sentiment 
needed to be directed, but could ostensibly have been 
directed near anywhere and serve its primary purpose of self-
empowerment and self-validation on the part of the sensible.
Brycchan Carey’s “Read this and Blush” argues that 
abolitionists and slavery apologists at the time actually saw 
sensibility as a movement which needn’t necessarily have 
been directed towards ending the slave trade. But before 
exploring Carey’s article and how it too presents us with a 
conception of the sensible which is typical but (perhaps) in 
the process of becoming highly contestable, I will note that 
though Langford’s article attempts a general overview of the 
culture of sensibility, though it offers no examination of 
primary material, it still advances a conception of men and 
women of feeling that can in my judgment convince simply 
because it offers one contemporary historians are eager to 
accept. Though the current trend in historiography is strongly 
against seeing historical subjects as beneficent, it does not 
lean towards imagining them as evil or amoral. Instead, the 
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expectation is that in any cultural era one will find people 
who are more or less the same as in any other. Cultures vary 
drastically, but (ostensibly) not so a people’s essential nature 
(Barker-Benfield, referring to Norbert Elias psychoanalytic 
study of cultural development, actually argues that people do 
change—but not that they improve). Langford’s subjects are 
far more self-interested than they are selfless, but they are not 
bad people: he thus offers the preferred (by historians) 
conception of people as neither heroic nor horrific. Though 
he writes that “abolition takes its place among the manifold 
expressions of the new sensibility” (516), and thereby makes 
abolition seem simply one of many means by which the 
fashionable engaged in the latest fashion—“sensibility,” he 
also writes that true “sensitivity to the plight” (505) of others 
arose from increased awareness of their suffering. Sensibility 
is to Langford (as it is to most historians of English culture) 
integral to the humanitarian movement, but not only or 
primarily such.
Like Langford, Carey is another historian who offers a 
sense of the eighteenth-century sensible “man” as someone 
of considerable artifice. He is as well another historian 
concerned to show how sensibility was used by one group 
against another; indeed, his article is primarily about how 
various prominent abolitionist and slavery apologists used 
sentimental rhetoric in a heated battle for the hearts of the 
British public. Readers of abolitionist literature are made to 
seem as if their level of interest in the slave trade depended 
upon the ability of abolitionists to craft writings that provided 
DRAINING THE AMAZON’S SWAMP
505
the satisfactions they were looking for. And these were? As 
the eighteenth-century progressed, readers increasingly 
expected sentimental descriptions of slaves so that they could 
make use of them to evidence their ostensibly intrinsic 
capacity to pity. As with Langford’s, in Carey’s account of 
them sentimental readers come across as a fickle lot—they 
had to handled in just the right way. He writes that 
abolitionists such as James Ramsey needed to know just how 
to use guilt to make readers feel obliged to support 
abolitionist efforts, without insulting them. They come across 
as completely self-interested, and as rather insincere as well: 
in a part of the article where he informs us how sentimental 
rhetoric was employed by both abolitionists and by slavery 
apologists, we are told that both abolitionists and slavery 
apologists felt the sensible public could be distracted away 
from the goings-on in the slave trade.  (We are told of how 
James Tobin and the Bristol newspapers used sentimental 
rhetoric in an effort to draw the sensitive reader to feel for 
the suffering agriculturalist and chimney sweep.)
Apparent in this article is not just how much the reading 
public demanded of writers of abolitionist literature, but also 
how able these writers proved in meeting their demands. 
About James Ramsay’s Essay on the Treatment and Conversion of 
African Slaves in the British Sugar Colonies, Carey writes:
Ramsay’s style is neither overtly evangelical, nor 
overtly sentimental. Rather, he sets out to discuss 
slavery under various headings and in various styles, 
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which initially gives the Essay a somewhat eclectic 
appearance. He writes about the history of slavery in 
the style of an historian, about the economics of 
slavery in the style of the new political economists, 
about the theology of slavery in the style of an 
Anglican clergyman, and about the humanity of 
slavery in the style of a sentimental novelist. Long 
before he chooses to deploy his sentimental rhetoric, 
Ramsay shows that he intends to be rigorous and 
scholarly. His descriptions of the daily routine of 
plantation slaves are meticulous on the one hand, 
while on the other hand he shows that he is prepared 
to take on some of the most celebrated thinkers of his 
age. (110)
Ramsay comes across here as a master of rhetoric, whose 
range and finesse with rhetorical tropes/tricks is on par with 
an adept playwright’s. But Carey seems most concerned to 
characterize them not so much as artisans but as 
commanders, commanders who used rhetoric not simply to 
satisfy readers’ desires and actions but to determine them. 
Thomas Clarkson (whose “Essay on the Slavery and Commerce of 
the Human Species [. . .] replaced James Ramsay’s Essay as the 
handbook of the emerging abolition movement” [130]), 
though he had never been to Africa, still with his writings 
determined the nature of how Africa and the slave experience 
came to be understood in Britain through the end of the 
eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century (133). 
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And he was fully aware of his power: we are told he 
“recognized the power of his vision to mould other people’s 
perceptions” (133).
When Carey attends to the sentimental efforts of slavery 
apologists, they too are described as empowered and cunning.  
Slavery apologists such as James Tobin come across, then, 
exactly as we would have expected them to have, given how 
they were introduced in the introduction (to the book of 
which this article constitutes one chapter) as “as skilful as 
they are insidious” (17). They—a select group—are insidious, 
evil; but like their rhetoric-wielding counterparts, they are not 
driven by sordid passions they remain largely unconscious of: 
they too are men of reason. Both groups of writers might, 
however, have come across as something other than as expert 
tacticians had Carey offered us lengthier selections of their 
descriptions of slave’ or chimney sweep’ life, and had he not 
directed us to look at the selections he does in fact supply as 
evidence of their rhetorical mastery. Though he does tell us 
that in Ramsay’s Essay we can find “forty pages of minute 
detail of the slaves’ daily sufferings” (11), and that in 
Clarkson’s Essay “there are many terrible, painful images of 
slaves suffering, and [that] we are repeatedly asked to 
sympathize not with the dismal and melancholy images 
beloved of sentimentalists but with more horrific images of 
violence and abuse” (132), very likely at the end of reading his 
article we do not suspect their interest in suffering arose from 
their being perverse.
In “Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain in 
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Anglo-American Culture,” Karen Halttunen actually asks if 
writers of abolitionist literature (her focus is on British and 
American culture from the late eighteenth to the mid 
nineteenth-century) enjoyed writing about/depicting slaves’ 
suffering. She writes: “Was it possible [. . .] that the 
reformers’ own sensibilities had been blunted or, worse, that 
their spectatorship had generated in them a positive taste for 
cruelty?” (326). But Halttunen is not putting forward her own 
question here; rather, it is one reformers were themselves 
asking concerning the potential effects of their long-
witnessing of pain and suffering. She argues that in the 
eighteenth-century the “cult of sensibility” (304) redefined 
pain so that it became something which was not just 
unacceptable, something which shouldn’t simply be tolerated 
as part of man’s lot, but something which could warp the 
minds and souls of those exposed to too much of it. It 
became generally understood that spectatorial sympathy 
could lead, not just to blunting one’s sensibilities but to the 
development of a taste for pain (308), a taste which 
manifested itself in the burgeoning popularity of gothic 
fiction. She writes that humanitarian reformers were 
concerned to prove that their own witnessing of horrific 
abuse hadn’t corrupted them. Anti-slavery writers, who often 
relied on extensive descriptions of torture they themselves 
had witnessed to help determine the nature of public regard 
for the slave trade, therefore “filled their writings with close 
descriptions of their own immediate emotional response to 
the spectacle of suffering, to demonstrate that their 
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sensibilities remained undamaged” (326). Reformers (anti-
slave trade and otherwise) were also concerned that the 
printed word could cultivate a taste for pain. They used a 
variety of techniques to help “distance themselves from any 
imputations of sensationalistic pandering” (328). (For 
example, she notes that Newton and Clarkson both use 
asterisks [328].) But, she writes, “[m]ost commonly, 
reformers’ apologies, demurrals, and denials of sensationalism 
were simply followed by shockingly vivid representations of 
human suffering” (330).
If they knew or suspected that such vivid representations 
risked warping their audience, risked actually producing more 
cruelty, why then did they for the most part still persist in 
showing them to their audience? Two possible answers come 
to mind. One, they did so because they decided that though 
they surely risked harming their readers, many of the afflicted 
would as a result find themselves even more determined to 
do something to help end the suffering. Two, they did so 
because they were sadists—whether or not as a result of 
prolonged exposure to others’ pain, something had warped 
them so that they were now compelled to draw others into 
their sickly state. Halttunen considers both possibilities, but 
very clearly prefers the former. She tells us that “[t]he 
reformers’ purpose was not to exploit the obscenity of pain 
but to expose it, in order to redefine a wide range of 
previously accepted social practices as cruel and 
unacceptable” (330). However, she appreciates that by 
persisting to show the scenes they could be understood as 
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being moved primarily by the latter impulse. But she works to 
persuade and even intimidate us away from understanding 
reformers as mostly sadistic, for she writes, “the historical 
emergence of the pornography of pain in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries and its wide-ranging presence 
in a variety of popular literary genres point the historical 
inadequacy of attributing the phenomenon solely to sexual 
psychopathology, whether individual or collective” (331).
Marcus Wood, in “Stedman: Slavery, Empathy, 
Pornography,” more or less comes to the opposite conclusion: 
that is, he argues that writers and readers of pornographic 
depictions of slaves were moved primarily by sadistic and/or 
masochistic impulses—they were perverse. As a test case to 
see if the eroticization of slave imagery was necessarily 
pornographic, he explores John Stedman’s writings on the 
slave trade. He concludes that though Stedman’s work before 
the 1790s was often salutary, in the ’90s it is clear that 
Stedman produced work from which he clearly took pleasure 
in his eroticized depictions of slave life. Wood believes that 
Stedman satisfied two urges in particular when he wrote his 
scenes of slave torture. One, he satisfied his masochistic need 
to vicariously experience the victim’s pain. Two, he took 
masturbatory and sadistic pleasure in “witnessing” male and 
female slaves subjected (essentially) to sexual violation.
Wood would have us believe that the ostensibly sensible, 
those who wrote and read anti-slavery tracts, exploited the 
suffering of slaves in a way and to an extent advanced by no 
other historian so far considered. He really does make the 
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sensible out to be abhorrent and evil—people whose pleasure 
in witnessing abuse was such that it is hard to believe they 
could have been anything but disappointed when victory was 
achieved and the slave trade finally ended. But it isn’t just the 
eighteenth-century sensibles who stand so accused. That is, 
there is a strong sense that twentieth-century historians—his 
contemporaries, his own cohort—are being charged with 
being perverse as well. Historians approach what he believes 
is really quite obviously simply pornographic literature, always 
out of higher purpose—just like sensibles did—and neither, 
suspiciously, and ultimately indictedly, can see the 
pornography: Wood would have us know that actually they’re 
both excusing their satisfaction of illicit desires at their 
subjects’ expense.
Wood makes other historians seem worthy of censure, 
and some historians are responding to him in kind. Carey, for 
example, writes that “Wood may not convince all readers that 
abolitionists were principally motivated by a desire to view 
sado-masochistic pornography (although, no doubt, some 
were), but he does remind us very strongly that the discourse 
of slavery and abolition is thoroughly entwined with other 
early-modern and modern discourses about the body, the 
mind, the soul, society, economy, and the fundamental 
questions asked by every generation about human nature and 
humanity’s place in the universe” (13). In this reference to 
Wood’s writing, I, at least, sense Carey both admonishing and 
schooling Wood. Wood is being reminded that historians 
know that though there are always individual exceptions; no 
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group of people is entirely either benevolent or sick—they’re 
always (ostensibly) a mixture of the good and the bad. People 
are essentially the same, wherever placed in time: their 
motives are common sense, never psychiatrist-worthy. Any 
other opinion is self-evidently ignorant. He is also being 
reminded that it is preferred that you mostly not talk motives, 
anyhow, especially their masturbatory, oral, sadistic, bodily 
ones. Instead, you are to talk about cultural discourses about the 
body subjects were located within and participated in. That is, 
you are to delimit the conversation about human motivation 
to conversations about conversations.
I happen to like Wood’s willingness to write of historical 
subjects as having masturbatory and oral needs. I admire how 
involved Wood is willing to become in the lives of those he 
studies, of the risk he is willing to take in hopes of figuring 
out what makes them tick. There is a real sense that when he 
estimates that Stedman “is like some gargantuan method 
actor always trying to get inside the experience of the victim, 
[. . .] always trying to eat up their suffering, so that in the end 
he can play their part better than they did” (139-40), that he 
came to this conclusion by trying to get inside Stedman’s 
experiential world.  That is, in his efforts to understand 
Stedman, he becomes something of the method actor 
himself. This sort of immersion is risky; identifying with 
someone like Stedman may be unsettling, and rarely do I see 
such boldness from historians. It can also lead to ridicule. For 
example, in the ’70s the psychohistorian Lloyd DeMause 
wrote that he would curl up in a fetal position to help access 
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the mental/emotional states of historical subjects he believed 
were regressing to states associated with birth, but such 
admissions helped make both him and psychohistory aptly 
sumuppable as “clownish” once academia had finally cleared 
itself from the unsettling 1960s/70s influences that had them 
for a short while letting their guard down, and allowing some 
outside “crazy thinking” in.
Wood’s essay actually very much reminds me of the sort 
of research one can still find in journals (if even still, ever so 
rarely) such as The Journal of Psychohistory. As with Wood’s 
essays, articles for this journal are willing to and do assume 
that historical subjects were often far more emotive, 
passionate, and sexual than they were rational and calculating. 
Unlike Wood’s article, however, what they don’t do is 
moralize; and it is his strong tendency to moralize, to 
condemn, that I find puzzling, unfortunate, and am myself 
inclined to want to censure. Wood understands Stedman and 
other reformers as sadists and/or masochists. He can identify 
Stedman as “a person of strong direct emotional responses 
and apparently without remorse” (138). But he does not seem 
to want us to involve ourselves in understanding how he 
came to be this way. No, Stedman is not set up to be 
understood, only for censure and ridicule. For example, when 
he discusses Stedman’s fear that he could be the subject of 
female rape, he directs us to “see the hysterical and intensely 
misogynistic account in Stedman, 1962, 39-40” (125). One 
senses here that if we looked at the account he directs us to 
and did not immediately recognize Stedman as but a vile 
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woman-hater, he would judge us suspect ourselves. Be 
assured, a therapist would find Wood’s characterization of 
Stedman as working against an empathic appreciation of why 
he feared older women; indeed, s/he would conclude it 
worked against understanding him, and judge it, as I judge 
it—cruel.
The current historiographical exploration of sensitivity 
and the English slave trade suggests that true sensitivity and 
empathy is a very hard thing to cultivate. But though I gauge 
Wood’s desire to humiliate Stedman, to show him up, 
extremely unfortunate, I find his efforts far more 
emancipatory and encouraging than depressing. With his 
work, with the alarmed reaction his work inspires from other 
historians, I sense the conception of historical subjects as 
mostly reasoning (or calculating) as coming under effective 
attack, and believe it could work to build stronger bridges 
between history and psychology/therapy. My hope is that it 
could help move some of those currently entering the 
historical field to engage more seriously with explorations of 
historical motives, once so fruitfully entertained in the ’70s. 
And if some of them do look anew at the research being 
engaged with at that time, they might find themselves 
empowered so they could actually accept Wood’s assessment 
of reformers, recognize them as often disingenuous, and yet 
still understand them as genuinely improving—as members of a 
generation that really were more empathic and sensitive than 
their predecessors were. That is, they might come to 
appreciate that the old whig historians, though mostly about 
DRAINING THE AMAZON’S SWAMP
515
triumphalism, actually held constant to an admirable historical 
truth. 
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The Good Fight (July 2006)
George Walker’s Love and Anger celebrates the virtues of a 
good fight, of a good war, and the rewards it offers its 
participants. Though wars are a kind of an embrace, they 
cannot be engaged in by lovers—they require good guys and 
bad guys, who hate one another. Walker implicitly 
understands how the desire for war mostly moves all wars, and 
communicates it primarily by cuing us to appreciate that all 
the good characters involved in the play’s battle between 
good and evil have similar-seeming evil counterparts. That is, 
he guides us to see everyone involved in the fray as 
potentially interchangeable, as truly of the same kind. So if war 
is being praised, is there anything or anyone in the play 
subjected to unmitigated critique? Yes, someone is. Though it 
well might be missed, Eleanor is set up for brutal criticism, for 
she is an agent of the cruel suppression peacemaking affords, 
and the play is strongly aligned against goodly-doers of this 
absolutely worst sort.
I understand that many will read or see the play and 
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judge it a satiric attack on power, lust, and greed—the usual 
triumvirate of the awful—embodied in its characters Sean 
Harris and John Connor. Yet much would have to be ignored 
in order to interpret the play this way. One would have to 
ignore much of how the play begins, for instance, for it 
begins with the ostensible foremost good and enlightened 
character, Peter Maxwell, indulging in just these same vices. 
Though he was once as vice-prone as any other, though he 
agrees with Harris when he argues that “for twenty years [he 
was] [. . .] one of the greediest and one of the biggest” 
“greedy prick[s]” (70), Maxwell believes himself now reborn, 
newly pure. Ostensible evidence of his goodly transformation 
comes from the fact that he gave up a lucrative position as 
head of a prominent Toronto law firm to deal with society’s 
downtown’ downtrodden. It also comes from his giving-away 
of all his possessions. Connor is willing to believe Sarah when 
she suggests, as part of an effort to manipulate him, that 
Maxwell might be “env[ious]” (50) of him; but though vice-
prone, he has no real cause to be envious, for the play begins 
by showing just how much he actually acquired through 
descent.
He gets, for instance, new clientele—of in truth an 
especially appealing kind. Though Maxwell wants us to 
imagine them as consisting not just of the disadvantaged but 
of the “quasi-exotic,” the “pathetic,” the “dregs” (30-31), and 
though Harris deems Maxwell’s new clientele more reason to 
pity him, to not draw the law down upon him, the only client 
of his we actually encounter provides him something he likely 
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did not possess with any surety with his previous clientele—
namely, clear evidence of his power over them. That is, though 
Maxwell says that with his previous clientele he used to “piss 
on their ingrained intelligence” (19), simply in order to afford 
his services his previous clientele would have had to have 
counted amongst the very rich and entitled—they would have 
been the sort to know that Maxwell was their lawyer, 
ultimately their servant, that they were the ones paying him. 
And though they would have respected Maxwell’s reputation 
and genius, this would have made him—but appropriate, to 
properly attend to their business. Indeed, though the play 
concerns Maxwell’s life after having left his old law firm, it 
still reminds us of what previous clientele contact could have 
been like by showing us how Harris’s new client, Connor, 
reacts when he believes he’s being poorly served. When 
confused and confounded by Sarah’s behavior towards him, 
Connor turns to Harris and exclaims: “Look, you’re my 
lawyer and I want some answers from you right now!” (51). 
With Gail, Maxwell’s new client, however, though she shows 
some dismay with her lawyer—i.e., Maxwell—too, she is 
readily made quiescent, for she is vastly more dependent on 
hers than Connor is on his own. Connor, being rich, can 
always hire a different lawyer, an option not available to her. 
Nor is there any chance that even if she could find other help, 
s/he’d count amongst the country’s best lawyerly minds, 
something we are told Maxwell once was, and may still be. 
Her dependency upon Maxwell, we note, is made clear both 
to her and to us at the beginning of the first scene. Maxwell 
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seems to have taken advantage of the fact that he knows Gail 
really has no one else to turn to by speaking to her in ways he 
wouldn’t dare with a less dependent client—with someone 
who really could afford to turn down his services. Maxwell 
has talked to her—or, more accurately, at her—for a half an 
hour, concerning things which clearly interest him but are of 
little interest to her. When Gail complains about his apparent 
lack of interest in her own concerns, Maxwell responds by 
first reminding her that she is marginal (Maxwell tells her, 
“You’re marginal. Your cause is marginal. Outside the 
corridor, so to speak” [13]), then of how lucky she is to have 
found him (Maxwell tells her, “I believe you when obviously 
no one else does” [14]), and moves her to appreciate that “a 
shiny new future” (15) depends entirely on her “letting” him 
behave just as he wishes (Maxwell tells her, “you’ll have to 
allow me to proceed in my own way” [14]). That is, in 
response to her agitation and assertiveness, Maxwell manages 
her into—for him—comfortable pliancy.
Gail will not be paying Maxwell in cash—there is 
something else he desires from her. This something isn’t sex, 
but the play guides us to appreciate that—if he had been a 
slightly different man… For with Gail, the play presents us 
with a childish—with her ball cap and jeans—young woman 
whose readiness to be servile is suggested in her being in his 
office in response to Maxwell’s beckoning (i.e., his “call” 
[14]). She has a husband—but his return to her rests entirely 
with her getting this middle-aged man to agree to take on her 
cause. This he agrees to, but only if she agrees to “trust” (15) 
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him, to accept his unusual behavior and submit to his odd 
requests. He hints that the thing she most has to offer is love, 
a willingness and an ability to service the needs of all those in 
“need [of] love” (15). She shows this, but also fear: she fears 
he might be “crooked.” In sum, though I think—especially 
with his easing her fears, his effort to get her to trust him, and 
his assurance that if she does so her reward will be a shiny 
new future—there is something in their relationship that 
smacks of the pedophilic “relationship” between the candy-
laden pedophile and the guileless child, we more strongly 
sense the middle-aged man seeking not quite so puerile 
revitalization through associations with the young. Someone, 
that is, who is undergoing your typical midlife crisis.
It should be difficult to understand Maxwell any 
different. He is in his early fifties and has been further 
reminded of his mortality by just having suffered a stroke. His 
mind is clearly on death: when he surveys his life, he imagines 
it one where “Death was surrounding [him] [. . .] like a 
demon inevitability” (17). He suddenly understands his life as 
unfulfilling—the definitive midlife crisis complaint. Harris, we 
note, makes the same complaint. And when Harris visits 
them we are made to appreciate how these ostensibly now 
completely different men still share the exact same life goals.
With Harris and Maxwell, we have two men of about the 
same age (specifically, Maxwell is “50,” Harris, in his “early 
50s” [12]), who pursued the same career path—law—and 
seek rejuvenation: Maxwell seeks “rebirth” (31), Harris, “new 
challenges” (27). Maxwell believes himself on a very different 
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track than the one Harris still resides on, and there is cause to 
mistake them as vastly dissimilar from one another. Maxwell 
has stripped himself of his earthly goods; Harris’ new pursuit 
is built on all he had accumulated: he will use the friends and 
reputation he has acquired from being an established lawyer 
to launch a career as a politician. Maxwell locates himself in 
the “gutters” and associates with the destitute; Harris seeks 
“new mountain”-tops and takes on increasingly affluent and 
powerful clients (i.e., Connor). But the differences, though 
they appear significant, remain superficial: both paths attend 
to the very same needs, to assuaging the exact same fear. The 
(stereo)typical midlife fear is of death, and both paths tend to 
this fear. Maxwell believes that with his new life he has 
regained his childhood. He prefers to be called “Petie” 
because it better suits who he has become—“[y]ounger,” 
“more unfinished” (30). He believes he has become the 
person he once was before law school corrupted him, the 
young Maxwell who once had principles, who followed his 
parents’ code of honor. Rather than someone who will soon 
face death, he believes his miraculous re-invention of himself 
amounts to a re-birth. He will help create a “new era”: phase 
two is “[t]he amazing rebirth of Petie Maxwell and the new 
era to which he is dedicated” (31). But though Maxwell will 
be reborn, Harris’s new path means his maybe never 
perishing: for no matter how successful a lawyer becomes, it 
is only the lawyer who moves on to become a politician that 
has any chance of being immortalized.
In short, the play provides very good reason for 
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understanding these two men as not so different from one 
another as they prefer to believe is the case. Maxwell believes 
Harris used him. He wants Harris to believe his theft of his 
wife and kids made him feel like one of “God’s lowest 
creatures” (32). But we should not believe him in this, for 
Harris’ theft is actually advantageous for Maxwell. In pursuit 
of a new life path, Maxwell seeks to shorn himself of all that 
ties him to a previous one he associates with death. He 
gleefully gives away all he had acquired during his twenty 
years as a lawyer, but had he also had to distance himself 
from his wife and kids, he would not have been able to do so 
so readily. Middle-aged men who in their mid-life crisis act 
childishly and hang out with young women, often experience 
a crippling hangover: they must deal with the anger and 
disappointment they receive from wives and children they’ve 
neglected and humiliated. Thanks to Harris’ “theft” (for 
though Maxwell chides Harris for thinking of his wife as a 
possession, it seems clear that Maxwell thinks of her as much 
the same: he exclaims, “You’d been screwing my wife” [32; 
emphasis added]), Maxwell can more readily understand his 
rebirth as something earned.
If Harris’ own path wasn’t predicated on accumulation, 
Maxwell might actually owe him one for taking his wife (a 
wife, we note, he thought a “jerk” [31]) and kids off his 
hands. By having Maxwell argue that his humiliation could be 
completed either by his bending down and kissing Harris’ ass 
or by Harris bending down and kissing Maxwell’s, the play 
suggests that who exactly is using whom here may not be so 
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clear. More than this, with the humiliation accomplishable 
regardless of who does the bending down and who the 
remaining upright, the play encourages us to assess Maxwell’s 
descent and Harris’ ascent as interchangeable; as means to the 
very same end.
Since Harris is Maxwell’s old partner, and since Connor 
is made to seem as much Harris’ new partner as he is his new 
client (they are likened to a team throughout), we are guided 
to compare Maxwell and Connor as if they were former and 
current partners of Harris.’ And, indeed, in how they both 
differ from Harris—and despite Maxwell’s attempt to 
establish Connor as nothing more than a Nazi—they can 
seem similar. Maxwell acknowledges that Harris is charming. 
His charm and ease are the products of his privileged family 
background. He is polished, good-looking, superior—the sort 
of person people can feel almost obligated to promote to 
societies’ highest positions. Both Maxwell and Connor have 
made good but despite the odds, through their ingenuity and 
boldness. Connor makes clear that he more or less emerged 
from nothing, that he came from a working-class 
background. The same seems true of Maxwell as well, for he 
characterizes his background as one where humility and 
honor were the highest virtues—virtues, that is, held in 
highest-esteem typically by the conservative working class. 
Both, too, are hotheads. Connor is explosive and quick to 
anger; and even though Maxwell can be tender, he certainly 
rages as well. (Harris accuses him of having spread 
“outrageous, bullheaded, unsupportable, inflaming crap” 
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about Connor, and given what we see of Maxwell, we do not 
doubt the accuracy of these characterizations.)
Both claim the same turf: they’re ostensibly all about 
serving the needs of the lower classes. Maxwell would be 
their legal and moral crusader, Connor their guide to all they 
need know of the world. In fact, given all we had by then 
heard of Connor and Maxwell, at the beginning of scene 
three, when Sarah is telling Eleanor and Gail her story of an 
invasion, as we hear her story and think of its protagonists we 
might be thinking as much of Maxwell as we are of Connor. 
Her story is about invasive men “looking for a place to take 
over,” that are “[l]ooking for adventure” (33). These men 
have “sold” (33) all their goods, have “prostitute[d]” “their 
wives,” and set up a “headquarters” in this alien territory (33-
4). They believe themselves “indestructible,” are intent on 
being “free to be themselves,” have voices inside them 
“talking to them,” and have a proprietary, expansive desire to 
get their “word [. . .] out” (34). Maxwell is looking for 
adventure (he will identify his activities as an “adventure” 
[42]), he has given away all his goods, he has a wife now 
sleeping with another man, he believes he is “immune” (32) 
to persecution, he has entered an unfamiliar part of town and 
set up headquarters there, he has argued that his turn to the 
“dark side” in law school resulted from a force having taking 
him over, he believes himself finally “back” (26) to being the 
man he once was, he has made the whole city aware of his 
opinion of Connor, and he has his mind on the 
“reorganization of an entire culture” (29). So even though 
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Sarah’s story is about crusaders who hate those not-white-in-
color, and even though Maxwell and others repeatedly call 
Connor a Nazi, it is a story that actually lends to 
understanding its main protagonists as being more similar to 
Maxwell than to Connor.
So given that the play encourages us to consider just how 
different villains really are from heroes, the play could be 
assessed as a satire on the efforts of societal do-gooders, with 
all their ostensibly selfless, noble intentions. Though I have 
focused on the play’s first act, its ending even better supports 
this thesis. The trial evidences an outrageously greedy and 
unfair Maxwell. Though he acknowledges that you can repent 
just by “say[ing] to yourself, ‘I repent’” (70), Maxwell won’t 
allow that Harris might do the same to exonerate himself. 
That is, “The demigod [,] [. . .] [t]he former greedy prick[,] [. . 
.] [t]he man with a hole in his brain[,] [. . .] [t]he angry man[,] 
[. . .] t]he reborn man[,] [. . .] [t]he avenger!” (71)—Maxwell—
is the only one who gets to repent. One cannot but sense 
here that to Maxwell, Harris is simply means to satisfy his 
own need to feel grandiose. The trial also evidences a greedy 
and unfair Sarah as the presiding judge. Sarah believes she is 
fair, not prejudicial (79), but she too is shown using the trial 
to humiliate Connor and Harris—the same need she attended 
to earlier by fooling them into thinking she was a lawyer 
(“Well that just shows how stupid you are. I’m a mental 
patient. You’ve been tricked by a person with a shattered 
mind” [51]). Her verdict of brutal humiliation and execution 
(they are to be drowned in toilets) for the guilty, is moved by 
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whim, not evidence. And since this verdict follows a long 
series of humiliations (which include brutal physical assault, 
and exhaustive name-calling) inflicted upon the two (on 
Connor, especially), it is no surprise that a number of critics 
find the court scene indulgent and counter-productive.
Mel Gussow, for one, in a review for the New York Times, 
argues that the play is “self-defeating[,]” for “[a]s the lawyer 
[Maxwell] [. . .] sinks deeper into misanthropy and into 
sermonizing, he becomes increasingly tiresome” (New York 
Times, 9 December 1990). Of course, if the play is judged a 
satiric attack on progressive reformers rather than on the rich 
and powerful, Gussow’s reaction would argue for its 
effectiveness, not its failure. Indeed, those who react to the 
play as Gussow does and are familiar with the history of 
satire, could see the play as akin to Apuleius’ Metamorphoses, 
for, just as Love and Anger makes the rich and poor seem 
similar to one another, just as it repeatedly emphasizes their 
intrinsic similarity and mutual culpability by having them 
frequently fuse into “a mass of punching, kicking, groaning 
bodies” (52),
 
[t]he Metamorphoses shows that in a narrative satire 
fictions operate through the interrelatedness of 
characters: not only the relationship between two 
people, a fool and a knave, but between rich and poor 
fools, [. . .] and so on. They are held close to a theme 
or a vice, but they also project a visualizable world of 
total interrelatedness, like a cheese completely 
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infiltrated by maggots [. . .] [.] As it is unrolled, this 
world is monotonously similar in all its details, and 
finally static; but a world nevertheless in which Lucius 
[principle character of the Metamorphoses] is himself 
deeply implicated. (Ronald Paulson 57)
Or perhaps they would find the play akin to picaresque 
satires, to those satires that feature Quixote (heroic)-figures 
who aim to be honorable but “easily become [. . .] selfish 
egoist[s] who tr[y] to make over the world in [their] [. . .] own 
image” (Paulson 101). But though in so many ways Love and 
Anger seems intent on critiquing would-be heroes and leaving 
it at that, its over-all intention is not really to show them up. 
Instead, the play argues for the real wisdom, rather than the 
folly, to be found—by one and all—through war.
The play makes this argument primarily through what it 
shows happening to Sarah when she engages with those she 
believes evil and beyond redemption. Just as it worked to 
make Maxwell comparable to those he feuds with, the play 
encourages us to understand Sarah as much the same as all 
the others constituting the massings that develop out of each 
of the melees. She believes Connor to be similarly possessed 
by mean-spirited voices, which talk to and control them. She 
serves as Maxwell’s new partner, and thereby is primed for 
ready comparison with his previous one—Harris. She too is 
in search of revitalization and freedom. And though while 
pretending to be his new law partner, she is the one who 
voices a loud critique of simplistic, brutal solutions (i.e., she 
gets Connor to admit the absurdity of killing the poor as a 
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solution to downtown problems), she actually demonstrates 
why brutality can be an effective means towards solving 
longstanding concerns. After Sarah does the amazing in 
persuading a veteran lawyer and a canny businessman she is a 
competent lawyer who can handle and manipulate Maxwell, 
she, Gail, Harris, and Connor participate in a wild melee. The 
fight is followed by a blackout and an intermission: the 
audience is made to wonder just what might have happened?, 
to speculate as to what good could possibly have followed 
from two women taking on at least one highly enraged male 
opponent who “wanted to kill” (53) them. When the play 
resumes, the audience is provided good reason to decide 
things turned out badly, for “[t]he office is a mess,” “Gail is 
sitting on the floor against the desk [,] [. . .] and Sarah is lying 
face down near the door” (53). But though Sarah says she 
likely has a broken bone, both she and Gail are in fact actually 
doing very well. Sarah found delivering blows very 
“satisfying”; she thoroughly enjoyed getting “in a few really 
good whacks” (53). She in fact guesses that she’d have been 
better off if she’d “started hitting earlier in [. . .] life” (53), and 
seems right in this, for fighting lead not just to a high but to 
be able “to make sense” (54), to sanity, to a willingness to 
admit she does not in fact believe herself black: a substantial 
step toward using something superior to avoidance to deal 
with her troubles.
The battle proved therapeutic; and in the loving and 
supportive sisterhood it helped beget between Gail and Sarah, 
it looks to have engendered even more. And we note that 
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after the fight, neither of them hate their opponents. Instead, 
Gail reflects on how her preferred way of seeing the rich 
cloaked her from being aware of her own need to hate them, 
and admits that the rich might not even actually be the 
villains she had admittedly willfully taken them for. Sarah 
admits she imagines herself black because it helps her “feel 
brave” (54), and she’s surely onto something here: for 
previously she admitted that though she “doesn’t take 
messages” from ordinary people, she would rise to action if 
such calls came from “[p]eople threatening Petie” (35).
Though they seem to do little more than drug her up, her 
doctors might still appreciate that what Sarah really needed 
was to be around those who could draw her out. For we are 
told they believe Sarah “has to have a way, even in her state, 
to manifest her courage [. . .] [—] [t]hat her courage is still the 
most important thing to her” (35). It is Eleanor who relates 
this information, and it is Eleanor who clearly does not 
believe it—for she responds to Sarah’s participation in the 
fray simply by berating her for it. She sees the results of the 
melee and judges it foul—and as surely resulting from Sarah’s 
impulsive decision to attack Gail. She is irate, and tells her 
sister to stop “scaring [her] [. . .] to death” (56). Eleanor 
would have Sarah remain pacified, sedated through drugs, 
because an active and alert Sarah is a source of considerable 
distress for her. We note that Eleanor wishes Maxwell had 
failed in his efforts to shift his work to the slums for the same 
selfish reason. For even while he’s suffering from another 
stroke, she can’t help but berate him for making a move that 
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has her feeling “very uneasy” and unable to “function” (56). 
Maxwell, however, wants Eleanor to join in with his group, to 
join in with his movement. It is a request he makes several 
times, and we note her typical response: “Don’t involve me in 
whatever it is you’re up to these days. I have problems of my 
own” (16). Near the play’s close, however, she says she would 
be “grateful” (61) to be included—but in truth this would be 
cause not for celebration but for regret, for nowhere in the 
text is there a hint that she would prove anything but a very 
sour addition to Maxwell’s gang.
Eleanor is a bummer, a spoiler of everyone else’s fun. 
Even after she says she would “honestly” be very grateful to 
be included in Maxwell’s plans, just her presence causes Sarah 
to lose confidence in her performance as the trial’s judge (we 
noticed her ascent from patient to lawyer to judge) and begin 
to cry. She is most active in the trial when she slaps Connor 
on the face for his blasphemous prayer, an act consistent with 
her response to Maxwell’s lambasting of religion at the 
beginning of the play. (A battle follows her slapping of 
Connor, but we note that since somehow everyone but 
Eleanor ends up “form[ing] [the] [. . .] mass of [tangled] 
bodies” that end up on the couch, her being exclused is made 
to seem as if it is one of the points behind the melee.) She is 
the one who would call the police or the hospital in response 
to any dangerous development—and we note that if she had 
called an ambulance after Maxwell suffered his stroke, he 
would have been denied the opportunity to die honorably, 
redemptively, in battle. (Harris and other characters also at 
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times threaten to call the police, but they always pull back 
from doing so; indeed, their threats to call the police make 
them seem akin to kids who threaten the same but are 
actually determined not to let things move into adult control.)
We also note that in scene one Maxwell’s sudden need to 
berate people on the street, to insist that they “[h]ave a little 
self-respect” (19), follows his being schooled by Eleanor on 
the proper way to treat people. That is, Eleanor, who was 
introduced as “[c]arrying a bag of cleaning supplies” (16), 
who is identified by her sister as being “brilliant” at “tidy[ing] 
up” (61), makes Maxwell, the would-be crusader of the 
downtrodden, sound, in his demand that the street people 
“[g]et out of the garbage” (19), just like she does. The real 
threat to Maxwell and Sarah’s rejuvenation clearly is not 
Harris and Connor, who, though they begin by mocking the 
trial, not only actively participate in it but end up crediting its 
legitimacy—they dance and cheer when they believe the 
apparently-not-so-show trial has established their innocence 
and clarified their virtue—but rather, Eleanor. And after she 
unsettles Maxwell and Sarah, she herself gets violated.
Connor greatly unsettles Eleanor when he handles her 
and moves her out of his way (20), and in this particular 
instance, violence is set up as praiseworthy, not because it can 
make people feel good but because it can of course also make 
them feel really, really lousy. Maxwell judges Connor’s 
behavior to be truly odious. He calls Connor a “bully” (20), 
and suggests his behavior toward Eleanor proves he must 
have beaten his secretary so badly she required hospitalization 
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(21). But the play guides us to question just how offended 
Maxwell really is by Connor’s violence towards her, to 
wonder if at some level if Connor, in attacking her, is serving 
as Maxwell’s agent. Connor’s assault on Eleanor follows a 
contest between Maxwell and her that seems as if between 
mother and child. While interacting with Gail, he takes out 
and plays with a string of colored paper clips. Eleanor, 
wishing him to behave less childishly, takes them from him, 
an act he follows rebelliously by taking another clip from out 
of his pocket. But since this contest ends with her 
successfully chiding Maxwell away from childish behavior 
toward an advocacy of orthodox adult virtues (i.e., 
cleanliness, self-respect), it is one she wins decisively. And 
then, we note, Connor bullies her. Maxwell actually construes 
the attack as a child’s upon his mother. He asks Connor, 
“What’s wrong. Some trouble with mummy?” (20). But the 
play makes clear that it is Maxwell, not Connor, who is prone 
to think of Eleanor as his mother, for his near last words are, 
“Eleanor, you look like my mother” (83).
Eleanor is not gravely hurt by play’s end, and if we assess 
the play as holding the same conception of mothers many of 
those living in the twentieth-century’s other extended period 
of Darwinian capitalism—the 1920s—did, this would have 
been too much to ask. At one point in the play Maxwell calls 
God a “she” (42), suggesting that rather than a man and a 
father the almighty is instead a woman and a mother. Ann 
Douglas writes that ’20’s New Yorkers believed the same 
thing, that is, that the greatest obstacle to growth was a 
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(historical) woman (in their case, their predecessor, the 
Victorian Titaness)—and held destroying her the first of 
priorities. Specifically, she argues in Terrible Honesty that for its 
cultural emergence modern New York depended upon a 
collective, ruthless effort to distinguish itself from a 
Victorian, matriarchal past. New Yorkers, she argues, 
believed their predecessors to be puppets of clan matriarchs, 
and in order to avoid their fate, made their city fully offensive 
to matriarchal control.
Douglas spends a great deal of her book delineating how 
writers especially played a big part in helping New Yorkers 
understand their city as matricidal, in showing how they not 
only helped create but helped keep going the manic but 
highly creative ’20s energy. And it may be that works such as 
Love and Anger played a part in helping sustain the manic 
period of indulgent capitalism Torontonians experienced at 
the end of the twentieth-century. For just like how writers in 
the ’20s helped entrench the presence of the brutal, 
empowered father-figure, Love and Anger leaves us with the 
sense that the text’s featured bully(er) of mothers—
Connor—will continue to rule in Toronto. It ends with him 
feeling rejuvenated, dead set on “keep[ing] the momentum 
going” (81). And though it is easy to imagine playgoers being 
disappointed in this, it is just as easy to imagine the affluent 
amongst them, those enjoying all the spoils capitalism 
afforded them, feeling reassured that this satire was not one 
which foretold the end to bad-boy economics. Since satires 
are normally understood not just as critiques but as agents of 
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reform, the Toronto-advantaged were likely well allayed in it 
actually playing out as something of an anti-satire. 
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Soothing Satire (July 2006)
Generation X purports to offer “tales for an accelerated 
culture,” but it really offers tales that service the needs of a 
select group of people—those who constitute Generation X. 
Its aim is therapeutic; it seeks not so much to scold as to heal. 
But if we care about such things, it may yet still be judged a 
satiric text. For healing requires the construction of a group 
surround, a secure, distinct sense of themselves as different 
from all others, and recent scholarship has it that this is 
something satires are wont to do too. Though we may not be 
prepared to imagine satires as as much about the construction 
of groups as they are about criticizing them, in The Literature of 
Satire Charles Knight argues that eighteenth-century satires, at 
least, did nurture the development of “nations” (a particular 
kind of group), and that they did this by “celebrating” “the 
characteristics of one’s nation” while “mock[ing]” “those of 
others” (58-59).
Generation X cultivates a generation’s identity rather than 
a national one, but works in the same way Knight believes 
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eighteenth-century satire once did: that is, those select group 
of twenty/thirty-somethings who aim to simplify their life, to 
opt out of a society bent on the mindless acquisition of more 
and more, are made to seem salutary, while those who either 
choose to remain within, or are unaware of the problematic 
nature of, their society, become worthy of mockery. Since 
Gen Xers like to see themselves as nicer than other people, 
they would have to take care when they mock. And though I 
think they do this because they really are that damned nice, 
the fact that after they mock they often pull-back afterwards 
and reprimand themselves for being unfair, does make them 
seem concerned to not be too mean. An example of such 
pulling-back occurs when, after Claire assesses the old 
patrons who visit her store as “endless waves of gray hair 
gobbling up the jewels and perfumes at work,” and as “greedy 
little children who are so spoiled, and so impatient, that they 
can’t even wait for food to be prepared” (9), the narrator 
admits that however much he enjoyed Claire’s 
characterization of them, it was nevertheless “a cruel, 
lopsided judgment of what Palm Springs really is” (9-10). But 
given how frequently members of generations which precede 
and follow their own are characterized as not just shallow and 
unconscious but as barely controllable beings with insatiable 
oral needs, we are guided to conclude that though it might 
well be cruel to mock them, it would be hopeless to try and 
redeem them.
By oral needs, I mean an insatiable desire to chat and 
chew (and vomit—they seem to do a lot of that too). Gen 
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Xers are subject to their (i.e., other generations’) “incessant” 
“chatting” (33), and are keenly aware of their need to chew. 
Claire imagines old ladies as capable of eating live animals, as 
“sucking the food right out of them” (9), but the text makes 
clear that they’d much prefer human meat, for they count 
amongst the numerous essentialized as cannibals in the text. 
Mrs. Baxter would eat her brood, and even the stylish, the 
tailored—Tyler and his set—“would have little, if any, 
compunction about eating [their] fellow[s]” (106). Those with 
cannibalistic tendencies cannot of course be expected to 
move society in progressive new directions. Whatever the 
nature of their self-assessments, regardless of where they’ve 
dined—regardless of who they’ve dined upon!—devourers 
cannot constitute a society’s brain trust. But they may yet 
have something important to offer—other than making Gen 
Xers look good in comparison, that is. Just as those deemed 
intrinsically debased—slaves—kept the American-plantation 
South and ancient Greece “going,” commercial societies’ 
peons can be trusted to work, work, work, so they can buy, 
buy, buy. All of them, even Andy’s parents, who count 
amongst the text’s few non-Gen Xers that aren’t 
characterized as creatures of appetite, enjoy the fruits of 
commercial society, and all of them can at least be trusted to 
keep things moving, to keep dramatic change at bay, and 
thereby service Gen Xers’ foremost need—to feel that the 
ground they stand on won’t unexpectedly shift away.
Clearly evident in the text is how much Gen Xers fear 
the future. Andy admits to this fear, but the margins as much 
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as the main text inform us of it. The margins—Gen X’s 
territory—tell of their efforts to overcome their fear, by 
switching lifestyles, for example (26). They tell of Gen X’s 
awareness of the “false sense of security among coworkers in 
an office environment (111), of their suspicion that “you 
might not count in the new world order” (159), and of their 
desperate need to believe that someone out there will take 
care of them (34). But the margins tell another story too, 
namely, that the behemoth commercial society, its ways and 
its products, will last and last, and so the path of the future, as 
depressing as it might seem, is nevertheless clearly spelled 
out—certain. Shoppers might “pretend that the large, cement 
blocks thrust into their environment do not, in fact, exist” 
(71), but they manifestly do. Thrust into our face is the text’s 
message that “the love of meat prevents any real change” (10; 
emphasis added). And because society’s cannibalistic 
carnivores enjoy “stuff” as much as they enjoy “steak,” 
“Brazilification,” a widening of the gap “between the rich and 
the poor” (11), is made to seem as if it cannot but be the 
future.
This is not to say that everything made to seem 
permanent is not subsequently made to seem perishable. For 
example, Andy states that his parents’ home has been in 
essentially the same state for decades, but also that much 
energy has been put into “staving off evidence of time’s 
passing” (137), and that for all such effort, it could still prove 
victim to sudden catastrophe. But there is a sense that should 
disaster occur, it would be precipitated not by others but by 
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Andy’s parents themselves, out of a felt need to prove their 
fears justified. Fear of the future precipitates disaster, but 
again, though this fear is registered by some who don’t count 
amongst the Gen X set—by Dag’s former office mate, 
Margaret, for example—the buying hordes either seem 
blissfully unaware there is anything to fear or understand 
“catastrophe” as no more than an exciting thrill-ride. Tyler’s 
generation does not fear the future. Nor, seemingly, do Phil 
and Irene—that is, those who live in a “permanent 1950s” 
(112). Andy admits to envying Tyler his lack of fear, and he 
may be just as “sooth[ed]” (112) by him as he is by Phil’s and 
Irene’s ongoing 1950s.
In a chapter titled “It can’t last,” we find further 
evidence of just why “it”—i.e., commercial society—actually 
can. Claire, discussing how pained she is to be visiting 
Disneyland with her cousins at the age of twenty-seven, looks 
to the resort she’s staying at and says, “I can’t believe I let 
myself get dragged into this. If the wind doesn’t knock this 
place down first, it’ll implode from a lack of hipness” (37). 
The resort, La Spa de Luxembourg, will disappear one day, 
but would be replaced by something equally obnoxious. The 
needs of obnoxious but unrelenting families like the one she’s 
burdened with, who, though they talk about disasters, do so 
in a “spirited” (34) manner, ensure this will be the case. And 
we should not believe that Claire would have it otherwise. 
For though both she and Andy imagine blowing apart the 
staidness, the text suggests that they would be upset if any 
such disruption actually occurred. When it turns out Claire’s 
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father is having a heart attack rather than just another one of 
his faux ones, when Andy describes his parents’ fear that their 
never-changing house could be vandalized, the narrative does 
not turn towards gleeful celebration; instead, it veers in the 
opposite direction. It is not that Gen Xers do not desire for 
their families, the outside world, to undergo dramatic 
alteration—they very likely do, but not before they’re (i.e., 
Gen Xers) ready. And Gen Xers won’t be ready until they’ve 
dressed the damage life had inflicted upon them before they 
opted out.
Preparing themselves so they’re ready for change may in 
fact be a large part of what Gen Xers are up to behind the 
walls of their constructed generational surround, within their 
established sanctuaries. That is, with the semi-conscious 
slaves of commercial society going about their business, with 
the outside world, in its routineness, in its predictableness, 
seeming in some ways akin to the day-to-day life of those 
living within boring but safe Texlahoma, Gen Xers are not 
using their free time as plantation owners and Greek 
aristocrats were wont to do with theirs. They aren’t 
luxuriously languishing. They aren’t simply philosophizing. 
They aren’t even doing what Andy says they are doing—not 
really. Andy says they are stitching together stories “to make 
their own lives worthwhile” (8); and though their stories may 
make them seem enviably cool, worthy of admiration, though 
their stories do work to make them seem worthy of 
celebration in the way Knight argues satiric tales once helped 
make Britons feel, they stitch more to repair than they do to 
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construct. But maybe we should expect this from storytellers 
these days—even satirical ones. That is, though scholars like 
John Clare argue that the severe wars between nations in the 
twentieth-century has meant that not just satirists but all 
writers will be drawn to write of entropy, of the inevitability 
of dissolution and decay, it may in fact be more reasonable to 
expect the opposite from them: that is, that shared, widescale 
multi-national tragedies would lead to sustained efforts to use 
stories to help recover from a lengthy period of disquiet.
It may be that shocks can be quitted through potentially 
disquieting means, though. It may have been beneficial for 
Andy to have chosen to recall, and thereby come to associate, 
his memory of when his Americanness lead him to being 
subject to a crowd of Japanese co-workers’ jealous gazes, with 
his just having made a carload of Japanese tourists feel 
uncomfortable and fearful. But clearly the stories themselves 
and/or the nature of the environment in which they are told 
helps ease or quit shocks by means less sadistic. Indeed, he 
tells us about the drawbacks of being selected for special 
attention by a Japanese executive, not just after a 
confrontation but amidst a group of friends, who’ve agreed 
not to critique one another’s stories. Andy borrowed the 
practice from alcoholics anonymous; but while those in AA 
used it at one another’s expense, Andy and his friends use it 
help one another heal and improve. Told within a nurturing 
atmosphere of friends who genuinely want to help one 
another live better lives, the awfulness that emerges from 
their stories about the sun, for example, lead to Andy’s 
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decision not to partake in such awfulness, and to Claire’s 
decision that they ask for more from themselves than using 
stories to construct a “carapace of coolness” (8).
Cushioning can also be found within some of the stories 
themselves. For instance, Evlina finishes her telling of Tyler’s 
distressful life story with her beaming restorative warmth and 
love into his eyes. Andy’s story of how Edward’s room 
became a nightmaric enclosure also ends—with Edward 
emerging into a world which promises that you can “move 
about with ease” (51), once you’ve learned your way—
soothingly. So, too, his story of his distressful encounter with 
the Japanese executive, which has him back in Portland 
“breathing less crowded airs” (59). But as is clear from 
Claire’s reaction to their stories about the sun, the stories 
themselves neither need be warm nor end warmly for them to 
assist Andy’s group of friends “live life” more “healthily” (8). 
Indeed, very often it seems their stories function primarily to 
help point out the exact nature of their wounds so that within 
the confines of their sanctuary they can be addressed. Andy’s 
fictional and true-life stories reveal his obsession with, and 
very likely also his fear of, “vandalism,” of sudden and violent 
intrusion. For instance, he has his character Edward bar 
doors against all others (but the intruder is already inside his 
enclosure), his own encounter with executive made him “feel 
as though [he] [. . .] had just vandalized a house” (58), and he 
attends to his parents’ fear that “a drifter [would] [. . .] break 
its way inside [their home] and commit an atrocity” (144).  In 
his stories, vandalism, break-ins, are catastrophic, but in his 
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Palm Springs’ enclosure, with Dag and Claire (especially 
Claire) forever “invad[ing]” (5) his space, break-ins become 
routine, and more a source of stimulation than upset.
Messes also upset Andy, but Dag, who creates them, 
shows in his stories he fears not messes but the possible 
reactions his messmaking might produce. Dag’s gasoline-
spilling story likely wouldn’t be his favorite had he not known 
all too well what it was like to draw upon himself less pleasing 
reactions from those whose love and support he needed. He 
was pleased his father didn’t get angry; but though the 
incident pleased, it did not heal—for afterwards Dag 
continued to be drawn to precipitating disasters he knew 
would enrage others. His “accidental” dumping of radioactive 
waste into Claire’s bungalow, seems by design. And Claire 
ends up supplying him what he may have been looking for 
when he’d precipitated similar upsets in the past—rejection, 
but rejection which could be assuaged through his own 
efforts: Dag allows Claire some revenge by allowing her and 
Tobias to spoil his bed, he and Andy “sweep, sweep, sweep” 
(84) all the dust up, and eventually things do return to 
normal.
Of course, things return to normal in part because Claire 
reorients her attention onto Tobias, onto the hold he has on 
her. Her mission moves her outside of her enclave; and the 
fact that she and Andy so enthusiastically rejoice or quickly 
reset after returning from engagements with outsiders in way 
of their personal evolution, helps make their sanctuary seem 
not just safe but authoritative—sturdy and strong.  And 
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though it is built over a fault line, it is a safe place to return 
to—and because it is, Claire and Andy feel emboldened to 
engage and dispense with those outside its walls who were or 
are a source of distress. Claire travels to New York and rids 
herself of her interest in Tobias—who had been depicted as 
being adept in using her—by playing to his inclination to 
offend to secure excellent reason for leaving him behind for 
good. Andy travels “home” to Portland, to his parents, who 
offer both support and belittlement, and uses demonstrations 
of their inability to understand him as an excuse to conclude 
they would not and should not be a part of his future. 
Ironically, like all other constituents of commercial society, 
Tobias and Andy’s parents are not so much caricatured as 
they are packaged, packaged to be ready-shipped out of Gen 
Xers’ lives.
Such detachments from familiar fixtures may assist these 
Gen Xers’ detachment from a much more faithful friend—
their Palm Springs sanctuary. But even though it provided a 
safe haven, Andy and his friends do end up leaving it behind 
in pursuit of better. There is a sense that some of the stories 
they tell one another, in conjunction with happenings in their 
real lives, also help them prepare for such a move. We note 
that sometime after Claire tells her the Texlahoma story in 
which two sisters watch another of their sisters escape into 
space, Evlina successfully leaves Palm Springs for a better 
way of life. Upon learning of this, Andy and Dag feel just like 
the sisters in the Texlahoma story did—jealous, left-behind. 
But perhaps also a bit better prepared to see themselves leaving 
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the disappointing in pursuit of something preferable in the 
future.
Sanctuaries are desirable, but they’re not paradise—and 
this no doubt helps them better function as places to 
recuperate within. For while wounded and vulnerable, the last 
thing you want to do is make claim to something that’s sure 
to draw unwelcome notice. And the text shows it’s in 
essential agreement with Caliban’s conclusion that “the best 
way to escape [. . .] ire, / is to not seem too happy” 
(Browning, “Caliban Upon Setebos” 256-7)—not only do 
some of the stories told (such as Dag’s story of how a man 
followed up his suddenly feeling freed of a lifelong-held fear 
of sudden apocalypse by finding another fear to obsess over) 
evidence a need to follow the onset of sudden happiness by 
hurriedly finding justification for feeling miserable again, the 
text repeatedly suggests that standing out, having too much 
of what others similarly desire, invites catastrophe. We learn, 
for instance, that Tyler’s numerous infidelities invite an angry 
older woman’s pursuit, that Tyler’s mercenary companion’s 
gem-like blue eyes doom him, that Andy’s Americanness 
makes him subject to a crowd’s jealous eyes (and perhaps also 
to a Japanese executives’ sexual advancements), and that the 
Texlahoma sister who abandons hum-drum for true love is 
used by her (ostensible) lover, and dies.
Best be at your best before drawing upon oneself that 
kind of heat, and Andy, especially, appears to know this all 
too well. That is, the reason Andy describes his Palm Spring’s 
sanctuary as such a compromised place likely owes to his 
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need to convince himself that those who might take a closer 
look therein, wouldn’t find much to interest them. Andy 
seeks camouflage, but no doubt about it, real treasure lurks 
behind his narrative veils. For instance, though possessions 
really aren’t quite their thing, strip away their conjoined 
adjectives and Andy and his gang are left with bungalows, a 
Saab, and jobs, rather than “clean but disorganized little 
bungalow[s]” with “serviceable (and by no means stunning) 
furnished room[s] [, which require] [. . .] cheer[ing] up by 
inexpensive low-grade Navajo Indian blankets” (6), a 
“syphilitic Saab” (74), and “McJobs” (5). The adjectives tell 
the truer tale? Maybe not as much as you think: little 
bungalows can be quaint, syphilitic Saabs can be endearing, 
and McJobs seem sufficient to keep their current lifestyle 
going. But Gen Xers might well be pleased if such a 
consideration occurred to you, especially if they’d count you 
amongst the devouring plentitude.
They do leave their safe world behind them, perhaps 
prepared to pursue better—and perhaps also to attend more 
fairly to those they’ve used along the way. That is, though 
Andy shows outsiders as not just different from but clearly 
inferior to Gen Xers, he is sensitive and self-aware enough to 
know at some level what he is up to. Even if it is Coupland, 
and not Andy, who in the text’s margins notes that members 
of one generation tend to characterize previous and 
subsequent ones as inferiors, Andy, who knows there are 
things about his own friends he ought to but is reluctant to 
explore (such as the implications of appreciating that his 
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friends’ smiles always seem to give them the look of the 
fleeced), who can size up and assault his friends with a mean 
but acute estimation of their failings, who is aware of their 
tendency to narrate everything as “from hell,” surely is aware 
of this need too. We note that he disposes of Tyler and 
Tobias in his narratives a little too neatly and a little too 
loudly. His written estimation of them could possibly both 
service current purposes as well as potential future ones: that 
is, when he’s prepared himself to take in the world anew, they 
might serve as quick pointers to all he might be in mind to re-
appraise.
Might he come to decide that most people—that is, not 
just Tyler and Tobias—are not best understood as slaves to 
commercial culture? Might he re-assess Brazilification as only 
“the latest thing,” an enthusiasm, a madness which would 
pass? I would hope he would. But I’d settle for him becoming 
comfortable enough with real uncertainty that the pleasing 
certainty a vice-filled world can offer one, would have lost 
much of its appeal.  
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